Sherry Sontag;Christopher Drew (12 page)

Craven took one look at the submarine it seemed nobody could love and was transfixed. All he saw were the possibilities, the strange and wonderful things that could be done with all of that excess space. And when he caught a glimpse of that gorgeous gaping mouth, it was enough to send him, like any self-respecting mad scientist, reeling with joy. No other submarine in the fleet boasted a hatch larger than 26 inches. Halibut's hatch was 22 feet.

It was settled: Halibut would be Craven's submarine, his laboratory, his ministry, his pirate ship. He would have $70 million to outfit her with electronic, sonic, photographic, and video gadgets. The Navy put out the word, and in February 1965 Halibut went into Pearl Harbor to be refitted as an oceanographic research vessel.

Less a lie than a huge omission, that was only one of several cover stories Craven would employ. The DSRV program and his other deepsea projects would add more layers, all hiding what Craven had proclaimed to be his "Skunk Works"-a term he borrowed for its drama from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the spy-plane manufacturer Craven would soon have working on the design of the DSRVs and also on a Deep Submergence Search Vehicle. The plan was that the DSSV would be able to sit on the ocean floor 20,000 feet deep and pick up objects with a mechanical arm. It was to travel to any recovery area mounted on the top of a submarine.

It would take two years to rebuild and test Halibut, but Craven would have little time to be impatient. From almost the moment the refit began, Craven's mass of cover stories began earning him notice outside the insular realm of Naval Intelligence. Suddenly he was being pulled into other high-profile projects.

Rickover, who had once done everything he could to limit Craven's interest in deep-diving mini-subs, now came to Craven asking him to help build the first nuclear-powered one, though one of steel, not glass. (The admiral would forever remain scathing about glass, to the point of insult.) But Craven was now working with Rickover, and the liaison would prove to be a crucial step in the scientist's education: crucial because it was through Rickover that Craven would learn how to mine the Navy's budget, deal with Congress, and handle the cadre of admirals who ran the submarine program.

It was a Faustian pact. Rickover may have been sixty-four years old, an age at which even less controversial officers have long been retired, but Craven, like just about everyone else in the Navy, could never quite learn to handle him. Rickover liked to begin their conversations in a way that showed just who was in charge: "Craven, my people are more competent than your people, but your shop is bigger, so I'm going to have to work with you." Rickover liked to try to throw men off balance just to see how they would handle themselves.

Rickover personally christened the mini-sub "NR-1." It might as well have been called the USS Rickover, for "NR" was the designation for the Naval Reactors Branch-Rickover's realm. If the president could have Air Force One, Rickover would have his NR-l.

Unlike Woods Hole's Alvin, which was completed in 1965 and was only 22 feet long, NR-1 was to be 137 feet, nearly half the size of an attack sub. NR-1 would be able to go down to 3,000 feet. Equipped with underwater lights, cameras, and a grappling arm to retrieve small objects, it also would have the potential to do some spying. One of the chief design problems was finding some way to shield the nuclear reactor in the NR-1. Standard sub reactors were shielded with a foot of lead on either end. But that would have made the NR-1 too heavy. Instead, Rickover, Craven, and the other designers decided it would have the standard lead shielding only in front where it faced crew compartments. The entire thirteen-foot area of the sub behind the reactor would be closed off permanently and flooded. The idea was to allow the wall of water to absorb any escaping radiation and work as a substitute for lead shielding. Craven had no doubt that environmentalists would cringe at the plan, but both he and Rickover believed it was entirely workable. Thirteen feet of water has the same molecular weight as one foot of lead. But when NR-1 was submerged, the water would add no weight at all-when water displaces an equal amount of water, the effective weight is zero.

But before NR-1 could be built, it had to be paid for, and right now there was little room in the budget for a mini-submarine among the plans for DSRVs and Sea Labs. The problem didn't faze Rickover, and he solved it at a meeting with Craven; Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Raborn's top deputy on Polaris; and Robert Morse, the assistant secretary of the Navy for research and development.

"You have any money we can get started with right now?" Rickover asked. Craven answered that his deep-submergence group could spare $10 million of its research and development money. Smith noted that the Polaris program had about $10 million of unused ship construction funds.

"How much is this submarine going to cost?" Morse asked.

Without hesitation, Rickover answered: $20 million. Morse went on to outline the tortuous process by which ships are normally built: contract definition, bidding, congressional approvals. Rickover cut him off before he could finish. "Just leave all that to me." Then Rickover turned to Craven and directed, "You call up Electric Boat tomorrow and tell them to get started."

Craven, Smith, and Morse exchanged looks of disbelief. Nobody believed this could be done for $20 million-the budget soon grew to $30 million. They also saw no way that Congress was going to stand for this. Less than a week later, Rickover called Craven and told him that the president was going to announce that afternoon that NR-1 was going to be built.

Upon hearing the news, Morse moved quickly from a state of shock into a state of panic. Up until that moment, NR-1 had been little more than an admiral's fantasy; indeed, Rickover had given only sketchy accounts of his plan to Paul H. Nitze, the secretary of the Navy, and Robert S. McNamara, the secretary of Defense. Though both had approved it, Morse knew Congress was not going to like hearing about a major project this way. As soon as the president announced the NR-1, the House Committee on Appropriations hastily called a hearing.

Craven, on Rickover's orders, had just a few days to come up with an official mission statement, a full-bore cost-benefit analysis, and a detailed study as to why the Navy needed the mini-sub.

"Well, you know, Admiral, that study really doesn't exist," Craven answered.

"It will exist by the time the hearing takes place," Rickover barked back.

Now the existence of NR-1, and perhaps his own career, rested on Craven's ability to spin visions from a black hole. He needed to prove that NR-1 was a crucial investment, one worth $30 million.

The appropriations committee wasn't fooled, but in the end it had no choice but to give in. NR-1 was now a presidential directive. No other submarine or ship had ever been authorized faster, or ever would he again. Later, the General Accounting Office, Congress's investigative arm, scrutinized the project and concluded that it was one of the worst managed programs its investigators had ever seen.

Rickover answered in typical form, firing off a letter to his critics that so amazed Craven that he committed it to memory. "I read the GAO report, and it reminds me of a review I read of Lady Chatterley's Lover in the magazine Field and Stream. The reviewer of that book knew as much about the real purpose of Lady Chatterley's Lover as the GAO knows about the design and development of submarines."

Rickover was no gentler on Craven. The admiral was infuriated that he had to share Craven with the Halibut refit, the DSRV program, and the other deep-ocean projects. As far as Rickover was concerned, none of those was more important than his NR-1.

Making the admiral even angrier was the fact that he was not cleared for the details about Halibut's new mission. Little went on within the submarine force that he didn't know something about, but the intelligence programs were one of the few areas in which he had no official "in," no real say. He took out his frustrations on Craven, who began to imagine that the admiral was waiting up nights before calling, waiting until Craven fell into a deep slumber or thought about romancing his wife. He was almost convinced that his time submerged conducting tests on Halibut was being monitored by Rickover, who seemed to time his calls for moments when it was impossible for Craven to answer. Craven always paid dearly for being unavailable.

One Friday, Rickover was giving a speech in New York City and he sent word to Halibut, which was out near Hawaii, demanding that Craven meet him in New York first thing Monday morning.

Craven hopped a plane, suffered a moment of panic when the flight got socked in by fog during a layover in Los Angeles, and finally landed in New York and raced breathless to Rickover's hotel suite, where the admiral was waiting. "You were out there playing golf with the beach boys," he said, mocking the cover story Craven had crafted for his trip to Hawaii.

He then turned to the house phone. "Bring this man the biggest lunch in the hotel." Craven waited for the punch line: he knew the admiral wasn't worried that he might he hungry after the long trip.

Sure enough: "For the next hour, you are going to sit and eat lunch," Rickover announced. "And I am going to bawl you out."

Appearances to the contrary, Rickover liked Craven almost as much as he liked making him miserable. Rickover was impressed that Craven had moxie enough to withstand his worst tantrums. The admiral also loved that Craven had never attended the Naval Academy. Rickover had been a loner as a midshipman, and now he made great sport of adding a little torture to the mix when he interviewed Naval Academy graduates for his nuclear program. Those entrance interviews had become more like initiation rites, in which the admiral took young men to the psychological brink in his quest for perfection. Trying to rattle his applicants, Rickover would spout obscenities, seat them in chairs with one leg cut short, or send them off to "Siberia," a storage closet where they would be left for hours.

Perhaps the all-time Rickover classic occurred when he squared off against a candidate and said, "Piss me off, if you can." The young man answered without hesitation and without a word. He lifted his arm and with one motion swept Rickover's desk clean of books, papers, pens, everything. The candidate was accepted.

For Rickover, torturing Craven was a mere sideline.

Craven, meanwhile, was increasingly on call as the Navy's resident deep-ocean expert. But there was one call that stood out from all the rest. It came on a Saturday morning in January 1966.

"This is Jack Howard," said an assistant secretary of Defense in charge of nuclear matters. "I've lost an H-bomb."

"Why are you calling me?" Craven asked.

"This one I've lost in the water, and I want you to find it." Craven was being assigned to work with a team hastily assembled by an admiral in the Pentagon. Another group was going to the site.

A B-52 bomber had collided with an air tanker during a refueling operation 30,000 feet in the air off the coast of Palomares, Spain, losing its atomic payload. Three of four bombs were recovered almost immediately. But a fourth was lost and had presumably fallen to the bottom of the Mediterranean. President Lyndon Johnson knew the Soviets were looking for the bomb, and he refused to believe the Navy's assurances that there was a good probability that it would never be recovered by either side. Indeed, that was the belief of most of the people assigned to find the bomb-but not Craven.

Craven called in a group of mathematicians and set them to work constructing a map of the sea bottom outside Palomares. That sounded reasonable enough, but Craven intended to use that map for an analysis that seemed more reminiscent of racetrack betting than of anything ever put down in a Navy search and salvage manual.

Once the map was completed, Craven asked a group of submarine and salvage experts to place Las Vegas-style bets on the probability of each of the different scenarios that might describe the bomb's loss being considered by the search team in Spain. Each scenario left the weapon in a different location.

Then, each possible location was run through a formula that was based on the odds created by the betting round. The locations were then replotted, yards or miles away from where logic and acoustic science alone would place them.

To the uninitiated, all this sounded like the old joke about a man who loses his wallet in a dark alley. Instead of searching the alley, the man chooses to search for his wallet yards away under a street lamp because the light there is better. But as far as Craven was concerned, there was good science behind his apparent madness.

He was relying on Bayes' theorem of subjective probability, an algebraic formula crafted by Thomas Bayes, a mathematician born in 1760. Essentially, the theorem was supposed to quantify the value of the hunch, factor in the knowledge that exists in people beyond their conscious minds.

Craven applied that doctrine to the search. The bomb had been hitched to two parachutes. He took bets on whether both had opened, or one, or none. He went through the same exercise over each possible detail of the crash. His team of mathematicians wrote out possible endings to the crash story and took bets on which ending they believed most. After the betting rounds were over, they used the odds they created to assign probability quotients to several possible locations. Then they mapped those probabilities and came up with the most probable site and several other possible ones.