Thatcher (11 page)

In 1979, Margaret Thatcher's experience of foreign affairs was very limited. It was not her first priority – she would rather have got on with the job at home. Her upbringing in Grantham, the centre of the world to her, reading and loving Kipling's view of England while the war raged outside, had left her with absolute conviction that Britain was great, and that its contribution to the world was a force for civilisation and for good. This colonialist view does not sit well with multiculturalism, or with the European Union for that matter. It changed over time, but reluctantly. The challenges to her government were huge: the European Union, post-colonial problems like Rhodesia, the Falklands and Hong Kong, arms and trade agreements with the Soviet Union and America, and the Irish question. None of these had a simple answer, but answer them she must. She had even less faith in Foreign Office answers than she had in any other branch of the Civil Service. By the end of her period in office, she travelled without taking Foreign Office personnel, although in 1979 she did not have that confidence. The result was a foreign policy that developed different answers for different situations, but was unified by her personal manner. Critics may claim that she responded to and articulated the concerns of middle-class Britain. She certainly set a new direction in foreign policy, marked by her own individual style.

She had little time to reflect. Elected in May 1979, the European elections were in June. These were the first elections where Euro-MPs were elected directly to the European Parliament, rather than being delegated from national parliaments. Her view of the EU was well known, and repeated to young Conservatives in June:
Conservative principles do not change when we cross the Channel. There must be a golden thread of consistency running through our policies for Britain and our policies for the European Community. During our own election campaign, we argued for reduced public spending, lower taxation, more effective competition and a relentless war on bureaucracy. We shall pursue these same objectives in Europe
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To her, her first task was to put the British contribution onto the European Union agenda. Britain imported more goods than other countries, and so paid more in tariffs. On the other hand, the European Union budget disproportionately supported agriculture, and Britain had less agriculture than other countries. We paid out more, and received less. This was an unacceptable situation, and Margaret Thatcher was determined to use her first European Summit in Strasbourg to change it. She went armed with her usual encyclopedic knowledge of the problem and determination to be heard. She delayed dinner on the second day to raise it –
Argument always gives one an appetite, she said
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This first meeting ‘set the scene' for her dealings with Europe. She saw herself as a strong voice for Britain, other leaders saw her as strident and demanding. Disputes were going to continue – she did not agree with any moves for the European Parliament to take over functions of the British Parliament, or for the sovereignty of nation states to be subsumed by the EU. Other leaders saw Europe as much more than just a trading community, and France and Germany were already powerful allies.

At the next summit in Dublin, her single-mindedness meant that no work could be carried out unless and until the British claim for a rebate was discussed and agreed. She did not succeed this time, and the row over contributions rumbled on. In her view, the EU owed Britain a reduction of £1,000 million of ‘our money'. This argument crystallized the personal and political position of Britain over this first term of office. Although the French president, Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, was a conservative he was
an Olympian, not a patrician
in Margaret Thatcher's eyes.
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She meant that he used the prestige of his name and family history to exclude the grocer's daughter from informal gatherings, and pomp and circumstance to marginalise her at formal ones. She had much more in common politically with the socialist German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Only different views of Europe separated them: His vision was of a united and federal Europe, hers of a European Union supporting free trade and made up of independent nations. The two men were friends, and hugely influential in Europe. Margaret Thatcher was not a friend to either, and was fighting for influence in European decision- making. To the concern of the Foreign Office which would have liked a wider discussion and a less obdurate and focused approach, she made it clear that the question of Britain's economic contribution would be the single major issue in dealing with the European Union. Even the Cabinet wished to smooth over the issue. In May, she was forced to accept an interim agreement because the Foreign Secretary, Peter Carrington, told her he personally would accept no other course of action, and it was clear that at least six colleagues and 70 Tory MPs would support him. The issue of British rebate continues to rumble in the background of EU negotiations.

Before Dublin, and scarcely back from Strasbourg, she travelled to the economic conference in Tokyo for the group of seven principal western industrial powers (the G7). She attracted huge interest at this summit – as much or more for being a woman in a male enclave as for the role she took. For her part, she became irritated with the process, refusing to enter into the first-name jocularity of the world leaders and disinterested in the main business of oil pricing and control. On the way, she had an unscheduled dinner at Moscow airport with the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin. Here there were two issues – current American policy was to agree arms limitation with the Russians and Margaret Thatcher disagreed with that (six months later, when Russia invaded Afghanistan, she felt vindicated). Secondly, there was the problem of Vietnamese refugees. Could Russia put pressure on its fellow communists in Vietnam? The short-term answer was no. Her third summit that year was to be held in Lusaka for the meeting of the Commonwealth heads of government.

Despite these high-profile pressures, the biggest issue of this first term was to find some resolution to the problem of Rhodesia. In 1965, the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith had made a unilateral declaration of independence from British rule, flouting the policy that former colonies would only be recognised as independent states if they had introduced democratic elections and majority rule. His minority white government had struggled on until 1979, when elections were held and Bishop Muzorewa was elected as head of a black government. To bring peace to the country, this government needed international recognition. Margaret Thatcher's first instinct was to support the bishop even though he had been elected while Robert Mugabe was still leading a terrorist force, and the rebels had not been in included in the process. The Foreign Office was convinced, and convinced her, that this government would never achieve recognition from the surrounding Black African states. To do nothing was impossible – the sanctions that had creaked on since 1965 were unpopular, and would probably not be renewed by her government. Her response was pro-active and brave. Conservative ministers talked to every important player –
in contrast to her attitude in Ireland, this included Mugabe and other leaders of guerrilla forces. These discussions and Foreign-Office briefings changed her view of independence: before this point she had argued against extensions of freedom for Commonwealth countries. By 1985 her opinion had almost reversed, from the need to maintain Britain's colonies to – in practice, if you are a parliamentary democracy, then the holding of them
[colonial territories]
really can only be a temporary thing, until you bring them to... those same institutions which protect their liberty, in the same way as we developed ours. So if you look at it philosophically, it could only be a temporary thing, not a power structure; and that, I think, was shown years ago as people went first from colonies to dominion status in the pre-war period.
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In Rhodesia, willingness to grasp the nettle, change tack and take risks paid off: Britain took direct control of the country through the governorship of Christopher Soames while more elections were held. Soames and his wife moved to Rhodesia before any cease-fire had been declared, at some personal risk. On 18 April 1980, Rhodesia, governed by a democratically-elected Mugabe, received independence. The experience tested the relationship between her and Peter Carrington, the Foreign Secretary on whom much policy in this first term would rely. In her memoirs she describes a
heated exchange
on the long journey out, when he suggested that the best they could do was damage-limitation. At that time, she says, she had never heard that phrase, and she intended to do very much better than that.
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While she continued to move away from the Foreign Office, some individuals, including Carrington, could influence her. Rhodesia was a strange first task for a woman whose personal beliefs would argue for retaining Commonwealth countries under British rule, but a necessary resolution to the problem for which she received due credit.

By the time she embarked on her second term of office in June 1983, Margaret Thatcher was an experienced, if not popular, diplomat. She had scored success over Rhodesia, established a European refund to Britain, and of course had won absolute victory in the Falklands. After that war her confidence in the superiority of Britain was manifest:
I believe Britain has now found a role. It is in upholding International Law and teaching the nations of the world how to live
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The lessons would not have included the inner-city riots and public opposition that marked the end of her first term in office. Her attitude to the peace was typically intransigent. As far as she was concerned, she was the victor, and the question was now settled. Argentina did not see it the same way. Arguments over supporting and owning the small Falkland Islands continued throughout her period in government and are not settled today.

The victory was helped along by Ronald Reagan, US President since 1980 and a natural ally. With him, Margaret Thatcher formed the close friendship she lacked in Europe. This was a personal and political friendship: she liked Reagan, though she did not always trust him, and she was adamant that Britain and America were natural allies and that Britain owed America for its intervention into the world wars. More important, the Cold War between Britain and Russia was affecting British economy – current defence policy was to invest in nuclear weapons for Britain, but also to support America, while America contributed to Britain's defence. Deterrence depended on a strong America. Her memoirs say:
From the first I regarded it as my duty to do everything I could to reinforce and further President Reagan's bold strategy to win the Cold War
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And she did not move from that position, even when the Americans invaded Grenada, a British protectorate, without telling her. Worse, they told the Foreign Office they were not going to invade, leaving the Foreign Secretary to give misleading information to the House. This was tricky for Margaret Thatcher. She was furious with Washington: Hugo Young describes her as ‘incandescent'.
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Not only had Reagan humiliated her, America had also broken international law. Washington had thought that she would support the invasion, aimed as it was at unseating a Marxist government. But as far as she was concerned –
I think as a general rule we in the Western countries, the Western democracies, use our force to defend our way of life, we do not use it to walk into other people's countries, independent sovereign territories. We try to extend our beliefs not by force but by persuasion. So there is a general rule that you do not cross into an independent sovereign country. It's not an inviolate rule, but it's a very, very good one. I think, therefore, that if you're going to go into an independent sovereign country – and don't forget Grenada was given independence in 1974 with a fully independent constitution with a legal system, with democracy, it had gone by 1979 when Maurice Bishop seized power as a Marxist – but I think it's a good fault not to walk into another person's country and therefore, let me put it this way... you have to be absolutely certain that if you do there is no choice, or if there is no other way... . You mentioned oppression, Communism – yes, I hate it. There are many, many peoples in countries in the world who would love to be free of it, love to be free of it, that doesn't mean to say that we can just walk into them and say now you are free, I'm afraid
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This was an answer which also showed her usual detailed briefing. Her friendship with President Reagan did not seriously falter, however.

In the same week, there were massive demonstrations in London against the arrival of US cruise missiles in Britain. The Grenadian action could have threatened that decision, not least because it strengthened American opinion. She knew this, but did not hesitate:
We have a job to do here. We have to get Cruise missiles sited in pursuit of the NATO decision. We have to take the lead in doing it... . It was the most important thing in East/West terms and that you do not in fact put in jeopardy. All right, things somehow changed on the Monday
[invasion of Grenada]
, they did not tell us anything over the weekend. But even then you just go back and look at the very first principles
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Later, and again against the advice of her Cabinet and public opinion, she supported the American bombing of Libya. In a response to Neil Kinnock at question time she said:
I remind him again that the United States, our staunch ally, keeps over 330,000 troops in Europe to defend the freedom of Europe and that, without the United States and Britain, Europe would not today be free. We must continue to keep that Alliance
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This summed up her personal and political view that America deserved and should have absolute British loyalty, and that Britain would benefit from this special relationship. In 1991, she committed British forces without hesitation to the first Gulf War, to fight with the Americans and the other Coalition forces.