Reagan: The Life (78 page)

“Hell no,” Reagan said.

L
ORD
I
HOPE
I’m ready,” Reagan wrote on the eve of his first session with Gorbachev. The president focused on what he would say; his handlers agonized over how he would look. Reagan arrived at the Château Fleur d’Eau ahead of Gorbachev and prepared to greet him at his car. The November morning was windy and cold. The question of the hour was: Should the president wear an overcoat as he stepped outside? His advisers were split. The age issue persisted; Reagan must appear no less vibrant and vigorous than Gorbachev. But it was
cold
outside, and he was, after all, seventy-four. Would Gorbachev be wearing a coat? No one knew. The matter remained unresolved when Gorbachev’s limousine suddenly pulled up. Reagan silenced the debate by bounding out coatless. He offered his hand to Gorbachev, who emerged from the car coated, scarved, and hatted. As the cameras of the world’s media clicked and whirred, Reagan’s team tallied one for their side and prayed against pneumonia.

The summit was scheduled to last two days, with private meetings between the principals alternating with larger sessions including staff. “
President Reagan began the conversation by telling the General Secretary that the two of them could really talk now,” Reagan’s interpreter and note taker at the initial private meeting recorded. “The President indicated that he approached this meeting with a very deep feeling and hoped that both of them could realize its importance and the unique situation that they were in.” Reagan said that in the larger sessions they would talk about arms control and other issues of policy. “But he wondered if the primary aim between them should not be to eliminate the suspicions which each side had of the other.” To talk about arms without addressing the suspi
cions would be fruitless. “Countries do not mistrust each other because of arms,” he said. “But rather countries build up their arms because of the mistrust between them.”

Gorbachev responded that he shared Reagan’s desire that the two of them get to know each other. Serious steps were necessary to bridge the differences between the two countries, and these would require “political will at the highest levels.” Gorbachev acknowledged the mutual mistrust Reagan spoke of, but he pointed out that cooperation existed at various levels of culture and trade. The general secretary granted that “squalls” in the relationship between the two countries had occasionally been severe. “But he could definitely state that in the USSR there was no enmity toward the United States or its people. The Soviet Union respected the U.S. and its people. The Soviet people and the leadership of the Soviet Union recognized the role of the U.S. in the world and wished it no harm.”

Reagan expressed confidence that the American and Soviet peoples would discover more of what they had in common the better they got to know each other. Friendship between them would grow. The role of their governments was to let this happen. “It is not people but governments that create arms.” Reagan shared a lesson he had learned in a lifetime of dealing with people. “People do not get into trouble when they talk
to
each other, but rather when they talk
about
each other.”

Gorbachev said the overriding issue was the threat of war, specifically nuclear war. “Young people are wondering about whether they will be alive or not, and the older generation, which has suffered so much”—in the war against Germany—“is also thinking about this.” If the two sides at Geneva could create an impetus toward eliminating the threat of nuclear war, they would have accomplished a great deal. Failure was unacceptable. “If no such impetus is created, there will be great disappointment, and no statements or press announcements will justify the meeting. People will say that we are irresponsible.”

Gorbachev mentioned an issue that was sure to come up in the larger meetings. Bilateral relations were essential, but the Soviet Union and the United States must not forget the interests of other countries. “The Soviet Union has its national interests and the U.S. has them as well. Other countries also have their national interests. In the international context, we cannot speak of advancing some of these interests at the expense of suppressing others.” Gorbachev shared a saying he had heard after the announcement of the Geneva summit: “Reagan and Gorbachev should bear in mind that the world does not belong only to the two of them.”

Reagan said he had not heard the saying. He agreed that the superpowers should remember the interests of other countries. But he had to point out that the Soviet Union was not always helpful. “One of the things that creates mistrust of the USSR by the U.S. is the realization of the Marxist idea of helping socialist revolutions throughout the world and the belief that the Marxist system should prevail.” The United States supported each country’s right to self-determination, Reagan said. “But the U.S. feels that the Soviet Union attempts to use force to shape the developing countries to their own pattern, and that such force is often used only by a minority of the people of the country.”

Reagan, noting the time, suggested they join the larger group. But Gorbachev wouldn’t let the president’s assertions go unanswered. “There were some who considered that the American Revolution should have been crushed,” he observed. “The same applies to the French Revolution and the Soviet Revolution.” People made their own revolutions; these were not imposed from without. “The U.S. should not think that Moscow is omnipotent and that when I wake up every day I think about which country I would now like to arrange a revolution in.”

T
HE TÊTE-À-TÊTE HAD
been scheduled for fifteen minutes. “
We did an hour, which excited the hell out of the press,” Reagan remarked that evening. It also evoked anxiety in Reagan’s staff, who wanted to keep the president on schedule. One staffer asked George Shultz if he should break up the meeting. “
Are you out of your mind?” Shultz responded. “This is what it’s about. The longer they talk, the better it is.”

Reagan and Gorbachev gathered their entourages. Gorbachev spoke first before the larger group. He returned to the central issue of war and peace. “
If the two of us are unable to tackle this issue,” he said, “it is difficult to see how we can deal with others.” Gorbachev conceded that the Soviet Union had its own counterpart to the American military-industrial complex. “There are people linked to military affairs in both countries,” he said. “There are people who earn their living from these matters.” But such people should not be allowed to dictate policy. The overweening power of the military hindered economic progress, Gorbachev said. “Soviet and American scholars have shown that one job in the military sector is three times as costly as in the civilian sector. More jobs can be created if the money is channeled into civilian areas.”

Gorbachev had been reading Reagan’s speeches. He quoted the presi
dent as saying that a nuclear war could not be won and therefore must never be fought. Gorbachev said he agreed. Reagan had said the superpowers must treat each other as equals; Gorbachev agreed. Reagan had said cultural exchanges between the two countries conduced to peace; Gorbachev agreed. The general secretary reemphasized the need for cooperation. “We can live in this world only together,” he said. “So we both must think how to put relations on a new track.”

He hoped the president would not mistake the meaning of his remarks. “If the United States thinks that by saying these things I am showing weakness, that the Soviet Union is more interested than the United States, then this will all come to nothing. The Soviet Union will not permit an unequal approach. But if there is on the U.S. side a positive will, the United States will find the Soviets an active participant in the process.”

Reagan reiterated his earlier theme of trust. “If the two sides are to get down to the business of reducing the mountains of weapons, then both must get at the cause of the distrust which led to building these weapons,” he said. The United States had shown itself worthy of trust, he asserted. After World War II, when it possessed a nuclear monopoly, it had refrained from employing it. It had reduced its armies from twelve million men to fewer than two million and had cut its navy by half. The Soviet Union, however, had not reciprocated. It had rejected multiple American offers to reduce nuclear arsenals. The Kremlin instead had increased its arsenal even as it promoted world revolution. “The United States watched the Soviet military buildup, including nuclear weapons,” Reagan said. “The United States also sees an expansionist Soviet Union. It has a satellite in Cuba just ninety miles off our shores.” The expansion continued to the present. “Now we see
Afghanistan,
Ethiopia,
Angola and
Yemen—with, for example, 35,000 Cubans in Angola.”

Reagan said that Gorbachev overestimated the influence of the military on American policy and spending. “Our budget for humanitarian affairs—for the elderly and handicapped and for other social needs—is greater than our total
military budget. Two-thirds of our military spending pays for manpower; only a small percentage is spent on equipment. The total military budget is a very small percentage of our GNP.” Yet he agreed that America would be better off economically with an even smaller military. “The United States has no economic interest in continuing a military buildup.”

Reagan said that the Soviet buildup provoked fears among Americans—“maybe not fears of war, but that the Soviet Union could
acquire such an imbalance of strength that it could deliver an ultimatum.” Gorbachev needed to address these fears, as he—Reagan—was willing to address Soviet fears of the United States. “But more than words are needed. We need to get on to deeds.”

Reagan was the first to touch on the issue of strategic defense. Gorbachev had said previously that an antimissile shield would be destabilizing and dangerous, for it would give the United States a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. Reagan denied any offensive intent. He didn’t even know whether an antimissile shield would be possible, but he wanted to explore it. “The United States has a research program. The Soviet Union has the same kind of program. The United States has some hope that it might be possible.” Reagan suggested that both sides conduct research on an antimissile system. “And if one or both come up with such a system then they should sit down and make it available to everyone so no one would have a fear of a nuclear strike.” This would be essential even if the superpowers eliminated their nuclear arsenals. “A mad man might come along with a nuclear weapon. If we could come up with a shield and share it, then nobody would worry about the mad man.”

P
OSSIBLY
R
EAGAN REALIZED
this would be the last word before lunch. In Hollywood he had been known for hitting his mark. But whether designed or not, the recess that followed his introduction of the issue of strategic defense served his purpose of framing it as he wished without allowing Gorbachev an immediate rebuttal. Reagan didn’t know for certain but could reasonably guess that SDI would be the hardest nut for the two sides to crack, and he wanted an uncontested first blow.

Gorbachev didn’t want to give Reagan that advantage. He seemed quite willing to talk through lunch. Yet protocol intruded, and the two sides separated. Reagan relaxed, satisfied he had done well in his first appearance on the summit stage, while Gorbachev simply grew more impatient. So it appeared, at any rate, when the general secretary opened the afternoon session with a blistering rebuttal to Reagan’s defense of SDI. “
Twenty years ago there was no strategic balance,” he said. “The United States had four times as many strategic delivery systems as the USSR, and also forward-based systems. What would the United States have done if the Soviet Union had possessed four times as much? The United States would have had to take steps, just as the Soviet Union did, to establish parity.” Gorbachev denied Reagan’s assertion that the Soviet
Union had surpassed the United States. “All institutes which study the problem, including the ISS”—Institute for Strategic Studies—“in London, conclude that there is strategic parity. Force structures are different, but they support different strategies.”

The Soviet government insisted on maintaining parity, Gorbachev said, but it sought parity at a lower level. “We must meet each other halfway if we are to find a way to reduce strategic weapons. The time has come for us both to muster the political will and realism to make progress and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun the other side. Even now, due to computer technology, one side could get ahead in space. But we can match any challenge, though you might not think so. We know that the United States can meet any challenge from us, and we can meet any challenge from you. But why not make a step which would permit lowering the arms level?”

Gorbachev warned that SDI would trigger an arms race in space. “And not just a defensive arms race but an offensive arms race with space weapons,” he said. “Space weapons will be harder to verify and will feed suspicions and mistrust. Scientists say any shield can be pierced, so SDI cannot save us. So why create it? It only makes sense if it is to defend against a retaliatory strike. What would the West think if the Soviet Union was developing these weapons? You would react with horror.” Gorbachev cited remarks by Caspar Weinberger that missile defense in Soviet hands would be a threat to the West. “If we go first, you feel it would be bad for the world, feeding mistrust. We cannot accept the rationale which says it is good if you do it and bad if we do it.”

Gorbachev said he knew Reagan was very attached to the idea of strategic defense. But he cautioned the president against acting on the idea. “We will have to frustrate this plan, and we will build up in order to smash your shield.” Gorbachev took pains to ensure that Reagan understood what he was saying. “If the United States embarks on SDI, the following will happen: first, no reduction in offensive weapons; second, the Soviet Union will respond. This strategy will not be a mirror image of your program but a simpler, more effective system.” Gorbachev wanted the president to consider other implications of SDI. Even if the system worked at some level, it would have dangerous consequences. “It will require automation which will place important decisions in the hands of computers,” he said. “This could unleash an uncontrollable process. You haven’t thought this through. It will be a waste of money and will also cause more distrust and more weapons.”