Pirates of Somalia (39 page)

CHAPTER 11: INTO THE PIRATES’ LAIR

1.
Jonathan Clayton, “Somalia’s Secret Dumps of Toxic Waste Washed Ashore by Tsunami,”
Times
(London), March 4, 2005,
http://www.thetimes.co.uk
. The claims of the local people and the initial UN Environmental Programme assessment mission were challenged by a subsequent UN fact-finding mission to Puntland’s coastal areas, which failed to find evidence of widespread radiation sickness. “UN Mission to Puntland on Toxic Waste in the Coastal Areas of Somalia,”
Somaliland Times
, October 7, 2005,
http://www.somalilandtimes.net
.

CHAPTER 12: PIRATE INSIDER

1.
Though tempting to believe (and completely consistent with other accounts of pirate behaviour), Hersi’s claims contradict the statements of both former
Victoria
hostages I interviewed, Matei Levenescu and Traian Mihai, who asserted that the pirates on the ship never consumed alcohol and never progressed beyond fist fights. The incidents Hersi discussed may have taken place on land.

2.
In the case of the
Victoria
, intra-group tensions may have been due to the lack of familial homogeneity within the gang. According to former hostage Traian Mihai, the gang was composed of multiple families from various towns in Puntland; however, they were almost certainly all members of the Isse Mahamoud sub-clan.

3.
This is almost certainly an exaggeration, though if one considers the money the gang spent on khat (see
Chapter 14
), potentially not a very gross one.

CHAPTER 13: THE CADET AND THE CHIEF

1.
German defence ministry spokesman Thomas Raabe reported that a Turkish frigate had been within eighty to one hundred nautical miles at the time of the attack. Katharine Houreld, “Somali Pirates Seize German Ship, 11 Crew,” Associated Press, May 6, 2009.

2.
Informed as it is by his own unfortunate experience, Levenescu’s condemnation of the transit corridor—not to mention the international naval forces—is hardly fair. The IRTC, in conjunction with scheduled convoys and greater naval coordination, greatly reduced the number of successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden.

3.
So hazardous were the winds that in one instance a supply boat being hoisted by one of the
Victoria
’s deck cranes was blown onto the deck, damaging its hull.

4.
The other hostage I interviewed, Traian Mihai, noted that one of the three leaders, a “foreigner” to Eyl, spent only two days on shore during the entire length of the
Victoria
’s captivity.

5.
Not surprisingly, Somalis have a predisposition for diabetes. The primary cause is supposedly genetic, though the Somali cultural proclivity for using tea and other drinks as mediums for consuming sugar probably has something to do with it.

6.
This start-up sequence is necessary to heat the ship’s highly viscous bunker fuel to a temperature of seventy degrees Celsius, the point at which it is properly combustible. All large cargo ships possess a diesel-powered heating unit specifically for this purpose.

7.
Mihai was able to fill in a few details of Loyan’s biography. Contrary to Hersi’s description, Loyan spoke English fluently, having studied for five years at an Indian university. This fact suggests that, like Hersi, he is a relatively well-off member of the Somali diaspora.

8.
There could hardly be better evidence of the hijackers’ fear of the Puntland security forces. This behaviour is inconsistent with claims by various commentators that the Puntland government is complicit—or even actively involved—in piracy. It is also evidence that the Puntland security forces are disorganized to the point that an easily obtainable set of clothing is all the identification required to prove membership.

CHAPTER 14: THE FREAKONOMICS OF PIRACY

1.
There are three differing accounts of the number of men who assaulted the
Victoria
: Hersi claims there were ten men in two boats; Matei Levenescu says there were nine in one boat; and the media reports of the incident state that there were eight attackers. Given that he was an eyewitness, Levenescu’s figure is almost certainly the accurate one, and it is the number I will use in this analysis.

2.
The $150,000 paid to one attacker (Mohamed Abdi) might explain why Hersi was under the impression that each member of the attacking team would receive a commensurate share ($140,000 of a $3 million ransom, according to him).

3.
These estimates are based on a tally of the total number of pirates killed (60), injured (24), and taken into custody (454) by the combined international naval forces since August 2008, as of May 2010. These figures are taken from the news blog Bruxelles2 (
http://bruxelles2.over-blog.com
), which compiles data from EUNAVFOR, NATO, the US Navy, the US Department of Justice, and the Royal Navy. Given the large number of assumptions and unknown variables (such as the number of pirates dying from causes other than naval intervention, such as starvation or dehydration), my estimates are only a very rough account of the perils of piracy.

4.
Les Christie, “America’s Most Dangerous Jobs,”
CNNMoney.com
, October 13, 2003.

CHAPTER 15: THE ROAD’S END

1.
When I spoke to them in Dhanane, the pirates told me that they were expecting a ransom of $2.5 million.

2.
Quoted in Sapa-AFP, “Dead Crew Member Identified,” Independent Online, June 24, 2009,
http://www.iol.co.za
.

EPILOGUE: THE PROBLEMS OF PUNTLAND

1.
Malkhadir Muhumed, “Pirate on US Wanted List Arrested in Somalia,” Associated Press, May 20, 2010.

2.
Katharine Houreld, “Somali Pirates Torturing Hostages,” Associated Press, February 1, 2011.

3.
For example, in April 2009 former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton told Fox News that a ground invasion of Somalia was the only way “to end [the piracy] problem once and for all.” Slightly more reasonable voices have recommended targeted bombings, a strategy that would claim the lives of far more civilians than pirates and serve only to inflame anti-Western sentiments.

4.
Al-Shabaab’s targets were thoughtfully chosen to deliver that message. In Hargeysa, the organization bombed the presidential palace, the Ethiopian embassy, and UN Development Programme headquarters, perhaps in response to Somaliland president Dahir Riyale Kahin’s plans to pass a (largely toothless) anti-terror law. In Bossaso, the target was the Puntland Intelligence Service, a CIA proxy funded by the American government. The two bombings claimed the lives of at least thirty people.

5.
UN Monitoring Group on Somalia,
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853
(2008), S/2010/91, March 10, 2010,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml
, 39.

6.
William Bolitho,
Twelve Against the Gods
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1929), 8.

APPENDIX 2: THE
VICTORIA
GANG

1.
The material in the following analysis draws heavily from Stig Jarle Hansen’s comprehensive report,
Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies
, NIBR Report 2009:29 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009),
http://en.nibr.no
. All subsequent quotations are from this report.

2.
Ion Tita-Calin,
“Dezvşluirile foştilor prizonieri ai piraşilor somalezi”
[Revelations from former Somali pirate prisoners],
Cuget Liber
, July 28, 2009,
http://www.cugetliber.ro
.

An Antonov prop plane operated by Jubba Airways, Djibouti, June 2009.

Next stop: Somalia. (
Courtesy the author
)

Boyah, a pirate leader who has claimed to have hijacked more than twenty-five ships, with a Blue Jays T-shirt slung over his shoulder. (
Courtesy the author
)

A Toyota Surf, the vehicle of choice for pirates. The “18” on the license plate indicates that it has been recently registered. (
Courtesy Mohamad Farole
)

The view from the mayor’s office, Garowe. (
Courtesy the author
)