Spoken from the Front (21 page)

In the same vein, we have stopped building police infrastructure
until the police demonstrate an ability to look after
what they have got and professionally man the existing
check-points. Police stations barely a year old have no power
because the generator starter battery has been robbed, none
of the plumbing works because the copper-pipe work has disappeared,
and they seem to take a pride in systematically
defecating around the toilet before moving into the next
room. The police have other far more distasteful habits that
are not uncommon in Afghanistan. But it is their general
abuse of the civil population that is at the heart of many of the
problems faced by Afghanistan.

In the Garmsir district, southern Helmand, it was the foul
behaviour of the Afghan police that prompted the local elders
to send a delegation to Baluchistan to request the support of
the Taliban in freeing them from the daily humiliation of the
national authorities. Subjugation to a strict fundamentalist
code enforced by foreigners was preferable to being ruled by
their own authorities.

Our exit strategy in Afghanistan hinges upon enabling the
Afghan to govern himself and therefore they must be taught
to do for themselves all of what we are doing on their behalf.
Significant progress has been made with the formation and
training of the Afghan National Army and steps are being
taken to consolidate and professionalize the police force.

Each construction project we engage in has been vetted by
the Afghan provincial council and measures are taken to
ensure that the local people have the capacity to sustain the
project without foreign intervention. The tribal leaders are
now beginning to lobby the provincial government for
assistance and the very embryonic provincial departments
are starting to address the people's needs by employing local
firms to carry out development work. This system is closely
mentored by British civil servants and military engineers. It is
a slow and frustrating process, but without it everything else
we do is futile. Racing ahead with grand reconstruction
projects would probably suit the average Afghan and
appease the international press but it would do nothing
towards creating enduring peace and stability.

It is the slow pace of this critical development work that
will cause the international community to be committed in
Afghanistan for many years to come. In the meantime there
will be an enduring requirement for our military to have a
presence in Afghanistan in order to reassure the populace and
disrupt the activity of the Taliban. Sadly, more men like Lance
Corporal [Mathew] Ford, Lance Bombardier Clark and
Lance Bombardier McLaughlin will die fighting in remote
corners of this alien country. But without their efforts none of
the other capacity building activity would be possible;
Afghanistan would continue to be a failed state and a breeding
ground for fundamentalist activity, led by individuals
that despise all that we stand for in countries such as ours.

Given the enormous area of terrain, much of it far from
hospitable, and the difficulty in distinguishing between
insurgent and civilian, defeating the Taliban with military
might is probably not achievable. We must make the Afghan
people believe that their future under the Government of
Afghanistan banner is better by far than anything the Taliban
can offer and compel them to take charge of their own affairs.

In April 2007, the men of 12 Mechanized Brigade replaced the
Royal Marines as part of Operation Herrick 6. The entire force
totalled about 5,800 servicemen and women. As the Afghan
summer returned, the fighting once again intensified. The Anglian
and Mercian regiments, with distinctive and bloody histories, soon
found themselves embroiled in action akin to that fought by their
predecessors.

The main combat power for Operation Herrick 6 was provided by
1 Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment, 2 Battalion The Mercian
Regiment (formerly The Worcesters and Foresters), 2 Battalion The
Royal Regiment of Fusiliers and 3 Battalion The Yorkshire
Regiment, with the Light Dragoons providing armoured reconnaissance;
26 Engineer Regiment, 19 Regiment Royal Artillery and
4 Logistic Support Regiment gave their specialized support. The
Army Air Corps flew Apaches and the RAF Harriers from 1
Squadron provided close air support. RAF Chinooks and Hercules
supplied transport while Force Protection was the responsibility of
the RAF Force Protection Wing Headquarters and the RAF
Regiment.

Captain George Seal-Coon, The Royal Anglian
Regiment

Captain George Seal-Coon, 1 Battalion The Royal Anglian
Regiment, is twenty-seven. He was born in Norwich and grew up
in the nearby town of Aylsham. He is the son of a solicitor, who
served in the Territorial Army, and has a younger brother. He
went to school in Norfolk and, after favouring a career in the
military, was awarded a sixth-form scholarship from the Army.
Seal-Coon went to university in Nottingham to study French and
Russian, then in 2004 to Sandhurst. Afghanistan was his first
overseas tour and he was deployed there from March to
October 2007. He is single, and based at Pirbright, Surrey. As
well as being a full-time soldier, he is a part-time artist and has
sketched many military scenes, from on and off the battlefield.

I was platoon commander of 7 Platoon, B Company, in
Afghanistan – in charge of roughly thirty men at any one time
– although that number dwindled with casualties and times
away on R&R [rest and relaxation]. When we arrived at
Camp Bastion, we were apprehensive but at the same time
we felt well prepared, having trained intensively for the
better part of nine months prior to deploying. We were keen
to get on with it. Everyone was aware that at some stage we
were going to come under contact, and we were keen to know
how we would react when that moment arrived.

Initially, we deployed to FOB Rob [Forward Operating
Base Robinson] to provide security for the artillery fire base.
It was fairly quiet, although we were rocketed a couple of
times. It was opium harvest time and the Taliban weren't
really up for a fight. So we didn't have any big contacts
initially. It did, however, give us time to get out on patrol,
work with the Royal Marines' Armoured Support Troop and
generally get a feel for the place.

In mid-April, we were involved in Op Silicon – the Viking
[tracked armoured fighting vehicle] battle group's first major
op. The aim of that was to clear the Green Zone [of Taliban] –
the fertile farming area either side of the river Helmand
above Gereshk. The plan was to clear it up to the limit of
exploitation [LOE]. Further up the valley, we were then to
secure the area for the engineers to establish patrol bases for
the ANA [Afghan National Army], from which they could
then project force.

We deployed with Vikings out to the high ground overlooking
the Gereshk valley. We got settled there for the night.
It was quite a strange, stormy night. As soon as we were
settled, with sentries out, it started to rain – and it got windy:
on one or two occasions, we were lying, trying to sleep, when
someone's roll mat came whipping past, disappearing into
the desert night.

We launched into the Green Zone just before dawn. It was
a battle group operation involving well over a thousand men.
My company, B (Suffolk) Company, was point at the time. We
had A Company on the northern flank, on the edge of the
desert. There was an area up there called the Red Fort, a
medieval fort, built from red sandstone, which dominated the
surrounding area. A Company had to push up there. Our job
was to push towards our LOE about six K away, defeat any
Taliban we encountered and provide security. Then the
engineers would move up and build the FOBs and we would
patrol the area.

Initially it was quite quiet. We moved out in the Vikings to
a drop-off point on the edge of the desert. A few shots were
fired as the Taliban sentries pulled back into the Green Zone.
We moved in, on foot, quickly, with very few problems. We
had it reported that the women and children had largely
moved out of the area, which was often a precursor to the fact
that something [a fire-fight] was about to happen. We pushed
up the valley, through poppy fields, compounds and dense
undergrowth, with an Apache overhead providing some eyes
out into depth. The first big contact was on the company's
right flank. We had the Vikings there as flank security,
moving along a wide canal path. The ANA were supposed to
follow up on that flank but had not yet pushed forward. At
the time, my platoon was point. We were about to cross the
edge of an open field to break into some compounds
when the Vikings were opened up on from the south-east,
beyond the canal they were paralleling. We also began to take
fire from positions to our front. We moved in amongst the
compounds fairly rapidly, making use of what cover was
available. This was mid-morning and it was already getting
pretty hot – about 45°C. We were carrying quite a bit of kit,
ammo, body armour and radios: the GPMG [general-purpose
machine-gun] gunners were probably loaded down with
about forty kilos and the rest of us not too much less.

At first, we came under small-arms and PKM [machinegun]
fire. Then RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] were fired.
The fire was all being directed at the Vikings so we extracted
back to assist them. I liaised with my OC [officer commanding],
Major Mick Aston, and pushed forward to support the
vehicles. Two of my sections and I crossed the canal over a
narrow footbridge, with the vehicles and 2 Section providing
fire support – we were quite exposed at this time and you'd
be surprised at how quickly you move, even with all that kit!

On the far side, we took cover in an irrigation ditch, waist
deep in water and taking quite sustained, accurate enemy
fire. My personal weapon was a rifle and each section had a
GPMG and two minimis [light machine-guns]; a couple of
guys had UGLs – underslung grenade launchers. My platoon
sergeant 'Woody' Woodrow had a mortar man with him, with
a 51mm mortar – an excellent weapon. This first contact went
on for three hours, solidly. I suppose, during the entire day,
we were in contact for about seven hours.

We identified two positions in a field, about 150 metres to
our front and engaged. At this point, I had two sections
spread out along the ditch, suppressing the enemy. Not long
into the fire-fight we were engaged from our rear. Fortunately
everyone was in cover. Between ourselves, 6 Platoon and a
Javelin [anti-tank] missile, we managed to silence that threat.
It was really a case of winning the fire-fight and providing
ourselves with security, guarding against Taliban trying to
outflank us. We suppressed them and tried to call in an
Apache [attack helicopter]. They were unable to identify the
enemy positions, deep within the tree-lines. The Taliban
had about a platoon [-sized force] and they were fairly spread
about, using the cover well.

The Taliban tried to push around our flanks and we then
had RPGs fired at us. We had a lot of fire-power going down.
It was my first proper contact and that of almost everyone
there. Initially, it was a shock to the system. The compounds
were constructed of compacted mud walls. The villages were
a web of these compounds, often with a couple of alleyways
weaving through. The walls were really hard, offering good
protection from fire and blast. Every time we breached a compound,
we had to use explosives and crowbars. During the
day, I fired on a couple of occasions but for the most part I
was trying to co-ordinate my sections. My mortar man,
Private [Richie] Barke, used his 51mm [mortar] to pretty good
effect, getting his bombs on target every first or second shot.
We also used it to mark the enemy for CAS [close air
support], firing a few smoke rounds on enemy positions and
then air – I think it was a Harrier – came in and dropped 500-pounders
[bombs].

We had extracted back over the canal using the Vikings as cover
and were sheltering, waist deep, in another irrigation ditch, in anticipation.
The first bomb was a blind – the second on target. We stopped taking
fire on that flank after that. 6 Platoon had been pushed into the village
and ended up in danger of being isolated in a compound to the east, with the
Taliban pushing forward and attempting to surround them. Effectively, they
were taking some fairly accurate and concentrated fire, defending this compound.
Ourselves [7 Platoon] and 5 Platoon then broke back into the compounds and
cleared through to them. We were clearing buildings on red[aggressively, as
distinct from on green: a softer approach], due to the proximity of the enemy
from that point. We would breach a wall or door, possibly with an explosive
charge, throw a grenade in, then clear the compound in an aggressive manner.
We took one or two RPGs fired in airburst [exploding above the men], as we
progressed towards 6 Platoon – fortunately they were ineffective. 2
Section were about to grenade one particular compound after creating an entry
point, when the grenadier and Corporal Parker heard a noise. A family –
mostly women and children and a couple of older men – had been sheltering
within a room. They were shaken up and scared but uninjured. We spoke to them,
reassured them, and they told us that the Taliban had extracted ahead of us
and pointed us in the right direction. One of the men guided us a short distance
along the route.

We linked up with 6 Platoon, the Taliban fleeing ahead of
us. 7 Platoon became point platoon again and we pushed up
towards our LOE. By this stage, it was about 5 p.m. and we
had fought through the hottest part of the day, almost nonstop.
Spending so much time in the flooded ditches had been
a relief – I think that prevented a few people going down with
heat exhaustion. We continued to clear compounds. About
150 metres short of the LOE, my lead section commander,
Corporal Mann, came back, reporting his lead scout had
spotted something. We pushed through cautiously and discovered
a wounded Taliban fighter trying to hide in the
bushes. He was badly injured in the leg so we secured the
area and gave him what first aid we could. We discovered a
further three Taliban, whom we took prisoner, and there were
a number of enemy dead in the area who had been engaged
either by us or the AH [attack helicopter]. There were about
seven dead in all. This was on the edge of the built-up area
bordered with cornfields. Meanwhile 5 Platoon and Major
Aston's tac [tactical] group discovered a number of enemy
forces in depth and they killed a further five in that area.

We had gone through the day with a couple of biscuits,
travelling light on kit to provide more room for ammo. The
guys were pretty tired and the adrenalin rush and exertions
started to take their toll. It was seven o'clock when we
reached our LOE. We didn't get dry clothes or food and water
resupply until ten or eleven o'clock. Remarkably, there was
only one casualty. One man, Private Sheppard, was slightly
wounded in the face by an RPG fragment. Bearing in mind
the intensity of the fighting, we were very lucky. I was
massively proud of my men that day. It was a huge step forward
for all of us.

We had taken the Taliban off guard. It was quite rare for our
guys to see the Taliban up close. They [the victims] were
dressed in drab colours and Afghan traditional dress, with
Soviet-style chest-rigs [load-carrying equipment]. We
recovered a number of RPGs, AK-47s and a couple of PKMs
from their position. Most of the dead were probably in their
twenties or early thirties. 5 Platoon had to remove the corpses
the next day and for some of the guys it was an unpleasant
task. In the heat of the day, the bodies were in quite a state, in
particular those that had been killed by AH fire. The bodies
did not seem like they had been human beings. Their skin
was quite waxy: they almost didn't seem real.

Warrant Officer Class 2 Keith Nieves, The Royal
Anglian Regiment

Warrant Officer Class 2 Keith Nieves, 1 Battalion The Royal
Anglian Regiment, is thirty-four. He was born in Bury St
Edmunds, Suffolk, the son of a builder, with a sister, who has
died. At sixteen he left school to go into the Army. He had
intended to work as a thatcher but his sister bet him £20 that he
couldn't join the Army and he took her up on it. He was a
member of the junior Parachute Regiment based in Pirbright,
Surrey, then progressed to the adult ranks. In 1993, having
sustained stress fractures in his legs, he decided to transfer to his
local infantry battalion, The Royal Anglians. He has completed
tours of Northern Ireland, Croatia, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
His second tour of Afghanistan in 2007 was as a colour sergeant.
Married with two sons, he lives in Pirbright, Surrey.

I had done a tour of Afghanistan in 2002, in Kabul. My second
tour of the country began on 2 April [2007]. This time we
were in Helmand province. In the build-up, we knew it was
going to be more kinetic than in Kabul. During the Kabul
tour, we had a lot of interaction with the local community –
there was a lot of PR stuff. But in Helmand province we soon
realized we were going to have much less contact with the
public and the locals.