Sexual Ethics in Islam (28 page)

There are, and always have been, strong elements within Muslim norms that value sex, both as a strong human need and also as a foretaste of the delights of paradise. Sex is powerful and needs regulation, no less so for its link with the sacred. As Ze’ev Maghen points out, “Both sexuality and spirituality are largely exercises in unruliness; the
shari‘a
delimits each of them and thereby makes them possible.”
4
How, though, can a feminist think about sexual intimacy within the constraints of God’s revelation to humanity without becoming limited by patriar- chal notions that deny women’s lived experience and potential as fully human, fully moral, and fully sexual beings? It is easy to find revelatory support for women as fully human and fully moral; it is more challenging, but not impossible, to see women as fully sexual in a way that recognizes their status as moral agents. One must seek out and privilege these elements in the tradition, and justify one’s choices. Appealing to timeless princi- ples rather than historical specifics is a crucial interpretive strategy. But one must be prepared to define and defend the principles chosen and promoted in this way. For instance, the necessity of equality as a component of justice must be defended, not merely asserted. Discussions among feminist, reformist, liberal, and progressive Muslims must continue increasing in philosophical and ethical complexity. Simplistic

toward an islamic ethics of sex 155

invocations of justice and equity are insufficient without con- sideration of the wide range of ways in which those terms have been and continue to be understood throughout Muslim his- tory. This will mean, in part, working through the conceptual legacy of past generations of thinkers who have grappled with these questions. Although there is something to be said for a “fresh” approach to the Qur’an, there is a wealth of insightful material that directly engages critical issues for those who seek egalitarian social relations today. And there is a lot to be said for not having to reinvent the wheel.

It is important to realize, though, that if only those who are trained as religious scholars (whatever that comes to mean) are deemed capable of engaging in discussions over how Muslims should behave in their intimate lives and how Muslim families should be regulated, women will be largely excluded from ranks of those wielding religious knowledge. Although there are no restrictions on female participation in scholarly endeavors in theory – and a number of exceptional women, past and present, have been recognized as religious authorities
5
– there are significant practical obstacles to female education in madrasa-settings. Likewise, there are social considerations restricting the ascription of religious authority to women. If mastery of the classical tradition is required in order to be considered credible, women are likely to be marginalized, if not entirely excluded, from interpretive reforms. And it matters deeply that women, whose concerns and perspectives differ from men’s, be among those engaging in renewed ethical thought on topics including marriage and sex.

As to the question of religious authority and influence, it is important to note that many Muslim thinkers and authors who are perceived as authorities, and who write and speak from a position of authenticity, are not themselves fully grounded in the classical tradition; they have a selective and often incoherent relationship to law and scriptural interpretation. (As Abou El Fadl points out, “the connections between the classical episte- mological and hermeneutic heritage and Muslims living in the United States have been thoroughly severed.”
6
) Yet because their views are congruent with conventional wisdom about what is

156 sexual ethics and islam

“Islamic” – or because their maleness and ethnic background give them an air of authority – their pronouncements are not questioned. There are some scholars with a thorough grounding in the tradition who also engage with modernity in a compli- cated and thoughtful way but they are, sadly, relatively few compared to the broader group of those who speak in platitudes and, on issues associated with sex and sexuality in particular, make sweeping generalizations about women, gender, and Islam that do not allow for nuance, dispute, or transformation.

Part of this book’s aim has been to highlight striking inconsistencies in the way that several controversial topics are approached in the work of specific authors and, more import- antly, certain conventional discourses. By pointing out these inconsistencies and contradictions, it is possible to challenge and possibly dismantle certain dominant discourses. If some- one insists that a wife must be continuously sexually available to her husband because Bukhari includes the Prophet’s reported words to that effect, one can ask whether the questioner also accepts the authenticity of Bukhari’s report that the Prophet consummated his marriage with Aishah when she was nine. If someone insists that polygamy is valid for all times and in all places because the Qur’an authorizes it, one can inquire whether the same holds true for slavery. Such juxtapositions do not replace systematic and nuanced exploration of the topics at hand; they serve, rather, to shock one’s discussion partner into considering a familiar topic without the comfortable veneer of apologetic conventional wisdom. One should not stop with rough analogies on complex issues, but rather use those analo- gies to (re)open dormant questions about the timelessness of specific points in the Qur’an and hadith.

The freedom to treat Qur’an and hadith not as reposi- tories of regulations to be applied literally in all times and places but as sources of guidance for Muslims in transforming their societies in the direction of fairness and justice is important. Individuals must be willing to take responsibility for acts of interpretation, rather than insisting that they are simply doing what “Islam” requires. In fact, it is a precondition for keeping Islam relevant that Muslims’ understandings shift over time and

toward an islamic ethics of sex 157

place. Islam is meant to be lived in history, and human beings have, for better or worse, taken on the role of earthly vicegerents. That role cannot be fulfilled by merely carrying out orders, but must involve the exercise of initiative, judgment, and con- science. This matters not only at the level of social reform, however; the conservative view that the family is the bedrock of society deserves real attention. The values that are taught and especially lived in intimate contexts should be guided by deep ethical reflection on the overarching divine purpose for human life on earth: to command what is right, to forbid what is wrong, to do good deeds, and to be ever-conscious of God.

Notes

Notes to Introduction

1. Wolfe and Beliefnet, eds.,
   Taking Back Islam
   .
   

2. On the genesis of these images, see Kahf,
   Western Representations of the Muslim Woman.
   

3. Al-Sheha,
   Woman in the Shade of Islam
   , p. 79.
   

4. One Indian author writing in the 1970s sums up a dominant view: “While we are by no means opposed to the granting of all legitimate freedom to women, we cannot afford to import the characteristic evils of Western civilization in respect of sexual liberty.” Niazi,
   Modern Chal- lenges to Muslim Families
   , pp. 60–61.
   

5. Doi,
   Woman in Shari’ah
   , p. 185.
   

6. See also Wani,
   Maintenance Rights of Muslim Women
   , p. 9.
   

7. Al-Shafi‘i,
   Al-Umm
   , K. al-Sadaq, “Al-shart fi’l-nikah,” vol. 5, p. 108.
   

8. Sheila Briggs’ remarks, Feminist Sexual Ethics Project colloquium III, Brandeis University, September 2005.
   

9. Yalom and Carstensen, “Introduction,” in idem., eds.,
   Inside the Ameri- can Couple
   , p. 10. See also Yalom,
   A History of the Wife
   .
   

10. A number of female slaves mentioned in biblical stories bore children sired by their masters, who included Abraham and Jacob. On the sexual use of male slaves in the ancient world, see chapter 5.
    

11. Michael Sells’ insistence that work on religion and violence must be first, comparative, and second, both critical and self-critical, applies equally to work on issues of religion and sexuality. Michael Sells, lecture at Brandeis University, April 21, 2005.
    

12. Yalom, “Biblical Models: From Adam and Eve to the Bride of Christ,”
    

    p. 15. Even if Yalom is generalizing here – there are some denomin- ations that ceased using wifely promises of obedience long before the time she designates – the point is well taken. See also the 1945 New Jersey verdict quoted by Shanely,
    Just Marriage
    , p. 8.
    

13. Haideh Moghissi, however, argues that “only individuals who have some- how escaped the sexual repression which dominates the lives of women and men in Islamic societies can deny its overriding role in defi women’s experience. Poverty and hunger hang over women’s heads throughout the region. But ... sexuality and sexual repression are where women suffer most.” Moghissi,
    Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism
    , p. 95.
    

    notes 159
    

14. Plaskow, “Decentering Sex,” p. 30.
    

15. Ruxton,
    Maliki Law
    , p. v.
    

16. Historian Huda Lutfi, referring to a fourteenth-century Cairene docu- ment makes a more broadly applicable point: “prescriptive religious literature should not necessarily be taken as a reflection of reality.” Lutfi, “Manners and Customs of Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women,”
    

    p. 102. See also Sonbol, “Introduction,” in idem, ed.,
    Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History
    .
    

17. Tucker,
    Gender and Islamic History
    .
    

18. Ahmed,
    A Border Passage
    , p. 128. Ahmed does recognize the value of this tradition, at least in comparison to “fundamentalist Islam, textual Islam’s more narrow and more poorly informed modern descendant.” See also Ahmed,
    Women and Gender in Islam
    , p. 239, where she writes of the dominance of the “technical, legalistic, establishment version of Islam, a version that largely bypasses the ethical elements in the Islamic message.”
    

19. Kevin Reinhart (at the Mapping Muslim Ethics colloquium, Duke Uni- versity, April 2005) pointed out the paradox in my project: I am attempting to contest the jurists’ interpretive authority in part by focus- ing on them.
    

20. Khaled Abou El Fadl describes the selective approach to Qur’an and
    sunnah
    reflected in “the endless stream of dogma that one encounters in Muslim conferences, lectures, and publications,” in
    The Authoritative and the Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses
    , p. 17. A focus on Qur’an and “authentic” hadith to the exclusion of jurisprudential doctrines charac- terizes even some self-identified progressive authors, such as Syed,
    The Position of Women in Islam
    . Syed (p. ix) describes his approach: “I start with the relevant verses of the Quran followed by the appropriate, authentic Hadith and have supplemented where necessary with relevant remarks and comments of Islamic authorities and scholars;” addition- ally, he provides his “own comments in areas where there is no com- pelling authority to follow and yet where an urgent answer is needed.”
    

21. Rahman,
    Islamic Methodology in History
    , is the best developed defense of this approach.
    

22. Jonathan Brockopp notes that there is “a substantial literature under each of these categories,” but “we would look in vain here for practical application of Islamic ideals to matters of daily life.” See “Taking Life and Saving Life,” in idem, ed.,
    Islamic Ethics of Life
    , p. 10. On ethical thought broadly, see Hourani,
    Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics
    .
    

23. Brockopp, “Taking Life and Saving Life,” p. 10. He also notes that “sharia is far too large a category to be reduced to ethics,” as it also encompasses ritual matters that are outside the purview of ethical thought (p. 11).
    

24. Faruki, “Legal Implications for Today of
    al-Ahkam al-Khamsa
    .” Faruki mentions, but does not discuss in detail, historical developments of this scheme over several centuries.
    

25. See Jackson,
    Islam and the Blackamerican
    , p. 160. The phenomenal suc- cess of scholar and media figure Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s
    The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam
    , is indicative of the desire for simple answers; a children’s title by Mohammad Mazhar Hussaini likewise proclaims its relevance as
    My Little Book of Halal and Haram
    .
    

    160 sexual ethics and islam
    

26. Wael Hallaq argues “that the shari‘a is no longer a tenable reality” and those who advocate its reapplication are “in an irredeemable state of denial.” Hallaq, “Can the Shari‘a be Restored?,” p. 22.
    

27. Murad, “Boys will be Boys: Gender Identity Issues.”
    

28. Zahra Ayubi points out, however, that some immigrants base their view of Islamic legal requirements (e.g., with regard to woman-initiated divorce) on modern statutory provisions of their country of origin rather than any legal school. Ayubi, “American Muslim Women Nego- tiating Divorce,” p. 48.
    

29. Taji-Farouki and Nafi, “Introduction,” in idem, eds.,
    Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century
    , p. 10.
    

30. “[O]ne of the most significant features of contemporary Muslim thought is the attachment to and even veneration of ‘Islam’ in contro- versial debate. Thus we find that [authors] accurately represent Muslim thought when they say that ‘Islam requires,’ or ‘Islam accepts,’ or some other similar locution.” Reinhart, “The Past in the Future of Islamic Ethics,” p. 216.
    

31. Abou El Fadl,
    Speaking in God’s Name
    , pp. 144–5, 62–3.
    

32. Al-Yawm al-Sa‘udi
    , “ ‘Al-tahjiz’ wa ijbar al-mar’a ‘ala al-zawaj min akbar anwa‘ al-zulm.” Antoun, “The Islamic Court,” p. 464, discusses a case where a contemporary Jordanian judge concluded that al-Shafi‘i was wrong in allowing fathers to compel marriages for their children. For references to female consent in works aimed at a general audience, in addition to the sources cited in Ali, “A Beautiful Example,” pp. 283–4, see, e.g., Al-Sheha,
    Woman in the Shade of Islam
    , p. 39: “Islam con- sidered the opinion of the daughter in the marriage as an essential condi- tion for the validity of the marriage itself.” Describing “classical Islamic law” (or
    Shari‘a
    ) specifically, Khadduri, “Marriage in Islamic Law,”
    

    1. 213, declares: “Although an offer to marry is actually made through a woman’s father, the woman’s consent is considered imperative if the contract is to be binding.” Fadel, “Reinterpreting the Guardian’s Role,” provides a substantive re-evaluation of Maliki doctrine, and discusses its relevance to Muslim marriage in the United States.
       

33. Sahih Muslim
    , trans. Siddiqi. The quote is from vol. 1–2, p. 702; hadith discussing sex with female slaves are found in vol. 1–2, pp. 734–5 and 743–4. See also Hidayatullah, “Islamic Conceptions of Sexuality,”
    

    1. 263, where she declares that “According to the Qur’an, the proper vehicle for enjoying the union between sexual partners is marriage. In fact, it is the only acceptable framework for sexual relations between two human beings.” She refers briefly to the Prophet’s practice of concubi- nage on p. 290, n. 14. On slavery generally, and slave concubinage specifically, see chapter 3.
       

34. I owe the use of the term “dissonance” in this context to Farid Esack, personal conversation, April 2005.
    

35. Mohja Kahf, personal communication, March 2004.
    

36. Full disclosure: I was one of three scholars contributing a brief essay.
    

37. Kugle, “Enough with the Prudes: Bring On ‘Sex and the Umma’.”
    

38. Bailey,
    Sexual Ethics: A Christian View
    , p. 8.