Tank Tracks to Rangoon (20 page)

It had been intended that C Squadron should form part of the Imphal garrison as a last-minute reinforcement, but events had moved too quickly for the plan to be completely successful, for whilst most of the personnel had arrived safely, the Kohima road had been cut behind them before their tanks could come up, and now they were manning the Carabiniers’ reserve tanks under the title of YL Squadron.

The attack did not succeed, and it came as an unpleasant surprise to the tank crews to find that the Japanese had brought a new 47-mm anti-tank gun into the field which was not only accurate, but which could penetrate a Lee as well. After one of the YL tanks had had its turret blown off, the operation was cancelled.

On 25th April a second attack was mounted to clear the enemy out of Ningthoukong, with the Carabiniers’ A Squadron supporting 1/4th Gurkha Rifles. The approach to the village was across open paddy fields, and the Japanese opened up with their 47-mm anti-tank guns at 800 yards. No sooner had the FOO called for supporting fire from his field battery, than his tank was knocked out, and he was unable to provide further assistance.

The Lees continued to labour across the paddy, but the enemy was shooting extremely well, and was knocking out one tank after another, although the tanks in their turn knocked out several of his advance posts. When the attack was called off, A Squadron was down to three tanks.

Three days later, the Gurkhas tried again, with the aid of Lt Beaumont’s troop, which had not been involved in the earlier attack. The approach was made from a different direction, but the ground was so bad that the tanks had to be towed to the start line by a tractor, and then a cloudburst reduced visibility
to zero, so the infantry went in alone, and succeeded in securing a lodgement.

On the following day, Beaumont’s troop tried to advance again, and this time managed to get within 100 yards of the main position, after one tank had thrown a track in the atrocious going. After shooting up a number of slit trenches, bunkers and snipers, Beaumont dismounted and went forward on foot to try and find a way for his tanks, but was shot through the head and body. Sgt Hall then took over, but his tank in turn shed a track and had to be towed out with difficulty.

On 30th April Cpl Brennan’s tank finally penetrated the position and dealt with most of the remaining bunkers; in one instance Brennan so pounded a bunker that the bodies of its late occupants flew through the air.

That night the surviving Japanese evacuated their remaining positions. They had been almost as stubborn in defence as the Carabiniers had been in the attack, but not quite. The effect of these actions was to open the Silchar track to supplies for the previously beleaguered 32 Brigade.

Nonetheless, the price in irreplaceable tanks and trained crews had been excessive, and could not be repeated. The problem was given considerable thought by Colonel Younger, whose solutions appear in a letter to the Senior Officers’ School at Dehra Dun, India, written shortly after the battle ended.

‘To my mind there are two ways of carrying out an attack of this nature:

1.
Infantry to get a bridgehead at night, preferably by a silent attack with a deception plan involving noise and movement of tanks etc, where you do not intend to actually attack. Having got the bridgehead, minefields etc, must be breached and the tanks got into the bridgehead
before
first light. Next day the infantry methodically mop up the village with the tanks on call; the tanks at call operating inside the village.
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2.
Lay on all the divisional artillery, including medium and air, and raze the place to the ground; then attack under
cover of smoke. The tanks should, under cover of smoke, be able to get into the village as in the dark.
But
, of course, heavy bombing will often make a village impassable to tanks.’

The adoption of these tactics ensured that tank losses were kept to a minimum whenever a fortified village was attacked, but this was by no means the end of the battle for Ningthoukong. The Japanese became obsessed with retaking the village, and sent in attack after attack, by day and by night, against it. On two occasions at least, they brought up tanks in small numbers to force the position.

On the 12th June, the Gurkha garrison were assaulted at dawn after a heavy bombardment by artillery and mortars. The Japanese infantry were as usual dedicated to death, as they had been in many previous attacks. But on this occasion they brought five Type 97 tanks with them, and had the benefit of fire support from several more, the position of which could not be located.

One of the garrison’s two anti-tank guns was destroyed almost at once, but the other succeeded in knocking out two of the tanks, and in taking evasive action the other three bogged down in deep mud.

Nonetheless, they continued to dominate the position with their fire, and their infantry secured a foothold from which it was essential that they should be ejected.

Gurkha reinforcements arrived, and with them came a rifleman named Ganju Lama, a Piat
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gunner who had already won the Military Medal for knocking out a Japanese tank a few weeks earlier. Now, Ganju crawled forward through the mud with his Piat, intent on destroying the three stranded vehicles which were paralysing movement about the position, ignoring the coundess rounds that splattered the slime all round him, and ignoring too a wound in the leg, further wounds in both arms and a smashed wrist. At thirty yards range, his first bomb blasted a hole in the nearest tank, and then, standing up, he recocked his weapon, inserted a new bomb, and crawled towards the second tank,
which he also knocked out. He was about to take on the third when it fell to the garrison’s anti-tank gun.

Still Ganju was not satisfied. He had seen several survivors jump clear, and since they showed signs of fight, he wanted them dead. He therefore crawled back to his comrades, obtained a supply of grenades, and returned to finish them off. Not surprisingly, Ganju Lama was awarded the Victoria Cross, one of several won by 17th Indian Division on this sector, and in their counter attack, his battalion threw the enemy out of the position.

At Potsangbam, north of Ningthoukong, a murderous battle of attrition between the tanks and the village’s defenders, could have given the Japanese a victory over the British armour, had not a daring patrol action by 9/14th Punjabis succeeded in capturing three of the efficient 47-mm anti-tank guns on 7th May.

The following day, the 9/14th, supported by two troops from A Squadron 3rd Carabiniers, a troop of 7th Cavalry Stuarts, and two Valentine bridgelayers, closed in on the village before first light. The tanks’ approach march took them south from Bishenpur, then west to Chothe, then south again until they were due west of Potsangbam.

Here they found they had to cross a number of nullahs. At the first, the leading tank overturned, crushing several Indian sappers who had been riding on the vehicle. The bridgelayers then came up, spanned the first and second nullahs, and a way over the third was found by Lt F. A. Shepherd, who went forward on foot. The tanks then shook out, and engaged the wood screening the village itself. The following account of the action is taken from Shepherd’s own report on the battle.

Through the periscope I was watching my MG fire spraying the wood, when about ten yards from me I saw three flashes and through the smoke the outline of an A/Tk gun. The co-ax was almost on so I put him on and saw spots of daylight appearing all over the gun shield. I got very excited and loaded and fired the 37 myself three times, knowing that it must be on as the co-ax was on, 1 AP 2 HE and finally 2 75-mm HE which completely wrecked it and set the ammunition on fire.

I looked to my right and saw three of the other tanks in line on my right, blasting the edge of the wood. I looked behind and saw the infantry along the line of the nullah and ditch. I reversed my tank and eventually the infantry commander called me from the call box and said he was held up by a MG in a fox-hole. I said I would neutralize and blew the top off with 2 75 HE and 1 airburst. It looked about a two or three man pit, dug down in the ditch which runs along the edge of the wood, with timber and earth head
cover. I saw two dead Japs lying by the remains and one running for the thick wood at the back of the first compound. I got him with a burst from the co-ax. The infantry were now able to make the ditch along the edge of the wood. The other tanks were firing steadily into the village. The infantry commander called me and asked me to advance straight into the village through the infantry. I said that I did not like the look of the ditch but that I would have a shot and do my best. I had grousers on, and I thought that once in I would perhaps see possible routes for the other tanks. As I advanced I found that my steering was gone, looked back and saw that my track was ten yards behind, blown off by a mine. About this time 5 Able reported that he was flooded with petrol and that the fumes were very bad. I ordered him to pull back about 100 yards and open up and switch on fans. I do not know if it was at this stage that a mine blew his track off. All this time we were firing steadily and the infantry in the ditch looked to be OK. 3 Baker then went forward to go through the infantry and into the village. He stuck in the ditch. The Squadron Leader came up about this time and ordered me to do my best to unditch 3 Baker with 3 Able, and to take over one of these vehicles to get into the village, by the track where I had entered previously. I dismounted my 75 loader to get 3 Able up to 3 Baker and to hitch on a tow rope. I gave him steady covering fire. He rather rashly went straight across to 3 Able, and after a while guided him into position. He came back to my tank to get a tow rope as 3 Able had none and 3 Baker’s was buried under the nose of the tank. 5 Able reported to me that he was lying beside my tank. I can only assume that he was hit by a sniper in isolated clump, later located and knocked out by a Stuart tank. About this time 0930 (?), 3 Able came back on the air and 3 Baker dismounted a man into the ditch to dig out the tow rope. He connected the tow rope to 3 Able but it snapped during towing. About this time the shelling began. Some shells landed in the area and the infantry fell back. M.12
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was painting the picture very clearly back to the Squadron Leader. This was a great help as it left me free to keep on firing at the Jap MG’s, which, although I could not see them I managed to keep fairly quiet. 3 Able reported that he had very little petrol left. He thought that he had been hit in the petrol tanks, but I do not know when this occurred. The Squadron Leader said about this time to hang on, infantry could hold on where they were, and that he was sending up the Stuart Troop. The shelling was getting very accurate now. They seemed to be concentrating on the tanks. Mike Charlie (Sgt. Davis) had turned up and reported a ‘bit of a do with an ant’ somewhere round the SW corner of the village. Perhaps it had hit 3 Able earlier on. My operator reported the batteries were getting low, and as the engine was not charging, and the ‘homelite’ juice was all used up, I began calling every quarter of an hour only. The Squadron Leader was away somewhere now, and I guessed that he was laying on something else. Mike 4 was doing control. We then
got hit by a shell. Sparks flew inside the turret, the Browning barrel was damaged and we could not get the gun back into the tank to change it. We unscrewed the barrel casing and pushed it out through the mounting and used the bow gun in place. The Stuart troop arrived and I told the commander all I knew. The shelling went on again and we had another very close. The 75 gunner seemed to be suffering from slight concussion, the co-ax jammed with a round in the breech, we had no spare barrels left as they all had separated cases that the clearing plug would not shift. The batteries were nearly dead. We only had two boxes of MG ammunition left and some 37 HE. I called up and suggested that we might evacuate. A quarter of an hour later it was agreed that we should.

We took vital gun parts out. I called for covering fire from surrounding tanks, lit two 4 inch smoke dischargers, and pushed them over the edge of the turret on the ‘dushman’
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side of the tank. We baled out through the 75 side door and ran for the ditch. I saw there M.12 and M.5 with tracks off. We walked back up the nullah. We got machine-gunned and an odd shell nearby, but we made it and got back to chothe where I reported to the squadron leader.

For the remaining troop leader, life was anything but a picnic.

I surveyed my command. Reading from right to left Cpl. Litchfield’s tank was burning furiously, mine had its track off, Sgt. Bull was OK. Then came Sgt Davis, whose starter motor had gone, Sgt Pearce’s and the FOO tanks neatly lined up side by side in a minefield, both with tracks off, Freddie Shepherd’s abandoned in the middle with its track about ten yards away, and Cpl Bowden’s inextricably stuck in the ditch. A complete Stuart was also present.

The next problem was to contact Colonel Booth, who was about 250 yards away on the other side of the open space. This space was nicely illuminated by the two burning tanks. (I forgot to mention above that Sgt Lucas’s tank had been previously hit by shellfire, and was burning when we arrived.) I crawled out of the escape hatch at the bottom of the tank, followed by repeated requests from my crew to look after myself (which were unnecessary) and somehow got across to Colonel Booth. The enemy was firing at all they could see on the open space, and one had to be fairly nippy. I was. Colonel Booth (who had been wounded by shrapnel and blown up by a mine) showed me where his perimeter was and we moved the two runners and the Stuart into position. We mounted the Brownings from my tank beside the others and dug in, expecting an attack any minute. Much to our surprise the enemy, who must have had more of a knock than I then realized, did not attack, and we all managed to get a little sleep, being woken up every few minutes by firing from the wood, and turrets, 75 amn, petrol etc., flying all over the place from the burning tanks.

The next morning the 1st West Yorks arrived and took over
from the 9/14. The enemy was fairly quiet, and we started mending the track of Sgt Pearce’s tank. This was finished by mid-day, but just as we were leaving Jap guns opened up, and Tpr Martin was killed and Tpr Mortimer wounded. We waited for a bit and then I realized that the minefield was still fairly extensive, and before we could move any of the tanks in that area it would have to be cleared. I asked for sapper assistance, which did not come until the next evening, so started to look myself. I found three Jap mines and disarmed them.

The evening of 9/10 May was fairly quiet.

On the 10th things got a bit warmer, the sniping was heavy and those blasted guns up in the hills were peppering us incredibly accurately. So I kept everybody under cover, and decided to carry on with the recovery after dark. But the Japs decided otherwise, and during the evening ‘stand to’ when all available tanks were manned, we were shelled like hell. Sgt Davis’s tank got a direct hit and immediately went up in flames. Sgt Bull’s was hit and set on fire but was not burnt out. Casualties luckily were slight—Tpr Green had shrapnel in the shoulder and Tpr Clayton concussion. But the trouble was that most of the chaps were badly shaken, and recovery was not on, except that Tpr Waller and myself straightened out the track of the FOO Tank and replaced the broken track blocks. The sappers arrived and cleared lanes for the tanks to move. They found ten (all Jap types) around my tank.

On the morning of the 11th I sent back Sgt Davis’s crew. We were greatly heartened by the first class air strike on the village. We were pretty close to the enemy positions and the bombs seemed to be coming all around us, but not one fell outside the Jap area, and I think it must have hurt the Jap a lot. After the bombers had finished the Hurricanes came in right over our heads with cannon, and we cheered like madmen, and ducked down again damned quickly, as one Jap sniper at any rate was determined to show us that he wasn’t frightened of our planes, and he had an LMG!

Major Pettit walked down to see us in the afternoon (he had also been the previous afternoon), bringing the welcome news that we were to leave. I had to take all runners out and cross the nullah at the prepared crossing, and the others were to come back with the West Yorks.

The only runners left now were Sgt Pearce’s tank (and he had a hole in the petrol tank), and the Stuart which had run out of petrol. We filled up and set off leaving Sgt Bull to bring back the remainder of the party. More bad luck to come. It had rained very hard in the afternoon and the crossing was a mass of mud. The Stuart sank straight away and we crowned our efforts by bogging the Lee in trying to get it out. So once more we had to abandon tanks, and we started to march across country. We did our best to bring out everything we could (my own load was one Browning, one Sten plus ammo, two Verey pistols, two revolvers, haversack and water bottle).

By the time we reached Bishenpur, after a march of about two miles across exceedingly wet and difficult country, I doubt whether there was anything visible of me below my tin hat.

The remainder of the party got in during the small hours, all intact. They brought in all the salvageable Brownings, 14 in all, which must have been a bit of a strain during a night march across country.

As a matter of interest three Lees and a Stuart were eventually recovered from the village area, in spite of the fact that it was held by the enemy for almost a week. These tanks were all capable of being made runners, as was a Japanese Tankette which was recovered at the same time.