Peak Everything (26 page)

As noted above, both groups need to design a survivable energy transition strategy in order to sell their message to policy makers.
Carbon emissions come from burning depleting fossil fuels, the primary energy source for modern societies. Thus both problems boil down to energy problems — and energy is essential to the maintenance of agriculture, transportation, communication, and just about everything else that makes up the modern global economy.

With regard to both problems there are only two kinds of solutions: substitution strategies (finding replacement energy sources) and conservation strategies (using energy more efficiently or just doing without). The former are politically preferable, as they do not require behavioral change or sacrifice, though they tend to require more planning and investment. The least palatable option, from a political standpoint, is also the quickest and cheapest — doing without (curtailing current usage). We have gotten used to using enormous amounts of energy at unprecedented rates. If we had to use much less, could we maintain the levels of comfort and economic growth that we have become accustomed to? Could we even keep the lights on?

Several questions become critical: How much of a reduction in energy supply will be imposed by the peaking of production of oil, natural gas, and coal? How much will be required in order to minimize Climate Change? And how much of that supply shortfall can be made up for with substitution and how much with efficiency, before we have to resort to curtailment?

Climate analysts agree the world needs to reduce emissions considerably. In 1996 the European Environment Council said that the global average surface temperature increase should be capped at a maximum of two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and that to accomplish this the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO
₂
) will have to be stabilized at 550 parts per million (the current concentration is 380 ppm, though the addition of other greenhouse gases raises the figure to the equivalent of 440 to 450 ppm of CO
₂
). But recent studies have tended to suggest that, in order to achieve the two degree cap, much lower CO
₂
levels will be needed. One study by researchers at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact in Germany concluded that — again, to keep the temperature from increasing more than two degrees Celsius — the
atmospheric concentration target should be 440 ppm of CO
₂
equivalents, implying that the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases will need to be stabilized at current levels. But, to make the challenge even more difficult, it turns out that the biosphere's ability to absorb carbon is being reduced by human activity, and this must be factored into the equation; by 2030, this carbon-absorbing ability will have been reduced from the current 4 billion tons per year to 2.7 billion. Thus if an equilibrium level of atmospheric carbon is to be maintained through 2030, emissions will have to be
reduced
from the current annual level of 7 billion tons to 2.7 billion tons, a reduction of 60 percent. It is hard to imagine how, if that translated to a 60 percent reduction in
energy consumption,
it could mean anything but economic ruin for the world.

Depletion analysts look to about a two percent per year decline in oil extraction following the peak of global oil production, with the rate increasing somewhat as time goes on. Coal extraction, following the production peak, will probably decline more slowly, at least for the first decades. Regional natural gas decline rates will be much steeper. The dates for global production peaks for these fuels are of course still a matter for speculation; however, it is reasonable to estimate that we might see a 25 to 45 percent decline in energy available to the world's growing population over the next quarter-century as a result of depletion.

Everyone would be happy if it were possible simply to substitute renewable sources of energy for oil, coal, and gas, and both depletion activists and climate activists support the expansion of most renewable energy technologies, including solar and wind. But there are realistic limits to the scale at which renewables can be deployed, and to the speed with which this can be accomplished.

Not all depletion or emissions activists support the large-scale development of biofuels (ethanol, butanol, and biodiesel), which are the only realistic renewable replacements for liquid transport fuels, because of the low EROEI entailed in making these fuels, and because these substitutes imply worrisome tradeoffs with food production.

Some depletionists and some climate analysts recommend expanding nuclear power, arguing that technological advances could
make it a safe and affordable alternative. Others argue against it, noting that high-grade ores will be depleted in 60 years, and that the entire nuclear cycle of mining, refining, enrichment, plant construction, and so on (excluding fission itself ) is carbon intensive. One analysis suggests that, from the mid-2020s, the task of clearing up all past and future nuclear wastes will require more energy than the industry can generate from the remaining ore.
²

Then comes the equity issue. A few nations have benefited disproportionately from fossil fuels. If “developing” nations that have not yet had that opportunity are now required to forgo it, they will understandably perceive this as grossly unfair. They are unlikely to agree to dramatically reduce their own carbon emissions (i.e., fossil fuel consumption) unless already-industrialized nations lead the way and reduce theirs proportionally more. Also, it's necessary that at least a few of the “developing” nations — the ones that are rapidly industrializing now — be brought on board any global emissions or depletion agreement for it to have real meaning, as they have the economies with the fastest growth in energy demand. The prime example: while for practical purposes Americans will probably continue to lead the world in
per capita
fossil fuel use for some time, China has overtaken the US as the world's foremost national emitter of greenhouse gases.

Theoretically, the fairest solution, from an emissions point of view, would be to assign each living human an equal per capita right to emit carbon, and to create a market for those rights, so that continued disproportionate fossil fuel consumption by already-industrialized nations would entail substantial payments to less-industrialized nations. Fairness would also imply a steeper rate of reduction in fossil fuel consumption by the heavier users — a cut in emissions of considerably more than 60 percent.

However, to ask industrialized nations to share their wealth with less-industrialized nations while the former are engaged in a partially self-imposed energy famine seems highly problematic. What politician could demand the extra sacrifice? What public would vote for such a policy?

Where does this leave us? Let's assume that the more pessimistic critical analyses of both groups are correct. That is, let's say that a
60 percent reduction in emissions is needed within 25 years, that natural gas will not be available in sufficient quantities to serve as a transition fuel, that “clean” coal will not help much, that low-grade fossil fuels will not make up for shortfalls in oil production, that CTL production will remain marginal, that renewables will not come on line in sufficient quantity or soon enough, that nuclear power won't come to the rescue — and that modest contributions from these sources
added together
will not come close to making up for shortfalls from oil, gas, and coal depletion or from the voluntary phasing out of carbon fuels.

If this turns out to be the case, we may face a staggering need for energy efficiency and curtailment. Neither group wants this as its political platform.

As we have seen, there are understandable reasons for some climate activists to ignore the arguments and priorities of depletionists, and vice versa. Dealing with only one of the two problems is much easier than confronting both. But our goal must be to deal with reality, rather than merely our preferred image of reality, and reality is complicated. Our world faces the interacting impacts not only of Peak Oil and Climate Change, but also of water scarcity, overpopulation, over-fishing, chemical pollution, and war (among others). In the end, there are too many of us using too much too fast, while competing for dwindling resources.

What would it take to solve all of these problems at once? A good start would be to require a global across-the-board 2 to 5 percent per year reduction in fossil fuel consumption and the provision of substantial financial and technical aid by industrialized nations to less-industrialized nations in creating as much of a renewable energy infrastructure as is possible. But to the patient (the main fossil fuel users) this medicine might seem worse than the disease. A grand plan like this has almost no chance of gaining political backing.

Realistically, we are left with the customary policy tools meant to ameliorate the world's ills piecemeal: emissions and depletion protocols, tradeable quotas, emissions rights, import and export quotas, carbon taxes, and cap-and-trade mechanisms.

Thus for practical reasons it is probably inevitable that, to a certain extent at least, emissions and depletion activists will continue to pursue their separate policy goals. But it makes sense for the two groups to be informed by one another, and to cooperate wherever possible.

It is fairly obvious why such cooperation would benefit the depletionists: Climate Change is already a subject of considerable international concern and action, whereas Peak Oil is still a relatively new topic of discussion. This is partly because Climate Change fits well with the environmentalists' previous pollution-centred campaigns.

But how would such cooperation aid emissions activists?

In a word: motivation. As discussed earlier, emissions activists appeal to an ethical impulse to avert future harm to the environment and human society, while the Peak Oil issue appeals to a more immediate concern for self-preservation. In extreme circumstances, the latter is unquestionably the stronger motive. Strong motivation will certainly be required in order for the people of the world to undertake the enormous personal and social sacrifices required in order to quickly and dramatically reduce their fossil fuel dependency. Sustainability and equity are issues that are hard enough to campaign on in times of prosperity; when families and nations are struggling to maintain themselves due to fuel shortages and soaring prices, only massive education and persuasion campaigns could possibly summon the needed support.

Taken together, Climate Change and Peak Oil make a nearly airtight argument. We
should
reduce our dependency on fossil fuels for the sake of future generations and the rest of the biosphere; but even if we choose not to do so because of the costs involved, those fossil fuels will soon become more scarce and expensive anyway, so complacency is simply not an option.

What would cooperation between the two groups look like? It would help, first of all, for activists on one issue to spend more time studying the literature of the other, and for both groups to arrange meetings and conferences where the intersections of the two issues can be further explored.

Both groups could work together more explicitly to promote proactive, policy-driven reductions in fossil fuel consumption.

Climate activists could start using depletion arguments and data in tandem with their ongoing discussions of ice cores and melting glaciers, but to do so they would need to stop taking unrealistically robust resource estimates at face value.

For their part, depletionists — if they are to take advantage of increased collaboration with emissions activists — must better familiarize themselves with climate science, so that their Peak Oil mitigation proposals lead to a reduction rather than an increase of carbon emissions into the atmosphere.

Perhaps, for both groups, with a stronger potential for motivating the public will come the courage to tell a truth that few policy makers want to hear: energy efficiency and curtailment will almost certainly have to be the world's dominant responses to both issues.

I
N HIS BEST-SELLING 1998 book
The Greatest Generation,
Tom Brokaw extolled the virtues of the American women and men, now deep into their retirement years, who grew up during the Great Depression and fought in World War II. Brokaw's book contrasted “the greatest generation any society ever produced” with those that preceded and followed it. The cohort born during World War I and up to 1930 faced immense adversity and made sacrifices that ensured the survival of freedom and democracy; as a result, their children have enjoyed the most extended and exuberant period of affluence in the history of any nation.

Brokaw and I are children of that generation; ours is the so-called Baby Boom demographic cohort, about which an oil tanker's worth of ink has been spilled in self-adulation, self-criticism, self-analysis, and general self-obsession. I hesitate to join in the orgy of generational mirror gazing, but I can't help but reflect on a simple fact: during my lifetime, and that of my cohort, about half of the non-renewable resources of the planet will have been used. Gone, forever.