Read Porn - Philosophy for Everyone: How to Think With Kink Online
Authors: Dave Monroe,Fritz Allhoff,Gram Ponante
Tags: #General, #Philosophy, #Social Science, #Sports & Recreation, #Health & Fitness, #Cycling - Philosophy, #Sexuality, #Pornography, #Cycling
Facile equations between feminist porn and lesbian or couples porn, like those between feminist porn and its actual or intended manner of use, do not invite an exploration of the particularities of what does and does not “feel right” about particular examples of pornography. Insofar as the discussions of feminist pornography by advocates of feminist lesbian porn
14
and advocates of feminist couples porn
15
do explore the particularities of what “feels right,” they thereby suggest that the feminist character of feminist porn derives from something separable from and more fundamental than either its depiction of lesbian sexuality or its orientation toward heterosexual couples. In order to illustrate what I take to be a fundamental feature of both feminist lesbian porn and feminist couples porn that conforms to my personal, yet explicitly feminist, sense of what “feels right,” I will turn, by way of contrast, to an example of the sort of pornography that does not “feel right.” I refer specifically to what is generally termed “fuck machine porn.”
Fucking machines are mechanical gadgets with the ostensible function of fucking women (or, less often, men). On the face of it, fuck machine porn seems capable of transcending the limitations of both lesbian porn and couples porn by replacing the gendered sexual partner with an ungendered mechanical partner designed for
her
pleasure. Regarded in this manner, fuck machine porn would seem like the ultimate expression of woman-centered sexuality! Even so, fuck machine porn does not “feel right” to me.
The fact that fucking machines “feel wrong” is not merely a consequence of their exaggerated size and speed, nor is it just my reaction to the names of the various machines.The website fuckingmachines.com,
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for example, features machines bearing such names as Annihilator, Chopper, Drilldo, Fuckzilla, Hammer, Hatchet, Intruder, Monster, Predator,Trespasser, and so forth, many of which betray an underlying impulse toward domination. Exaggerated penis size is a common element within pornography, and the extent to which size or speed correlates with a woman’s pleasure is largely a matter of personal preference. Representations of sexual domination are another common element within pornography. The sexual domination of women by men is not without feminist critics, of course, but serious conceptual difficulties arise in connection with efforts to delineate the boundary between sexual acts of domination and ordinary sexual acts. This is especially clear in consideration of the radical feminist suggestion that all acts of penetration, and hence all “vanilla” sex acts, amount to the domination of a woman by a man. I accept this characterization, not as a criticism of particular sex acts, but in recognition of the fact that sex and power are intimately entwined. The wholesale suppression of desire, including the desire to dominate or be dominated, diminishes the power of the erotic. Just as pornography featuring missionary position sex, or even pornography featuring women in bondage, does not necessarily “feel wrong” simply in virtue of its display of domination, the fact that fuck machine porn does “feel wrong,” at least to me, must derive from some other source. Indeed, the fact that the vast majority of mainstream pornography “feels wrong” to me must also derive from some other source.
Pornography often centers on decontextualized sex acts. In many cases, it centers even more directly on some specific portion of the decontextualized sex act. Consider, for example, the position of prominence occupied by the “money shot” in mainstream porn. Also consider video loops, a mainstay of cyber porn, in which specific portions of decontextualized sex acts are edited into an endlessly repeating cycle. By narrowly focusing on particular acts and portions of acts, much pornography seems like an effort to reduce human sexuality to its essential core for quick and convenient consumption. In contrast, Luce Irigaray suggests that women’s sexuality is not limited to a single sex organ and, as a result, lacks the boundaries that would allow us to clearly delineate a discrete point at which sex begins and ends.
17
Indeed, Irigaray claims that “woman has sex organs more or less everywhere”
18
and that “the geography of her pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly imagined.”
19
Although I hesitate to make such sweeping generalizations about the nature of female sexuality, I do believe that, for at least some women, our sexual pleasure is not confined to a discrete physical or temporal point. It is not reducible to the “money shot” and it is not contained within a discrete bodily location. To the extent that feminist lesbian porn and feminist couples porn offer more richly contextualized representations of sexuality than mainstream porn, thereby offering representations that are more consistent with women’s own experience of sexuality than mainstream porn, such representations may better meet our individual standards of what “feels right.”
Discussion
Habits, including sexual habits, are developed over time, largely in response to personal experience. For example, as a young person fumbling around with a partner for the first time, we generally do not have a preference to lie on the left rather than the right side of the bed, or vice versa.As repetition begins to breed familiarity, however, we often acquire such preferences.To the extent that our experience with pornography is among the factors that shape our sexual desires and expectations, I am concerned that exposure to mainstream porn conditions many men to ignore – either inadvertently or with smug disregard – the subtlety and potentiality of women’s sexuality, while a comparative lack of exposure to feminist porn simultaneously conditions women – either from ignorance or from shame – to do the same thing. The available range of feminist porn is rather limited, consisting primarily of lesbian porn and couples porn. I do not believe that women want pornography to center on a wedding any more rather than we want pornography to center, as it typically does, on other clearly delineated events such as penetration and ejaculation. I do believe, however, that many of us are looking for more richly contextualized representations of sexuality than pornography typically offers.
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NOTES
1
For examples, refer to Andrea Dworkin,
Pornography: Men Possessing Women
(London: Women’s Press, 1981); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); and Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Pornography and Civil Rights
(Minneapolis: Organizing Against Pornography, 1988).
2
Nadine Strossen, “In Defense of Pornography,” in James Elias et al. (eds.)
Porn 101: Eroticism, Pornography, and the First Amendment
(Amherst: Prometheus, 1999), p. 24.
3
Audre Lorde, “The Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,” in Henry Abelove, Michele Barale, and David Halperin (eds.)
The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader
(New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 339.
4
Ibid., p. 340.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., p. 341.
7
Ibid., p. 339.
8
Ibid., p. 340.
9
Ibid., p. 341.
10
Ibid., p. 340.
11
Stanislaw Lem,
Imaginary Magnitudes
, trans. Marc Heine (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), p. 17.
12
Amber Hollibaugh, “Desire for the Future: Radical Hope in Passion and Pleasure,” in Carole S. Vance (ed.)
Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality
(Boston: Routledge, 1984), pp. 1–27.
13
Candida Royalle, “Porn in the USA,” in Drucilla Cornell (ed.)
Feminism and Pornography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 541.
14
For examples, refer to Amber Hollibaugh, “Seducing Women into ‘A Lifestyle of Vaginal Fisting’: Lesbian Sex Gets
Virtually
Dangerous,” and Becky Ross, “ ‘It’s Merely Designed for Sexual Arousal’: Interrogating the Indefensibility of Lesbian Smut,” both in Drucilla Cornell (ed.)
Feminism and Pornography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
15
For examples, refer to Drucilla Cornell, “Pornography’s Temptation,” and Candida Royalle,“Porn in the USA,” both in Drucilla Cornell (ed.)
Feminism and Pornography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Also refer to Veronica Monet, “What is Feminist Porn?” in James Elias et al. (eds.)
Porn
101: Eroticism, Pornography, and the First Amendment
(Amherst: Prometheus, 1999).
16
I would like to acknowledge that kink.com, the parent site responsible for fuckingmachines.com, has adopted a values statement, as well as a set of explicit model rights and director rules, that is sensitive and responsive to the sorts of concerns raised by Dworkin, MacKinnon, and others regarding the potential victimization of women within the porn industry. I would also like to acknowledge that, insofar as it aims to “demystify and celebrate alternative sexualities by providing the most ethical and authentic kinky adult entertainment,” as expressed by its official tagline, kink.com offers a genuine alternative to mainstream pornography. My personal distaste for fuck machine porn should not be misconstrued as an attempt to censor or censure kink.com or any other safe and ethical producers of fuck machine porn.
17
Luce Irigaray,
The Sex Which is Not One
, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
18
Ibid., p. 28.
19
Ibid.
20
I am very grateful for helpful comments received on an earlier draft of this essay presented for the University of Idaho and Washington State University Philosophy Colloquium, April 2006. I am also grateful for discussions with and feedback from Gary Krug.
J. K. MILES
CHAPTER 11
BUMPER STICKERS AND BOOBS
Why the Free Speech Argument for Porn Fails
Pornography is free speech applied to the sexual realm. Freedom of speech is the ally of those who seek change: it is the enemy of those who seek to maintain control. Pornography, along with all other forms of sexual heresy, such as homosexuality, should have the same legal protection as political heresy.
(Wendy McElroy)
1
“I’m shocked, I tell you, shocked!”
You have picked up this book and no doubt have been titillated and maybe shocked by some of what is written herein. The title of my essay has the same goal as the cover of a porn magazine: titillate, shock, and hopefully get you to keep looking. I title this essay “Bumper Stickers and Boobs” to titillate. I subtitle it “Why the Free Speech Argument for Porn Fails” to shock many free speech advocates and get everyone thinking. I will expose myself early. I hope to convince you that whatever else porn is, it is not free speech just applied to the sexual realm.There may be reasons not to censor porn, but violating freedom of speech is not one of them.
“But wait a minute!” you say. “If pornography is expression and America (at least) is founded on freedom of expression, then shouldn’t there be a freedom to distribute, look at, and salivate over good porn?” Wendy McElroy says, “Pornography, along with all other forms of heresy, such as homosexuality, should have the same legal protection as political heresy.” If McElroy is right, the only difference between porn and political heresy is the message expressed.
Philosophers like things in the nice neat package of an argument. So let us render McElroy’s statement into an argument. We can call it the free speech argument for porn. It goes like this:
1.The right to express one’s religious and political views no matter how heretical should be protected from censorship.
2.Looking at, making, and publishing pornography are forms of sexual expression.
3.Sexual expression, no matter how heretical, should be protected the same as political and religious expression.
4.The right to express one’s sexual views no matter how heretical should be protected from censorship.
5.Looking at, making, and publishing pornography, no matter how heretical, should be protected from censorship.
Invoking the term “freedom of expression” or “right to free speech” has a way of stopping arguments. Appeal to a right to freedom of expression and you have just played the trump card. If sexual expression is included in the right to expression, then there is a strong reason to leave it alone. When you apply the term “right” to the ambiguous term “expression” it does cause some rather ludicrous law enforcement. Two adults have sex in a motel and one gets paid by the other and it is called prostitution and someone goes to jail. If both get paid for making a film, however, it is called expression and no one goes to jail. That seems . . . silly. Both are forms of sexual expression. If premise three is correct, sexual expression no matter how heretical to others, should be protected the same as any other kind of expression.
I am going to try to convince you the free speech argument for porn is seriously flawed because premise three is seriously flawed. In order to do that, I am going to appeal to your intuitions. I am going to try to convince you that people do not treat porn as just another form of expression like political and religious expression, and that is a good thing, too. I am also going to try to persuade you that if we did treat porn like any other heresy, there would still be a major difference between expressing a political opinion and using porn to express a sexual opinion.
The Preacher and the Porn Star
There is a debate that goes on over and over again in modern society. It usually takes place on some late night talk show like Jerry Springer or Howard Stern. Some porn star and some preacher sit in a studio. The topic (of course) is porn. The preacher wants to ban it. The porn star wants to celebrate it.When the subject of censorship comes up, the porn star howls that showing her boobs on film is sexual speech (this point might even be occasioned by said porn star bearing her chest, which is blurred out for the folks back home). She argues that she is proud to display her expression just as the preacher proudly displays his own expression with the “Get sanctified or get French Fried” bumper sticker.
The preacher usually defends his bumper sticker slogans as religious speech or political speech protected by his (and everyone’s) right to freedom of expression, but denies the display of girls on film should be protected in the same way. The porn star counters that if we allow bumper stickers we should allow sexual expression. And on it goes until commercial or someone throws a chair.
The problem is that both the preacher and porn star are wrong. The good reverend is wrong that showing boobs is not expression. The porn star is also wrong. Her boobs and his bumper sticker are not the same when it comes to freedom of speech. Before being all philosophical, let us take a case from history to illustrate this point.
Picnic Sex and the Prudes
In 1971 Robert Paul Cohen expressed his disapproval of the mandatory draft by writing “Fuck the Draft” on his jacket. When he walked into a California courthouse, he was arrested. The Supreme Court ruled that Cohen’s right to free speech was violated. Cohen had a right to express his disapproval of the Vietnam War in no uncertain terms. In essence, Cohen’s jacket became his bumper sticker expression.We tend to think if something is free expression, it is like a bumper sticker or Cohen’s jacket. You should be able to put it on a bumper sticker and express yourself all over the East Coast.
Now I am going to do something philosophers love to do. I am going to take this case and wrench it out of its context to make a point. Suppose instead of writing “Fuck the Draft” on his jacket, another guy – we will call him Schmoen – had instead hired a prostitute to wear a banner designating her (or him) “The Draft” and Schmoen proceeds to express his disapproval of the war by having sex in a public space in order to express the same sentiment as Cohen’s jacket actually did. The question is, should Schmoen’s performance be protected the same as Cohen’s jacket? Notice, I did not ask if they were both expression.They are both expressive.The question is whether they should be treated the same.
Before you answer, let me take this one step further. Suppose Schmoen did not have an angry anti-war message, but instead wanted to extol the joys of sexual liberation. He thinks that Americans, especially religious conservatives, are prudes and should lighten up about sex. He places a sign next to his little copulation vignette that expresses the sentiment that sex should not be taboo. It says, “You picnic and I’ll do this.”
All of these are expressions in one way or another. The intent is to express some opinion in all three cases, and they are not too fanciful. People have bumper stickers that express their feelings on war, rights, political candidates, etc. Masking sentiments with innuendo (e.g., “Buck Fush” or “First Hillary, then Monica, now Us!”) only serves to draw attention to the real idea.
People also make and look at porn as a form of expression. Larry Flynt has made a career satirizing political figures with porn-related imagery. Obviously, a lot of porn has no “grand protest.” Most porn falls into the category of pure porn.This “porn purely for porn’s sake” is analogous to Schmoen’s attempt to convince us all to drop our sexual hang-ups by enjoying his picnic sex. In fact, if there is one thing the porn industry wants to make clear, it is just what Wendy McElroy has stated: “Porn is free speech applied to the sexual realm.”
But if porn is free speech about sex like preaching is free speech about religion and campaigning is free speech about politics, then why do most of us intuitively want to treat Schmoen’s protest of prudery via “picnic sex” differently than political speech or religious speech? Enough questions – time for some philosophical analysis.
“Don’t look, Ethel!”
Most of us would not treat the bumper sticker and the public sex the same. In fact, most of us would treat them very differently. We would allow Cohen to walk anywhere he pleased with his jacket saying “Fuck” anything he wanted to. We might bar him from walking the halls of the elementary school (if for no other reason than to keep the kids from making their own jackets), but on the street he is fine.
But when it comes to sexual speech acts, most of us would not. In fact, we would want Schmoen out of the sight of passersby.We would probably make him do his protest in a private venue open to the public with a warning sign in red letters. Some people would want the warning sign to be roughly the size of a 1979 Buick and ID checked at the door.The fact is that we treat sexual speech much differently than we do political or religious speech. In other words, we do not treat boobs like bumper stickers and we do not treat bumper stickers like boobs. But I owe you a reason why.
Tease Me,Whip Me, Persuade Me
The intuitive answer is that looking at a bumper sticker is different from looking at some Tom, Dick, or Schmoen in the park trying to convince you to stop being a prude. Intuitively, why do most people think bumper stickers are more important than boobs when it comes to free speech? The reason is that most people think of bumper stickers as an attempt to persuade others to believe something, whereas boobs are well, just titillating. Perhaps persuasion is more important than mere expressive acts.
This is exactly what a philosopher has argued recently. George Sher says that we ought to treat persuasion as distinct and as more valuable than mere expression. The reason is that we tend to be able to evaluate clearly someone’s
opinion
when it’s expressed verbally. However, expressive
actions
are more ambiguous.
2
Now someone might object that if the concern is about ambiguity, Schmoen can add a sign to make clear what he wants to express.Whatever you think of Sher’s argument, one thing seems to emerge from all of this intuiting.The value of Schmoen’s expression is not so much that he can vent about American prudes (he could do that without being stark naked), but that he can try to convince those who do not agree with him and to do that he must be able to confront some people who (he thinks) are prudes.
The heart of this intuition is that freedom of expression is not just about expression. Rather, it is expression to convince others. That is in fact what political and religious expression is designed to do. From the church that passes out Bibles to the congressman who passes out bumper stickers, religious and political expression persuades. Most porn does not persuade anyone to any particular opinion. It is made, bought, and consumed for a lot of reasons (masturbation, instruction, etc.), but persuasion is not usually one of those reasons. Even those who read
Playboy
“for the articles” are looking for keen political commentary and satire
along with
their porn.
Biting the Bullet
But you say,“Suppose I don’t share the intuition of most people.What if I think what’s good for the politician is good for the porn star? If we protect one, we should protect the other regardless of how it persuades.” This is a good point. My argument so far has relied on a lot of assumptions about what most people would think about boobs and bumper stickers. It is far from conclusive that most people share the intuition that porn should not be treated the same as public religious or political expression. My argument could very well be wrong even if most people do have that intuition. If there is one thing philosophers know it is this: just because most people believe something does not make it true – not by a long shot.
What if we bite the bullet and say Schmoen’s expression is no different from unwanted political or religious expression? Some porn defenders do just that. Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, in her
Defending Pornography
, says that pornography should be as free as political speech even if it does force us to look at images and actions we find not fit for public display.
3
“Biting the bullet” is a euphemism for an unpleasant activity that philosophers have to do all the time. It means that sometimes philosophers have to swallow an implication of their argument that they do not want to, in order to keep the argument consistent. If porn is free speech applied to sex then we should treat it like bumper sticker speech. But in order to do that, we would have to allow it to be as public as bumper stickers or billboards, as Strossen suggests. Before we bite this bullet let us stop and examine it.
Suppose you are in the audience for the late night show. Let us say also that you are not there
just in case
the porn star decides to bare all.You are really there for scintillating moral discussion. Now the porn star (we shall call her Pamela) wants to convince you that what she does and those who watch her do it are not doing anything wrong.To illustrate her point and to shock you out of your prudery, she bares her boobs.What has she just done? She has tried to convince you that looking at boobs is okay by making you look at boobs. Now if you had bought her argument that porn is good, then you could have subsequently bought her DVD. However, Pamela’s persuasive method is to make you do what she wants in order to convince you that watching her do it is okay.This seems more than just persuasion.This starts to sound like coercion.