Reagan: The Life (67 page)

Reagan resented Goldwater’s public airing of grievance and disputed the senator’s assertions. “
Says he was never briefed,” the president grumbled privately. “He was briefed on March 8 and 13.” Yet Reagan didn’t specify what Goldwater was told in the briefings, which obviously didn’t satisfy him. Nor could Reagan deny the underlying facts of the mining or the damage the affair was doing in Congress to the administration’s Central American policy. “There is a rebellion which will probably lead to their shutting aid off to the Nicaraguan Contras—which will bring joy to the Soviets and Cubans.”

Reagan thought his Central American policy was right, and he thought the American public would agree if he explained it to them satisfactorily. “
Central America is a region of great importance to the United States,” he declared from the Oval Office, looking sincerely into the television camera. “And it is so close: San Salvador is closer to Houston, Texas, than Houston is to Washington, D.C. Central America is America. It’s at our doorstep.” And it was in mortal danger. “It’s become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to install communism by force throughout the hemisphere.” The war for Central America had already begun. “Right now in El Salvador, Cuban-supported aggression has forced more than 400,000 men, women, and children to flee their homes. And in all of Central America, more than 800,000 have fled—many, if not most, living in unbelievable hardship.” Some of those refugees had found their way to the United States; more would certainly follow.

The stakes could not be higher, Reagan said. “If we do nothing, if we continue to provide too little help, our choice will be a communist Central America with additional communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere and communist subversion spreading southward and northward.” There might be no stopping the red tide. “A hundred million people from
Panama to the open border of our South could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes.”

But it wasn’t yet too late. “We can and must help Central America. It’s in our national interest to do so, and morally, it’s the only right thing to do.” Helping Central America meant standing up to the communists who sought to destroy freedom and democracy there. Congress had voted assistance to El Salvador, but more was needed. “We’ve provided just
enough aid to avoid outright disaster, but not enough to resolve the crisis, so El Salvador is being left to slowly bleed to death.”

Most Americans didn’t appreciate the gravity of the Central American crisis, Reagan said. Some still thought the
Sandinistas of Nicaragua were honest reformers; this view couldn’t be more wrong. “The Sandinista rule is a communist reign of terror.” The Sandinistas had started showing their true colors almost as soon as they seized power. “The internal repression of democratic groups, trade unions, and civic groups began. Right to dissent was denied. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly became virtually nonexistent.” Groups that defied the regime experienced brutal repression. “There has been an attempt to wipe out an entire culture, the
Miskito Indians, thousands of whom have been slaughtered or herded into detention camps, where they have been starved and abused. Their villages, churches, and crops have been burned.” The Sandinistas had alienated even former supporters. “Many of those who fought alongside the Sandinistas saw their revolution betrayed. They were denied power in the new government. Some were imprisoned, others exiled. Thousands who fought with the Sandinistas have taken up arms against them and are now called the
contras. They are freedom fighters.”

The United States must assist the freedom fighters. “The simple questions are: Will we support freedom in this hemisphere or not? Will we defend our vital interests in this hemisphere or not? Will we stop the spread of communism in this hemisphere or not?”

R
EAGAN WAS DETERMINED
to keep the contra war going whether Congress funded it or not. Robert McFarlane later recalled giving the president a paper describing the bleak prospects for the contras as appropriated funding dwindled and Congress refused to provide more. Reagan read the paper and handed it back. “
We’ve got to find a way to keep doing this, Bud,” he told McFarlane. “I want you to do whatever you have to do to help these people keep body and soul together. Do everything you can.”

McFarlane set to work. In June 1984 he summoned the National Security Planning Group to the Situation Room. “
The purpose of this meeting,” he explained to the president and the others, “is to focus on the political, economic, and military situation in Central America—to offer a status report and to discuss next steps needed to keep our friends together while continuing to make progress toward our overall political goals.” McFarlane offered good news and bad news. The good news was
that Congress had approved $62 million in additional money for military assistance to El Salvador. The bad news was that the legislature was refusing to fund the Nicaraguan contras. On the most recent House vote the administration’s contra proposal had lost by sixty-four votes, and while that margin might be whittled down, a reversal of the decision appeared unlikely.

William Casey described the progress and prospects of the contras. “The
FDN in the north remains strong,” Casey said, referring to the largest anti-Sandinista group. “The
ARDE”—a more recently formed alliance—“in the south is on the run under pressure.” The CIA had $250,000 in cash left from previous appropriations; this would soon be gone. Weapons were dwindling as well. “Our warehouses have arms and ammunition which can hold till August.” When the money ran out, the contras would be on their own. “Many of the anti-Sandinistas will stay in place within the country in order to feed themselves,” Casey said. “We estimate that about half will retreat into
Honduras and
Costa Rica in some disarray.” The United States could not turn its back on the refugees. “We have to provide humanitarian assistance to help these individuals and those they bring out with them when they come into Honduras and Costa Rica.”

Casey hoped Congress would heed the administration’s appeal for contra funding. But if it didn’t, there were alternatives. “The legal position is that the CIA is authorized to seek support from third countries,” he said. “In fact, the finding”—the statement of the president’s authority—“encourages third country participation and support in this entire effort.” Casey said he was looking into support from the governments of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras (as well as a “South American country” whose identity was deleted when the minutes of this meeting were declassified). “If we notify the oversight committees”—in Congress—“we can provide direct assistance to help the FDN get the money they need from third countries. There will be some criticism, but senior members of the oversight committees recognize that we need to do this.” Looking toward the president, Casey said, “We need a decision to authorize our permitting the FDN to obtain third country support.”

Reagan didn’t respond at once to Casey’s appeal. “It all hangs on support for the anti-Sandinistas,” he said. “How can we get that support in Congress? We have to be more active.”

George Shultz urged that the administration continue to engage the Sandinistas in negotiations, if only to deflect charges that the United
States was ignoring diplomacy in favor of a military solution to the Central American unrest.

Reagan took the secretary’s point. “If we are just talking about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so far-fetched to imagine that a communist government like that would make any reasonable deal with us,” the president said. “But if it is to get Congress to support the anti-Sandinistas, then that can be helpful.”

Jeane Kirkpatrick agreed that diplomacy had its place. But it might fail, and it shouldn’t obscure the absolute necessity of funding the contras. “If we don’t find the money to support the contras, it will be perceived in the region and the world as our having abandoned them,” Kirkpatrick asserted. “And this will lead to an increase in refugees in the region and it will permit Nicaragua to infiltrate thousands of Nicaraguan trained forces into El Salvador. And this will be an infiltration we could not stop.” She urged the president to appeal again to Congress and the American people. But if the Democrats in the House continued to ignore the national interest, the administration should take other measures. “We should make the maximum effort to find the money elsewhere.”

Shultz offered a caution. Congress had voted on the contra funding and rejected it. The decision was on the record, and the administration couldn’t simply pretend it hadn’t been made. Bill Casey had said the presidential finding allowed raising money from third countries; Shultz relayed a different opinion. “I would like to get money for the contras also,” he said, “but another lawyer, Jim Baker, said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense.”

Casey cut in. “I am entitled to complete the record,” he said. “Jim Baker said that if we tried to get the money from third countries without notifying the oversight committees, it could be a problem. He was informed that the finding does provide for the participation and cooperation of third countries. Once he learned that the finding does encourage cooperation from third countries, Jim Baker immediately dropped his view that this could be an ‘impeachable offense.’ And you heard him say that, George.”

Shultz held his ground. “Jim Baker’s argument is that the U.S. government may raise and spend funds only through an appropriation of the Congress.”

Caspar Weinberger jumped in. “I am another lawyer who isn’t practicing law, but Jim Baker should realize that the United States would not
be spending the money for the anti-Sandinista program. It is merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain money from other sources. Therefore the United States is not, as a government, spending money obtained from other sources.”

Shultz appealed to a lawyer who
was
practicing—on behalf of the United States. “I think we need to get an opinion from the attorney general on whether we can help the contras obtain money from third sources,” he said. “It would be the prudent thing to do.”

Ed Meese didn’t object to going to the attorney general,
William French Smith, but he thought the question needed to be framed appropriately. “As another non-practicing lawyer,” Meese said, “I want to emphasize that it’s important to tell the Department of Justice that we want them to find the proper and legal basis which will permit the United States to assist in obtaining third party resources for the anti-Sandinistas. You have to give lawyers guidance when you ask them a question.”

Bill Casey returned to the fate of the contras. “It is essential that we tell the Congress what will happen if they fail to provide the funding for the anti-Sandinistas. At the same time, we can go ahead in trying to help obtain funding for the anti-Sandinistas from other sources. The finding does say explicitly ‘the United States should cooperate with other governments and seek support of other governments.’ ” He added, “We have met no resistance from senior members of the intelligence committees to the idea of getting third country funding.”

Reagan remained noncommittal on third-party funding. He hadn’t given up on Congress. “I am behind an all-out push in Congress,” he said. “We must obtain the funds to help these freedom fighters.” Congressional funding would send a message to the Sandinistas. “It is what will keep the pressure on.”

The meeting had run overtime. Robert McFarlane realized that a consensus was lacking. “I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas until we have the information we need”—from the attorney general. He added, “I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way.”

Reagan closed the session with a caution cloaked in a smile. “If such a story gets out,” he said, “we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House until we find out who did it.”

R
EAGAN WARMED TO
world travel only slowly. His postwar journey to England to shoot
The Hasty Heart
satisfied his modest pre-political wanderlust, which his aversion to flying did nothing to inflame. Ambition for office eventually prodded him into the air, but even after he became California’s governor his transoceanic miles mounted slowly. He visited several American allies at the behest of
Richard Nixon, who wished to assure them that Washington was keeping them in mind. He met
Chiang Kai-shek of
Taiwan (the Republic of China, formally),
Francisco Franco of
Spain,
Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines, and
Lee Kuan Yew of
Singapore. After leaving Sacramento and while readying runs for the White House, he traveled to Europe and Asia. The travel still didn’t thrill him, but a former governor who sought to become the nation’s diplomat in chief and commander in chief could stand the international exposure.

As president he finally discovered the joys of travel. Air Force One, of course, made the journeys themselves much more comfortable. And the White House staff handled all the logistics. He simply had to step out his door, board his helicopter for the short hop to Andrews Air Force Base, climb the steps of his personal Boeing 707, and be off.

Yet the effortlessness of travel was only part of what made foreign trips attractive. Reagan’s Hollywood career had accustomed him to the perquisites of celebrity, but these were nothing next to the treatment a president received. Everywhere he went, he was the biggest story in that week’s news, and American allies and protégés who sought to make a good impression turned out crowds that put to shame anything a mere actor could have commanded. Moreover, though the cliché that Ameri
can politics stops at the water’s edge has been honored more in the breach than in the observance, Reagan discovered that criticism of his actions was often muted when he was abroad. Even Tip O’Neill understood that it was bad form to blast America’s head of state when he was representing the country to the world.

Reagan traveled to
Canada in July 1981 for a meeting in Ottawa of the
Group of Seven economic powers and to Mexico that October for a conference in Cancún on economic development. In June 1982 he took a ten-day trip to Europe, starting with France for a G7 meeting in Paris, continuing to Italy, where he had an audience with Pope John Paul, then to Britain to address Parliament and see Margaret Thatcher in her native environment, and finally to
West Germany for a meeting of the NATO council and a look at the
Berlin Wall. In late November and early December 1982, Reagan visited Central and
South America, with stops in
Honduras,
Costa Rica, Colombia, and
Brazil. The following year he crossed the Pacific to
Japan and
South Korea; in the former country he addressed the Diet, or parliament, while in the latter he visited the demilitarized zone that buffered South Korea from
North Korea.