Sexual Ethics in Islam (21 page)

A woman used to perform circumcision in Medina. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said to her: “Do not cut severely as that is better for a woman and more desirable for a husband.”
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La tunhiki
, which Ahmad Hasan translates as “do not cut severely,” might be more literally rendered “do not ruin” or “do not uproot.” Although Abu Dawud reports this hadith, he criticizes its transmission and calls it weak. Another hadith, also classified as weak, states that
khitan
, circumcision, is a
sunnah
for men and a
makruma
(noble act) for women. Other evidence for early approval of female circumcision is less direct – unwitting rather than deliberate – and perhaps therefore more persuasive. One famous hadith declares that both partners in a sexual act must perform an ablution (to restore ritual purity before prayer)

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“when the two circumcised parts (
al-khitanan
) meet.” It is pos- sible to explain this away as a linguistic peculiarity of classical Arabic, according to some: the less dominant part (the female organ) is subsumed under the characterization of the more dominant part (the male organ).
29
A more likely explanation is that genital cutting was practiced on some women in seventh- century Arabia.
30
The use of “large-clitorised” as an insult (sug- gesting that the woman in question had not been circumcised), or reference to a man’s mother as a “clitoris-cutter” assumes the existence of the phenomenon. There are also references to female circumcisers in other contexts that certainly suggest some form of clitoral excision was an accepted, if not necessarily universal, practice among some Arab tribes at the time of the Prophet.

Opponents of FGC have dealt with the circumcision hadith texts in various ways. Some scholars and activists have pointed out that the isolated hadith texts that exist on the subject are weak (e.g.,
mursal
– missing a link in the chain of transmitters), and thus unreliable as evidence, a point which even supporters of the practice generally concede.
31
Alternately, or additionally, they are interpreted as recommending moder- ation of an existing practice, not the imposition of something unknown, a point to which I will return. In no case do the hadith convey obligation. In contemporary English-language texts, misleading summaries or translations of the Abu Dawud hadith (“Do not cut severely”) often do much of the work of interpret- ation. To take one example, a pamphlet distributed by Minaret of Freedom and also available online quotes the hadith, explain- ing it as “one tradition of disputed authenticity [which] permits (but does not encourage) the removal of a miniscule segment of skin from the female prepuce, provided no harm is done.”
32
The explanation of the command “do not ruin” as “removal of a miniscule segment of skin from the female prepuce” is reading a great deal into the vague words attributed to the Prophet.

Jamal Badawi, in an appendix to his well-known and frequently quoted
Gender Equity and Islam
, attempts to make similar points by interpolating several words into his own English translation suggesting specific directives that are missing from the Arabic: “Cut off only the foreskin (outer fold of skin

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over the clitoris; the prepuce) but do not cut off deeply (i.e. the clitoris itself), for this is brighter for the face (of the girl) and more favorable with the husband.”
33
Although the Arabic text (which Badawi does not provide) does not specify what part of the anatomy is mentioned, Badawi does so himself. He defines what is to be cut (“the foreskin,” “the outer fold of skin,” “the prepuce”) and, more importantly, what is not to be (“the clitoris itself ”). As in the previous pamphlet, Badawi’s objective is not to clarify for individual Muslims how they should conduct their personal affairs but rather to present Islam in a positive light to both non-Muslim and Muslim readers who may be uncomfort- able with what they have heard, read, or been told about various controversial matters.

Keller’s objective in his translation of
Reliance of the Traveller
is somewhat different from that of the authors just discussed, as the text is primarily a conduct manual rather than a contribution to a broader controversial literature, and he is dealing with jurisprudential doctrine rather than a Prophet statement. Nonetheless, he makes similar changes to his English rendering of the passage that I translated, in the epigraph to this chapter, as “Circumcision is obligatory for every male and female. [For men,] it consists of cutting the foreskin of the glans of the penis, while female circumcision consists in cutting the clitoris and is called reduction.” For comparison, his translation (which involves several levels of elaboration of the text, utilizing coded letters and parentheses to indicate commentary) reads:

Circumcision is obligatory (O: for both men and women. For men it consists of removing the prepuce from the penis, and for women removing the prepuce (Ar: bazr) of the clitoris (n: not the clitoris itself, as some mistakenly assert). (A: Hanbalis hold that circumcision of women is not obligatory but sunna, while Hanafis consider it a mere courtesy to the husband.)[)]

Only the first three words of this passage (“Circumci- sion is obligatory”) belong to Ibn Naqib al-Misri; the words introduced by “O:” represent the commentary of ‘Umar

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Barakat, who is responsible for much of the content of Keller’s
Reliance
. The explanation of the less onerous requirements of the Hanbali and Hanafi schools, introduced by “A:” is the commentary of a modern Syrian scholar. Only rarely, with particularly sensitive matters or those on which there is striking disagreement between the legal schools, does Keller typically include such material. The inclusion of these qualifications here functions to diminish the reader’s perception of the place of female circumcision within religious law. The most important feature of this translation, however, is the definition of female circumcision with Keller’s own parenthetical definition (intro- duced by “n”) of the crucial term
bazr
.

In his translation, Keller attempts to describe the two types of circumcision in entirely parallel ways, which requires him to omit certain words from the discussion of male circum- cision and add words to the description of female circumcision. The Arabic text indicates that circumcision of males requires “qata’a al-jilda alati ‘ala hashfat al-dhakar,” which Keller renders as “removing the prepuce from the penis.”
Qata’a
, which he ren- ders as “removing,” I have translated, above, as “cutting” so as to preserve the potential for ambiguity in the description of the circumcision procedure for females, although“removing”– cut- ting off – is the most likely meaning. The rest of the Arabic is straightforward:
al-jilda
(“the prepuce,” skin, or foreskin) which is on the glans (
hashfat
) of the penis (
al-dhakar
). Keller’s English text presents slightly less information in its description of the male anatomy; while the Arabic refers to the penile glans, his translation simply refers to the penis. When it comes to female circumcision, Keller departs from the text more significantly by adding a key term. He renders “qata’a al-bazr” as “removing the prepuce of the clitoris,” treating
bazr
as a term specifically for the clitoral hood or prepuce. (Keller does not indicate what other term might mean clitoris, if
bazr
does not.) The vast majority of scholars, however, take for granted that
bazr
means clitoris, not clitoral prepuce.
34

The insistence of Keller, Badawi, and others on min- imizing the extent of cutting recommended or required by the Prophet’s words and/or the classical legal tradition can only

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succeed via well meaning but deceitful manipulation of the texts. Would it not be a better alternative, if one accepts the hadith texts, to accept that previous approval even by the Prophet, but certainly by the classical jurists, need not preclude rejection today? To some extent these sources can prove helpful, as both hadith and legal texts seek to minimize the scope of cutting performed, and not to impose a new practice or render existing custom more severe.
35

Those activists who struggle against FGC in contexts such as Egypt and the Sudan, where some members of the ‘ulama have sided with the practice’s opponents, have used a variety of strategies to argue for its prohibition. Many acknowledge, as a precondition for an open and honest dialogue, that some form of female circumcision has been justified in religious terms, and attempt to discern how to present an honest, compelling argu- ment for significant modification of the realm of what is under- stood to be properly Islamic. Gradualism is one vital strategy; Toubia argues that, while “The ideal goal would be total eradica- tion” as an interim measure “recommending alternative customs is necessary.”She suggests perhaps“a ritual of just nicking the clit- oris or labia without excising any tissue” because “The transition from infibulation to no procedure is so drastic that few will be comfortable with it.”
3
6
However, the extent to which this will be satisfactory is unclear; research done by Rogaia Abusharaf in the Sudan suggests that while some women are strong advocates of “sunnah” circumcision (here meaning clitoral excision, not merely a “ritual nicking”) to replace the standard infibulation, others do not consider the milder cutting to be “real” circumci- sion.
37
In any case, in these instances scholars and activists are concerned with convincing the women who perpetuate the prac- tice, not with affecting Western perceptions.

Conclusion

One promising avenue for change is from within the legal trad- ition, but there are limits to the impact the‘ulama can have on the practice of FGC. Some scholars have begun the process of

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attempting to shift the frame of reference and treat female cir- cumcision as a medical procedure, as activists have suggested,
38
rather than a religious ritual and marker of Muslim identity. In doing so, they have suggested a different set of standards by which to judge associated practices. Shaykh al-Tantawi, stating that the Qur’an contains nothing on the subject and that the hadith attributing any stance to the Prophet are weak, opines that therefore one should defer to the views of doctors. On medical grounds, of course, the“surgery”fails basic qualifications for per- formance. Egyptian jurist Gad al-Haq, among others, however, objects to this approach on the grounds that medical knowledge is continuously changing and evolving, and it is foolish to fore- sake what is eternal for what is ephemeral.
39
While the ‘ulama can be instrumental in struggles to eradicate FGC, there will likely always be dispute among its members. Further, relying on inter- nal struggles within the ‘ulama or even campaigns to legally ban FGC (as an Egyptian law did before it was overturned) ignores the crucial point that formal religious authority may not be the most salient ground for both practitioners and those who make decisions about following the practice, who are uniformly female, even though religious sentiment is influential.

What tactics should be employed by activists, and what role should religion play as a justification? Activist A’Haleem’s appeal for a “final religious announcement” against FGC relies on a mistaken view of Islamic religious authority as something unidirectional and static. Pronouncements in this vein, such as that by Swedish Sheikh Ahmed, suppress rather than promote interpretive leeway. A historically contextualized approach – which recognizes the likelihood that the practice existed but also that it is deeply troubling in many respects – can support a process of gradual change. Although based on a tendentious pre- sentation of the hadith text, the Minaret of Freedom’s broader conclusion that the Prophet’s directive as quoted in Abu Dawud “clearly forbids severity in circumcision and bases such limita- tion on both the potential to harm the woman and the potential to make her less desirable to her husband” seems more appropri- ate (though “forbids” might be replaced by “advises against”). The pamphlet argues, though, that “Permitting such a ritual

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constitutes an act of tolerance by Islamic law for pre-Islamic practices, and may be overruled by the Islamic prohibition against harmful acts.”
4
0
Both of these points are potentially help- ful. One can think of female genital cutting as something subject to gradual change and, as Kevin Reinhart has pointed out, it can be liberating to think in terms of principles rather than specifics. Nonetheless, caution is warranted in claiming a power to “over- rule” accepted practices on the basis of broad principles.

Changes in public policy and national law without con- comitant changes in public opinion are futile, and potentially even counterproductive. Reform in legal thought is slow, and is not a guaranteed success. There will likely always be those, such as Egyptian scholar Gad al-Haq, who will vehemently support female circumcision. Both legal and jurisprudential reform are, I believe, necessary. But ultimately, the most crucial shift must take place in public opinion. And in order for such a shift to happen, religious language will need to be employed. However, I think that on this issue in particular – and the lesson can be applied more broadly – the simplistic invocation of “Islam” is a recipe for failure. The insistence that Islam forbids FGC is not so much false as meaningless: it depends entirely on what one intends by the term “Islam.” The texts, as is frequently noted, do
not
speak for themselves, though I do think it is possible to read them in ways that yield a determination that any form of female genital cutting is reprehensible at best and that extreme forms such as infibula- tion must be forbidden. How does one marshal ethico-legal arguments that will be couched in terms of reprehensibility, of minimization of a customary practice? Rather than ask whether or not female circumcision is Islamic, it is more helpful to ask what legal or ethical values should be assigned to the range of practices that fall under the rubric of FGC. And indeed, if one determines that such practices are reprehensible or forbidden – verdicts for which I think there is a great deal of justification in the texts – then one must attempt to discern the best way to combat their performance.At the same time, it can be difficult to resist the temptation to make totalizing claims based on one’s own sense of justice, particularly when debates are not merely theoretical but result in real injury to real women and girls.