After 1918, when the time came to commemorate the enormous French losses in World War I, the republican cult of the war dead, what Antoine Prost calls the civil religion of interwar France, was again more marked in the provinces, and not just because it was in the villages and hamlets that the human losses had been greatest. The Third Republic, and everything it stood for, mattered more in the towns and villages of France’s regions and departments than it did in urbane, cosmopolitan Paris: The loss of that heritage is thus felt more deeply there.
24
The experience and the memory of war in our century is an important clue to France’s fractured heritage, and perhaps deserves more attention than it receives in
Realms of Memory
. In the words of René Rémond: “From 1914 to 1962, for nearly half a century, war was never absent from French memory, from national consciousness and identity.”
25
The First World War I may have been morally untroubling, but it left scars too deep to touch for a long time: In addition to the five million men killed or wounded, there were hundreds of thousands of war widows and their children, not to speak of the shattered landscape of northeastern France. For many decades World War I lay, as it were, in purgatory—remembered but hardly celebrated. Only very recently have the battlefields of the Western Front become sites of more confident commemoration—as you enter the Department of the Somme, official roadside signs welcome you to the region, reminding you that its tragic history (and its cemeteries) are a part of the local heritage and merit a visit: something that would have been unthinkable not long ago.
26
But World War II, not to speak of France’s “dirty wars” in Indochina and Algeria, carries more mixed and ambivalent messages and memories. If Vichy is now a
lieu de mémoire
for scholars and polemicists, for most French men and women it has yet to emerge fully from the coffin of oblivion into which it was cast in 1945: “four years to be stricken from our history,” in the words of Daniel Mornet, the prosecutor at the trial of Marshal Pétain. The twentieth-century past, in short, cannot easily substitute for the older, longer history whose passing is recorded and celebrated in Nora’s collection.
It is not just that the recent past is too close to us. The problem is that although the land, the peasants, even the Church (though not the monarchy) survived well beyond 1918 and even 1940, something else did not. In the first half of the Third Republic, from 1871 until World War I, there was no difficulty in absorbing the trophies of an ancient royal past into the confident republican present. But there is nothing very glorious or confident about French history since 1918, despite de Gaulle’s heroic efforts; just stoic suffering, decline, uncertainty, defeat, shame, and doubt, followed in very short order, as we have seen, by unprecedented changes. These changes could not undo the recent memories; but they did—and here Nora is surely right—appear to erase the older heritage, leaving only troubling recollections and present confusion.
This is not the first time France has had occasion to look back on a hectic sequence of turbulence and doubt—the men who constructed the Third Republic after 1871 had to forge a civic consensus and a national community in the aftermath of three revolutions, two monarchies, an empire, a short-lived republic, a civil war, and a major military defeat all in the span of one short lifetime. They succeeded because they had a story to tell about France that could bind the past and future into a single narrative, and they taught that story with firm conviction to three generations of future citizens.
Their successors cannot do this—witness the sorry case of François Mitterrand, president of France throughout the 1980s and for half of the 1990s. No French ruler since Louis XIV has ever taken such care and trouble to commemorate his country’s glory and make it his own; his reign was marked by a steady accumulation of monuments, new museums, memorials, solemn inaugurations, burials and reburials, not to speak of gargantuan lapidary efforts to secure his own place in future national memory, from the Arch at La Défense in western Paris to the Very Large Library on the south bank of the Seine. But what, aside from his Florentine ability to survive in power for so long, was Mitterrand best known for, on the eve of his death? His inability fully and accurately to recall and acknowledge his own role as a minor player at Vichy—an uncannily precise individual reflection of the nation’s own memory hole.
The French, like their late president, don’t know what to make of their recent history. In this, to repeat, they are not so very different from their neighbors to the east and elsewhere. But in France these things used to seem so simple, and it is the contrast that causes the level of unease audible in Nora’s great work. It also, I think, explains his juxtaposition of history and memory that I noted earlier. Memory and history used to move in unison—historical interpretations of the French past, however critical, dealt in the same currency as public memory. That, of course, was because public memory in its turn was shaped by official accounts of the national experience that derived their meaning from a remarkably consensual historiography. And by official I mean above all pedagogical—the French were taught their memory—a theme brought out in Nora’s collection by the essays on French history as taught in nineteenth-century schoolbooks.
Now, in Nora’s view, history and memory have lost touch, with the nation and with each other. Is he right? When we travel the French
autoroutes
and read those didactic placards, what is actually happening? There would not be much point in telling us that we are looking at Reims Cathedral, approaching the battlefield of Verdun, or driving near the village of Domrémy, for example, unless we already knew why these places were of interest; for this, after all, the panels do not say. Their transparency depends on knowledge that the passerby has already acquired—in school. We don’t need to be told what these places “mean”; they take their meaning from a familiar narrative which they confirm by their presence. And therefore the narrative has to come first, or else they have no meaning.
Lieux de mémoire
—“realms of memory”—cannot, in short, be separated from history. There is no
autoroute
information panel telling you when you are passing “Vichy” (as distinct from a signpost indicating the exit for the town). This is not because “Vichy” is divisive (Jeanne d’Arc, born at Domrémy, is, after all, a highly contentious symbol, currently the darling of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front), but because the French have no narrative to which they can attach “Vichy” that would give to it an agreed, communicable meaning. Without such a narrative, without a history, “Vichy” has no place in French memory.
In the end, then, it doesn’t really matter that “old” France has gone forever, or that, in Armand Frémont’s phrase, the state is “reprinting the poem of French rural society” in “eco-museums” and rural theme parks, though much is thereby lost. This isn’t even new—there has always been forgetting and remembering, the inventing and abandoning of traditions, at least since the Romantic years of the early nineteenth century.
27
The problem with living in an era of commemoration is not that the forms of public memory thus proposed are fake, or kitsch, or selective and even parodic. As a deliberate attempt to both recall and outdo the Valois monarchs, Louis XIV’s Versailles was all of these things and an anticipatory pastiche of every
lieu de mémoire
that has succeeded it to this day. That is just how heritage and commemoration are.
What is new, at least in the modern era, is the neglect of history. Every memorial, every museum, every shorthand commemorative allusion to something from the past that should arouse in us the appropriate sentiments of respect, or regret, or sadness, or pride, is parasitic upon the presumption of historical knowledge: not shared memory, but a shared memory of history as we learned it. France, like other modern nations, is living off the pedagogical capital invested in its citizens in earlier decades. As Jacques and Mona Ozouf gloomily conclude in their essay on Augustine Fouillée’s educational classic
Le Tour de la France par deux enfants
: “
Le Tour de la France
stands as witness to that moment in French history when everything was invested in the schools. We have completely lost our faith in the realm of pedagogy, which is why Mme Fouillée’s sharply etched portrait seems to us so blurred.”
28
For the moment, at least, Pierre Nora’s themes are still material for a study of
lieux de mémoire
. But to judge from the virtual disappearance of narrative history from the curriculum in school systems, including the American, the time may soon come when, for many citizens, large parts of their common past will constitute something more akin to
lieux d’oubli
, realms of forgetting—or, rather, realms of ignorance, since there will have been little to forget. Teaching children, as we now do, to be critical of received versions of the past serves little purpose once there no longer
is
a received version.
29
Pierre Nora is right, after all—history does belong to everyone and to no one, hence its claim to universal authority. Like any such claim, this will always be contested. But without it, we are in trouble.
The selection of essays from Pierre Nora’s
Les Lieux de mémoire
, translated by Arthur Goldhammer and published in 1998 by Columbia University Press, was reviewed by me in the
New York Review of Books
in December of that year. Since then, the University of Chicago Press has published a different selection of essays from the same French work under the title
Rethinking France
, making available in English some of the essays not included in the Columbia collection. However, the Goldhammer translations are distinctly superior.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII
1
James E. Young,
The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 5. See also Daniel Sherman, “Art, Commerce and the Production of Memory in France after World War I,” in
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity
, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 186-215.
2
Milan Kundera,
Testaments Betrayed: An Essay in Nine Parts
(New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 128.
3
Saul Friedländer,
Nazi Germany and the Jews
, vol. I,
The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939
(New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Henry Rousso,
The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
4
Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in
Realms of Memory
(Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992), 1:3.
5
Les Lieux de mémoire. Vol. 1, La République; Vol. 2, La Nation; Vol. 3, Les Frances
, all under the direction of Pierre Nora. In addition to the translation under review here, four volumes on the themes of the state, space, cultures and traditions, and historiography will be published by the University of Chicago Press.
6
Philippe Burrin, “Vichy,” in
Realms of Memory
, 1:182.
7
“In France . . . the intensity of the phenomenon [of commemoration—TJ] owes less to the accidents of chronology than to the richness of the French historical repertoire, to the radical nature of the revolutionary break, and to the memorial rumination to which the country has been condemned by the feeling that it is no longer a place where history on the grand scale is made.” Pierre Nora, “The Era of Commemoration,” in
Realms of Memory
, 3:610.
8 Pascal Ory, “Gastronomy,” in
Realms of Memory
, 2:443.
9
Nora, “Between Memory and History,” in
Realms of Memory
3, 6-7.
10
“En fin de parcours, le lecteur étranger perd le fil. Qu’est-ce qui n’est pas lieu de mémoire?” Pim den Boer, “Lieux de mémoire et l’identité de l’Europe,” in
Lieux de mémoire et identités nationales,
ed. Pim den Boer and Willem Frijhoff (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1993), 17. See also Pierre Nora, “Preface to the English-language edition,” in
Realms of Memory
, 1:xvii.
11
Nora, as well as being a respected teacher, is editorial director at Gallimard, France’s premier publishing house, and responsible for
Le Débat
, the country’s most important intellectual periodical. He has drawn on the work of some close collaborators from this enterprise.
12
Nora, “The Era of Commemoration,” in
Realms of Memory
, p. 614.
13
Nora, “Introduction” to Volume 3 of
Realms of Memory
, xii.
14
Pierre Nora, “La notion de ‘lieu de mémoire’ est-elle exportable?” in
Lieux de mémoire et identités nationales
, p. 9.
15
Chateaubriand is quoted by Jacques Le Goff in “Reims, City of Coronation,” in
Realms of Memory
, 3:245.
16
For a fine example of what can be done with the study of towns and cities as sites of memory (or forgetting), see Sophie de Schaepdrijver, “Bruxelles, ‘lieu sans identité’ ou le sort d’une capital incertaine, voué à l’imitation,” in
Lieux de mémoire et identités nationales
, p. 90: “Le sort de Bruxelles est, je crois, exemplaire de ce qui se passe lorsqu’une ville devient lieu d’oubli, lieu d’une course à la modernité qui n’est freinée par nul instinct de conservation (car au nom de quoi conserverait-on?).” [“Brussels’ fate seems to me an exemplary instance of what happens when a town becomes a site of forgetting, of a rush to modernize restrained by no instinct for conservation—for in the name of what would one conserve?”]