Target: Rabaul (26 page)

Kusaka surely realized that while he struggled to replace his losses, the Allies were growing stronger and closing in from two directions. A lesser individual might have caved under the pressure, or become physically diminished like Tsukahara, but Kusaka soldiered on. Correctly anticipating a big showdown for Bougainville, he consolidated his air strength. During late August, remnants of the units that had served as reinforcements during the battle for New Georgia were called back to Rabaul. The 21st Air Flotilla, which had spent the past few months
on Saipan as a training and replacement unit, was disbanded on September 1. Its two units, Air Group 253 (fighters) and Air Group 751 (medium bombers), were transferred to Rabaul. Additionally, operational control of all
rikko
units shifted to the 25th Air Flotilla.

As a human body reacts to an acute threat, Kusaka gathered his air units close to Rabaul and prepared to defend his most important asset.

KENNEY JOINED MACARTHUR in New Guinea to observe the big paratroop drop over Nadzab and remained in the forward area until Lae fell. He was absent from a conference on September 10 at GHQ, where MacArthur hosted representatives from SOPAC to discuss the next segments of the Elkton Plan. Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, Halsey’s chief of staff, and Col. William E. Riley, USMC, war plans officer for SOPAC, conferred with MacArthur and his staff on the schedule.

During the summer, the Joint Chiefs had modified the Pacific war strategy established by the Casablanca conference and the follow-up military conference in Washington. To Allied planners, it looked as though MacArthur’s push through the Philippines would be an oppressive campaign, mainly due to the many large islands involved. By comparison, the Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific seemed vulnerable because of their geographical isolation from each other. Thus, plans were made for Admiral Nimitz to initiate a drive up the Central Pacific, beginning with the seizure of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands in November 1943.

Brimming with confidence, the Joint Chiefs approved the Central Pacific campaign and confirmed plans for Cartwheel, estimated to end by spring 1944. MacArthur learned of this when the JCS informed him that they intended to use two of his marine divisions, all the naval transports, and a good portion of Halsey’s warships to support the Central Pacific campaign. Naturally, MacArthur objected strongly; he felt forced into a rivalry with Nimitz. Halsey likewise railed at the plan, which would mean losing ships and assault forces from his command.

Other developments in Washington also affected MacArthur and Halsey. An ad hoc group called the Joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded that “a considerable economy of force would result if Rabaul was neutralized rather than captured.” The current campaign against Rabaul, they said, offered “small promise of reasonable success in the near future.” MacArthur had an important ally, however, in Admiral Leahy, who was not only President Roosevelt’s chief staff but the senior member of the JCS. Arguing against reducing the Elkton Plan, Leahy kept the 1st Marine Division in the Southwest Pacific. However, the 2nd Marine Division, originally earmarked for the assault on Rabaul, was transferred to Nimitz’s command for the invasion of Tarawa.

The final decision came after Marshall suggested that MacArthur seize Kavieng, the Admiralties, and Wewak, isolating Rabaul. Again MacArthur objected, claiming the recommendation “involved too many hazards.” He continued insisting that Rabaul had to be captured, because Simpson Harbor was a prized
anchorage that would support subsequent operations. But contending that an assault on Wewak would be too hazardous, while asserting that Rabaul
should
be invaded despite its fearsome defenses, was irrational—and probably explains why MacArthur was overruled. In August 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met in Quebec for another conference. There, the JCS approved the latest recommendation to neutralize Rabaul, rather than capture it.

The subsequent meeting in Brisbane enabled MacArthur’s staff and Halsey’s representatives to update Elkton III. Halsey had changed his mind about invading southern Bougainville and the Japanese-held islands nearby. Had he stuck with that concept, his invasion forces would have faced twenty thousand defenders on the beaches. After seizing Vella Lavella, which bypassed the enemy’s fixed defenses, saving time and many lives, Halsey altered the plan. Realizing that the same principle would hold true on Bougainville, he decided to employ a tactic like an end-around run. Rather than smash headlong against the heavily fortified beachheads, he would send his invasion forces around the tip of Bougainville and land along the lightly guarded western coast.

Adjourning the one-day conference before dinner on September 10, the attendees produced a working schedule for Cartwheel’s next phase. Beginning in mid-October, Kenney’s air forces would commence a two-week campaign against Rabaul with the “objective of neutralizing Japanese air forces and destroying shipping.” Next, between October 20 and 25, Halsey’s SOPAC forces would occupy the Treasury Islands before the main assault on Bougainville, which would commence on November 1 “at a selected location on Empress Augusta Bay.” During the invasion, Kenney’s squadrons would continue their strikes on Rabaul. Finally, MacArthur’s amphibious forces would prepare to invade New Britain at Cape Gloucester on or shortly after December 25.

The plans would require close coordination between SOWESPAC and SOPAC. Although MacArthur was in overall command, he sought Halsey’s opinion. The two leaders’ high level of cooperation was later confirmed in the U.S. Army’s official history of World War II: “If ever a series of offensives was conducted according to plan, it was the extremely systematic Allied moves in the Pacific that started in 1943.”

Cooperation extended to the commanders’ staffs. Kenney, for one, began preparations for his role in attacking Rabaul, which included a major new development. With aid from a Seabee detachment, the airdrome on Kiriwina Island had been enlarged to add a fighter strip, and was now operational. This meant that the P-38s would be able to escort bombers all the way to Rabaul, as they could stop at Kiriwina to refuel on the way home. Other than the Lightnings of the 8th Photo Squadron, no Allied fighters had been over Rabaul since a disastrous event on January 20, 1942, when eight Australian CAC-1 Wirraways of 24 Squadron attempted to intercept a raid by more than one hundred Japanese carrier planes.
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Planning to hit Rabaul with the biggest air attack yet in the Pacific theater, Kenney and ADVON reduced the size and frequency of missions against strongholds in New Guinea. Concurrently, the 348th Fighter Group picked up a greater share of the missions over the JAAF airdromes. This created an opportunity for Kearby, commanding officer of the 348th, to lead a fighter sweep against Wewak on the morning of October 11. Having advocated such an offensive tool for weeks, Kearby led four Thunderbolts—a small pack of intruders spoiling for a fight—deep into Japanese territory. Taking the bait, the Japanese sent up nearly forty interceptors, resulting in a large-scale melee. Based on the alleged evaluation of gun camera footage, Kearby shot down six enemy fighters, the most scored to date during a single mission by any pilot in the U.S. Army Air Forces.

The day before Kearby’s fighter sweep, Kenney and MacArthur flew to Port Moresby to be on hand for the forthcoming daylight raid on Rabaul. When he heard of Kearby’s deed, Kenney promptly brought the ace to Government House to share the tale with him and MacArthur. After hearing it, Kenney declared that the record for victories in a single mission was five, accomplished by a navy pilot who had received a Medal of Honor, and that he was immediately recommending Kearby for the same award.

Years later, Kenney steadfastly maintained that Kearby’s six victories were “a record unequaled up to that time by any aviator of any nation in the whole history of air combat.” Somehow, he didn’t know (or forgot) about Marine Lt. James E. Swett of VMF-221, who downed seven Aichi D3A Vals on April 7, 1943, and received a Medal of Honor; nor did Kenney acknowledge the feat of Navy Lt. Stanley W. “Swede” Vejtasa, VF-10, who downed two Vals and five Nakajima B5N Kates in one mission during the Battle of Santa Cruz in late 1942 and received a Navy Cross. Both pilots had been flying obsolescent Grumman F4F Wildcats.

Kenney was surely salivating about having another Medal of Honor recipient in his air force. The only problem was the gun camera footage. Although it allegedly verified the six kills, Japanese records reveal the loss of only two fighters that day, with another badly damaged and one slightly damaged.

Regardless of whether his actions merited a Medal of Honor, Kearby and his foursome displayed tremendous courage in taking on upwards of forty enemy fighters. The Japanese even acknowledged the brave actions of the “foe craft,” which were mistakenly identified as P-40s. Coverage of the event appeared on October 13 in the English-language edition of the
Japan Times
: “Japanese Army air units, detecting an enemy formation attempting to invade over Wewak in New Guinea early Monday morning, met it in combat and quickly forced it to flee. Four of the enemy P-40s fought back courageously and the Japanese shot down one and repulsed the other three.” Of course the reporter failed to mention that the four fighters were the only American planes in the fight; nevertheless, the nod to their bravery was highly unusual.

An important strategic fact was left out of the article. The press didn’t reveal that Lt. Col. Tamiji Teranishi, commanding officer of the 14th Flying Brigade, was
shot down over Wewak on October 11. Kearby was probably the pilot who got him. Another high-profile Japanese ace also died in the same engagement, likely by one of Kearby’s wingmen, making it a dark hour for the JAAF fighter units at Wewak.

PRIOR TO KENNEY’S planned aerial assault on Rabaul, his biggest concern was the weather forecast. The 8th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron attempted to get pictures of Rabaul several times in early October, but they kept returning with unexposed film. Bad weather was the culprit virtually every time. Finally, on October 6, Lt. Kay W. “Joe” Klages brought back “nice pictures of [the] dromes, town, and harbor.” This was almost certainly the high-speed pass witnessed by McMurria, Holguin, and the other POWs working on an air raid shelter in Chinatown. Holguin, who kept a calendar in his head, was off by only one day in thinking the flyover occurred on October 5.

Bad weather hindered attempts to get more pictures until October 9, when pilots “photoed hell out of Rabaul” for three days, according to the squadron diary. The weather forecast predicted good conditions on October 12; hence, the mission planners were anxious to get the latest updates regarding air strength and shipping at Rabaul.

In early October the photo Lightnings brought back evidence of eighty-seven medium bombers, thirty-seven light bombers, and almost sixty fighters on the airdromes. Although Rabaul was still a JAAF rear area, most of Kusaka’s Eleventh Air Fleet units were present. The exception was Air Group 201 and part of Air Group 253, currently deployed in northern Bougainville. By October 10, however, the count at Rabaul had jumped to an estimated 274 aircraft. Reinforcements accounted for many of the new arrivals; others included the veteran Air Group 204, recently withdrawn from Bougainville.

The additional enemy fighters did not deter Kenney. Two days prior to the raid he sent a letter filled with bold predictions to Hap Arnold:

By the time you get this letter you should have read some headlines about the show on Rabaul which, according to our long-range weather forecast, will take place on October 12. This is the beginning of what I believe is to be the most decisive action initiated so far in this theater. We are out not only to gain control of the air over New Britain and New Ireland, but to make Rabaul untenable for Japanese shipping and set up an air blockade of all the Jap forces in that area.

The attack will be opened by 120 B-25 strafers, each with eight forward firing fifty-caliber guns, and carrying approximately a ton of either parafrag or 100-pound frag bombs. The targets are the three Jap airdromes around Rabaul. Following them, between eighty-four and ninety-six B-24’s will attack the shipping in the harbor from 20,000 feet altitude, concentrating three-plane element pattern bombing on between twenty and thirty of the
largest ships. Each B-24 is loaded with six 1000-pounders. In the past we have averaged around five percent of direct hits on shipping from high altitude. Our daylight bombing during the past three months on Salamaua, Lae, and Wewak has improved our accuracy tremendously. I expect to sink between twenty and thirty ships in this attack.

As the Jap has plenty of radar warning, he should be able to put in the air between sixty and eighty fighters, so we will have between one hundred and one hundred twenty P-38s as top cover for the show. The P-38s will take off from Dobodura and stop in at our new airdrome at Kiriwina for refueling after the combat. I told the kids that in addition to the ships sunk I expect forty or fifty Nips shot down in combat and one hundred or so more destroyed on the ground. You can compare these guesses with the headlines when you read them.

Still basking in the success of September’s airdrop over Nazdab, Kenney could scarcely contain his enthusiasm. Having slaved for more than a year to develop his air units under trying conditions, he could finally see progress. On the eve of the campaign to knock out Rabaul, the Fifth Air Force and the RAAF units in New Guinea were powerful. Thanks to the gradual influx of new planes and the seizure of advanced airdromes, Kenney had six veteran P-38 squadrons, two seasoned heavy bomb groups, three medium bomb groups, and some Australian squadrons that could all reach Rabaul. The strike would involve over three hundred aircraft—the largest Allied effort to date in the Pacific.

Preliminary movements began on October 11. Thirteen Bristol Beaufighters of 30 Squadron RAAF flew from Goodenough Island to Dobodura, where they joined two squadrons of the 38th Bomb Group and the entire 345th Bomb Group, which had arrived from Port Moresby. Although relatively new to the theater, the 345th had been picked to lead the low-level portion of the strike. The group was well-trained, earning Whitehead’s praise as one of the best he had ever observed.