Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (10 page)
Read Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang Online
Authors: Adi Ignatius
I wrote three letters—on August 28, 1990, December 7, 1990, and May 9, 1991—to Jiang Zemin [who had been brought in from Shanghai to replace Zhao as Party General Secretary], Li Peng, and the Politburo Standing Committee, respectively. The point of these letters was to request an end to the investigation and house arrest and the restoration of my personal freedoms as early as possible.
I also mentioned in those letters that since so much time had already passed since the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee launched its investigation, I didn’t believe there could still be anything left to clarify. I truly had no idea what could cause my investigation to go on for so long. Since June 1990, no one had come to talk to me about issues related to the investigation, nor had anyone come to check on any related material. If anything remained unclear, why didn’t they just ask me? I could help to clarify things. This tactic of dragging things out without a resolution, of a perpetual suspension in the name of an ongoing investigation, was beneficial neither to me nor to the Party.
I also pointed out that since the Fourth Plenum, Central Committee leaders had repeatedly announced to domestic and foreign reporters that I was free to move about, that I was neither under house arrest nor even partial house arrest. However, what is the truth? The fact is, since the Fourth Plenum, I have been continuously detained in my house.
In the past, it was common practice to curtail the personal freedoms of senior cadres who had held opposing views or made mistakes, especially during the Cultural Revolution. However, the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee had acknowledged the lessons from this past, and now, after more than ten years of implementing reform and with the current emphasis on establishing the rule of law, we must not repeat this behavior.
I therefore demanded my immediate release from house arrest and the restoration of my personal freedoms, regardless of whether or not the investigations were over.
All these letters of mine fell like stones dropped into the sea, disappearing without a trace. Their tactic was simply never to respond.
In fact, limitations on my freedom of movement began as early as June 1989. However, I was never officially notified, and there was no written documentation of it. In order to prove that these limits really did exist, and also because I was feeling gloomy from the protracted house arrest, in October 1990, just before the Asian Games, I made a decision to go out golfing.
When the Security Bureau of the General Office discovered my plan to go out to play golf, they informed the secretary working in my home to advise me against it. They said, “It has never been said that going out was permitted.” I replied that no one had ever told me I was
not
permitted to go out. If there was such a rule, then they should show it to me. They neither showed me any such document containing the rules of prohibition, nor allowed me to go out.
They ordered the chauffeur not to drive when the time came. I indicated that if the chauffeur refused to drive, I would take the bus. Of course, they were afraid this would cause a public stir.
At the time, neither Jiang Zemin nor Li Peng was in Beijing. They asked Qiao Shi [the Politburo member in charge of security] for instructions, but Qiao Shi couldn’t make the decision, either. He asked the Security Bureau to improvise a decision appropriate to the situation.
Finally, the Security Bureau allowed the chauffeur to drive and sent a police car to escort us. After I played at Chang Ping Golf Course, a Sino-Japanese joint venture, the Japanese staff at the golf course reported the news to the Japanese embassy. This spread soon after to Japanese reporters and other foreign correspondents. The news was released that very day and was followed up with coverage by major international news agencies as well as newspapers in Hong Kong and Taiwan. A Hong Kong television channel even played an old video clip of me playing golf as they reported the story.
Both Jiang Zemin and Li Peng became extremely anxious. They condemned the decision and began an investigation to find out who had allowed me to go out to play golf. After this disturbance, they notified me verbally in the name of the Central Committee that I was prohibited from going out during the investigation. With that, the fact that they restricted my freedom and subjected me to house arrest had finally left an official trail.
In front of domestic and foreign reporters, however, they continued to claim that I was free. It is obvious that they were reluctant to let the public know the truth because they were conscious of being in the wrong.
On October 8, 1992, [Politburo Standing Committee members] Qiao Shi and Song Ping asked me to Huairen Tang in Zhongnanhai for a talk. Ding Guan’gen and Li Tieying were also present. Qiao Shi, representing the Central Committee, announced that the CC had decided to end my investigation while upholding the political and administrative judgment against me declared by the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee. The announcement was to be included in the public statement of the CC meeting that was about to come to a close. They had come to inform me the day before it was to happen.
After listening to this, I replied by making three points:
First, with regard to the judgment made against me at the Fourth Plenum of “supporting turmoil” and “splitting the Party,” I did not agree with it and have declared my reservations. I have not changed my mind and continue to have my reservations.
Second, I demanded that the Central Committee announce its decision to appropriate levels within the Party in a formal document. And when announcing the upholding of the original judgment, the facts on which the judgment was based must be laid out as well. What are the facts that support the original judgment? Are they the thirty items raised? If so, I demanded that all the items be put into the formal document.
Third, since the investigation had drawn to a close, my personal freedoms must be immediately restored. As for what I should be aware of in my activities, the Central Committee can make suggestions and I will respect them, but I absolutely will not accept unreasonable and coercive rules to limit my freedom.
Qiao Shi and the others said they would relay my response to the Central Committee and report back to me with the results.
While I was making my second point—the demand for a public announcement of the judgment—Qiao Shi interjected, “You should think about how to avoid any impact on stability.” As I was making my third point demanding the restoration of my freedoms, they said that the 14th Party Congress [October 1992] would attract many foreign reporters. “Your case is very sensitive, and after the public statement is made, there could be a lot of foreign reporters probing around your house.” They hoped I would observe Party discipline and take into account the big picture.
In reply, I offered to refrain from going out during the 14th Party Congress. Upon hearing this, they seemed to relax. Song Ping said that after the Party Congress, my outside activities could be increased gradually, in order to downplay the issue slowly over a long period of time. That was how the conversation ended.
I heard later that when they announced the conclusion of my investigation and the upholding of the original judgment, they said nothing more, not even in the Politburo meeting. They did not distribute reports of the Investigative Group. That means that after more than three years of investigation, specifically what was discovered and what the facts were that supported the two-point judgment against me—these all were circumvented with only the announcement of an end to the investigation. Of course, there were no objections. The public statement of the plenum mentioned only the one sentence about “ending the investigation and upholding the judgment.” There were no other materials released. The plenum of the Central Committee had made the initial decision to launch the investigation, so when the plenum announced the closing of the investigation, it should have supplied a concluding report to the plenum. But it did not. On the contrary, they said at the convening meeting that it would be sufficient just to mention the issue within each group with no further discussions about the matter.
Judging from how these events were handled, I could see how nervous they were about dealing with my case. They had many concerns and spoke only with great caution.
When Qiao Shi announced the Politburo’s decision to me, he read aloud from a written statement. I had originally intended to take notes while he was reading it, but he spoke too quickly. Afraid I’d be unable to catch everything in writing, I asked Qiao Shi for a copy of the statement. Qiao Shi said, “Yes,” and told the comrade taking notes, “Give a copy of the notice to Comrade Ziyang.” Afterward, however, when I told my secretary to call them to request a copy of the notice, they refused. They did not offer any explanation, either. I don’t know what they were afraid of.
Given the situation, I was afraid they would not report my three-point statement in its entirety, as I’d expressed it, especially as the three points were not pleasant to hear. So when I returned from the meeting, I sent them my three points in the form of a memorandum. Of course, as usual, there was no reply.
In any case, they ended the investigation without releasing any documentation to the Politburo or to the plenum of the Central Committee. After three years of investigation and upon the investigation’s conclusion, why not release the facts obtained to the public? In fact, they were simply afraid.
What problems had they actually uncovered in the three years of their investigation? On June 21, 1990, Wang Renzhong had provided me with the draft of the thirty-item Investigative Report with a letter attached, saying that if I had any disagreements, I could raise them by writing my comments on the document and returning it to him.
The Investigative Report
The draft was titled “Issues Relevant to Comrade Zhao Ziyang and the Political Turmoil of 1989.” The thirty items contained in the document were as follows:
1. On the evening of April 15, Comrades Hu Qili and [Shanghai Party secretary] Rui Xingwen reported to Comrade Ziyang on the situation following the death of Comrade Hu Yaobang: that there was a potential for street demonstrations and gatherings and that someone could take advantage of the situation to stir up trouble. They suggested that the Central Committee issue a notice to warn regional governments to be alert. Ziyang did not take the warning of turmoil seriously, and thought issuing a warning notice was unnecessary. On April 16, the Ministry of Public Security believed the situation could become more serious and issued a warning to the regions within the system of the Ministry of Public Security.
2. During the period of commemoration for Comrade Hu Yaobang, signs of turmoil became more obvious daily. Many comrades in the Central Committee and in the Beijing municipal government believed that the nature of the events had already changed. On numerous occasions, they brought to Zhao Ziyang’s attention the need for the Central Committee to have an explicit strategy and plan of action to stop the situation from further development. However, he always avoided any serious discussion about the nature of the matter. On April 23, just before he was to visit North Korea, comrades from the Central Committee again suggested he call for a meeting, but he declined.
3. On April 19, the Shanghai
World Economic Herald
and the magazine
New Observation
jointly held a symposium about the commemoration of Comrade Hu Yaobang, openly condemning the [1987] Anti–Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign. They said the Campaign was unpopular, attacked senior comrades in the Central Committee, and demanded that the Central Committee admit its mistakes, and were the first to propose comprehensive guiding principles for the political turmoil. On April 24, the
World Economic Herald
wrote a detailed report of this meeting and rushed to publish it, echoing the turmoil taking place in Beijing. On April 26, the Shanghai Party Committee handed down administrative punishment, ordered the newspaper to stop distribution, and reorganized the newspaper’s staff. This was entirely correct. However, after Zhao Ziyang returned from his visit to North Korea, he not only refused to provide support for this decision, but also accused the Shanghai Party Committee of aggravating the situation and turning things in a less favorable direction. On May 2, when he talked about the issue with [Chairman of the China Democratic League] Fei Xiaotong and leaders of other political parties, he said, “It would be better if both sides were to back down with dignity to mitigate the situation. Send a message to the Shanghai Party Committee to back down appropriately.” On May 11, when he talked with [then Shanghai Party chief] Comrade Jiang Zemin about the
World Economic Herald,
he said, “I will not put pressure on you, nor will I involve myself in this matter. The matter is for you to deal with. If anyone asks me about it in the future, I will reply that I don’t know anything.”4. On May 3, before Comrade Zhao Ziyang made his speech at the Seventieth Commemoration Anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, several comrades, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and Li Ximing, stated their belief that the anti-Party, anti-socialism turmoil that was then developing was the direct evil consequence of the long-term spreading of bourgeois liberalism. Therefore, they repeatedly suggested to Zhao that he use his speech to target the political agenda proposed by the architects of the turmoil by adding content unequivocally condemning bourgeois liberalism. These suggestions were, however, rejected by Zhao.
5. On April 23, before visiting North Korea, Zhao called [his aide] Bao Tong for a talk, asking him to keep an eye on the development of the student demonstrations. On April 30, immediately upon Zhao’s return to Beijing, Bao Tong met with Zhao to report that the April 26 editorial had been written with too harsh of a tone, had not reasoned things out fully, and had precipitated the confrontational emotions of previously neutral students. Several days later, Zhao told Bao that he also felt that the April 26 editorial had flaws.
6. On May 1, Zhao asked his secretary Li Yong about the situation with the student demonstrations. When discussing the student street demonstrations of April 27, Zhao said that they were an indication that the students had been displeased by the editorial, but since the Central Committee had made its decision, it would be difficult to reverse the position expressed in the editorial.
7. On the afternoon of May 2, Zhao Ziyang held a symposium to discuss the student demonstrations with leaders of other political parties: Fei Xiaotong, Lei Jieqiong, and Sun Qimeng. By then the Central Committee had already explicitly proposed the strategy of unequivocally taking a public stand opposing the turmoil. Zhao Ziyang should have implemented the strategy of the Central Committee, but when some people challenged the appropriateness of designating the problem of the student movement as “turmoil” without first analyzing it, not only did Zhao fail to persuade them ideologically, he even said, “Your suggestions today help us to better understand the issue,” and agreed with their views. After the symposium, Zhao said to Comrade Yan Mingfu [head of the United Front Work Department] that the designation of the nature of the event made by the April 26 editorial in the
People’s Daily
was wrong, that it appeared that comrades on the Politburo Standing Committee had only presented the one-sided view of the Beijing Party Committee when reporting to [Deng] Xiaoping. Now it was very difficult to turn things around. The key was how to persuade Comrade Xiaoping. If he could just say once that the situation had been overestimated, it would unify the thoughts of the members of the Standing Committee, and the Party could make the turnaround. Zhao asked Yan to share his views with Yang Shangkun and expressed the hope that Comrade Shangkun would accompany him to visit Comrade Deng Xiaoping. That evening, after Comrade Yan Mingfu met with Comrade Shangkun, he reported back to Zhao that Comrade Shangkun’s response was that Comrade Xiaoping’s view regarding the turmoil had already been carefully considered, and could not be changed.8. On the morning of May 3, Zhao Ziyang talked to Yang Shangkun about the April 26 editorial, after which Zhao told his secretary Li Yong that it seemed it would be difficult to change the stand taken by the editorial. Instead, the effects must be mitigated gradually by turning things around slowly.
9. On the morning of May 4, Zhao Ziyang verbally outlined and Bao Tong put together Zhao’s speech to be delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank Board of Governors. Without consulting with any other comrades on the Standing Committee, he delivered the speech that afternoon in total contradiction to the Central Committee’s strategy to stop the turmoil. At that time, serious turmoil was already taking place, but he said the opposite: “There will be no major turmoil in China. I have full confidence in this.” The Central Committee had indicated clearly that the turmoil was aimed at undermining the leadership of the Communist Party, rejecting the socialist system, but he said, “They absolutely do not oppose our fundamental system, but rather are asking us to correct the flaws in our work.” When all sorts of facts already demonstrated that a tiny minority of people were manipulating the student demonstrations to wage turmoil, he still said, “It is unavoidable that some people might attempt to manipulate the actions of the students.” After his speech, Zhao personally instructed the reporter of the Xinhua News Agency to publish the original speech in its entirety. This constituted an exposure of his divergence of opinion from the Central Committee. After the speech was published, cadres, Party members, and the populace broadly responded with confused thought because there appeared to be two different voices within the Central Committee. Some universities announced a boycott of classes and the street demonstrations reemerged. The whole situation took a turn for the worse.
10. On the morning of May 5, Zhao Ziyang met with Peking University president Ding Shisun and the vice president of Beijing Normal University, Xu Jialu. Zhao said, “I intentionally tried to reduce tensions with my speech at the Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank. We shouldn’t discuss the nature of the movement now. Frankly, we don’t even know who the tiny minority of people are.”
11. In the afternoon of May 5, Comrade Zhao Ziyang invited himself to the member symposium of young staff from several Beijing universities held by the Central Committee of the China Democratic League. Some people expressed disapproval of the April 26 editorial and support for Zhao’s ADB speech. When the meeting ended, Zhao said, “Everybody spoke well. Thanks!” He thereby voiced his agreement with the opinions expressed in the meeting.
12. Even as the situation with the turmoil was taking a turn for the worse, and with propaganda reports in some publications starting to head in an obviously wrong direction, on the morning of May 6, Zhao Ziyang called Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen for a talk, and told them, “Currently, freedom of the press is a hot issue. We could learn some lessons from the recent press coverage. In the beginning, control was tighter, but then it became more relaxed. The street demonstrations have been reported on, and the press seems to have become more open. There is no big risk in this.” He even said, “In the face of the popular wishes of the people, and the progressive trend worldwide, the only thing we can do is manage the situation by responding to the circumstances. The student demonstrations have highlighted an issue: the people strongly demand reform and worry about the overall halting of reform.” On May 9, Hu Qili organized Zhao’s remarks into a brief that was disseminated to press organizations after Zhao had inspected and approved it. On May 12, Comrade Hu Qili and [a secretary of the Party’s Central Committee Secretariat] Rui Xingwen briefed leaders of Beijing press organizations at a dialogue meeting. By that time, more than a thousand people from Beijing press organizations had signed a petition and taken to the streets to protest. Some newspapers published articles attacking the Party and the government, causing propaganda and public opinion to veer even more out of control.
People’s Daily
and many other news organizations covered the street protests, sit-in demonstrations, and hunger strikes extensively, showing support for the demonstrations and prompting more and more people to participate. The social order of Beijing had fallen into utter chaos.13. On April 21 and again on May 21, Comrade Zhao Ziyang met with Comrade Du Runsheng [who headed efforts to reform rural policies] to discuss the student demonstrations. After these meetings, Comrade Du Runsheng twice called for meetings at the Hall of Science, each time with more than ten participants, to talk about Zhao’s ideas. They discussed their assessments and made suggestions for handling the student demonstrations. Zhao very much approved of everyone’s suggestions and hoped to make the student demonstrations a turning point for resolving several important issues then under heightened public attention.
14. The Politburo Standing Committee held a meeting on May 8 to hear a report prepared by the Group to Stop the Turmoil. What they should have done was discuss how to adopt resolute measures to stop the turmoil, but Zhao Ziyang instead spoke emphatically on so-called “anti-corruption” efforts. On May 10, the Politburo held a meeting in which Zhao reported on the May 8 Standing Committee meeting and proposed six concrete measures for fighting corruption and promoting political reform. These measures were not discussed and agreed upon at the Standing Committee meeting.
15. In these two meetings, the question of how to respond to illegal student organizations was brought up many times. Comrade Zhao Ziyang said, “In many places where local official student associations cannot win majority support, reelections can be held. They should not be afraid of stepping down and letting others take over as a result of elections.”
16. On May 9 and 10, a symposium on Contemporary Socialism Studies was held in Beijing. It was proposed in the meeting that socialist reform must overcome barriers on the way to a market economy and democracy; that issues of socialist democracy, freedom, and human rights were all of importance and significance. Zhao Ziyang met with comrades participating in the symposium and said, “The main lesson we must learn from this student protest is that we must speed up the process of political reform.” The May 12 issue of the
People’s Daily
published a headline story that covered the meeting, titled “Reform Must Overcome Barriers on the Way to Market Economy and Democracy.” In actuality, it provided theoretical grounds for the turmoil, and assisted in the escalation of the turmoil.17. On the afternoon of May 16, Comrade Zhao Ziyang met with Gorbachev. As soon as the conversation began, he said. “On issues of importance, the Party still needs Deng Xiaoping to be at the helm. Since the 13th Party Congress, whenever we deal with major issues, we always inform Comrade Deng Xiaoping and seek his guidance.” He also said that this was the first time he had ever revealed this Chinese Communist Party decision. The day after the talks, the slogans used in the street protests converged on attacks on Comrade Deng Xiaoping. Slogans such as “Overthrow Deng Xiaoping!” and “Support Zhao Ziyang!” flooded the street protests and Tiananmen Square.
18. On the evening of May 16, the Politburo Standing Committee held an emergency meeting. Comrade Zhao Ziyang suggested telling students that the April 26 editorial was in error. He suggested that it be said that the draft of the editorial had been sent to North Korea for his approval, and that he bore full responsibility. He repeatedly said that the April 26 editorial had problems for which an explanation was essential, and that without taking this step, no progress could be made. If the situation were not turned around, there would be no way out.
19. On the afternoon of May 17, the Politburo Standing Committee held another meeting. Comrade Zhao Ziyang continued to uphold his incorrect position while the majority of comrades on the Standing Committee ardently opposed him. They believed that continuing to back down would result in major nationwide upheaval and inconceivable consequences. Comrade Deng Xiaoping ardently supported the position of the majority of the comrades on the Standing Committee. To bring an end to the turmoil, the meeting resolved to call in a part of the military to station itself in Beijing and martial law was imposed on certain districts of the city. Zhao believed, on the contrary, that imposing martial law would lead to grave consequences. He stated that he was unable to carry this out.