Pearl Harbor (17 page)

In the New York metropolitan region, a special task force of one hundred FBI agents, along with city police and detectives, scoured the city, shutting down Japanese businesses and arresting Japanese nationals on their target list. Those arrested were taken to Ellis Island, where they were held indefinitely until they received further instructions from Washington. Estimates suggest that a few hundred were detained. New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia directed Japanese nationals to stay in their homes. The police closed the Nippon Club on West Ninety-third Street. Police escorted the twelve members at the club to their respective homes. Additionally, New York City policemen visited every Japanese restaurant in the city. They allowed diners to finish their meals before closing the restaurants and escorting the owners and staff to their homes.
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Also on December 7, the Treasury Department under Morgenthau started waging economic warfare against Japanese-owned businesses in the United States. The government invoked a “total embargo” on shipments of every kind to Japan and its occupied territories, making it illegal for an American to transact business with Japan. On Sunday evening, Morgenthau sent some 4,000 agents to forcibly sever all economic ties between Japan and the United States. Treasury agents also visited and assumed control of every Japanese bank in the United States. The government froze the assets of Japanese nationals, preventing them from withdrawing money from their bank accounts to buy food and other necessities. (At the urging of the first lady, the Treasury Department later allowed each family to withdraw one hundred dollars per month for living expenses.)
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What began as a relatively modest security program prior to Pearl Harbor quickly morphed into a massive violation of civil liberties. Stories circulated about plots among Japanese residents to aid an enemy landing on the coast of California. Deeply embedded racism reinforced the fear of sabotage. Newspapers vilified Japanese residents, calling them “mad dogs, yellow vermin and nips.” Business interests saw an opportunity to eradicate competition from Japanese farmers. The entire political establishment of California clamored for action against Japanese residents.

The Japanese living on the West Coast were obvious and easy targets. There were too many German and Italian aliens to arrest them all, and they exercised considerable political clout, especially in the Midwest and East. There were also too many Japanese Americans in Hawaii to be moved. Those of Japanese descent on the West Coast thus became the chief available targets for American frustration and hostility. “These people were not convicted of any crime,” Eleanor wrote years later, “but emotions ran too high, too many people wanted to wreak vengeance on Oriental looking people. There was no time to investigate families or to adhere strictly to the American rule that a man is innocent until he is proven guilty.”
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Roosevelt, preoccupied with the military and diplomatic demands of fighting a global war, and largely indifferent to violations of civil liberties, would eventually give in to the pressure. According to Stimson, he and Roosevelt discussed the possibility of evacuating the Japanese from the West Coast on February 11, 1942. FDR expressed no opinion. He considered it a military matter, and he left it up to the War Department to develop a policy. Stimson, in turn, handed the issue off to Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy, who was responsible for domestic security. McCloy believed that he was given “carte blanche” by the president “to do what we want” with the Japanese.
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On March 21, 1942, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the forced evacuation of Japanese residents on the West Coast. More than 100,000 people, many of them American citizens, were told
to dispose of their property however they could before being rounded up and taken to government “relocation” centers scattered throughout the West. Attorney General Francis Biddle, who opposed the measure, claimed FDR showed no regret in signing it into law. “I do not think he was much concerned with the gravity or implications of this step,” he wrote. “He was never theoretical about things. What must be done to defend the country must be done. The military might be wrong. But they were fighting the war. Nor do I think that the constitutional difficulty plagued him—the Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.”
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Roosevelt may have viewed the evacuation as a matter of military necessity, but his decision was shaped by both prejudice and indifference. He considered the egregious violation of civil liberties a trivial issue, especially when compared with the larger strategic goal of fighting and winning a global war. In 1982, a government commission reviewing the internment criticized the Roosevelt administration for “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.” Unfortunately, it was a fair assessment.

10

“We are all in the same boat now”

O
N SUNDAY EVENING, Winston Churchill was having dinner with the American ambassador to Britain, John G. “Gil” Winant, along with diplomat Averell Harriman and his future wife, Pamela. “The Prime Minister seemed tired and depressed,” Harriman recalled. “He didn't have much to say throughout dinner and was immersed in his thoughts, with his head in his hands part of the time.”
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There was plenty of reason for gloom. For most of the year, as Nazi bombs rained down on London, Churchill's top priority was to convince Roosevelt to enter the war. To his dismay, he had managed to wrangle old ships and other material but few commitments from the frustratingly elusive Roosevelt.

The two men had started a correspondence in September 1939 when Churchill joined the cabinet as the first lord of the admiralty. Churchill sent a series of letters about the problems confronting the British navy. On May 10, 1940—the day that Hitler invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and France—Churchill became prime minister, and the correspondence became more frequent, and more urgent. On May 15, he promised to fight alone, but if the United States did not intervene, he warned Roosevelt, “You may have a completely subjugated, Nazified Europe established with astounding swiftness, and the weight may be more than we can bear.”
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Roosevelt was not sure about his new counterpart. Although they came from similar social backgrounds and possessed a flair for the dramatic, Churchill was a political conservative who dreamed of preserving the British Empire. His love of alcohol, and capacity for consuming it, was legendary. “I suppose Churchill was the best man England had,” FDR told his cabinet on hearing the news that he was the new prime minister, “even if he was drunk half of his time.”
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In January 1941, Roosevelt had sent Harry Hopkins to London as his personal emissary to get a better sense of Churchill. “I suppose you could say—but not out loud—that I've come to try to find a way to be a catalytic agent between two prima donnas,” Hopkins told CBS correspondent Edward R. Murrow, who was in London at the time. Hopkins spent twelve evenings with Churchill, traveled with him to military posts, and came away inspired by Churchill's determination and statesmanship. “People here are amazing from Churchill down,” he wrote FDR, “and if courage alone can win—the result will be inevitable. But they need our help desperately.”
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The frail, businesslike Hopkins was a big hit with Churchill as well. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes noted, “Apparently the first thing that Churchill asks for when he gets awake in the morning is Harry Hopkins, and Harry is the last one he sees at night.” Hopkins lobbied for more aid, but Roosevelt remained cautious. While declaring that America “must become the great arsenal of democracy,” he refused to give Churchill what he needed most—a declaration of war against Germany and American troops on European soil.

Over the next few months, Churchill continued to write as many as two or three letters a week to Roosevelt, describing Britain's plight and pleading for American intervention. His radio addresses, which were broadcast in the United States, were extremely popular. By 1941, Churchill ranked second only to FDR as the “favorite personality” on U.S. radio. Although his words inspired Americans, they seemed to make little difference in Washington. British ambassador Lord Halifax observed that trying to pin down the Roosevelt administration
on a clear policy toward Britain was like “a disorderly day's rabbit-shooting.”
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At the end of 1940, Roosevelt suggested that he and Churchill meet “to talk over the problem of the defeat of Germany.” Churchill accepted, and in August 1941, they met at Placentia Bay in Newfoundland—the first of many conferences between the two leaders. “I've just got to see Churchill myself in order to explain things to him,” FDR told Henry Morgenthau. Both men came away with renewed respect and affection for each other. After an informal lunch, Roosevelt noted in a letter, “[Churchill] is a tremendously vital person & in many ways is an English Mayor La Guardia. . . . I like him—& lunching alone broke the ice both ways.”
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Roosevelt's main reason for calling the meeting was to issue a declaration of war aims, which he hoped would educate the public about the European conflict and prepare them for the possibility of American intervention. The statement would also ease American anxieties that the United States might be forming an alliance that included the Soviet Union. Before the meeting ended, the two leaders issued the Atlantic Charter. The declaration pledged both nations to honor the principles of self-determination, free trade, nonaggression, and freedom of the seas, promising a postwar world in which all people “may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”
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But Churchill continued to press Roosevelt for a declaration of war against Germany. Roosevelt dodged, promising “to wage war, but not declare it.” He pledged the navy to protect British convoys as far east as Iceland while he looked for an “incident” to justify a more aggressive posture. Despite the good feelings between the two national leaders, Roosevelt's position remained the same: support Britain in every way short of war. FDR was acutely aware that the public, while favoring a tough line with Japan, wanted to stay out of a war in Europe. For now, he had no intention of challenging public attitudes.
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By December, British prospects seemed bleak. Churchill expected Germany to eventually defeat Russia, although the struggle was taking longer than expected. Once Hitler had vanquished Russia, he would turn
the full force of his military on England. At the same time, Japan was making threatening moves in the Pacific. He now faced the prospect of a spring offensive from the Germans and a war with Japan in the East.

There was a general sense in Britain that the war was already lost. An American diplomat who traveled to Scotland reported back to the embassy that most people he met believed that “the British are now losing the war.” The only way Hitler could be defeated was by a massive offensive on the ground. The simple reality was that the British lacked the manpower and the matériel to launch such an offensive without direct American intervention. British merchant ships carrying food and supplies were being sunk faster than they could be replaced. His field marshal in Africa cabled Churchill on November 4: “I am struck by the growth of the impression here and elsewhere that the war is going to end in stalemate and thus fatally for us.”
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As a flood of intelligence poured in that winter indicating that the Japanese were planning a major offensive, Churchill worried they would bypass American possessions and strike only at the British. At lunch on December 7, he asked Ambassador Winant bluntly, “If they declare war on us, will you declare war on them?” He did not get the answer he wanted. “I can't answer that, Prime Minister. Only the Congress has the right to declare war under the United States constitution.” Churchill sat in silence. His empire stood on the brink of destruction, and the best his American counterpart could offer was a civics lesson.
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J
ust before 9:00 on the evening of December 7, an aide handed Churchill a fifteen-dollar radio that had been presented to him as a gift from Harry Hopkins. Operating like a music box, it started playing when the lid was opened. Churchill used the radio to tune into the 9:00 p.m. broadcast of the
BBC News
, which he never missed. A few minutes into the broadcast came a bulletin announcing the Japanese attack. “President Roosevelt has announced that the Japanese have bombed the Hawaiian base of the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor.”
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There was initially some confusion among those gathered around the dinner table. Harriman repeated the announcement in shock. “My God,” he exclaimed, “they've attacked Pearl Harbor.” Another guest, however, assuming the announcement was wrong, said, “Oh, no, it was Pearl River.” Churchill's butler settled the dispute. “Yes, yes, we've heard it too. They've attacked the Americans at Pearl Harbor.”
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Churchill jumped up, slammed down the lid on the radio, and announced, “We will declare war on Japan.” The Japanese had already attacked Malaya, but the news had not yet reached the prime minister. Winant tried to calm the prime minister down. “Good God,” he said, “you can't declare war on a radio announcement.” He suggested they call Roosevelt to get the latest information and to learn whether a declaration of war would follow.
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A few minutes later, the two men went to the war room at Chequers. Ambassador Winant placed a call to the White House and soon had Roosevelt on the line. “I've got someone with me who wants to speak with you,” Winant said. “Who's that,” FDR asked. “You'll find out when he speaks.” Churchill, who was listening on an extension, broke into the conversation. “Mr. President, what's this about Japan,” he asked. “It's quite true,” Roosevelt answered. “They have attacked us at Pearl Harbor. We are all in the same boat now.” He told Churchill that he would go before Congress and ask for a declaration of war the next day. Churchill was thrilled that the United States had finally entered the war. “This certainly simplifies things,” the prime minister responded. For the first time, he believed the Allies could now win. “To have the United States at our side,” he wrote later, “was to me the greatest joy. Now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all! . . . Hitler's fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder.”
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