Read Some Day the Sun Will Shine and Have Not Will Be No More Online
Authors: Brian Peckford
Some Day the Sun Will Shine and Have Not Will Be No More (22 page)
The list of legitimate demands was endless. We were forced to bargain hard with
all those who were paid by the government, which naturally led to acrimonious
discourse with all union leaders, from the teachers and nurses to the
Newfoundland Association of Public Employees and CUPE.
We introduced, and the legislature passed, Bill 59, which banned rotating
strikes and provided for additional essential workers during a strike to protect
health and safety. This of course meant harsh
criticism from
inside and outside the province and even attracted a United Nations agency (that
font of all wisdom) to wade into the fray.
But these were unusual times that called for unusual measures if we were to
struggle through—and by and large the people understood and supported us. It is
something that you would not do in a perfect world, but we were hardly in a
perfect world at the bottom of Confederation’s ladder on almost every meaningful
measure.
Meanwhile, undaunted, we proceeded to build new hospitals and clinics in
Labrador, Roddickton, Port aux Basques, and Clarenville, and made major
improvements to hospitals in Grand Falls, Gander, and St. John’s, as well as
various senior citizen homes around the province.
We established the first ever Status of Women Advisory Council, the first ever
Arts Council, the first ever Environment Department (and attendant environmental
assessment legislation), and the first progressive legislation enabling the
establishment of ecological and wilderness reserves, a book publishers
assistance program, a sustaining grant for the symphony orchestra, and provided
funding for specific arts groups. We began setting aside moneys for a pension
fund; at this time all pension payments came out of each year’s budget. We
eliminated gender pay discrimination and introduced a policy where 1% of the
capital cost of all new public buildings was to be spent on Newfoundland
art.
We expanded the schools’ capital budget, reorganized the whole high school
program with the introduction of grade twelve, and reorganized the trade school
system into a professional community college system. The introduction of
specific institutes, like the first bona fide school for the deaf, cajoled the
federal government to help us support a new campus for the Institute of
Fisheries and Marine Navigation (to become known as the Marine Institute),
perhaps a one-of-a-kind post-secondary institution without equal in the world.
We also built the first and only Fine Arts degree program at Sir Wilfred
Grenfell College in Corner Brook.
On the resource side, while the eye was on the big prizes of fish,
water, and oil, we did deal with the here and now
simultaneously. New legislation was passed dealing with the forestry,
streamlining and causing more reforestation and sylva culture, introducing the
first Aquaculture Act, the development of a Labrador Resource and Transportation
plan, updating mining legislation, introducing a prospectors assistance program
(one of the discoverers of the giant Labrador nickel mine at Voisey’s Bay
availed of this program), overseeing the opening of the province’s first gold
mine, and having a Department of Rural Development with programs for leadership
and small businesses.
We also expanded the Newfoundland and Labrador Development Corporation, which
provided technological, administrative, as well as financial assistance to
businesses. The corporation oversaw the Newfoundland Savings Bond Program
(cancelled by a successive administration), which in one year collected over
$20 million, and also administered a stock savings program with the private
sector (which was also cancelled by a successive administration). Additionally,
a loan guarantee program, especially for small and medium fish companies, was
put in place along with other financial assistance programs for fishermen.
To fully appreciate the corporation’s work, the former president, Ira Bridger,
whom I appointed, has this to say:
In 1967 the province established the Newfoundland and Labrador Industrial
Development Corporation (NIDC) to provide long-term financing to industrial
and resource-based projects, both through commercial investments or other
financial arrangements. However, its role was a piecemeal approach,
generally focused on large-scale projects. In any event, it was not a fully
staffed organization engaged in promoting or providing financial services
but rather an administrative mechanism that facilitated projects being
advanced within a line department. Financial support for high-profile
projects could also be undertaken through other Crown
corporations.
Assistance to enterprises engaged in fish harvesting and processing was
provided largely through the Fisheries Loan Board. [It is interesting to
note that as early as 1943, the then Commission of Government began offering
loans to fishing companies willing to invest in fish processing plants.] The
agriculture sector was assisted through the Farm Development Loan
Board.
Some progress towards providing a broader range of financial support for
small- and medium-sized enterprises was made in the early 1970s. This arose
primarily from the federal government’s creation of the Department of
Regional Economic Expansion (DREE), which offered federal government support
for various programs in regional economic development. Provinces could
propose projects, which would be supported financially under General
Development Agreements (GDAs) between the federal and provincial
governments.
One of the initiatives arising from subsequent GDA proposals from
Newfoundland was the creation of the Newfoundland and Labrador Development
Corporation (NLDC) in 1972. Under a 10-year GDA, a revolving capital fund of
$20 million for term-lending financial support to local business was
established and to be managed by NLDC. Ninety per cent of the fund was
provided by the federal government and 10% provided by the province.
Operating costs for NLDC were shared 50–50. NLDC operated at arm’s length
from the provincial government and was managed by an independent Board of
Directors (with equal federal and provincial nominees).
For the next decade NLDC provided debt funding to a
variety of rural-based enterprises but lending activities were restricted to
the primary processing or manufacturing sectors.
In 1982, DREE was transferred to the Department of Trade and Commerce, and
with the creation of the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE),
the federal government decided to wind down many of the earlier initiatives
undertaken by its predecessor (i.e., DREE). The GDA model was disbanded. The
province was subsequently given notice that the federal government’s
participation in NLDC would end. The province decided to continue to
underwrite both the capital and operating requirements for NLDC and to
maintain its role as a mechanism for providing support to small- and
medium-sized businesses while reassessing its future role in light of a
review of a broader range of socio-economic development options.
In 1985, Premier Brian Peckford appointed a Royal Commission on Employment
and Unemployment, which called for an integrated strategy for social and
economic development and employment creation. The Summary Report “Building
On Our Strengths” was presented in 1986.
A new president was appointed at NLDC in 1986 and the provincial budget
for 1987 provided renewed support for the Corporation to expand and advance
a wide range of innovative programs for small- and medium-sized businesses,
which complimented the recommendations arising from the Royal Commission on
Employment and Unemployment.
NLDC was given a broader mandate to invest in enterprise in all sectors of
the economy. A number
of new specifically designed and
targeted programs were introduced, such as a Venture Capital Program
(focusing primarily on technology commercialization) and a Youth
Entrepreneur Program (focusing on entrepreneurs under the age of 25).
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A major innovation for promoting self-reliance was the issuance of
Newfoundland Development Savings Bonds to provide capital funding for NLDC.
The bond issue was primarily used to promote local enterprise and
entrepreneurship. Bond sales were restricted to residents of the province,
but some argued that there were more cost-effective ways to raise money that
did not take into account the tremendous intangible advantage of providing a
direct link to investment in one’s own community. As a result, the bond
issue received tremendous positive support from local residents, was
oversubscribed, and raised over $20 million.
In addition to the revitalization of NLDC, the Peckford administration
introduced a Newfoundland Stock Savings Plan and Venture Capital Tax Credit
Program, which provided provincial income tax credits to encourage residents
to invest in the provincial economy.
In 1987, NLDC created a subsidiary operation, the Enterprise Network Inc.,
which created, promoted, and initiated the development of a province-wide
Enterprise Network, a multimedia applications and
support system for communications-and-IT-enabled socio-economic development
in rural and remote communities, which also assisted in transferring the
skills associated with the emerging information economy to business and
economic development. This was an innovative, leading edge initiative that
drew national and international attention.
As a Crown corporation, NLDC was able to form partnerships with community
organizations and the federal government to plan and build the Enterprise
Network service. In 1988 the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency supported
the planning and initial pilot development of the Enterprise Network, and
in 1991 a special Cooperation Agreement was signed by the federal and
provincial governments to support the activities of the Enterprise
Network.
Unfortunately, support for this initiative was later abandoned by the Wells
administration. Nevertheless, the pioneering development work undertaken in
Newfoundland and Labrador was followed closely by others and emulated in
many other international jurisdictions.
There were other actions involving significant investments, including ongoing
support for the Bay D’Espoir aquaculture program; support for our first gold
mine at Hope Brook; tens of millions of dollars of federal-provincial money for
technology upgrades to the two paper mills; support for the Sprung Greenhouse
project; over $100 million in loan guarantees almost exclusively for the fish
processing industry; tens of millions of dollars to a Rural Development
Authority, which provided loans and grants for small rural-based businesses in
forestry, farming, crafts; and leadership support through the establishment of
Rural Development associations throughout the province.
Perhaps three major projects speak most dramatically to both
“those immediate on-the-ground issues” and why through them we could see even
more clearly why we had to push the big-three agenda, come what may.
THIS TROUBLED PROJECT CAME
as a result of Joey Smallwood’s
“industrialize or perish” philosophy. When I came to power it was mothballed,
and I had said during the campaign that I would see if something could be done
to get the project going again. At the time it was the largest bankruptcy in
Canada’s history. I was able to get Petro-Canada, then a federal
government–owned company, to pay for the mothballing costs. But this was for a
finite time. I was trying to find someone who would take the place over and make
it work. An almost impossible task! I am sure at the time there were very few
who thought it was really possible, let alone probable. At least that was the
information coming back to me. Additionally, the task was not made easier in the
fact that most of the studies that had been done to assess the possibility of
reopening the refinery all showed that it would take well over $100 million to
rehabilitate the place. This has troubled me to this day, since it seems obvious
that this was an inflated figure deliberately used to dissuade those who might
have an interest in seeing Come By Chance reopen. The politics of refining oil
in the Atlantic provinces during this time was very intense, showing as it does
the lengths to which existing operators were prepared to go to protect their
present position in the marketplace.
There had been some Middle Eastern interest with local Newfoundland business
involvement, but this turned out to be a false attempt: while they professed
private investment, with no public funds, subsequent meetings with them revealed
a requirement for substantial public funds. But when all seemed lost on this
venture and equipment was on site to begin dismantling (the mothballing time was
at an end), there came an inquiry from a group in Boston who had read a news
report in the
Boston Globe
about the refinery. This
was Cumberland Farms, a company owned by the Haseotas family (of Greek
extraction) who began with one farm and a cow and calf worth $84 in Cumberland,
Rhode Island, in 1939.
The company had become successful in the convenience store business throughout
New England and along the coastal states of the U. S. They had recently acquired
additional convenience stores with Gulf gas stations, and hence were interested
in a constant gas supply for their newly acquired assets. And thus was born a
relationship between the provincial government and Cumberland Farms.
Interestingly, and of great importance, was that although the company had no
refinery experience or expertise, they were skeptical of the studies that showed
that it would take well over $100 million to rehabilitate the refinery and were
willing to hire independent experts in the field from Texas to examine the
refinery and provide the company with estimates of how much it would cost to
successfully restart the refinery.