Terror in the Balkans (98 page)

before, and in no need of Italian troop garrisons there.65

Trio I also enabled the 718th Infantry Division to further develop the

more restrained approach that had taken embryonic form during its

operations of January and February. By mid-April, according to Ser-

bia Command, the Rogatica region contained ten thousand Partisans,

some of whom were former Chetniks, well equipped with rifl es, machine

174
terror in the balk ans

guns, and grenade launchers, but of uneven fi ghting value overall.66 The

718th’s combat strength was signifi cantly boosted in time for Trio I. This

eased the pressure it was under, and almost certainly helped it to con-

template more constructive measures.

The division still suffered weaknesses. At the end of March, for

instance, it failed to provide suffi cient clothing with which to equip one

company per infantry regiment as a mountain company.67 But by the

end of April it commanded a core artillery section and two infantry regi-

ments in their entirety, four Panzer platoons, four armored trains, and

ten territorial companies. At one point, on April 10, it had commanded

four entire Panzer companies. This was double the number commanded

by each of the other three German army occupation divisions in Yugo-

slavia at that time.68 The 718th was to commit the whole of its combat

strength to Trio I. It was further buttressed by two Ustasha battalions;

four additional tanks; four Croatian artillery batteries; and twelve infan-

try, rifl e, and border guard companies from the Croatian army.69 While

not the most formidable host yet assembled, it was a reasonable fi ghting

force for the purposes of the operation.

Trio I’s overall commander, General Bader, also sought to ensure that

the operation would be conducted on a saner basis than operations past.

On April 10, he announced that the operations must “exterminate the

insurgents in the Bosnian region, and pacify Bosnia through the estab-

lishment of public peace, order, and security.” But Bader had drawn

lessons from past operations. The aim for Trio I was to seal the areas

to be cleansed, and then for each unit to rapidly overwhelm the sector

assigned to it. In order to maintain close contact with one’s neighbor and

cleanse each area thoroughly, commands were urged to keep their daily

targets as small and manageable as possible. In other words, the 718th

was committing forces of similar strength to those it had used for Opera-

tion Southeast Croatia, within a comparable space of time, but over a

much smaller area and in markedly better weather. Further, to reduce

both communication problems and the danger of being bombarded by

one’s own side, the Italian aircraft committed to the operation were to

go nowhere near German ground units. They were to assist only Italian

troops, while German and Croatian troops would cooperate with Ger-

man and Croatian airpower.70

Glimmers of Sanity
175

The 718th advanced from its assembly points in Sarajevo, Olovo, and

Tuzla on April 20. The operation ended on April 30 with all targets

reached, even though many Partisans had escaped.71 The Axis forces

lost sixteen dead, the Partisans eighty, with eighty-seven rifl es captured.

Such fi gures indicate that the Axis forces had had a proper fi ght on their

hands instead of just slaughtering civilians. Copious amounts of livestock

were seized, but the vast majority was distributed among the peaceable

sections of the population.72 Reinforcements, realistic daily targets, and

effective air-ground coordination all gave the operation an easier passage

and relieved the pressure on the 718th. And a formation under less pres-

sure was likely to exercise more restraint.

Orders from on high fostered such restraint further. General Roatta—

no dove when it came to counterinsurgency—prevailed upon Bader to

consent that all insurgents who gave themselves up in the course of the

fi ghting be allowed to surrender as prisoners of war.73 This countered

a profoundly punitive order that General Kuntze, Wehrmacht Com-

mander Southeast, had issued on March 19. Kuntze had directed that the

troops conduct themselves more ruthlessly than the insurgents and thus

make the population fear them more. Though Kuntze left the specifi cs

to the commanders on the spot, he strongly indicated that the policy of

shooting one hundred hostages for every German soldier killed, and fi fty

for every German soldier wounded, should be resumed. And in contrast

with Bader and Roatta, he made no allowance for sparing captured reb-

els, declaring instead that “captured rebels are in principle to be hanged

or shot. If they are to be used for intelligence purposes, this should only

be a brief postponement of their death.”74

In another considered move, General Bader also commanded that

“
actual or attempted atrocities
by members of allied units (were) to be

dealt with on the spot using the
sharpest measures
.”75 During Operation

Trio II, Trio I’s successor operation (also referred to as Operation Focˇa),

the 718th apprehended seven Ustashe under the terms of this particu-

lar directive.76 The 718th’s divisional command, meanwhile, directed

that the troops distinguish between those found guilty and those merely

under suspicion, and that civilians who had aided the insurgents be

interned rather than shot. It also stressed that it was essential to glean

information from villagers rather than simply kill or terrorize them.77

176
terror in the balk ans

Following on the heels of the combat troops was the Wehrmacht’s

own Field Gendarmerie, strengthened by the Croatian army and the

Croatian gendarmerie. The Field Gendarmerie’s operations, according

to General Bader, went a considerable way towards quieting the pop-

ulation. After only a short time, the population was “placing limitless

trust in the measures of the German Wehrmacht.”78 A large proportion

of the inhabitants, who for fear of the Ustasha had fl ed into the woods,

now returned. Leafl ets and proclamations called on all inhabitants to

return to their homes and work peacefully. When the livestock the 718th

Infantry Division had gathered during the operations was redistributed

among the population, including refugees, it had “a particularly benefi -

cial effect upon the population’s mood.”79 The 718th was confi dent that

such measures could, among other things, counter some of the propa-

ganda messages the Partisans were spreading. “The Partisan commis-

sars,” according to the division’s intelligence section, “are telling their

followers that the Germans will soon leave the country because Turkey

has declared war on Germany. Our soldiers are easily able to dismiss

these rumors as nonsense.”80

And the 718th’s own troops were following the lead from above. The

738th Infantry Regiment’s second battalion, for example, burned down

houses and settlements on the way to Borovrat and arrested their male

inhabitants, but shot “only” fi ve suspect civilians.81 Brutal conduct

indeed, but it might have been more brutal still. Battle Group Wüst went

into detail over its tribulations, but showed that it too realized that lashing

out in response was less sensible than seeking to win the population over:

4/24/42: The poorest progress by night, through heavy rain and on

softened ground. The women and children left behind display great

anxiety over the Ustasha. The area gradually becomes steeper and

more lined with cliffs, the differences in altitude increase.

4/26/42: The differences in altitude on the route of march exceed

anything hitherto encountered in this operation . . . The population

claims that during the two days previously the Ustasha systemati-

cally plundered the villages, abducting people and cattle and laying

houses to waste.

Glimmers of Sanity
177

4/27/42: The population (of Rogatica) was cut off for months and

has suffered massive hunger. There have been accounts from all

sides that people have been eating grass. There was a heartfelt recep-

tion for the German troops, refl ecting the hopes of a better future

in the people’s emaciated faces. All inhabitants turned out onto the

streets to greet their liberators.82

Though this may be an overly rosy account of the reception the Germans

received, the inhabitants’ relief that the Germans’ presence could pre-

vent the Ustasha from slaughtering them was probably profound. Mind-

ful of this, on April 25 the 718th Infantry Division ordered Battle Group

Wüst to send out patrols to identify which Croatian units were burning

down villages behind Axis lines.83

Operation Trio II/Focˇa—in which the 718th was also involved—fi nally

put enough pressure on Tito’s Partisans to push them into embarking

on a “long march” from eastern to western Bosnia. The trek, beginning

on June 24, involved four thousand Partisans. The leadership blamed

the need for withdrawal not just on the military pressure from the opera-

tions, but also on the damage to morale caused by “Nedicíte” fi fth col-

umnists.84 Ultimately, however, the Trio operations, like the winter

operations before them, failed to actually destroy Partisan forces to a

decisive extent. Serbia Command admitted as much in a report that nev-

ertheless tried to talk up the operations’ success:

Through the actions of Combat Group General Bader in “Trio I and

Focˇa,” the
uprising
in the German area of
eastern Bosnia
has been

smashed,
and is now limited only to small local attacks. The pur-

suit of the bandit remnants is in full swing. The pacifi cation opera-

tions are beginning to take effect. The population is returning to its

homes and has to an extent begun to work again. But only German

leadership, the presence of German troops and the proper imple-

mentation of German administrative measures can ensure that the

limited successes achieved so far can be fully exploited.85

178
terror in the balk ans

In other words—reading between the lines—the Partisans had not been

destroyed and were still active, and in trying to destroy them the Ger-

mans faced a colossal task they were unable to entrust to anyone else.

The 718th conceded that the best it could do was either to try to prevent

the Partisans from returning to the region or to hinder their attempts to

slip away to the relative safety of the Italian zone.86

The operations’ failure to achieve more had many other causes also:

the Partisans’ elusiveness and, increasingly, their combativeness; the

defective state of the Croats’ fi ghting power, and the paltry “assistance”

rendered by the Italians.87 To Trio II/Focˇa, for instance, the Italians com-

mitted three divisions, but they were too slow to close the ring around

the Partisans as directed.88

But this time, the operations’ shortcomings seem to have further ener-

gized German efforts to cultivate the population rather than rely entirely

on military measures and terror measures.89 Bader pleaded for more con-

structive policies. He wanted the German forces in the NDH to induce

the Croatian government to ensure religious freedom, resettle refugees,

prevent Ustasha attacks, and punish the perpetrators of the crimes the

Ustasha had already committed.90 Fortner, for the 718th, went even fur-

ther; on at least one occasion he authorized the release of enemy deserters

irrespective of which particular insurgent movement they belonged to.91

In June, the Italians struck a deal with the Croats whereby the Croats

assumed responsibility for civilian and police administration in Zone II

and for civilian and military administration in Zone III. The Italians’

main aim, alongside a desire to placate the Croats, was to reduce their

military commitment to more manageable levels.92 This was symptom-

atic of an Italian anti-Partisan “campaign” marked by increasing caution,

the abandonment of important strongpoints, and the arming of increas-

ingly uncontrollable Chetnik groups. While the deal gave the Croats a

freer hand in these areas initially, it ultimately created an administra-

tive void that would eventually be fi lled by the Partisans. The Croatian

civilian commissar in Glaise’s offi ce perceived that Roatta was simply

trying to pacify his jurisdiction on the cheap, and spin it as some kind

of success to his rival Italian generals.93 Serbia Command reported that

Glimmers of Sanity
179

a vacuum ensued in these regions as soon as the Italians implemented

their plan.94

But the Partisans’ eventual triumph was still not assured. Quite apart

from anything else, they still faced enormous obstacles to overcoming

their Chetnik opponents. Chetnik propaganda, though disorganized,

peddled what was for many Bosnian Serbs a potent as well as chauvin-

istic message.95 Back in January, in a misguided attempt to entice waver-

ing elements and split the Chetnik movement, the east Bosnian Partisans