Tested by Zion (17 page)

In the trilateral meeting that day, he repeated the main points to Abbas and
Sharon – the need to fight terror and the real chance to reach peace and Palestinian statehood. He told them he would send Ambassador John Wolf, a senior career diplomat, to live in Jerusalem and monitor progress, reporting to Powell and Rice. More remarkable were a few words whose import could not have escaped the other parties: “Condi will be my personal representative.” Now the passing of the baton from Powell to Rice was not rumor: They had heard it from the president.

The Red Sea Summits had achieved all the White House wanted, symbolizing that the key Arab states, Sharon, and Abbas were on board for a new effort at peace. It had taken almost a year from the speech of June 24, 2002. Bush had judged correctly that no peace was possible with Arafat; in this he had applied the lessons taught by the Clinton administration, indeed by Clinton himself on January 20, 2001. Even while the global war on terror and the invasion of Iraq were said to monopolize his time, he had attended to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Rejecting the old “peace process” of endless negotiations, he had developed an approach and he had moved it forward against the odds. Bush's refusal to deal with Arafat had been rejected by European and Arab leaders for months, as had his demands for Palestinian reform. But Palestinians were far more open to Bush's insistence on transparency and democracy, as political arguments among them had shown. And Israel's right wing leader had been reelected convincingly after endorsing Bush's approach – the two-state solution.

Now the key elements were clear: the marginalization of Arafat, new Palestinian leadership that would fight terror and undertake reforms, Israeli commitment to a viable Palestinian state, and new negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. At the end of the meetings on June 4, there was reason for cautious optimism. Unfortunately, it did not last the summer.

On the Palestinian side, there was a serious backlash against what Abbas had pledged at Aqaba. Within two days of the Aqaba meetings, moderate Palestinians were privately warning us of trouble ahead. And, in the real world, the terrorists had a vote. On June 6, Hamas leaders ended talks they had been having with Abbas, claiming he had yielded too much in the summit meetings. Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi, in Gaza, slammed Abbas and said there would
be no peace until Zionism was eradicated from Palestinian soil. On June 8, a terrorist attack killed four soldiers; four days later, Israel would attempt to assassinate Rantisi, who was held responsible for the attack, and in the process kill 2 civilians and wound perhaps 30 more. This elicited a sharp comment from President Bush: “I am troubled by the recent Israeli helicopter gunship attacks. I regret the loss of innocent life. I’m concerned that the attacks will make it more difficult for the Palestinian leadership to fight off terrorist attacks. I also don't believe the attacks help the Israeli security.” On June 11, a suicide bomber blew up a Jerusalem bus, killing 16 and wounding more than 100 Israelis. Smaller lethal attacks continued almost every other day. For Sharon, each attack was new evidence that Abbas was simply incapable of action.

For the Bush administration, the immediate goal was to prevent terrorist acts and the Israeli responses to them from unraveling all that had been achieved at Sharm and Aqaba. The Israelis were asked to be careful and cautious in their own actions, avoiding civilian casualties; Abbas was pressed to get control of the security forces
and use them to stop acts of terror. When Rice called Abbas, he made a proposal: Have the IDF pull back in Gaza and we will replace them with our own security forces. In Washington, we were skeptical they had the ability to do so, but it was worth trying. After all, Rice said to her team, Israel has tried to defeat Hamas alone and is failing, so why not try this new strategy?

While Israel's security-force presence in the West Bank was pervasive, in Gaza it was far less so: Israel conducted operations there but had no presence in Gaza's cities. On paper, the PA had 50,000 to 60,000 security men on the payroll and Hamas had 1,000. Dahlan told us that of the 50,000 to 60,000, perhaps 10,000 ever came to work. That bloated payroll was typical of Arafat's Palestine: He had used it to buy loyalty. Still, the ratio of PA to Fatah/PLO/PA forces was 10 to 1, so why not give Dahlan and
his forces a chance? Israel did not want any form of truce with Hamas, which would be a form of recognition of the terrorist group. It wanted Abbas and
Dahlan to act immediately, or the IDF would call up reserves and implement its own plans for a major incursion into Gaza. In a discussion with Weissglas, Genger, and Ayalon on June 16, Rice advised caution: It was not even two weeks since Aqaba, so give Abbas and his forces a chance. But Weissglas told her there were no “Abbas forces.” All Palestinian meetings on security matters were still being held in Arafat's office, and it seemed he had
gained
strength since Aqaba. Still, at Rice's urgings, the Israelis agreed to wait and see what the PA forces could do in Gaza. Even a ceasefire between the PA and Hamas would be tolerable if it were part of a plan that would put the PA in charge. So the Israelis agreed to do less in Gaza and would be cautious in the West Bank as well, giving the PA some space. If it works, Rice said, we will build on it. The following day, John Wolf, now settled in Jerusalem, met with Dahlan to talk about Gaza. I have a plan and am ready to execute it, Dahlan told him, but Arafat is blocking everything, especially putting the security forces under Abbas's control.

As the terrorism
continued, so did Israel's attacks on terrorist leaders. On June 21, Abdullah Qawasmeh, the man Israel thought to be behind the recent
bus bombing, was killed in the West Bank; Powell denounced the killing the following day while visiting Jordan. But the forward momentum between Israel and the PA was sustained: Israel did agree on June 27 to pull its troops out of Gaza. On June 29, the PA announced a
hudna
or truce with the two largest terrorist groups: Hamas and Islamic Jihad said all attacks against Israelis would be suspended for three months.

At the end of June, Rice traveled to Israel and the West Bank to keep the momentum going. Rice began by disarming Sharon by taking a very hard line on security issues herself. We agree that a ceasefire alone is not enough; we agree that you cannot negotiate with terrorists. The president agrees that there can be no accommodation with terrorism. The Palestinians must go after and dismantle the terrorist organizations and unite their security forces under new leadership.

Her main message to Sharon was to give Abbas and
the PA a chance, and his main response was to agree – but only within a narrow window. Sharon told her that Arafat was still in control of most of the security forces and was acting to undermine Abu Mazen. We understand that acting against terror takes time, he said – but not unlimited time. The PA must get started. The Israelis were trying a test: We had given Dahlan the names of 19 terrorists, and we will see what Dahlan does with them, said Sharon (who no doubt believed Dahlan would fail the test, as he did). It will be impossible to show restraint if terrorism continues.

Rice said no one was asking Israel to allow a ticking bomb to go off, but that was not the issue; the question was whether security could be made into a cooperative venture with the Palestinians. Give them some space; let's get them to act. Sharon agreed in principle, but said this test had never worked before: When before we gave them names of terrorists, they warned the people, who escaped and later went back to terror. Nevertheless, he agreed to try it. He added that it would be easier to undertake this experiment when the security fence was completed, construction of which had begun on June 16. Look, he told Rice, suicide bombers were not coming out of Gaza because the borders were closed, but in the past two years there had been scores of attacks from the West Bank.

At this point, Rice was still not persuaded about the value of the fence. We are very concerned about the fence, she said; the plans show it going farther and farther in the West Bank, cutting off Palestinian villages and lands. It would be a real problem and would not help security because it would undercut political progress. She urged Sharon to take another look at the route of the fence; it looks like it will be a huge political problem in the United States, and we cannot and will not remain silent if the fence cuts Palestinian lands and villages. Try to find solutions that are not so politically harmful. Take a really hard look. The fence will cause difficulty.

Sharon bristled at Rice's comments, reminding her that the president had asked in Aqaba if there was any possibility not to build the fence. I told him then that it is neither a political border nor even a security border. The only goal
is to stop terror. It is very important for security. Near Jerusalem, I don't see any possibility not to build fences. We have to defend ourselves. Rice pushed back: You need to defend yourselves, but we are all going to try to deal with terrorism another way, to get the Palestinians to be active against terrorism. If the political situation is made more difficult by the route of the fence, we all lose. She proposed that John Wolf and Dubi Weissglas sit down and review the proposed route of the fence. I am ready to look again at the route of the fence, Sharon replied, but while it might cause some political problems, weigh this against funerals. We hope the United States will understand our problems and not pressure us not to defend ourselves.

The conversation began where it ended: Sharon would give the PA a little space to act against terrorism, but he did not believe they would do so. The discussion also showed that Rice and
Sharon could argue forcefully – and respectfully. There were no bad feelings in this relationship. She showed a feeling of respect to Sharon, as Weissglas described it: maybe it was because of his age, because he really could have been her father or grandfather. And she was very sensitive to the way he approached her. Sometimes Sharon would call her on the phone and say, “Hey, how are you, Condi?” and sometimes it was “Dr. Rice;” if he was very upset, he would say “Madame Secretary.” Weissglas remembered after one of those latter conversations, which ended with a very loud “Okay, thank you, Madame Secretary,” she called him to say, “What have I done wrong now? Why I am downgraded back to Madame Secretary?”
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When Rice left Jerusalem, it seemed there was some momentum: On July 1, Sharon and
Abbas met for the first time since Aqaba for a two-hour discussion, and the opening ceremony was broadcast live on Israeli and Palestinian TV. In both the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli troops were pulling back, allowing PA forces to take up positions and theoretically at least to stop terrorism. On July 2, the IDF pulled out of Bethlehem. The United States announced an additional $30 million in aid to the PA, targeted at work on the infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. But Sharon's sense of politics in the West Bank was correct: Arafat was not yielding to the pressure. On July 7, Abbas threatened for the first time to resign, in the face of orchestrated attacks from Arafat supporters criticizing his conduct at and since Aqaba. Abbas and Arafat kissed and made up a week later, and the resignation threat was withdrawn. Abbas then traveled to Washington for the first time as prime minister. It was now just six weeks since Sharm and Aqaba, but Bush wanted to keep things moving; that was why he had sent Rice to the region and why he was staying involved personally.

The symbolism of the trip was heavy: Arafat had visited the Clinton White House 13 times, but had never been invited to meet with Bush. (At the United Nations in 2002, Colin Powell had served as defensive tackle, literally pushing
Arafat back when he tried to get into a photo with Bush as the president moved down a General Assembly corridor.) Now a new Palestinian leader was standing in the Rose Garden and facing the world press alongside the U.S. president; in addition, Bush had given lunch to Abbas and his entire entourage, a clear sign of favor. In the meetings, Abbas told Bush he was meeting his Roadmap obligations but Israel was not. Although, of course, terrorist groups had not been dismantled in so short a time, the PA was regaining some control; people with masks and guns used to control the streets, but such people were no longer running around Palestinian cities. The problem was that Palestinians could not see any progress or reason for hope in Israel's actions. Israel was still building the fence, which Palestinians were already calling the “apartheid wall”; settlements were expanding; and Sharon was refusing to release any significant number of Palestinian prisoners out of the 7,000 Israel held. Bush responded with sympathy but also noted that, as concerned as he was about Roadmap implementation, he was equally concerned to see an end to violence and terrorism.

In the White House, we wanted to use this visit to give Abbas both pledges and symbols of U.S. support. In the Rose Garden remarks on July 25, the president said, “I’m honored to welcome Prime Minister Abbas to the White House. It is such an honor to have you here, sir. To break through old hatreds and barriers to peace, the Middle East needs leaders of vision and courage and a determination to serve the interest of their people. Mr. Abbas is the first Palestinian Prime Minister, and he is proving to be such a leader.” Bush also announced that the United States would provide $20 million directly to the PA, a signal of trust in Abbas and his finance minister, Salam Fayyad, that the money would not be stolen or misused.

In his Rose Garden response to Bush, Abbas reiterated some of the themes of his Aqaba speech – “Reform and institution-building are an internal Palestinian priority. We do not merely seek a state, but we seek for a state that is built on the solid foundations of the modern constitution, democracy, transparency, the rule of law, and the market economy” – but also used the occasion to state the main Palestinian complaints against Israel:

We continue to negotiate with Israel on the implementation of its obligations. Some progress has been made, but movement needs to be made in terms of freeing prisoners, lifting the siege on President Arafat, Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian areas, and easing up freedom of movement to Palestinians.…Your vision, Mr. President…cannot be realized if Israel continues to grab Palestinian land. If the settlement activities in Palestinian land and construction of the so-called separation wall on confiscated Palestinian land continue, we might soon find ourselves at a situation where the foundation of peace, a free Palestine state, living side-by-side in peace and security in Israel is a factual impossibility. Nothing less than a full settlement freeze will do because nothing less than a full settlement freeze will work. For the sake of peace, and for the sake of future Palestinian and Israeli generations, all settlement activities must be stopped now, and the wall must come down.
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