Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) (64 page)

28
(6.507c)
But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?:
See
Phaedrus
250d
for another assertion
concerning the qualities that distinguish sight from the other senses. The “artificer (demiourgos) of the senses” is presumably “god,” but this is not made explicit.

29
(6.508b)
And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?:
There was considerable theoretical speculation in the classical period about the mechanics of sight and vision, to which Plato alludes in several passages—for example, Phaedrus 251c,
Timaeus
45b—c, and
Meno
76c-d.

30
(6.508b-c)
And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world ... what
the
good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind:
The cosmology Socrates proposes, that the sun is the offspring of the good (“begat in his likeness”) is idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, his description of the sun as the offspring of the good builds on established associations between knowledge and physical sight (compare 6.484c); it also capitalizes on the keen awareness of the sun’s importance that would have been natural (and inevitable) in the pre-industrial society of classical Athens (compare 6.509b). On the logic of the analogy, just as the sun is responsible for the existence of all objects in the phenomenal realm, the idea of the good brings into being all objects in the intelligible realm. Moreover, just as the sun is the source of light in the phenomenal realm, which enables the eye to see physical objects (including the sun itself), the good is likewise the source of truth in the intelligible realm, which makes the soul (or mind) capable of apprehending intelligible objects (including the good itself). The power to exercise the faculty of sight, vis-à-vis objects in the phenomenal realm, is thus comparable to the power to exercise the faculty of reason, or knowledge, vis-à-vis objects in the intelligible realm.

31
(6.509c)
Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!:
The phrase translated by Jowett as “with a ludicrous earnestness” is in Greek the adverb
geloiôs
(“humorously” or “facetiously”). Compare 6.506d, where Socrates, though urged on by Glaucon, claims to be anxious about attempting to describe the idea of the good, fearing that his “indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule [
gelota
]” upon him. The “light” tone adopted by Socrates and Glaucon is yet another reminder that the ideas advanced here about the idea of the good, though suggestive and important, are not meant to stand as definitive “last words.”

32
(6.509d-e)
Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion ... and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images:
The figure of the divided line supplies key refinements to the theory of knowledge (that is, the theory about distinct cognitive faculties that are used to apprehend different types of objects) that is first advanced at 5.476d-480a.

33
(6.510b)
There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the inquiry can only be hypothetical
... ;
in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses ... proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves:
Despite Socrates’ initial emphasis on the differences among the
objects
represented by the divided line, his concern—beginning with this sentence—shifts to distinguishing the cognitive processes and faculties whereby mathematical objects and the ideas are apprehended. Mathematicians, as Socrates and Glaucon agree at 7.531e-532a, are not required “to give and take a reason” for the objects they study; they hypothesize, for example, a circle, and study its properties, but never question whether the circle they study actually exists or not. They rely, moreover, on visible images (for example, circles that are physically drawn) for their investigations. In contrast, dialecticians—that is, those who study the ideas—depend on no such physical models and, most importantly, test their hypotheses; they do not take for granted the existence of the ideas they investigate. Mathematical “objects” per se, then, do not differ substantively from the ideas, and they are capable of being apprehended by the faculty of “reason” (
noesis
) as well as that of “understanding” (
dianoia
); see 6.511d. It is, rather, the exercise of
noesis
that differs radically from the exercise of
dianoia.
The distinction here between
noesis
and
dianoia
looks ahead to the description of the philosopher’s education at 7.521c-540a, in which training in mathematical subjects—that is, “number science” (
arithmetikê
), plane and solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics—constitutes a mere “prelude” that prepares the future philosopher for his or her study of dialectic (7.531d).

34
(6.511b)
that other sort of knowledge which reason itself attains by the power of dialectic:
Dialectic and its use are described in more detailed, albeit still tentative, terms at 7.531d-539d.

35
(6.511d-e)
let there be four faculties in the soul ... and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have
truth: The terms Socrates now uses for the four cognitive faculties, which are rendered differently by different translators, are
noesis
(“reason”),
dianoia
(“understanding”),
pistis
(“faith” or “conviction”), and
eikasia
(“perception of shadows” in Jowett, but often translated elsewhere as “imagination”).
Noesis
and
dianoia
fall under the rubric of
epistemê (gnosis,
gnome), the terms used in book 5 to describe the general cognitive faculty that enables one to apprehend objects in the “higher” intelligible realm, whereas
pistis
and
eikasia
are different species of
doxa,
the general faculty by which phenomenal objects are perceived. See note 33 on 6.510b and note 24 on 5.476d.

1
(7.514a)
Behold! human beings living in an underground den:
Socrates’ allegory of the cave builds on the image of the divided line as well as the analogy established in the simile of the sun comparing the eye’s ability to apprehend the objects in the physical realm to the mind’s ability to apprehend intelligible objects. Likening the prisoners to “ourselves” (7.515a) and the world of daily experience to mere shadows and echoes, it vividly reinforces Socrates’ contention that most people are mistaken in their belief that the phenomenal world is real and knowable (see 7.517a-c). In contrast to the simile, the allegory accentuates the difficulties of apprehending the idea of the good, which is once again represented by the sun, and consequently of developing the cognitive faculty that enables this apprehension. It emphasizes the emotional as well as physical distress of the prisoner (that is, future philosopher) who, upon being released from his bonds, is disabused of his assumptions about “reality” as he makes the arduous upward journey out of the cave into the bright light of day (7.515c-d). The released prisoner, once accustomed to looking at the sunlit world and the sun itself, will also have difficulties when he is forced to reenter the dark and shadowy cave; the description of his tense dealings with his former fellow-prisoners at 7.517a-e harks back to Socrates’ explanation of the philosopher’s apparent uselessness in 6.488a-489a, and it resonates as well with what is suggested in Republic and other dialogues (for example,
Phaedo, Gorgias)
about the philosopher’s disdain for material goods and “prizes.”

2
(7.515e)
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent:
Socrates’ description of the released prisoner’s upward journey evokes the mythological motif of
anabasis
—that is, an upward journey out of the underworld. Compare 7.521c.

3
(7.517b)
and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upward to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world, in my view, at least, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly, God knows:
Compare Socrates’ reluctance to describe the idea of the good at 6.504b and 6.509c.

4
(7.518b)
certain professors of education:
Some sophists and professional teachers of rhetoric claimed to be able to instill knowledge (
epistemê
) in their students. According to Socrates’ argument, however, the faculty of
epistemê
is already in the soul; as the discussion of books 6 and 7 makes plain, cultivating this faculty is a challenging and difficult process that few are capable of undertaking since, as he states in the immediately following paragraph, it involves the reorientation of the whole soul away from “becoming” and toward “being.”

5
(7.520c)
Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark:
The verb “go down” (or “descend”) in Greek is
katabainein.
Katabasis (the opposite of
anabasis;
see note 2 on 7.515e) typically refers to a journey to the underworld undertaken by a heroic figure such as Heracles, Theseus, or Orpheus.

6
(7.521c)
as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?:
The reference may be to individuals like Asclepius, who was apothe osized after being killed by Zeus, and Semele, the Theban princess who was pregnant with Dionysus when she was killed by Zeus’ thunderbolt.

7
(7.521c)
the turning over of an oyster-shell: Ostrakon
in Greek actually means “potsherd” (pottery fragment), not “oyster-shell.” For the purposes of the game to which Socrates alludes, a potsherd was painted black on one side and white on the other; when it was flipped in the air, the players called “night” or “day,” just as people today call “heads” and “tails” when coins are flipped. Socrates’ meaning is that education is a serious affair that cannot be left to chance.

8
(7.521d)
Usefulness in war:
Arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, and astronomy, which constitute four of the five preparatory disciplines that future philosophers should study as they train their souls to move from “becoming to being,” all had obvious military applications. Nonetheless, when discussing geometry and astronomy, Socrates insists that utility in war is not the most important determinant of these disciplines’ value to guardians in training (7.526a and 7.528d-529a). Rather, they are useful primarily because they “make more easy the vision of the idea of good” (7.526d-e).