Rendezvous with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America (87 page)

But Paul Corbin was secretly engineering a deal with Pat Lucey, who had resigned as Carter's ambassador to Mexico in the fall of 1979 to join the Kennedy campaign. Discussions had been going on for more than a month, and Anderson and Lucey now met in seclusion. Anderson needed a running mate who was respected by the media and the political establishment, and the former Wisconsin governor filled the bill. Lucey was also a New Deal liberal and would appeal to voters on the Left.

Lucey told everybody he was leaving the decision to his wife, Jean, who, like her husband, adored the Kennedy family and despised Carter. It was easy to see where this was going. Jean Lucey told reporters, “Anderson is certainly the best of the lot.”
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T
HE
R
EAGAN TEAM ANNOUNCED
that the official kickoff of its fall campaign would be at Liberty State Park in New Jersey on Labor Day. The candidate would give a
major speech with the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island as a backdrop.
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Reagan would then return to Detroit. Democrats often kicked off their campaigns there, but this time the Republican candidate was competing for the workingman's vote.
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George Bush was to begin with a rally at the airport in Portland, Maine, and then stump in New Jersey.
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Carter announced that the launch of his fall campaign would be at a picnic in Tuscumbia, Alabama.
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Four years earlier, Carter had begun in Warm Springs, Georgia, where FDR had often vacationed.

R
EAGAN'S “NOBLE CAUSE” COMMENT
was beginning to generate manufactured indignation among the elites. In 1980 the Vietnam War was a taboo subject, at least any defense of it. The dominant culture subscribed to the argument that America had lost Southeast Asia because America was corrupt, the Pentagon was evil and incompetent, and there was moral equivalency between the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese—the killing fields of the puppet Cambodian regime set up by Hanoi notwithstanding. Reagan would not keep quiet, though. He said the North Vietnamese could not beat America in the field, so they beat America in its living rooms, with a propaganda campaign designed to weaken American resolve.

The phrase “noble cause” pushed buttons. Whether to use it at all had been hotly debated inside the Reagan campaign. It had been taken out of the original draft, but Reagan put it back in.
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It came out of the second draft. Reagan put it back in. It came out a third time. Reagan put it back in.

Liberal columnists such as Mary McGrory of the
Washington Star
denounced Reagan for making the remark. Even Rowly Evans and Bob Novak pronounced the comment “inexplicable.”
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A disloyal member of Reagan's campaign told Evans and Novak that he was “appalled” by the “noble cause” statement. Another aide, clearly more loyal, told the columnists that Reagan had a need “to tell it like he feels.”
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A split was developing in the campaign between men like Richard Allen and Ed Meese, who had been with Reagan for years and were more conservative, and more moderate latecomers like David Gergen. The hardliners had won out over the toughness of Reagan's speeches, even as the moderates attempted to reduce on-the-fly press conferences and to take Reagan out of the loop on his own speeches.

In the “noble cause” speech Reagan had also said that the Carter administration was turning a blind eye to Soviet hegemony. The White House response to developments in Poland illustrated his point. Workers across that Eastern Bloc nation, led by an unassuming, pipe-smoking electrician named Lech Walesa, had
gone on strike for the right to create their own labor unions and to protest the abysmal conditions in their country, where simple consumer goods that Westerners took for granted—light bulbs, toiletries, stationery—were either luxury items or unattainable. Poland's Communist government called out the riot squad, sending thousands of troops and policemen into the street to quell the protesters. Despite the Communists' heavy-handed response, the Carter administration refused to support the striking workers. Secretary of State Ed Muskie called for “restraint.”
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Such was the Carter administration's fear of antagonizing the Kremlin.

T
HE MEDIA DETONATED ANOTHER
bomb over Reagan's comments about “upgrading” relations with Taiwan without reducing recognition of China. The Communist regime that controlled the Chinese mainland was outraged by Reagan's desire to return to the “two-China” policy that existed before Carter canceled relations with the island country. Reagan had been to Taiwan in 1978, accompanied by Peter Hannaford and Dick Allen along with their wives. Like all anticommunists, he had deep feelings of support for the beleaguered Taiwan Chinese, often referring to their country by its official name, the Republic of China.

The Reagan campaign had sent Bush—a former envoy to China—off to Asia. The goal was to showcase Bush's foreign-policy expertise, but even before he left the matter of China and Taiwan had become a subject of dispute. At the send-off event for Bush, the media pressed the campaign over whether Reagan would reject Carter's policy and reinstitute recognition of Taiwan. The campaign unsuccessfully tried to assure the media that the policy would not be reversed.
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Now the Chinese used the opportunity of their old friend Bush's visit to attack Reagan in the state-controlled media. Bush had a two-hour meeting in private with Communist Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and emerged “looking chastened,” according to
Newsweek
. He was also reported to be in a state of “testiness.”
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When Bush was asked about Reagan's comments concerning improving U.S.–Taiwan diplomacy, “He put his hand to his forehead and groaned,” the
Washington Post
reported.
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Reporters kept pressing Bush on the matter, but the running mate refused to elaborate on his outward display.

R
EAGAN PRESSED ON TO
Dallas, where he gave a barnburner of a speech to thousands of religious leaders, who four years earlier had overwhelmingly supported the born-again Carter. Reagan made a profound statement that later became emblematic of his political skills: “I know you can't endorse me, but I endorse you.”
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The event was organized by the televangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell and
his Moral Majority. Anderson and Carter also had been invited to speak but had turned Falwell down. Billed as the Roundtable National Affairs Briefing, the conference was officially nonpartisan, yet these pastors and laymen were gearing up to mobilize their congregations for the fall election.

The audience and Reagan had far more in common than not, especially when Reagan said the theory of evolution was just that, a theory, and that the “Biblical story of creation should be taught as well.”
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Reagan then knocked it out of the park, concluding, “The First Amendment was written not to protect the people and their laws from religious values but to protect those values from government tyranny.”
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But the event was not stress-free for Reagan. Because of poor advance work by his campaign, he was stuck on the stage with a fire-and-brimstone pastor who said America should be governed by the Bible and not the Constitution.
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The entire national media took note of Reagan's discomfort.

The year before, Falwell had said that a liberal could not be a good Christian. When reporters caught up with Reagan, he went out of his way to disagree with Falwell, saying that it was possible “for a true Christian to support the Equal Rights Amendment” and “homosexual rights.”
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Reagan represented a paradox: although culturally conservative by nature, he also had been steeped in Hollywood's more tolerant, cosmopolitan way of life. Throughout his life and especially as an actor the gregarious Reagan socialized with all types. He never disavowed his days in Hollywood Babylon and always reminisced fondly of his old movie pals.

When it came to his personal dealings with individuals, Reagan was nothing like the man his enemies tried to portray. He was nonjudgmental with a generosity of spirit. Consequently, Reagan's relationship with the Religious Right would always remain a complicated one, a
pas de deux
. He periodically—and convincingly—threw them rhetorical red meat and they, in turn, threw him their votes. Whether Reagan—or anyone—could tangibly deliver what they actually wanted was, given the realities of modern American society, another matter.

T
HE
C
ARTER BATTLE PLAN
was taking shape. They would paint Reagan as a warmonger, a dangerous, trigger-happy nuclear cowboy unfit to hold high office. Rafshoon was preparing a hit commercial on Reagan named “Places he would attack.” Carter wasn't going to bother convincing voters that he was up to the task but rather would convince them that Reagan was not. Pat Caddell bluntly summarized his mission: to separate the voters who thought “Reagan is going to be worse” from those who felt “Reagan can't be any worse.”
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A Carter campaign memo clearly spelled out this agenda: “Our goal must be to establish the shadow
of doubt about Reagan's ability to handle the Presidency. His age, lack of foreign- policy experience, and simplistic economic philosophy are exploitable.”
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As most vice presidents do, Walter Mondale had become bored with his job. He was known to sometimes take a nap in his office or knock off early and go home. So getting back on the stump and making the partisan case against Reagan suited him just fine. Talking tough with reporters, Mondale said, “The other thing is that I believe when Reagan starts to fall, he'll fall like a crowbar.” He was asked, “Just how does a crowbar fall?” Mondale deadpanned, “Awfully fast.”
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The Reagan campaign continued to worry—deeply—that the White House was planning to spring an October surprise. Reagan strategists lay awake at night visualizing Carter going on national television to announce that the hostages had been released from Iran and were flying to Andrews Air Force Base, where Carter would greet them. Then there would be a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House and a procession up to Capitol Hill. Carter would get such a boost from the grateful American voters that he would bound right over Reagan and into a second term.

A
MBASSADOR
B
USH RETURNED TO
bad reviews from his trip to Asia. Indeed, many media outlets pronounced the trip a failure.
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Bush was in a difficult position, in part because of Reagan's comments about “upgrading” an American presence on Taiwan as part of a “two China” policy.
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Even former president Ford criticized Reagan's position on China, saying that Carter had done the right thing in canceling relations with Taiwan. But Ford did say he thought the controversy would not affect the outcome of the election.
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Lyn Nofziger agreed, telling reporters, “This campaign is not going to be won or lost on China.”
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Rather than backing away from the controversy, Reagan showed that he would not knuckle under to the Chinese. In Los Angeles, with Bush standing at his side, he read a two-thousand-word statement in which he said, “As president I will not accept the interference of any foreign power in the process of protecting American interests.” Reagan conceded that he might have “misstated” what he really meant about recognizing both countries, and he now made clear, once and for all, that if elected he would maintain full relations with the People's Republic of China but would also embark on reinstituting official recognition of Taiwan.
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The media tried repeatedly to get both men off stride. Reagan's jaw clenched and he raised his voice several times. Bush strongly rejected the reports that his trip had been unsuccessful and said clearly that the Chinese understood Reagan's position.
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The two men then swung into an attack on Carter, accusing him of creating the mess in the first place with the abrogation of the mutual-defense
treaty with Taiwan that had been supported and endorsed by every president since Truman.

The
New York Times
turned to John Sears, Reagan's former manager, for his analysis of the imbroglio. Vengefully, he remarked, “You can find yourself explaining every day why you're not an idiot. He's got some work left to do.”
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The Reagan-Bush press conference was important, though, as it got Reagan off the defensive. He realized the situation was a test of his command abilities and he had but three choices: to continue to stew in his own juices, to back off and essentially endorse the Carter position, or to enunciate his policies, firmly. Reagan chose the third option, and after his show of strength and decisiveness, the matter began to fade. Even the oft-critical columnists Germond and Witcover said, “Reagan's defense of his friends in Taiwan could be considered an act of political principle, conviction above pragmatism.”
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At another press confab, three thousand miles away in Washington, Governor Pat Lucey announced at the National Press Club that he would go on the ticket with Anderson. Lucey took a jab or two at Reagan, as would be expected, but he saved his strongest punches for Carter. He referred to “the human wreckage Jimmy Carter's presidency has left in its wake. Jimmy Carter has not seen this. He has been hiding in the Rose Garden trying to escape debates.” Lucey said he would campaign among labor unions, attack Carter, and make the case for Anderson.
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