The Angel (40 page)

  
11
.
      
Yitzhak Rabin,
Record of Service
(Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), pp. 345–46.

  
12
.
      
Military Intelligence document from June 1971; Shalev,
Failure and Success in the Warning
, n. 3 of ch. 4, p. 63.

  
13
.
      
It should be said, however, that the roots of the Concept could be found as early as 1968, two years before Marwan offered his services. In a meeting of the IDF General Staff about the possibility of war with Egypt that fall, the chiefs of the Israeli Air Force expressed their opinion that any Egyptian effort to cross the Suez Canal without first neutralizing Israel's air superiority would necessarily fail. The IDF chief of operations, Maj. Gen. Ezer Weizman, who had been the commander of the IAF, said of such an Egyptian move, “If only they would make such a mistake.” Uri Bar-Joseph,
The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), p. 45.

  
14
.
      
Shazly,
Crossing the Suez
, p. 128.

  
15
.
      
See: Ibid., p. 18; Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p.178; Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy,
The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshall El-Gamasy of Egypt
(Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1993), p. 205; Mohamed Heikal,
Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat
(New York: Random House, 1983), p. 50.

  
16
.
      
Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, p. 244.

  
17
.
      
Bar-Joseph,
The Watchman Fell Asleep,
pp. 84–85.

  
18
.
      
Shalev,
Failure and Success in the Warning
, n. 3 of ch. 4, p. 81, where he quotes from an MI document from May 1969.

  
19
.
      
“Intelligence Summary from Operation Dovecote,” December 17, 1972; Shalev,
Failure and Success in the Warning
, n. 3 of ch. 4, pp. 80–81; Eli Zeira,
Myth Versus Reality: Yom Kippur War—Failures and Lessons
(Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2004), pp. 89–90. The first edition of Zeira's book came out in 1993.

  
20
.
      
Zvi Zamir interviewed on the Israeli television program
Fact (Uvda)
, Channel 2, “The Last Spy,” December 27, 2007.

  
21
.
      
Interview with Zvi Zamir, July 8, 2008.

  
22
.
      
Conversation with Amos Gilboa.

  
23
.
      
Shalev,
Failure and Success in the Warning
, n. 3 of ch. 4, p. 186.

  
24
.
      
Interview with Aharon Levran.

  
25
.
      
Moshe Dayan interview with Rami Tal, in Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltser,
The Yom Kippur War: Real Time
(Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2003), p. 180.

  
26
.
      
Interview with Yonah Bandman.

  
27
.
      
Zeira,
Myth Versus Reality
, pp. 155–56.

  
28
.
      
Ibid., pp. 151–63.

  
29
.
      
“Supplement of Supplements,” Israel Television Channel 1, interviewed by Dan Margalit, September 23–24, 2004.

  
30
.
      
Interview with Arieh Shalev.

  
31
.
      
Interview with Aharon Levran.

  
32
.
      
Bergman and Meltser,
The Yom Kippur War
, p. 175.

  
33
.
      
Zamir and Mass,
With Open Eyes
, p. 133.

  
34
.
      
Ibid., pp. 132–35.

  
35
.
      
Interviews with Zvi Zamir and Freddy Eini.

Chapter 6: Sadat's Emissary for Special Affairs

   
1
.
      
Nadav Safran,
Saudi Arabia: Ceaseless Quest for Security
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 145; Robert Dreyfuss,
Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam
(New York: Henry Holt, 2006), p. 151; Gerald Posner,
Secrets of the Kingdom
(New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 80–82; Said K. Aburish,
The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud
(London: Bloomsbury, 2005), p. 301; Bob Woodward,
Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), p. 347; Mohamed Heikal,
The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 226.

   
2
.
      
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal interview with Al Jazeera Television, December 17, 2009.

   
3
.
      
Fawzi,
Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan
, p. 31. Other sources about the deal include: Jamaa,
I Knew Sadat,
pp. 216–18; Sabri,
Sadat: The Truth and the Legend
, p. 653; Tharwat,
Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion
, pp. 27–36.

   
4
.
      
Jeffrey Robinson,
The Risk Takers
(New York: HarperCollins, 1985), p. 122.

   
5
.
      
Avi Shlaim,
Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), pp. 346–47.

   
6
.
      
Gideon Gera,
Gaddafi's Way in Libya
(Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuhad, 1983), pp. 118–19.

   
7
.
      
John K. Cooley,
Libyan Sandstorm
(New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1982), pp. 6–7, 68.

   
8
.
      
Mohamed Hamad, “Egypt-Libya Relations from Revolution to War: Recollections of Salah al-Din al-Saadani, Egypt's First Ambassador to Libya After the Revolution,” part 13,
Al-Rei al-A'am
(Kuwait), October 15, 1997, p. 12.

   
9
.
      
Sabri,
Sadat: The Truth and the Legend
, pp. 652–53.

  
10
.
      
Tharwat,
Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion
, p. 34.

  
11
.
      
Ibid.; Sabri,
Sadat: The Truth and the Legend
, pp. 652–53.

  
12
.
      
“For 100,000 dollars a month . . . the ‘prophetic,' one of the great weapons dealers of Egypt,”
Al-Shaab
, December 2, 2009.

  
13
.
      
Sabri,
Sadat: The Truth and the Legend
, p. 652.

  
14
.
      
Fawzi,
Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan
, p. 29.

  
15
.
      
Jamaa,
I Knew Sadat
, pp. 217–18; Sabri,
Sadat: The Truth and the Legend
, p. 652; Fatah,
Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?,
p. 26.

  
16
.
      
Fatah,
Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?,
p. 31.

  
17
.
      
Jamaa,
I Knew Sadat
, pp. 184–85; Tharwat,
Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion
, pp. 27–36.

  
18
.
      
Jamaa,
I Knew Sadat
, pp. 184–85; Tharwat,
Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion
, pp. 35–36.

  
19
.
      
Jeffrey Robinson,
Yamani: The Inside Story
(London: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 85–86.

  
20
.
      
Shazly,
Crossing the Suez
, pp. 148–49.

  
21
.
      
Conversation with Howard Blum, September 1, 2010.

  
22
.
      
Ronen Bergman, “The ‘Khotel' Code,”
Yediot Ahronot (7 Days Supplement)
, September 7, 2007, pp. 29–30.

Chapter 7: Egypt Girds for War

   
1
.
      
Eyal Zisser, “Syria and the October War: The Missed Opportunity,” in
The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy
, ed. Asaf Siniver (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 67–83.

   
2
.
      
Uri Bar-Joseph and Amr Yossef, “The Hidden Factors That Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
37, no. 4, pp. 584–608.

   
3
.
      
Arieh Braun,
Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War
(Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1992), p. 17.

   
4
.
      
Ibid., p. 18.

   
5
.
      
Ibid., pp. 17–18.

   
6
.
      
Rabin,
Record of Service
, p. 380.

   
7
.
      
Braun,
Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War
, p. 18.

   
8
.
      
Ibid., p. 19.

   
9
.
      
Interview with Avner Shalev, Tel Aviv, August 29, 1998. In 1973 Shalev served as the Chief of Staff's aide-de-camp.

  
10
.
      
Branch 6,
Intelligence Survey 15/73
, January 24, 1973.

  
11
.
      
Lon Norden and David Nicole,
Phoenix Over the Nile: A History of Egyptian Air Power, 1932–1994
(Washington, DC,: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), pp. 269–70.

  
12
.
      
Arieh Shalev, “Intelligence Assessment Before the War,” in
National Trauma: The Yom Kippur War After Thirty Years and Another War
, ed. Moshe Shemesh and Zeev Drori (Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion University, 2008), p. 117.

  
13
.
      
Commission of Inquiry—The Yom Kippur War, Additional Partial Report: Justifications and Additions to the Partial Report of 9 Nissan 5734
(
January 4, 1974)
, vol. 1, Jerusalem (1974), p. 93 (hereafter: Agranat Commission, Third and Final Report).

  
14
.
      
Shalev, “Intelligence Assessment,” pp. 118–19.

  
15
.
      
Interview with Yonah Bandman.

  
16
.
      
For a detailed description of this discussion, see: Bar-Joseph,
The Watchman Fell Asleep
, 2005, pp. 69–70.

  
17
.
      
Ibid., pp. 71–73.

  
18
.
      
Shmuel Gordon,
Thirty Hours in October, Fateful Decisions: The Air Force at the Start of the Yom Kippur War
(Tel Aviv: Maariv, 2008), p. 193.

Chapter 8: Final Preparations and an Intermezzo in Rome

   
1
.
      
Braun,
Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War
, p. 28.

   
2
.
      
Time
, July 30, 1973, p. 13.

   
3
.
      
Robinson,
Yamani
, pp. 84–86.

   
4
.
      
Hanoch Bartov,
Dado: 48 Years and Another 20 Days
(Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2002), pp. 237–39.

   
5
.
      
John K. Cooley,
Libyan Sandstorm
(New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1982), pp. 106–09.

   
6
.
      
Aaron J. Klein,
The Master of Operations: The Story of Mike Harari
(Jerusalem: Keter, 2014), pp. 16–20; Zamir and Mass,
With Open Eyes
, pp. 142–46; Mohamad Hamad,
El-Rai el-A'am
(Kuwait), October 15, 1997, p. 12; interview with Zvi Zamir, September 1, 2009; Oded Granot, “How Gaddafi and Sadat Conspired to Shoot Down an El Al Plane,”
Maariv
Sabbath Supplement, December 2, 1994; Nadav Zeevi, “The Betrayed: Senior Mossad and MI Officials Talk for the First Time About the Handling and Abandonment of Ashraf Marwan, Israel's Number One Agent,”
Maariv
, December 28, 2007; Ilana Dayan, “The Last Spy: The Life and Death of Dr. Ashraf Marwan,”
Fact (Uvda)
, Israel Television Channel 2, December 27, 2007;
Maariv
, September 6, 1973.