Suleiman The Magnificent 1520 1566 (34 page)

In the meantime the Turks had won other victories further westward. The Spaniards were disastrously defeated in an effort to reestablish their authority in Tlemcen. In 1555 they were forced to surrender Bugia, which had been uninterruptedly in their hands for the past forty-five years; in 1558 they were routed in an attempt to capture Mostaganem. The Emperor, with whom Suleiman had so often longed to measure swords, died in September of the same year. There could be no question that the Turks

*R. B. M., HI, 343.

had got the better of him on the sea. The Sultan could reflect with pride on the story of their long rivalry. 5

Christian Europe looked eagerly forward to Charles's son and successor, Philip II, as the champion of the Cross against the Crescent. The new king had got back to Spain in September, 1559. The Franco-Spanish wars had been ended in the previous April by the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis. Philip was known to be a most devout Catholic; there was a general hope that he would try to revive the crusades. But, as usual, when the time for action came, the Spanish king held back. His attention for the time being was chiefly occupied with internal affairs; and the initiation and leadership of the expedition by which the Christians hoped to reestablish their prestige in the Mediterranean were consequently the work of others. Jean de La Valette, the new Grand Master at Malta, was determined to recover Tripoli for his Order, and persuaded the viceroy of Sicily to help him. After long delays a fleet of some ninety vessels, carrying 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers, was collected and sailed for North Africa on February 10, 1560.

Ill fortune dogged the expedition from the first. Its commanders were ignorant of the geography of the region about Tripoli, while Dragut knew every inch of the ground. A landing was attempted on the coast, some seventy-five miles west of their ultimate objective, but the place proved unhealthy and the water bad, so that the Christians retired to the island of Gerba to refit. At first they were warmly welcomed by the inhabitants, who hated Dragut, and hoped the newcomers would rid them of him; but when the latter showed signs of intending to establish a permanent base there, they changed their minds, and began to make plans to expel them. All of these de-

5 R. B. M n HI, 343-346.

lays gave Dragut an admirable opportunity not only to repair the defences of Tripoli but also to send for aid to Constantinople. On May 10, a galley from Malta reached the Christians with the stunning news that a Turkish fleet of 85 sail, under the terrible Piali Pasha, 6 had been sighted off Gozzo, and was making straight for Gerba. A panic seized the defenders. There was a mad rush for the ships, but the Turks bore down on them with a favorable wind, capturing twenty-seven galleys, and killing or taking prisoners some 5000 men. The remainder shut themselves up in the castle of Gerba, where they remained, without adequate food or supplies, to await the joint assaults of Piali Pasha and Dragut. The Turks had the game in their own hands, and they knew it. Instead of attempting to storm the fortress, they occupied themselves with cutting off its water supply, and after two sorties had failed, the place surrendered on July 31. All of its 6000 defenders who were not already dead were taken prisoners. The fortifications were razed to the ground. 7 The victors returned triumphant to Tripoli, which was to be Dragut's principal headquarters in the immediately ensuing years, and was to remain in Turkish possession, theoretically at least, till 1912. Piali Pasha got back to Constantinople in September with a magnificent train of captives and booty. It was by far the most significant victory of the Turks in the Mediterranean since the repulse of Charles V at Algiers, but "those who saw Suleiman's face in this hour of triumph failed to detect in it the slightest trace of undue efetion. . . . The expression of his countenance was unchanged; his stern features had lost nothing of their habitual gloom; ... So self-contained was the heart of that grand old man, so schooled to meet each change of For-

8 On this man see Hammer, VI, 188-189, 193-196; Henry Seddall, Malta (London, 1870), p. 58. T Hammer, VI, 189-193.

tune however great, that all the applause and triumphs of that day wrung from him no sign of satisfaction." 8

The Turks had not failed to note the slackness of the Spanish king in supporting the expedition against Tripoli. The moral was obvious; they must carry the war into enemy waters. In the spring of 1561 a Turkish fleet appeared out of the blue before Soller in Majorca and attacked it. The inhabitants were brave and resourceful, and the onslaught was ultimately repulsed, but the assailants were not discouraged. 9 In 1562, if not before, they had passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, and ventured out into the broad Atlantic to prey upon the treasure-laden galleons returning from the New World. On June 24 of that year, Sir Thomas Chaloner, the English ambassador to Spain, wrote home to Queen Elizabeth that "the Moors have spoilt many merchant ships about Seville and Cadiz, and amongst them three English ships, with a booty of more than 100,000 ducats." 10 Taken literally, the words of the English envoy would mean that the damage had been done by the Berbers, but the British of that day were not too accurate in their designations of remote states, and as the Turks were now in control of nearly all of the Mauretanian coast, there can be little doubt that they played a prominent part in the affair. There was, in fact, but one important point on the North African shore between Tunis and Morocco that still defied them, namely, the fortress of Oran and its strategically indispensable satellite at Mers-el-Kebir. Ever since the Turkish victory at Gerba, the Sultan had been maturing his plans for in attack on it. In the early months of 1563 he intrusted the execution of the project to Hassan, the son of Khaireddin

8 Busbecq, I, 322.

9 R. B. M., IV, 108.

w Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, 1562, no. 248, p. 127; cf. letter of June 27, no. 262, p. 136. A report to Chaloner from Seville, July 4, says "twenty sails of Turks and Moors are before the haven" (no. 279, p. 145).

Barbarossa, who now represented him at Algiers. Hassan was given a small fleet to carry his cannon and supplies, and he had an army of 25,000 men. In April he arrived before Oran, and at once made his preparations for a vigorous attack. Crucial events were about to take place there, as they were to do again in July, 1940.

It was just at this point that the tide turned. Now that the war had been carried into Spanish waters, Philip shook off his lethargy, and began vigorous measures of defence. The combined Spanish garrisons at Oran and Mers-el-Kebir probably numbered little more than 1000 men. During late April and early May they were able to delay the besiegers before the subsidiary outside forts, but it was obvious that they could not maintain themselves indefinitely without aid from Spain. Meantime, Philip had succeeded in collecting thirty-four galleys, and despatched them to the relief of his hard-pressed subjects. They reached Oran just as Hassan, who had been apprised of their coming, was about to launch a decisive blow which should forestall them; in fact they arrived at the very moment that the attack was beginning, and threw the assailants into confusion. Twenty of the Turkish ships escaped, but five others were captured. Taken with these were four large French vessels, a significant evidence of the fact that though the Franco-Turkish alliance had long since passed its prime, it was not yet extinct. The Turkish land forces made haste to raise the siege and take flight, leaving behind them sixteen pieces of artillery and large quantities of munitions and supplies. Altogether it was the most serious reverse that the Ottomans had sustained in North Africa since their loss of Tunis in I53511

Obviously the Christians would follow it up with a counter thrust, and as Algiers was much too strong, they elected to deliver it at Velez de la Gomera (popularly

n R. B. M., IV, 109-111.

known as the Penon de Velez) far to the westward, in Morocco, two-thirds of the way from Oran to Tangiers. The Spaniards had taken it in 1508, but lost it fourteen years later; Philip was now eager to recover it, more especially because it lay so close to his own beloved shores. The first attack, which was launched in July, 1563, had hoped to effect its object by a surprise; but the defenders were keenly on the watch, and the Christians withdrew defeated. The Turks were of course correspondingly encouraged, and showed it by venturing out again into the Atlantic. This time it would appear that their depredations reached as far as the Canaries. 12 The Christians saw that the sole way to rehabilitate their prestige was to capture the Penon de Velez at all costs, and in August, 1564, Don Garcia de Toledo, a cousin of the Duke of Alva and the son of the viceroy of Naples, was despatched for the purpose with a force over three times as large as that of the preceding year. He was given the title of Captain General of the Mediterranean—previously held by Andrea Doria, who had died in 1560. So imposing was his armament that the mere sight of it was enough to cause the defenders of Velez to flee into the interior. The Penon itself promised to give more trouble, but Toledo entered it without serious difficulty on September 8. He had captured with the loss of only thirty men one of the most dangerous of pirates' nests, which had generally been regarded as impregnable. 13 He was rewarded for his success with the viceroyalty of Sicily, while Suleiman at Constantinople laid his plans for revenge. There was to be one more great clash between the Cross and the Crescent in the Mediterranean before the curtain fell

There could be little doubt where the Sultan would elect to launch his last attack. He had captured Rhodes

12 Cesareo Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola (Madrid, 1895-1903), II, ' 1S R.B. M., IV, 111-114.

from the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in 1522. His fleets had expelled them from Tripoli in 1551. But they still held Malta, and Malta, even more than Tunis and Oran, was the chief barrier to his control of the Mediterranean. Tradition and expediency both dictated a grand assault on the last remaining stronghold of the Knights, and Mihraiah, the daughter of Roxelana and the widow of Rustem, who exercised much influence over Suleiman in the later years of his life, never ceased to represent it to him as a sacred duty to the Faith. 14 Yet the Sultan had many difficulties to contend with. There were plenty of ships and men to man them, but there was trouble about the high command. Suleiman had never accompanied his naval expeditions, and did not propose to do so now. He intrusted the fleet to Piali Pasha, and the land forces to Mustafa Pasha, who was no less than sixty-five years old, and had commanded his master's armies with distinction in Europe and in Asia. Both were typically successful military leaders according to the standards of the Porte. 13 Yet the Sultan wondered whether, after all, they would know how to conduct a Mediterranean campaign anywhere nearly as well as the officially less well accredited but far more experienced Dragut. Another star, moreover, had recently risen in the piratical firmament in the person of Aluch Ali, a renegade Calabrian fisherman who had become a fanatical convert to Islam; he was to be a thorn in the side of the Christians for many years after Suleiman's death, and ultimately recaptured Tunis and La Goletta. 16 For the present he was at Tripoli with Dragut, and both of them advised against an attempt to attack Malta. In their opinion it was essential to clear the Christians out of Mauretania first. 17 They failed to persuade the Sultan to abandon the enterprise on which he had set his

14 Hammer, VI, 198, 214.

15 Hammer, VI, 198-199; Seddail, Malta, pp. 57-58.

16 On his career see R. B. M., IV, 126, 138, 143-144, 1471 150-15** * 7 Mercier, III, 103.

z 8i Suleiman the Magnificent

heart; on the other hand, he had so much respect for their ability and knowledge that he charged Mustafa and Piali to take them into their confidence and attempt nothing without their approval and support. 18

On April i, 1565, the Turkish fleet left Constantinople. It numbered nearly two hundred ships, of which at least one hundred and thirty were fit for combat, and it carried land forces of about 30,000 men. The Grand Master Jean de La Valette had realized for months the peril of his position, and had been making every possible effort to avert it. He strengthened his defences. He called in his absent Knights from the different coinmanderies in Europe, and begged for outside aid. He mustered his auxiliaries and armed the inhabitants of the island; but he was unable in all to raise more than 8,500 men. When the Turkish fleet arrived on May 1 8— a full month earlier than it had been expected— his situation seemed desperate. There was a difference of opinion among the Turkish commanders as to whether to begin operations immediately or await the coming of Dragut, who had not yet appeared; but Mustafa insisted on taking the offensive at once before Christian reenforcements could arrive, and on the nineteenth he began to land his troops. 19 His immediate objective was the strong fort of St. Elmo, on the outer tip of the promontory of Mount Sceberras, which juts out to the northeast between the Great Harbor and that of Marsa Muscetto, and serves as a protection to them both. 20 La Valette had taken infinite pains to render it as nearly as possible impregnable, though it could hold but a bare

19 Hammer, VI, 200; Seddall, Malta, p. 61.

20 There is an excellent map of Mount Sceberras, St. Elmo, the two harbors, and adjacent fortifications in Major Whitworth Porter's History of the Knights of Malta, 2 vols. (London, 1858, in vol. II, facing p. i ) ; it also shows where the Turkish batteries were emplaced. It has since been reproduced in SeddalTs Malta (facing page 68) ; but, unfortunately, in both cases it is printed upside down. Cf. also map inside the covers of this volume.

thousand men; its site is that of the city which bears his name today. The Turks at once installed batteries on the adjacent shores and bombarded it furiously from the fleet; trenches were opened and preparations made for a grand assault. Dragut, who arrived with twenty-three ships on June 2, bluntly declared that the operation should never have been undertaken; but as it had been already begun, he insisted that it should be carried through, and did his utmost to make it a success. The story of the heroism of St. Elmo's defenders is one of the most thrilling in the annals of Christian warfare. The Turks were so much more numerous that they seemed ultimately certain to capture it; the object of the besieged was to slay as many of their enemies as possible, and above all to delay them before its walls, in the hope that reinforcements would arrive. Over 6,000 Moslems were killed—among them Dragut 21 —before the place was entered on June 23; and it is said that the Turks found only nine of the defenders alive. 22