Rush to Glory: FORMULA 1 Racing's Greatest Rivalry (29 page)

But even before all this happened, there was an even more bizarre incident—Italian policemen came to the McLaren pit and took Alastair Caldwell away. They told him they were arresting him on suspicion of importing illegal fuel into Italy. It was a trumped-up charge, and Caldwell’s theory was that Ferrari wanted him out of the way when the stewards made their fuel announcement.

Caldwell believed that Enzo Ferrari had been able to manipulate the situation by calling a friend in the local police station. He explained: “[Enzo] Ferrari had obviously said, ‘We need to get rid of Caldwell completely because he’ll go bananas. He’s the man to worry about. What can we do? We’ll pretend that the fuel has been illegally imported; we’ll tell him that and have him arrested on this basis.’ We had Texaco fuel, which had been brought in a truck from Belgium, certainly imported correctly with the right paperwork, but that didn’t matter. They had an excuse to lock me up.”

Caldwell was put in a cell at Monza police station and was held incommunicado for over two hours until a Texaco technician brought the customs paperwork that proved the fuel had been correctly imported. Caldwell emerged from incarceration only to be surprised with the news that Hunt was out of the race.

In the absence of Caldwell, Mayer had gone to the stewards’ office with Texaco’s analysis in his hand, demanding to know what was going on. The Italians showed him the telex they had received from the CSI in Paris to explain why they had acted as they had. But crucially, they showed him only the reply and not their original message. It was deliberate, underhanded skulduggery, as the scrutineers had always known exactly what the rules were. If they hadn’t, they had the very articulate Teddy Mayer on hand to remind them. Waving the CSI telex in his hand, the Italian chief scrutineer confidently sent Mayer away. But he was a dishonest individual, and for once Mayer had not asked the right questions, and lacking much Italian, he had been fobbed off with much gesticulations and mock indignation. Mayer lacked Caldwell’s technical knowledge to make an argument and couldn’t understand the paperwork in front of him as Caldwell would have been able to do. Enzo Ferrari had been very clever in removing Caldwell from the scene.

Meanwhile, Hunt, also lacking Caldwell’s guidance and the requisite technical knowledge about fuel chemistry, was in high dudgeon and prepared to believe that his fuel was illegal. The Italians had done their job so well, they convinced Hunt the fuel was illegal. He was furious with John Goosens, who headed up Texaco’s racing effort in Europe. Goosens was adamant that Texaco had done all it could, but Hunt was having none of it.

Hunt was apoplectic, not so much because of his exclusion but by the scrutineers’ assertion that he was a cheat. The implication of their actions was that the team had not competed fairly throughout 1976. Hunt, on learning the facts, later recalled: “The implication that we had been cheating annoyed me enormously. Not only had we not been cheating but running a high octane fuel would not help unless we had increased the compression ratio of the engine to match the increased octane rating. You have to modify your engine accordingly, and we certainly hadn’t done that—we could have run 150 octane petrol and our engine wouldn’t have given an ounce more power. Our fuel was totally legal, and we had gone to a lot of trouble before the race to make sure that it was, but to have that understood by the general public was more than one could ask. So this mud had been thrown, and some of it was inevitably sticking.”

Meanwhile, Mayer was continually on the telephone to Paris asking the CSI officials exactly what was going on. Mayer effectively wanted to know why the fuel, which was identical to that used throughout the season, had not been declared illegal before. No one had any answer to that. CSI officials were just as confused as Mayer about what was going on in Italy in its name. The Italians had done a lovely number on everyone. Niki Lauda and Daniele Audetto, who despite his many failings was an honorable man, realized exactly what was happening and were embarrassed but could hardly intervene.

Both Mayer and Hunt finally realized exactly what was going on but were powerless to do anything about it. They appealed the decision straightaway, which proved to be a mistake, as the matter then became sub judice in the eyes of the stewards, and they then refused to discuss it further. As Hunt remembered: “Because we appealed, we couldn’t discuss it further, so I was stuffed out of the race. You can’t run the grand prix a month later; and by putting me on the back of the grid, the argument could only be sorted out later.”

And that was the genius of the Italian tactics. It was one thing appealing a result after the event. But a no-result caused by cheating could not be reversed.

The fuel situation was later clarified and corrected by a statement from the CSI, but by then it was too late; the damage had been done. Hunt laughed when he saw the statement and said, “I was frustrated even more when the CSI put out a press release saying that everything was all right and that the McLaren team hadn’t been cheating.”

Added to what had happened in Spain and Britain, the Italian press ran huge headlines announcing “McLaren cheats,” and the coverage was read around the world. Mayer said, “I think Ferrari began to believe that if James could beat them, we must be cheating; and they began to try and find excuses.”

It was later found that the Italian fuel checks had been wrongly interpreted by the stewards, an interpretation that would almost cost James Hunt the world championship. He said at the time, “The rules are very complicated and they are difficult to understand, but they state that you can use the top grade of commercially available fuel in the team’s country of origin plus a tolerance of one octane.”

But at that moment, the Italians believed that Hunt, Mass, and Watson were out. But then something equally bizarre happened. Before the exclusions, three drivers hadn’t qualified for the race: Brett Lunger’s works Surtees, Arturo Merzario’s Williams, and Otto Stuppacher’s private Tyrrell. Gradually, all three drivers withdrew to make way for the disqualified drivers, and much to the chagrin of the Italians, Hunt, Mass, and Watson were back in the race.

But Hunt would still have to start the Italian Grand Prix from the second to last row of the starting grid. Hunt was so angry, he even thought about withdrawing. But realizing it would be a fruitless protest, he focused on trying to get some points—although he knew he could no longer win outright.

But his heart was not in it, and by the 11th lap, he was in 12th place when he came together with Tom Pryce’s Shadow and went off the road. His McLaren-Ford went into the sand and got beached, with its rear wheels spinning wildly. The sand traps, which were gradually replacing catch fencing, decelerated cars very effectively and slowed the McLaren so that it stopped just in front of the barrier. Hunt jumped out of his car and walked round, checking for damage. Seeing it was intact, he pushed the car out of the hole dug by the spinning tires. But he was then prevented from getting back in the car by the Italian marshals. For once, the Italians were abiding by the rules; although they didn’t please Hunt. But the longer time went on, the less relevant it became.

Hunt said, “They wouldn’t let me get back in. They pounced on me. But it wasn’t really worth making an issue of it because, firstly, the car was stuck in the sand and, secondly, I was now completely out of the race, even if I could have restarted. It was then hopeless trying to gain points as far as I was concerned.”

All this was going on against a backdrop of hissing and booing Italians. It was more like feeding time at a zoo than a motor race, and as he was too far away for their spittle to reach him, they started throwing the contents of their picnic baskets at him. Hunt showed his contempt for them by casually picking up an apple that had hit him and starting to chomp on it. He casually waved back in thanks, incensing the Italians in the stand.

In reality, Hunt was stupefied with frustration and seemed to want a fight with the entire Italian nation as he began his long walk back to the pit lane. During that walk he made up his mind that his accident had been the fault of Tom Pryce, so he decided to have it out with the young Welshman after the race. The blame culture and revenge seeking were a throwback to his public school background. When it surfaced, it exhibited the worst elements of his character. The truth about the accident was that Hunt had become distracted when he went into the corner and had braked far too late, with the inevitable result.

Convinced that Pryce had blocked him, however, Hunt stormed up to him after the race and shouted, “You are a brainless moron,” adding in for good measure that he was “
absolutely
brainless.” Almost immediately afterwards, as he cooled off in the motor home, he knew he had been wrong. He went to find Pryce and to apologize. He said later, “I just made a mistake.”

His high emotional state after the race had been made worse by his walk back to the pits. He called them “animals” and explained, “They were spitting and hissing. I wanted to confront them but thought better of it.” In the end, Hunt confessed, “I must admit I was quite pleased to get out of there unscathed. The propaganda campaign against me in the Italian press was really quite incredible: a very heavy deal. They really hated me in Italy, to an extent that was quite unbelievable. Anybody would think it was I who had caused Niki’s accident.”

Meanwhile, Lauda, unaware of all the drama, had enjoyed a steady race and managed to finish fourth. It was the bravest driving performance ever seen in Formula One—before or since. When he took off his helmet after the race, his fireproof balaclava was soaked in blood; his head and face wounds had opened up. The repercussions for the scarring on his face would be enormous. But he had done what he came to do; he had increased his championship lead. Hunt’s failure to finish had also been a huge bonus. Lauda’s courageous comeback had exceeded all expectations, not least those of his English rival.

Lauda said, “I did what I could. On the last lap, the oil pressure dropped and I took my foot off the gas a bit, as I wanted to finish at all costs. In the circumstances, fourth place was not bad at all for me.”

Hunt was full of praise, and any ill feelings toward Lauda from the past were genuinely put aside as the two men became temporary friends again and started speaking every day on the telephone. Hunt said, “To virtually step out of the grave and, six weeks later, to come fourth in a grand prix is a truly amazing achievement.” He added, “Niki drove a typical Niki race: well contained within himself and within his new limitations.”

The race was won by Ronnie Peterson in the March-Ford. It was the first win by March in almost five years and the first for Peterson since he left Lotus. Regazzoni was second and Jacques Laffite third in his Ligier. The three points Lauda won for finishing fourth in Italy gave him a five-point lead over Hunt, with Lauda on 61 points and Hunt on 56.

When the race was over, Ferrari team manager Daniele Audetto was very embarrassed by what had gone on that day. Audetto may have been overbearing at times, but he was fundamentally an honest man who believed in playing by the rules. He knew his countrymen had not been playing by the rules. He confessed admiration for Hunt, saying that the crowd’s hatred had been directed at the McLaren team and not at Hunt personally.

With that off his chest, Audetto then decided to make some bizarre and seemingly unprompted predictions about what would happen in the last three races. He predicted Hunt would win the United States Grand Prix at Watkins Glen, finish second in Canada, and third in Japan. Lauda, he said, would win the Canadian Grand Prix, finish second at the Japanese, and not score at all at Watkins Glen. How he knew all this was beyond anyone’s guess, but his predictions were widely reported around the world and taken seriously by many, especially Italian journalists.

Audetto also praised Lauda’s teammate, Regazzoni, predicting he would finish third, second, and first in the remaining three races. Again, no one really understood what he meant or how he could make such accurate predictions. But they also received wide publicity in Italian newspapers. But it was all typical Italian false praise, as Enzo Ferrari had already decided to fire Regazzoni and to replace him permanently with Reutemann after Monza.

Audetto’s ultimate prophecy was that Lauda would take the championship by one point from Hunt, 76 to 75. But interestingly, Audetto’s prediction took no account of the outcome of Ferrari’s protest against the British Grand Prix and the mountain that Hunt still had to climb to win.

For Hunt, things could only get better. But first they would have to get much worse.

CHAPTER
24

Hunt Loses British Win

McLaren Mess Up the Hearing

Paris: September 24, 1976

A
s the hoo-ha at Monza died down, James Hunt made a critical decision not to appear at an appeals court hearing in Paris that would either confirm or cancel his win at the British Grand Prix. The FIA Court of Appeal in Paris was convened to consider an appeal by the Ferrari team as to whether Hunt’s McLaren-Ford should have been disqualified from the results of the British Grand Prix. Ferrari had appealed the result, but James Hunt didn’t think they had a chance of success. Instead of planning a schedule that included going to the hearing in the three-week gap between Italy and Canada, he embarked on an alternative schedule of his own choosing—one that combined spending money and having a good time. He opted to ignore Paris and leave it all to team boss Teddy Mayer.