Stalin (14 page)

Some interesting accounts survive of how this tendency was perceived within the apparat. Stalin’s assistant, Amaiak Nazaretian, regularly corresponded with Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stalin’s old friend who was working in Transcaucasia in the early 1920s.
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This correspondence has been preserved in Ordzhonikidze’s archive. In the letters written during the summer of 1922, Nazaretian described his work under Stalin:

Am I happy with my job? Yes and no. On one hand, I’m getting quite an education here, I know what’s going on in international and Russian life, and I’m being schooled in discipline, developing precision in my job.… On the other, this work is purely paper pushing, painstaking, not very satisfying from a subjective standpoint; it’s menial work that takes such tremendous amounts of time that you can’t sneeze or squirm, especially under Koba’s firm hand. Do we get along? We do.… You can learn a lot from him. Now that I’ve gotten to know him, I have extraordinary respect for him.… Under his stern demeanor is an attentiveness to those he works with. We’re creating order in the TsK.

Koba has really got me trained.… He’s really cunning. Hard as a nut, it takes a while to understand what he’s up to.… Despite his well-reasoned savagery of temperament, if I can put it that way, he is soft, he has a heart, and he knows how to appreciate people’s dignity.… Now, the work of the TsK has really changed. What we found here was indescribably awful. Now we’ve shaken things up.

Nazaretian felt Stalin was tremendously significant: “Ilyich has fully recovered.… Yesterday, Koba went to see him. He has to keep a watchful eye over Ilyich and all of Mother Russia”; “Ilyich undoubtedly has a trusty Cerberus in him, fearlessly standing guard at the gates of the TsK RKP.”
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Nazaretian’s letters provide important details on how Stalin was perceived within the Bolshevik bureaucratic community. In Moscow, according to Nazaretian, an expression came into fashion: “to be going under Stalin.” This referred to officials who had been summoned to Moscow from their previous posts but had not yet been assigned new jobs and were “hanging, so to speak, in the air.”
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Such was Stalin as he appeared to his assistant early in his tenure as general secretary. Obviously, these descriptions carry an element of exaggeration, the admiration of a loyal secretary toward his boss. But the intelligent and observant Nazaretian was conveying a certain mood within the apparat. Many members of the bureaucracy began to perceive Stalin as an experienced and confident bureaucrat who held secure positions within the hierarchy. He was coolheaded, but he could be stern and unbending in standing up for his interests and opinions. At a time when the world of the Bolshevik bureaucracy was increasingly fracturing into patron-client cliques, these qualities drew him quite a few supporters.

In Nazaretian’s letters, Stalin is perceived within the party as Lenin’s loyal comrade, his pillar in times of political strife. And this view was largely accurate. Long years of collaboration, marred by only a few instances of discord, had created a strong bond between Lenin and Stalin. One Bolshevik left behind an eloquent memoir of a meeting between Lenin and Stalin in September 1921 in the latter’s apartment. A difficult squabble among top officials in Petrograd was being settled. Lenin tried to reconcile the feuding parties while Stalin paced the room smoking his pipe. At one point, Lenin looked at Stalin and said, “That’s an Asian for you—all he does is suck on his pipe!” Stalin knocked the pipe right out of his own mouth.
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This playful manner went beyond the boundaries of the boss-subordinate relationship. For Lenin, Stalin was a comrade-in-arms with whom relations were warm enough to allow for teasing. It is difficult to imagine that he would take such liberties with Trotsky, with whom he maintained a stiff, official manner, using the polite pronoun
vy
for “you” rather than the familiar
ty.

On 30 May 1922, an incident occurred that further attests to the close relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin, who was ill and facing the prospect of paralysis, summoned Stalin to Gorki, his residence outside Moscow. He asked Stalin to procure poison so that he could have the option of taking his own life when the time came. Stalin immediately told Lenin’s sister, Maria Ilinichna Ulianova, and Nikolai Bukharin, who then happened to be staying at Gorki, about this request.
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According to Maria Ulianova’s memoirs, they decided together to try to boost Lenin’s spirits. Stalin went back to him and told him that the time to carry out his intention had not yet come, and the doctors were promising he would get better. Lenin, in Ulianova’s account, “became noticeably more cheerful and consented, although he asked Stalin, ‘Are you being deceitful?’ ‘When have you ever seen me be deceitful?’ Stalin replied.”
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Lenin showed his concern for Stalin in several ways. While seriously ill in Gorki in June 1922, Lenin sent a recommendation to Moscow: “Require Com. Stalin, through the Politburo, to spend one day per week, beside Sunday, entirely at his dacha outside town.” The Politburo adopted the resolution.
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In August, after Lenin’s health improved, Stalin visited him regularly in Gorki. According to Maria Ulianova’s memoirs, “Ilyich greeted him in a friendly manner, with jokes and laughter, and urged me to be hospitable to Stalin and bring him wine, etc.”
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Later, when he himself was in power, Stalin adopted Lenin’s manner of showing concern for his subordinates.

Harmony between Lenin and Stalin lasted until the fall of 1922.

Lenin’s illness had tremendous political ramifications. The party, which was structured around a single leader, was vulnerable. The Politburo was forced to begin thinking about Lenin’s successor. The “troika” of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin was growing in influence in its contest with its main opponent, Trotsky. This face-off was actually an outcome of Lenin’s tactic of isolating Trotsky, but with Lenin’s illness, Trotsky’s isolation served to strengthen the troika, a dangerous prospect in Lenin’s eyes. Hoping for a recovery from illness, Lenin attempted to shift the balance of power, and Stalin was the easiest target.

A conflict over the program for uniting the Soviet republics can be seen as the starting point of Lenin’s efforts. The Civil War had created a unified state, but in the second half of 1922 it was decided to make this union official by publicly announcing the principles on which the new state would be built. For the most part, the Bolshevik leadership saw eye to eye on this issue. Nobody entertained thoughts of breaking up what had been the Russian Empire or granting real autonomy to any areas under Moscow’s control. There were arguments over the form the new union would take and the degree of independence various Bolshevik entities would enjoy, but all parties to the decision were expected to submit to the discipline of a unified party.

Stalin was open about his position. He proposed that the real state of affairs and Moscow’s true intentions be codified in the constitution without undue ceremony or diplomacy. He favored bringing all the major republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and the smaller ethnic entities into the Russian Federation with certain rights of autonomy. Overall, this proposal was in full accord with the party line and was supported by most party officials, in both Moscow and the ethnic republics. Stalin was probably surprised when Lenin opposed his proposal and advanced his own plan to proclaim a union of “independent” Soviet republics—even though the Bolshevik leader had no intention of granting genuine independence. The motives for Lenin’s position are difficult to pinpoint. Perhaps he was responding to dissatisfaction with Stalin’s program among Georgian and some Ukrainian party leaders. Perhaps, with his illness receding, he simply saw this as a good opportunity to reenter the political fray.

In September 1922 Lenin began promoting his program. He criticized Stalin for being too hasty, an assessment that must have stung. Stalin resisted and made a fighting retreat, accusing Lenin of “national liberalism.”
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His feelings are easy to understand: he had been put in a humiliating position and was forced to change a stance that he had put a lot of energy into advocating. But he chose not to do serious battle with Lenin. On 28 September, an interesting exchange of notes took place between Kamenev and Stalin during a Politburo meeting:

KAMENEV

: Ilyich is ready to go to war to defend independence.…

STALIN

: I think we need to stand up to Ilyich.…

KAMENEV

: I think so long as Vladimir Ilyich is insistent, we’d be worse off

resisting

.

STALIN

: I don’t know. Let him do as he sees fit.

Stalin relented. He knew Lenin well and appreciated how powerful he still was.

In October–December 1922 a conflict surrounding the question of monopolizing foreign trade followed a similar script. At a plenum on 6 October, a majority within the Central Committee voted to somewhat loosen the monopoly. Lenin, who was away from Moscow, took a stand against the liberalization. Stalin, who supported the 6 October decision, was slow to relent and expressed reservations. Lenin undoubtedly was not pleased.

This dispute ended with a move by Lenin that Stalin must have found extremely upsetting. On the issue of monopolizing foreign trade, Lenin demonstratively brought Trotsky out of disfavor and recruited him as an ally. Lenin had often resorted to this sort of maneuver—exploiting the conflicts ever-present at the upper echelons of the party. Now, however, the circumstances were different. Lenin was seriously ill, and the jockeying for power and influence was greatly intensified. To the alarm of Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, whose influence had been growing, Lenin proposed that Trotsky continue to work with him. On 21 December 1922, immediately after a Central Committee plenum voted to uphold his opposition to liberalization, Lenin dictated a note to Trotsky, employing his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia, as stenographer: “It seems that we’ve captured the position without firing a single shot, using a simple maneuver. I propose that we not stop here and continue the offensive.” Lenin advised Trotsky to raise the question of foreign trade at the upcoming party congress and also to speak at the Congress of Soviets.
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Such a move would discredit Lenin’s opponents, including Stalin, before a large assembly of party functionaries.

Trotsky immediately got to work and telephoned Kamenev, who told Stalin about the call. Stalin refused to carry out Lenin’s instructions to put Trotsky’s speech on the schedule of the Congress of Soviets. He also called Krupskaia and reprimanded her for taking down and sending the letter to Trotsky. Apparently the reprimand was rather indelicate, or at least it seemed so to the overburdened and high-strung Krupskaia. In theory, Stalin had a legitimate grievance against Krupskaia. Just a few days previously, on 18 December, the Central Committee plenum had voted to limit contact with Lenin, who had suffered another health setback. “Personal responsibility shall be placed on Com. Stalin to isolate Vladimir Ilyich both in regard to face-to-face dealings with officials and correspondence.”
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Krupskaia had violated this directive. But Stalin had also crossed the line with his emotional outburst. The troika saw Lenin’s appeal to Trotsky as dangerous and provocative.

Realizing his mistake, Stalin apologized to Krupskaia. Judging by Maria Ulianova’s memoirs, he also made an attempt to reconcile with Lenin. He met with Ulianova and told her how upset he was about being estranged from him:

I couldn’t sleep at all last night.… What does Ilyich think of me, how does he feel about me! As if I were some sort of traitor. I love him with all my heart. Find a way to tell him that.

But Lenin was implacable. Ulianova offers the following description:

Ilyich called me in to see him for something, and I told him, among other things, that his comrades send their respects.… “And Stalin asked me to send you his heartfelt regards and asked me to say that he truly loves you.” Ilyich grinned and remained silent. “So should I send him your regards?” I asked. “You can send them,” Ilyich replied rather coldly. “But Volodia,” I continued. “He is, after all, very smart, Stalin.” “He’s not smart at all,” Ilyich replied firmly, wincing.

Ulianova does not say exactly when this conversation with her brother took place, but it was almost certainly in late 1922 or early 1923, when relations between Lenin and Stalin were deteriorating and threatened to rupture completely. On 24 December Lenin dictated a document to his secretary—the well-known “Letter to the Congress”—in which he expressed apprehension about divisions within the party’s top leadership. Regarding Stalin, this document states, “Com. Stalin, now that he is general secretary, has concentrated immense power in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of exercising this power with sufficient caution.”
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In another letter, dictated on 4 January, Lenin was even more categorical. He proposed removing Stalin from the post of general secretary because he was “too rude.”
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Lenin’s growing irritation was the backdrop against which the “Georgian Affair” unfolded. This episode involved a dispute between a group of Georgian Bolsheviks and the leadership of the Transcaucasian Federation, which comprised Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The conflict was not with the entire federation leadership but with its head, Ordzhonikidze. The friendship between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze would certainly have influenced the general secretary’s stance on the matter. The Georgian Bolsheviks, with variable success, were inundating Moscow with complaints about Ordzhonikidze’s heavy hand. In late 1922 Ordzhonikidze gave his opponents more ammunition against him: in a fit of anger, he struck one of his adversaries. A commission headed by Feliks Dzerzhinsky was sent from Moscow to investigate.
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Lenin took a great interest, and when the commission turned in a report favorable toward Ordzhonikidze, he was not pleased. He believed that Dzerzhinsky and Stalin were covering for Ordzhonikidze and being unfair to his beleaguered accusers.