Pep Guardiola: Another Way of Winning: The Biography (39 page)

Two big names and strong personalities rode into town, and that town wasn’t big enough for the both of them. Or, at least, that’s how the media liked to portray it.

Media and fans enjoy explaining the world through a set of values, prejudices and predetermined points of view that configure the vision we have of it. That the world is becoming 140 characters
long (the length allowed by Twitter) reinforces the necessity of reducing the complexities of life in very simple black and white terms.

It’s the latest chapter in a very old story. Barcelona and Madrid have always been understood as two different institutional models, but, from that year, with José’s addition,
it became as partisan and polarised as at perhaps any point in the past. Mourinho provided the kind of theatrical confrontation that this symbolic clash thrives upon. It’s a contest made in
heaven because it is, without a doubt, a mutually beneficial rivalry that is nourished by preconceived ideas and fuelled by clichés that have taken hold because it’s convenient, not
just for fans and media, but for the clubs themselves who are
happy for it to continue – it’s good for business and also because they operate in a world where
people need to create a sense of opposites in order to help affirm their own allegiances and identities.

It was frequently presented as a David and Goliath story throughout the previous century with Barcelona relishing their status as underdogs, while Real Madrid were more than happy to play the
role of the big guy. But now they are two evenly matched Goliaths slugging it out, toe to toe, round after round after round.

Just as the world of politics shows different ways of comprehending the world, the respective styles of Barcelona and Real Madrid demonstrate two different ways of understanding the beautiful
game. Madrid has always been characterised by an energetic style of play, strong, fast and competitive. Whereas Barcelona discovered, in the Dutch model, a valid alternative style to take on
Madrid: effective passing and offensive play.

‘That role of an antagonist fits in well in Spanish football, because Spain is always the red and blue Spain, the peripheral and centralist, the Spain of Guardiola and Mourinho. That
duality is something that is received well by people. Mourinho has accentuated the division between the different ways of seeing football that Barça and Madrid have. The interesting thing is
the U-turn Madrid has taken goes against their history, because Madrid has never entrusted the team to a coach’; that’s how Alfredo Relaño, director of the sports daily
AS
, explains it.

Although the Portuguese coach claims to challenge himself more than he does others (‘I always try and set my sights on difficult goals so that I am always competing with myself’),
the following quote about his controversial take on rivalries gives an interesting insight into his working philosophy: ‘Having enemies in order to give your all isn’t necessary, but it
is better. Especially when you’re enjoying a lot of success and you tend to relax.’

So the ongoing battles between these two great sporting institutions eventually boiled down to this clash of personalities, this fight between their respective coaches. Such was the media
presence of Guardiola and Mourinho, the teams almost played second fiddle to their leaders, becoming known as ‘Guardiola’s team’ or ‘Mourinho’s
team’. The sides began to lose their own identities in the midst of the duel, much like what has happened in the technological battle between BlackBerry and iPhone – the
products have devoured their brands: Rim and Apple. The leading roles of the coaches gave the coaches themselves (the products) the victories, more so than the clubs (the brands).

And, to the casual onlooker, both of them developed a footballing project that was antagonistic.

Pep Guardiola surrounded himself with players from the youth team who shared the same values: emphasis placed on good passing, teamwork, good behaviour on and off the pitch, as well as some
signings that understood the philosophy. As Eto’o and Ibrahimović discovered, those who didn’t share his vision of the world and of football were soon moved on.

The Portuguese coach led a team of individuals whose loyalty to their manager was unconditional – they were prepared to give their life for him and in the name of victory. Anyone who
doubted him was swiftly brushed aside. Madrid’s traditionally vigorous style of play became aggressive, even violent, on occasions. Madrid were capable of humiliating rivals, they had an
insatiable hunger to win and it was visible for all to see exactly how much they enjoyed doing so.

For Mourinho, press conferences were like a theatre in which he really got into character and revelled in the attention. He would claim that Real Madrid were the victims of complex conspiracy
theories at the hands of the referees, FIFA, the Spanish government and even UNICEF. For him, victories were to be expected as he believed it was what the team deserved, whereas the various defeats
and draws were always treated with suspicion and with accusations of foul play. He would defend to the hilt his players’ often aggressive behaviour but he would cry blue murder at similar
conduct of his opponents against his team.

Whether he likes it or not, Pep has become a standard-bearer for good values, in a world in which there is a distinct lack of them. Mourinho is more of a product of our society, a preacher of a
modern way of thinking, who doesn’t shy away from conflict and
arguing with those in authority, always seeking explanations and making claims about conspiracy theories.
His teams win because they do things right; they lose because someone or something has not let them win.

If Pep’s greatest virtue is his sense of caution, then Mourinho’s is pure excess. The Portuguese prefers to massage his players’ egos and point them in the direction of
achieving good results; even Mourinho himself has defined himself as a ‘manager of egos’. Guardiola bases his methods on developing his players’ confidence through opportunities,
motivation.

Their individual styles of leadership reflect their personalities. Mourinho defends and enjoys his nickname ‘the Special One’ – he feels he is different from the rest and makes
sure that nobody remains indifferent to him; they either love him or loathe him. Including his players, who are all aware that there are consequences to their behaviour because Mourinho operates a
system of praise and punishment. Perhaps that gives José less trajectory in a club than a team coached by Pep – it is very hard to deal with constant pressure. Pep prefers to appeal to
the players’ individual emotions in order to generate a feeling of belonging to the group.

It’s fair to say that both coaches are befitting of the clubs they represent. Mourinho said that Guardiola is the best coach ‘for Barcelona’, a subtle reminder that he won
titles in four different countries. Pep has imposed a model in the club which places a lot of emphasis on players progressing through the academy, where the players begin to develop feelings for
the club and a sense of belonging. Pep is an example of Barcelona-ism, whereas Mourinho is the guru whom Madrid needed to recover belief.

Even aesthetically they are different: Guardiola is avant-garde, cutting edge; Mourinho is more classical. Pep is the coach who brought Prada and Dior to the football pitch. Although his image
goes beyond his elegant suit, his image is also his attitude. His style is that of a human being with diverse cultural interests, whereas Mourinho’s style is more similar to that of an
Italian man, unostentatious apart from the way he fastens his tie: a large, open knot for the Portuguese; straight and neat for the Catalan.

The differences are to be found in their personalities, too. Mourinho knows what he wants at every given moment. With Pep there are moments when it’s a yes, others a
no, and he chops and changes his mind. Sometimes he’ll ring a friend in the evening asking for help in one thing or another – and the very next morning he’s changed his mind and
rings them to tell them to forget about it.

With Mourinho, it’s clear from the start. ‘I’m going to win the league here in this country, then there in that country and two years later, there. Then at fifty years of age,
I’ll win the World Cup with Portugal.’ The only deviation from the plan is in terms of age or timescale. If it doesn’t happen when he’s fifty, then it will happen later.

He thrives on the other stuff he gets involved in, like going to London, toying with buying a house there – keeping everyone on their toes and running around him. Perhaps a consequence of
a footballer’s career that never took off. Pep doesn’t have the need to make it all about his choices, his next move, his arguments, his crusades: ‘I have played for Barça.
Everything that is used to feed an ego is unnecessary for me. Even praise makes me uncomfortable.’

Even their intelligence differs: Pep takes in as much knowledge as possible to help him with decision-making. José does the same, although he also has a cunning edge. He mischievously
went out of his way to get Pep to a point when their rivalry escalated to never-before-seen levels in world football. One imagines Mourinho shaving in the morning thinking what he can come up with.
‘Ah, I know!’ he must have thought one morning. And in the press conference that day he threw a dart: ‘There are people, much more intelligent than me, who manage to sell an image
of themselves completely different to mine, but deep down, they’re the same as me.’ Very rarely has Pep felt the impulse to answer Mourinho, but that day, less than an hour later,
Guardiola mentioned his words in his own press conference. ‘We’re similar in the sense that we both want to win, but apart from that no ... If that is the case then I’ve done
something wrong. I’ve never wanted to bring myself to his level. There are images that speak a thousand words. Both of us want to win, but our paths are very different.’

The roads to victory may well be very different, but the cars they drive, the petrol they use to get them there, are not so dissimilar. Mourinho is right.

The first game between Pep and José following the latter’s appointment at Real Madrid took place at the Camp Nou. Mourinho had only had five months with his new
squad and privately admitted that football was a ‘box of surprises’. He had no idea exactly how his young team was going to react to both the Barcelona style and the pressure –
only when you open it, he would say, do you know what’s inside.

The Clásico was played on a Monday, a rarity due to the postponement of fixtures because of an election day in Catalonia on the Sunday. Madrid were in good shape, taking on Barcelona as
La Liga leaders a point ahead of the Catalans – under Mourinho they had already become a solid team that conceded few goals and killed off the opposition with their quick counters: the
classic Mourinho team.

As they had in their prior Champions League encounters, the match started in the pre-game press conferences: a cat-and-mouse game to see who was going to fire the opening shot. José took
aim at Guardiola: ‘I hope players can help the referee and that it’s a game where people only talk about football.’ The implications were obvious. Pep kept his head beneath the
parapet.

Barcelona won 5-0 with goals from Xavi, Pedro, Villa (2) and Jeffren. ‘We couldn’t have played better, we could have scored more. We had them asleep, they couldn’t touch the
ball,’ Xavi remembers.

Víctor Valdés was practically a privileged spectator in the Barcelona goal: ‘I was getting dizzy following the ball. Finally I decided to stop looking so closely, my guys
were the ones with it anyway.’

Unsurprisingly, typically, Pep prepared for the game with an obsessive attention to detail. Early in the match, the team performed a few of those high-speed ‘piggy-in-the-middle’
passings for which they are famous, in midfield areas, with the intention of keeping possession and finding a gap at the same time. The Camp Nou was ecstatic, seeing their players not only hammer
the opposition,
but run – or, rather, pass – rings around their rivals. Guardiola identified more than ever with what the team was doing: it was a moment of
confirmation when everybody, fans, players, manager, was walking in the same direction. The big idea, writ large out there on the pitch.

The fact that this moment of affirmation, one of the best games ever seen, took place against a side managed by Mourinho was doubly satisfying. Pep admitted privately that he had betrayed
himself with the line-up versus Inter the previous season: the presence of Ibrahimović mortgaged the way the team played, with less possession and more direct attacks. That admission was
confirmation that he didn’t have the key to success but, if he was to fail, he wanted to do it his way. He studied closely the reasons for his mistake, and in the new season Pep persisted in
the idea of controlling games, of making Xavi, Iniesta and Messi the focus of the team. In the 5-0 Clásico performance, Pep saw the Barcelona he had been dreaming of.

Guardiola wanted to put the result into context: ‘What will prevail in history is not just the result, but the way we did it. It isn’t easy to play so well against such a strong team
– a team that was killing opponents domestically and in Europe. We have to be proud. Let’s dedicate this victory to Carles Rexach and Johan Cruyff who started all this, and to everybody
who has participated in the process: former presidents, former coaches, everybody. It is a global victory because we have done things differently and because there is no other club in the world
that trusts local people as much as we do.’

José tried to take the heat out of the result: ‘It is one that is easy to accept. It is not a humiliation, only my biggest defeat.’

Of course, Mourinho was underplaying the reality – and the truth was that this match would have the most profound influence upon his professional career. He made the mistake of being too
bold, of focusing his team’s energy on what they would do in possession, rather than when they didn’t have the ball. He went to Barcelona believing that he could take them on, at their
own game, in their own backyard. The scoreline might not have reflected the actual distance between the two teams in terms of quality – it was, rather, a difference in understanding how to
apply that quality to a particular situation.
And that was Mourinho’s mistake. It was one that he vowed would never happen again.