Stalin (74 page)

56, no. 5 (July 2004): 707–729.

67

. Cited in F. Chuev,

(Moscow, 1991), p. 475.

68

. Voting was carried out by

(polling); in other words, members voted remotely, not while they were seated together in a Politburo meeting. According to the tally compiled by Poskrebyshev, who handled most of the clerical aspects of Politburo resolutions, Stalin, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Voznesensky, Shvernik, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Andreev, Beria, Malenkov, and Kosygin voted in favor of expelling Zhemchuzhina from the party. “Com. Molotov abstained”; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1518, l. 162.

69

. Ibid., l. 164; Khlevniuk et al.,

p. 313.

70

. Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds.,

(New Haven, 2001).

71

. Cited in

(Moscow, 2010), p. 333.

72

. Letter from Gorbenko, a member of the military, dated 15 July 1945; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 863, ll. 79–86.

73

. Yuri Slezkine,

(Princeton, 2004), p. 297.

74

. Letter from military journalist S. A. Lifshits dated March 1949; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 876, l. 15; f. 17, op. 132, d. 118, ll. 1–3.

75

. From the diary of People’s Commissar V. A. Malyshev, who was present at the meeting; cited in

no. 5 (1997): 140–141.

76

. This and subsequent excerpts from documents pertaining to preparations for Mao’s visit are quoted, with minor modifications, from Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff, “To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao’s Long March to Moscow, 1949,”

no 16. (Spring 2008): 118–129.

77

. A. M. Ledovskii,

(Moscow, 1999), p. 55.

78

. Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 1 (June 1992), p. 19.

79

. A. V. Pantsov,

(Moscow, 2007), p. 47.

80

. Cited in A. V. Pantsov, comp.,

(Moscow, 2008), p. 166.

81

. A. M. Ledovskii, “Stalin, Mao Tzedun i koreiskaia voina 1950–1953,”

no. 5 (2005): 106.

82

. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 329, ll. 10–17; Chen Jian et al., eds., “Stalin’s Conversations: Talks with Mao Zedong, December 1949–January 1950, and with Zhou Enlai, August–September 1952,”

nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 5–7.

83

. From the memoirs of Matyas Rakosi; cited in

no. 3 (1997): 142–143.

84

. Odd Arne Westad, “Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950,”

nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–1997): 227–228; Dieter Heinzig,

(London, 2003), pp. 281–282, 286–289.

85

. Ledovskii,

p. 143.

86

. Cited in N. Fedorenko, “Nochnye besedy,”

23 October 1988, p. 4.

87

. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 329, l. 51.

88

. Fedorenko, “Nochnye besedy.”

89

. For a detailed examination of Stalin’s role in the Soviet nuclear project, see David Holloway,

(New Haven, 1996).

90

. Letter written to the members of the Soviet leadership by Beria from prison, 1 July 1953; cited in Naumov and Sigachev,

p. 75.

91

. Cited in A. V. Torkunov,

(Moscow, 2000), pp. 6–8.

92

. Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,”

no 5. (Spring 1995): 7–8.

93

. Ibid., p. 9; Chernobaev,

p. 533.

94

. K. Vezersbi [Weathersby], “Sovetskie tseli v Koree, 1945–1950 gg.,” in

ed. M. M. Narinskii (Moscow, 1995), p. 316.

95

. In January 1950 the USSR was boycotting the United Nations, demanding that the new Communist government of China be allowed representation. Starting the war in Korea at a time when the Soviet representative to the Security Council was absent was a clear blunder by Stalin, one of which the United States took full advantage.

96

. Cited in Kathryn Weathersby (introduction and translations), “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,”

nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 40.

97

. Cited in Torkunov,

p. 97.

98

. Cited in Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,”

nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996): 118. (Bracketed insertion is Mansourov’s.)

99

. Cited in Ledovskii, “Stalin, Mao Tzedun i koreiskaia voina,” p. 106.

100

. From the memoirs of Matyas Rakosi; cited in

nos. 5–6 (1997): 7–8. The fact that this meeting took place is also confirmed by the defense minister of Czechoslovakia, Alexeje Čepička;

no. 10 (1999): 85–86.

101

. Zaleski,

pp. 668–669.

102

. Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), f. 4372, op. 11, d. 677, ll. 9–10. Figures for military expenditures are for four ministries created after Stalin’s death: defense (which brought together the former defense and naval ministries), defense industry (an updated version of the former armaments ministry), the aviation industry, and medium-machine building. These ministries accounted for the lion’s share (although not all) of military spending.

103

. N. S. Simonov,

(Moscow, 1996), pp. 210–266.

104

. Council of Ministers resolutions dated 9 and 19 February 1953; A. A. Danilov and A. V. Pryzhikov,

(Moscow, 2001), pp. 92–93.

105

. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 329, ll. 66; Ledovskii,

p. 160.

106

. A. I. Kokurin and Iu. N. Morukov,

(Moscow, 2005).

107

. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 11, d. 282, l. 66.

108

.

(Moscow, 1956), p. 118.

109

. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 882, ll. 57–58.

110

. Letter dated 1 November 1952; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 903, ll. 42–46.

111

. This undated letter was sent from Stalin’s secretariat for Malenkov to deal with on 4 November 1952; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 901, ll. 39–40.

112

. Chernobaev,

p. 551; N. Kovaleva et al., comps.,

(Moscow, 1998), pp. 193–194.

113

. On the works of this commission and Stalin’s position on the subject, see Gorlizki and Khlevniuk,

pp. 139–140.

114

. A. I. Mikoian,

(Moscow, 1999), p. 578.

115

. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 11, d. 459, ll. 164–170.

116

. Kokurin and Petrov,

pp. 788–791; RGAE, f. 4372, op. 11, d. 677, l. 9.

117

. The inventories did not specify the agency originating the coded telegrams. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 117, ll. 1–173.

118

. Ignatiev told this story in testimony given 27 March 1953; N. V. Petrov,

(Moscow, 2011), p. 307.

119

. K. A. Stoliarov,

(Moscow, 1998), p. 163.

120

. Ibid., pp. 225–226.

121

. Ibid., pp. 167–168.

122

. Naumov and Sigachev,

pp. 34–35.

123

. For more details, see Timothy Blauvelt, “Abkhazia: Patronage and Power in the Stalin Era,”

35, no. 2 (2007): 220, 222–223.

124

. Naumov and Sigachev,

pp. 29–40.

125

. It was at the Nineteenth Party Congress that the party’s name was officially changed from the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, commonly referred to by the acronym VKP(b), to simply the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or KPSS. This name endured until the party and country were abolished in 1991.

126

. Mikoian,

p. 573.

127

. Ibid., pp. 574–576; Chuev,

p. 469; L. N. Efremov,

(Stavropol, 1998), pp. 12–16.

128

. N. Mukhitdinov,

(Moscow, 1995), pp. 88–89.

129

. Volokitina et al.,

pp. 558–566.

130

. Explanatory memorandum from Ignatiev to Beria dated 27 March 1953; cited in Petrov,

p. 297.

131

. Ibid., pp. 287, 299–300.

132

. Cited in V. N. Khaustov et al., comps.

(Moscow, 2007), pp. 522–523.

133

. Cited in N. V. Petrov,

(Moscow, 2005), p. 124.

134

. From a transcript of remarks by Stalin to a commission on reorganizing the Ministry of State Security’s intelligence service, November–December 1952; cited in

no. 5 (2001): 132.

135

. These press items were edited by Stalin. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 157, ll. 9–14, 29–33; Khlevniuk et al.,

pp. 392–397.

136

. For a detailed examination of this theory about the deportation of Jews, see G. V. Kostyrchenko,

(Moscow, 2009), pp. 329–380.

137

. B. S. Klein, “Politika SShA i ‘delo vrachei,’”

no. 6 (2006): 35–47.

1

. A. A. Chernobaev, ed.,

(Moscow, 2008), p. 553; O. V. Khlevniuk et al., comps.,

(Moscow, 2002), p. 436. When the log of visitors to Stalin’s office was published, Tkachev’s name was mistakenly given as Tolkachev.

2

. Chernobaev,

p. 553; Khlevniuk et al.,

p. 436.

3

. A. L. Miasnikov,

(Moscow, 2011), p. 295.

4

. Khlevniuk et al.,

pp. 436–437.

5

. N. Kovaleva et al., comps.,