Snow (14 page)

The cover-plan, to misdirect the enemy away from the true British
objective
, was an early example of strategic deception, a concept that would later be adopted by the Chiefs of Staff and their planners as an essential
component
of operations to engage the enemy in the build-up to D-Day. In this instance, however, the Norwegian campaign ended in a chaotic withdrawal across the North Sea and the occupation of the entire country by the Nazis. Despite the fact that it was Winston Churchill who had been the driving force behind the Norwegian campaign, the failure of this mission led to the collapse of Neville Chamberlain's government in London. Ironically when Chamberlain stood down it was Winston Churchill who replaced him as Prime Minister. Once again, MI5's handling of Owens, the organisation's first double-cross agent, would have an impact on the course of the war that was far greater than anyone could have imagined at the time.

However, not everything was going Owens' way, and he was soon to be reminded of the precarious nature of the business in which he was involved. On his latest mission to see Dr Rantzau, Owens had said that he feared the authorities might be closing in on his illicit transmissions. Coincidentally, on his return the British received an intercept from France which appeared to come from the area of London where Owens was based. The French were told that the British knew all about the source of the transmission, but for Owens the insecurity of his position can only have been amplified.

On 23 April 1940 a copy of the
Daily Mirror
was delivered by an Indian sailor to Owens' offices in Sackville Street where it was handed to his new business partner, William Rolph. Also presented with the newspaper was Owens' business card, which he had given to Dr Rantzau in Antwerp. Wrapped inside the newspaper were radio valves, the wireless replacement parts Owens had made such a fuss about when in Antwerp.

The man who delivered the newspaper was a Lascar or Indian sailor who disclosed to Rolph that he had travelled to Britain on the
City of Simla
which had left Antwerp on 19 April, and had arrived at the Albert Docks in London on the following day. Naturally, MI5 was anxious to trace the seaman so the ship's chief engineer and captain were invited to an interview at the Admiralty. There were over 160 Indians on board the vessel but MI5 calculated that the valves had probably been brought aboard in Antwerp. Apparently the ship had taken on its crew in Calcutta but one Indian, who was married to a German, had come aboard at Antwerp and had enquired about precisely when the
City of Simla
would sail to London. As for
smuggling
the valves off the ship in London, it seemed likely that they had been hidden under the fez that the Indian sailors tended to wear.

At MI5's request Rolph agreed to visit the
City of Simla
on 25 April 1940 to identify the Lascar. Rolph was well-placed to participate in the operation because he was himself a former MI5 officer who had served in the
organisation
during the First World War, and had remained in contact with his colleagues.

Rolph, wearing a boiler suit, was given a pass and escorted aboard the ship where the Certificates of Service for all the Indian and black seamen were made available for inspection. From these documents Rolph picked out Mohideen Coonjee as the sailor who most resembled the man who had delivered the valves. In order to confirm his identification a lifeboat drill was arranged, and while the men were putting on their life-belts, Rolph
spotted
Coonjee supervising a winch party and took his photograph. MI5 later concluded that Coonjee, born in 1897 in Bangalore, probably had acted for Obed Hussein, who ran a home for Indian sailors and a courier service in Antwerp, and was married to a German woman.

As a result of this investigation Obed Hussein was put under surveillance for a period of two months in an effort to pick up any of his contacts. Arrangements were also made to watch the Commander at the Taverne
Sonia and the Hotel de Londres, and consideration was given to the idea of putting a girl in touch with the Commander. According to one of MI5's Belgian contacts, it was likely that a man named Ullrich of the German Consulate in Antwerp was the go-between with Obed Hussein.

In an effort to move the sabotage plan forward, two airfields, at Martlesham and Farnborough, were selected by MI5 for a fire or explosion. The scheme was to damage an aircraft and a hangar, thus ensuring there would be a Court of Enquiry and plenty of publicity, and since this might lead to questions in Parliament it was felt that the Secretary of State should be informed. For an even better effect, there was a suggestion that two or three aerodromes should be attacked at roughly the same time over the course of a fortnight. It was felt that once accomplished, there would be little pressure from the Abwehr to repeat the exercise as Owens could protest that these events were not easy to arrange. One benefit, it was hoped, would be an improvement in security at government establishments. Of course, none of this could happen until the Germans finally managed to smuggle the explosives into Britain.

S
NOW
had also been asked to supply secret documents from aerodromes, although the exact nature of these secret documents had not really been defined. After consultation it was decided to include RAF instruction manuals and papers routinely carried in aircraft. Acquisition of such items would, it was thought, enhance S
NOW
's status, although there was no wish to compromise the most recent editions of the documents, so some slightly out of date, non-classified, versions were specially prepared so they would appear current and secret to the Abwehr.

Meanwhile, in Manchester, C
HARLIE
expressed concern that he had no sort of written sanction for the work he was doing for MI5, but it was explained to him that MI5 never provided that kind of documentation. He had perfected the production of the microphotographs to the point that they matched the German versions, and C
HARLIE
declared that he intended suggesting that his microdots would be a good method for sending reports to ‘Graham', with whom he had agreed a telephone code to facilitate more direct communications from Manchester. In reply, it was suggested that Graham would write to C
HARLIE
using invisible ink. In one conversation with MI5, C
HARLIE
wondered whether all his work would earn him any
recognition, such as a medal once the war was over, but there were no
assurances
on that score either.

By May 1940 the escalation of the war and associated travel restrictions had made it increasingly difficult for Rantzau to meet Owens in person, but he remained keen to begin training a replacement who would require
coaching
in sabotage techniques in Germany. This meant finding a new method of delivering his candidate to the continent, and attention now concentrated on arranging a rendezvous at sea with a fishing-boat.

O
N
15 M
AY
1940 two MI5 officers, T. A. Robertson and Richman Stopford, travelled to Grimsby to meet Mr Leach of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, who was told that there was a need to hold a rendezvous with a German submarine or seaplane somewhere in the middle of the North Sea. Mr Leach took them to see the owner of a trawler, the
Barbados
, registered as GY.71, which could be ready to sail by Saturday, 18 May.

The
Barbados
was predominantly black with a red, white and blue flag on the funnel. The MI5 officers revealed that they wanted the vessel to keep to its normal fishing routine and suggested the operation could be postponed until she returned from sea if she was engaged in fishing on the relevant date. The fisheries official explained that the trawlers generally fished in groups, and that if any of them strayed outside the permitted fishing grounds,
suspicions
would be raised. The two intelligence officers also learned that the crew boarded the ship in their everyday shore clothes carrying a seaman’s kitbag and oilskins. When the trawlers returned with their fish they used a different quay and then came ashore once they had docked.

The captain of the
Barbados
, who was believed to be entirely trustworthy and would be fully informed about the true purpose of the voyage, was assured by MI5 that there would be no risk to his ship or crew. The crew themselves were told rather cryptically that they might see ‘funny things on this trip, but whatever they see will not be what they think it is’. Their silence was to earn the crew members a bonus of £5, the mate £10 and the skipper £20, if the trip was a success – money that would be provided by S
NOW
. The skipper was asked to remember everything that happened during the voyage, and told that if MI5 needed to meet him, a discreet rendezvous would be arranged.

Owens himself was briefed on the mission on 17 May by Robertson who suggested that Sam McCarthy, whom he had recently met,
accompany
him on the voyage. Although Owens did not know it, McCarthy was already working for MI5, codenamed B
ISCUIT
. As soon as the need to find a replacement for S
NOW
was first mentioned, MI5 had acknowledged the need to control the candidate, and McCarthy was the chosen nominee. McCarthy was a reformed petty criminal, a conman who had been involved in drug smuggling and more recently had worked for the police as a
stool-pigeon
. However, as with C
HARLIE
, MI5 had decided against letting Owens in on the full plan, so he was to remain unaware that B
ISCUIT
was actually working for MI5 as a loyal double agent. This expedient was intended to give MI5 an opportunity to check on S
NOW
when he thought himself free of his handlers.

Earlier in May, Robertson had invited B
ISCUIT
to his club where he had been given the mission of gaining Owens’ confidence by befriending him, apparently by accident, at the Marlborough public house in Friarstile Road, Richmond, where the Welshman was a regular. He was given a description of Owens and was told that he was ‘a tremendous talker’. By the time the trawler mission became a reality, B
ISCUIT
had managed to make contact with Owens, and the two of them were to be treated as special observers, with the skipper kept in the dark about the exact nature of their mission. S
NOW
was to say that he was a friend of the owner of the
Barbados
, to whom he had paid £150 for his services. Robertson could not guarantee ‘that the crew of the trawler would keep their mouths shut but that we would have to take a risk on that’. He informed S
NOW
that the trip had many potential problems because they did not know what type of vessel Rantzau was planning to use, so they could not predict whether the meeting would actually take place on the trawler, or on Rantzau’s vessel. Finally, S
NOW
was given the information relating to his questionnaire and told that when the mission was completed he and B
ISCUIT
were to come ashore to be paid off in the normal way, and would be left to fend for themselves.

The suggested rendezvous was 53 degrees 40 minutes north, 3 degrees 10 minutes east, at 26 fathoms at midnight on Tuesday, 21 May or Wednesday, 29 May. The destination was chosen because to stray any distance outside the permitted fishing grounds could arouse suspicion and might even leave them open to attack from British aircraft. Once in the correct position, the trawler was to use special recognition signals supplied by Rantzau.

MI5 had invested a good deal of time, resources and trust in Owens and it appeared that this operation might achieve the capture or eradication of Dr Rantzau. On Saturday 18 May, MI5 asked S
NOW
if he had made his mind up about taking McCarthy on the mission, but he expressed some reservations and was not sure that he was the right sort of person. Accordingly, he was invited to a meeting in Richmond Park at four o’clock that same afternoon where the two men agreed a cover-story to explain how Owens had met McCarthy, and why he was the right man for this mission. At the end of this discussion S
NOW
was asked privately if he had made up his mind about McCarthy, and he agreed that McCarthy appeared to ‘fit the bill admirably,’ and then he added that ‘it was just as well that he was a greenhorn at this type of work.’

Before parting, Owens took McCarthy aside so that the two could talk things over, and MI5 was keen that they should learn more about each other. After their chat had concluded, B
ISCUIT
was driven away by MI5, and at this point he revealed that he and Owens had already spoken earlier that day, and during this conversation B
ISCUIT
had said that he was willing to go into Germany for Owens, but had wanted to know how much money he was going to make. Owens had told him not to worry because the Germans were fine people who would look after him. Owens then told B
ISCUIT
that he was going to introduce him to someone from MI5. B
ISCUIT
had said that he thought this might be a dangerous thing to do, but Owens had insisted that there was nothing to worry about because the Germans already knew all about his connections with MI5. B
ISCUIT
observed that his impression was that Owens was extremely pro-Nazi and was being paid vast amounts of money for his work. B
ISCUIT
also accused Owens of trying to get as much money out of MI5 as possible and said that Owens had told him that MI5 ‘were for it as soon as the Germans started landing in this country’. Owens had then accused MI5 officers of pocketing money they had been given to pay him.

This revelation immediately threw the trawler mission into doubt but, for the moment, B
ISCUIT
was instructed to carry on as if nothing had
happened
. In the meantime, MI5 hurriedly organised a series of meetings to discuss the development. If Owens was arrested the whole of the
double-cross
network could collapse, but B
ISCUIT
’s disclosure had led the officers gathered to believe that S
NOW
was double-crossing them; that he was working for the Germans and had revealed everything that he was doing for MI5. Guy Liddell was of the opinion that Owens treated ‘the whole
business as a money-making concern and gives a little to both sides.
Probably
neither side trusts him.’ He was relieved that the only information he had was planted on him by MI5.

The results of their deliberations were pragmatic, for they knew that they had the chance to capture Rantzau alive and this was an opportunity they could not pass up, and even if they could not take him alive they could eradicate him.

MI5 consulted the Admiralty and, working on the NID’s advice, came up with a plan codenamed Operation LAMP, which involved the trawler going out as if it was on a normal fishing trip, with S
NOW
and B
ISCUIT
on board, until the afternoon of 23 May. At this point they would head off so that Owens would think they were sticking to the original arrangements to meet Rantzau, whereas in reality they would sail in a direction that would take them away from the rendezvous location. Meanwhile, another trawler which had been made to look identical to the
Barbados
, but manned with naval personnel and under the charge of a naval officer, Commander Argles, was to wait at the rendezvous. This trawler would be equipped with depth-charges, hand grenades, an anti-aircraft gun and a wireless set. Accompanying them out of sight was to be an S-type submarine, HMS
Salmon
, which would lie in wait in the hope of capturing Rantzau. Having loitered for an hour or two at the wrong location, the
Barbados
would make its way back to port. Upon arrival, Owens would be arrested and charged with being a German spy, and it was planned to round up all those connected with Owens,
including
Mathilde Krafft, Eugene Horsfall, Mrs Whinfield and Samuel Stewart. Stopford telephoned Grimsby in order to inform the captain that Owens was double-crossing MI5, but that McCarthy was working for MI5.

Having arranged Operation LAMP, MI5 took precautions not to tip off Owens and called at his flat to give him the information he had been asked to supply and the money needed for the mission. MI5 also met B
ISCUIT
and he was told to get as much information as possible out of Owens on the journey up to Grimsby and when they were on the trawler. It was also arranged that B
ISCUIT
should make contact again when they arrived in Grimsby, if he could get away from Owens.

Thereafter B
ISCUIT
duly contacted MI5 daily and reported that during the train journey from King’s Cross to Grimsby, Owens had been making notes about things he had seen from the train, including aerodromes and power stations. He had also said that he thought MI5 was a rotten organisation and was keen to get his own back on them but, most worrying for MI5,
was that in addition to the information and photographs he was supposed to take with him, Owens had a document that they had not given him and which could seriously jeopardise the whole of the British Security Service. While still on the train Owens had produced a menu card for the fortieth anniversary dinner of the Important Persons Club, a dining-club run by MI5 at the Hyde Park Hotel to maintain links with retirees and other useful intelligence contacts. The menu included a seating plan identifying all the guests, and B
ISCUIT
said that Owens had told him that he could show him ‘the bastard’s name who I introduced you to’. At this point, B
ISCUIT
said Owens turned to the page with the name T. A. Robertson on it. Owens then said that the Doctor will be glad because ‘when our advance guard get here they will know who to get and where to get them’. B
ISCUIT
also told MI5 that Owens did not want the Doctor coming aboard the trawler because there was always the chance of a double-cross or someone photographing him. When they were in the hotel B
ISCUIT
had seen Owens going through the pockets of two naval coats hanging on a rack, but when he had not found anything he had said ‘we failed Hitler’ and gone to bed.

Despite the latest report from B
ISCUIT
, MI5 decided that the current plan could still go ahead and so the
Barbados
set sail from Grimsby in the very early hours of the morning of 20 May. During the voyage Owens spent much of his time asking the captain and crew lots of questions about convoys, what arms were at hand and whether there were any flashlights on board. He even asked the mate if he was in the German Secret Service. B
ISCUIT
grew more suspicious when he gained the impression that Owens was expecting an early contact to be made because he was continually searching the skies. Owens only left the wheel-house occasionally to go below for a cup of tea and at about 4.30 in the afternoon, when B
ISCUIT
was below deck, a seaplane circled the vessel and then flew off. The captain thought that the aircraft had British markings, but that they were in the wrong place, on the tail rather than the fuselage. The plane had flown away westwards, the direction from which it had appeared, and shortly afterwards two explosions were heard from the north-west, about one and a half miles away. Shortly after midnight the captain decided to cast his nets and do some fishing, so Owens retired to his cabin, but after only ten minutes the amphibious aircraft returned. This time the captain
identified
it as a seaplane and, as it circled them, it dropped green starlights from both port and starboard and flashed a Morse signal to heave-to. The captain went to tell B
ISCUIT
about the plane and asked him what to do
and, from the captain’s report, B
ISCUIT
became convinced that this was a German plane and was sure that Owens expected something to happen imminently, even though the rendezvous was not scheduled for several days. Worried that Owens might go up on deck and signal the plane, B
ISCUIT
ordered the skipper to haul in the nets, switch off the
running-lights
and head for home at full speed.

When Owens heard the nets being pulled in he became concerned that something was wrong, but the captain told him that the nets had become fouled and had to be recovered. When they had been sailing for about two hours Owens asked where they were going, and was told that they were going to a location near the rendezvous spot to wait.

From all that had happened B
ISCUIT
concluded that they were being
followed
by a German plane. B
ISCUIT
was keen to keep Owens below deck, so with the help of the captain and the mate, Owens was tied up, searched and locked in the captain’s cabin. Then Owens accused B
ISCUIT
of being a German agent adding, ‘I am a mug – I thought so and my man in London warned me about you’. He then told B
ISCUIT
that he was making a mistake: ‘it’s not me you want, it’s the other fellow, my agent in London. If you let me go we will get him.’ Then came B
ISCUIT
’s famous retort: ‘Heil Hitler… you bastard’.