Terror in the Balkans (21 page)

immediate result was that Mihailovic´’s Chetniks now openly joined the

revolt.152 The most important joint Partisan–Chetnik operations were

near Krupanj, Valjevo, and Kraljevo, and the epicenter of their coopera-

tion was northwest Serbia. The Germans’ increased Luftwaffe support,

mainly in the form of Stuka dive bombers, could only achieve so much

in the face of them.153

The principal town in the 704th’s jurisdiction was Valjevo. But, due

above all to explosions on the Valjevo-Užice road, the danger to the

town’s supply was growing daily, and coal stocks were so low that the

troops were forced to plunder the coal supply in the munitions factory

in Vistad. Meanwhile, every insurgent act of sabotage against roads,

railways, and bridges increased the town’s isolation.154 On September

12 General Borowski was forced to fl y from Belgrade to the 704th’s head-

quarters in Valjevo because of the insurgent roadblocks crisscrossing the

main road.155 Many of the division’s units were also cut off, and some—

such as the 724th Infantry Regiment’s tenth and eleventh companies, sta-

tioned in Krupanj—faced annihilation.

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111

The reports compiled by these two companies convey such a sense of

approaching doom, and of the brutalizing fear it spawned, that they are

worth recounting at length.

Both companies believed the disaster that befell them in early Sep-

tember could have been foreseen. Eleventh company claimed that “this

catastrophe came about because both companies were situated far from

the battalion in bandit-infested, diffi cult terrain. It requires no strategic

ability to cut the troops off from all relief and strike at their backs.”156

Particularly when, in the words of tenth company, the “bandits” were

obviously so strong:

Alarming news about the frequency of bandit unrest in the Krupanj

area was increasing during the fi nal days before the attack. Accord-

ing to these rumors, 1,000 men had gathered near Kamenica. In Ban-

jevac, a village next door to Krupanj, another 400–500 bandits were

said to be active. In the direct vicinity of Krupanj post offi ces and

administrative offi ces were being plundered. Headmen, truck driv-

ers, and workers who had ignored the bandits’ warning were being

shot. Small individual Wehrmacht units were being attacked, motor-

ized columns fi red upon and observation posts in Bela Orvka and

Stolica attacked. Despite all efforts, nothing could be done against

the bandits. These events undermined the Wehrmacht’s status and

reliability in the eyes of the Serbian population.157

As a result, the population’s support for the insurgents was growing: “in

the behavior of the population towards Wehrmacht members, an inner,

icy aversion and an all-unifying hatred towards anything German could

be felt.”158

The prelude to the main insurgent attack was a clash on the morning

of September 2. This engagement, and the fear that affl icted the troops

in Krupanj in its aftermath, are described by tenth company:

On Monday 9/1 at 22.00, NCO Seifert reported in from the watch at

Stolica with the news that the watch had been attacked by a strong

bandit group. On 9/2 at 06.00, a commando of fi ve squads led by

Lieutenant Rehmer and Lieutenant Halder, together with Medical

112
terror in the balk ans

NCO Heinrich,159 set out for Stolica to clarify the situation. On the

way, at the north-west exit of Pirstica, the commando encountered

a road block (two-deep felled trees, several meters high), which was

nevertheless undefended. About 800 meters in front of Stolica the

commando encountered an escaped troop from the Stolica watch

consisting of two NCOs and eleven men. At the same time, two

armed men were observed on the heights south-east of Stolica. The

commando opened fi re immediately; this was answered with heavy

fi re from rifl es and light machine-guns on the heights either side of

the road. Lieutenant Rehmer took two squads onto the slopes east of

the road. The enemy could not be seen.

In consequence of the ever more frequent reports that the bandits

were massing and that Stolica had been attacked, the company had

already been in a state of high alert for the past week. The hospi-

tal had been converted into a defensive strongpoint . . . That the

population of Krupanj had deliberately fl ed (from the Germans) was

clear from the behavior of the district chief. At 13.00 I entrusted him

with providing 20 men for a work detail. The mayor arrived himself

and explained that he could not carry this order out, even on pain

of being arrested or shot, for the entire population of Krupanj had

disappeared into the forest. It is clear from this that the whole popu-

lation was informed of the attack in advance, and that its behavior

indicates that it had been working with the bandits closely.160

“On Tuesday 9/2 at 20.45,” reported tenth company, “our watch brought

in an envoy with an offer to capitulate.”161 This part of the story is best

conveyed by eleventh company, which was stationed in the school

and received the ultimatum sooner. At eight in the evening a boy had

appeared with a note for tenth company from the leader of the Chetnik

forces surrounding them: “I demand your unconditional surrender; you

are completely encircled, no one will be harmed, you will be held pris-

oner until the end of the war. If you accept, fi re three fl ares off at 21.00.

If you refuse, the attack will resume at this time and you will be slaugh-

tered.”162 Both companies rejected the ultimatum. Then, “on Wednes-

day night at 00.30 a new attack began. It was a noise from hell, for the

Islands in an Insurgent Sea
113

volume was doubled in the valley. They bombarded our positions, par-

ticularly in the hospital, with grenade launchers.”163

Tenth company then picks up the story:

At 00.30 on 9/3 the bandits opened up a heavy fi re on our fi ve out-

posts. These pulled back into the hospital buildings. We returned

fi re, even though all we had to aim at was the fl ashes from the mouths

of the enemy guns. The enemy attacked in this way four times dur-

ing the night, whereby the fi nal attack, at 06.00, was the heaviest of

all. During the day the hospital was subjected to persistent light rifl e

fi re, and even to machine-gun fi re from time to time. Sharpshooters

fi red from a distance of 100 to 200 meters upon doors, windows, and

walkways in the hospital. The fi re grew heavier when they spotted

our men moving around. We could only move by crawling, jumping

or dragging ourselves from place to place, and that with the greatest

care. It was impossible to leave the building. During the time follow-

ing the attack on Stolica the men could neither sleep nor relax, but

remained in a state of constant alert.164

Our machine-gun posts and grenade-launcher post on the south

side of the roof had to be abandoned when dawn broke, because the

enemy had fi red upon them with a 3.7 cm gun . . . Our machine-guns

took up position by the windows on the third fl oor of the hospital.

From the day of the fi rst attack it was impossible to prepare warm

food for the men, because the kitchens . . . were under constant fi re.

The men received only greatly reduced amounts of cold provisions

such as meat conserve, eggs, and iron portions.

In the night Corporal Volmer was wounded with a shot to the head.

The next morning NCO Ulrich was wounded in the thigh when

relieving a machine-gun post.165 In addition, three wounded from

the Stolica watch lay in the police station.

At the break of darkness the fi re attacks began again, bigger than

before, and increasing in intensity and duration. Between 23.00 and

24.00 fl ashes of light were seen in the direction of Stolica and Moi-

evica at fi fteen-minute intervals, coming nearer and nearer to Krupanj.

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terror in the balk ans

At midnight a worsening of the weather set in with heavy clouds. The

moonlight, which had been providing good vision, deteriorated, and

at the same time the enemy fi re stopped. At 02.00 on 9/3 (sic), in com-

plete darkness, a heavy fi re bombardment began, lasting between 30

and 45 minutes. Because nothing could be seen of the enemy, we had

to restrict ourselves to laying down machine-gun, rifl e, and grenade

launcher fi re to prevent the enemy from breaking into the buildings.

It was established, by fi ring fl ares after the exchange was over, that the

stretch of ground in front of the hospital was clear of the enemy. But

enemy rifl e fi re continued with varying degrees of intensity.166

By evening on September 3, both companies already knew their posi-

tion was in imminent danger of being overwhelmed, and they burned all

their documents as a precaution: “At 22.00 on 9/3 I (Lieutenant Rehmer)

burned all secret documents . . . (On the morning of 4 September) the

enemy laid down a well-targeted rifl e fi re on all windows in the hospital.

The only relief for the men came through air support
.” Attacks on the insur-

gents by Stuka dive bombers the following day provided some respite,

but Lieutenant Rehmer himself was wounded, “whereupon I handed

over command to Sergeant Kreidel.”167 Eleventh company reported that

“Tenth company was unable to take one step outside, and thus spent four

days without water. Everyone was on constant alert from daybreak all the

way through to the next morning. And so on and so on.”168

On September 4 both companies realized they had to break out immedi-

ately or be destroyed. According to tenth company, “even before the attack,

the men were seriously exhausted from almost constant watch with only

brief respite. After the attack on Stolica the men knew no more rest at all . . .

Lack of sleep, exhaustion and the effect of the events, not to mention the

lack of supply and water, put the men in a nervous and overstrained condi-

tion. Ammunition was scarce . . . Under these conditions the hospital could

have held out at best for one more night and one more day. The promised

help never came, and therefore on 4 September a breakout was judged the

only remaining option.” As a preliminary, all supplies were destroyed.169

Then, “240 kilograms of explosives blew the hospital sky-high.”170

Tenth company described what happened next: “The medical offi cer,

Dr. Höhne, remained behind to care for the wounded. Some wounded,

Islands in an Insurgent Sea
115

including Lieutenant Rehmer, who had been wounded by splinters from a

hand grenade, took part in the breakout, and with immense effort were able

to prevail.” But, “despite the greatest of care, the breakout became scattered

into small groups. Sergeant Kreidel headed further east over the steep,

rocky mountain face, where he was surprised at a house on the heights

by bandits and, according to the troops behind him . . . was shot.” Sev-

eral other soldiers were picked off during this phase. “Of the main group

under Captain Seifert, the only men of tenth company to make it through to

Valjevo were the wounded Lieutenant Rehmer, fi ve NCOs, and 30 men.”171

Worse still was the plight of eleventh company. It was held up by mines

and other obstacles from the start. Further on its escape route was blocked

again, this time by a demolished bridge: “With infernal pleasure the ban-

dits wanted to gloat at our helplessness.”172 The company had to leave its

own equipment and wounded behind. “What happened to our wounded

I have no idea . . . In the evening at 22.30 we arrived in Valjevo . . . Up until

now we are still missing 42 men. How many are dead and wounded can-

not yet be established.”173

One staff offi cer in LXV Corps greeted this debacle with apoplexy. “The

shit the bandits are dealing out is just beyond belief now,” he wrote in a

private letter. “Today a general told us that two companies (!) have been

missing for fourteen days (!!!) Just imagine that!! Two companies taken

prisoner!!! With fi ve offi cers and so on!!! We’re searching for them with

aircraft, day and night!!! You just want to scream right at the heavens!!!!!”174

The two companies’ assessment was more analytical—and more remark-

able for it, considering what they had been through. Eleventh company

wrote: “against encirclement from behind we were completely powerless.

A probe into such mountainous and forested territory as around Kru-

panj, Stolica, Zajaca will lead either to no success, because the enemy can

escape with ease, or to defeat if the bandits are strong enough. The land is

so peppered with ravines that the use of trucks, maybe even tanks, is also

fruitless, for the enemy can put down roadblock after roadblock which

cannot be removed within a short space of time.”175

Of the insurgents themselves, tenth company wrote that “the bandits

can be thankful for their communications network, which runs quickly

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terror in the balk ans

from village to village across otherwise impassable terrain. The only