The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt (52 page)

As we settled down over the teacups, one of them made a remark with philosophic implications, and a heated discussion ensued. Dr. Chang was a pluralist and held forth in charming fashion on the proposition that there is more than one kind of ultimate reality. The Declaration, he said, should reflect more than Western ideas and Dr. Humphrey would have to be eclectic in his approach. His remark, though addressed to Dr. Humphrey, was really directed at Dr. Malik, from whom it drew a prompt retort as he expounded at length the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Dr. Humphrey joined enthusiastically in the discussion, and I remember that at one point Dr. Chang suggested that the Secretariat might well spend a few months studying the fundamentals of Confucianism! By that time I could not follow them, so lofty had the conversation become, so I simply filled the teacups again and sat back to be entertained by the talk of these learned gentlemen.

Early in the meetings of the commission we discovered that while it would be possible to reach some kind of agreement on the Declaration, we were going to be in for a great deal of controversy with the Russian representatives, particularly Dr. Pavlov, who attempted at every opportunity to write a bit of Communist philosophy into the document. For example, at the end of practically every article the Russian proposed to amend the Declaration to read: “This shall be enforced by the state.”

When such an amendment was proposed I, or one of the other Western delegates, would argue against it on the ground that this was an international declaration by the United Nations and that we did not believe it should be imposed by the power of the individual governments. We would then ask for a vote and the amendment would be defeated. But as soon as the next article was completed the Soviet delegate would again propose the same amendment and we would have to go through the whole business again with the same result, the defeat of the Soviet proposal. This naturally became monotonous but the Russians never gave up trying.

The drafting of the articles continued over many months. During our early work on the Covenants and measures of implementation it became apparent that it was going to be exceedingly difficult to agree on articles that would, if accepted, be legally binding on the various nations. This was difficult enough in regard to civil and political rights that have become fairly well accepted throughout the civilized world, but when it came to economic and social rights it seemed to me at times that agreement would be all but impossible. These articles have, however, now been adopted by the majority of the committee.

The reason for this, in part at least, was the vast social and economic differences between the various countries; the social and economic conditions in the United States, for example, as contrasted to existing conditions in a country like India. The gap was so great that it was well-nigh impossible to phrase concepts acceptable to both countries. Let me give one example to explain these difficulties.

With the aid of various specialized United Nations agencies, we set out to write the best possible article aimed at the encouragement of universal education. We achieved a preliminary draft that stated that everyone had a right to primary, secondary and higher education, the first two to be compulsory but all of them eventually to be provided free by the individual governments concerned. This might read well to a citizen of the United States but it was quite a different matter in India.

“Our economy is strained,” Madame Hansa Mehta, the Indian representative, explained, “and we are trying only to give all children a primary education. What would happen if we suddenly attempted to provide secondary and higher education, too? The article should be amended to read that the goal is to be accomplished gradually, with due consideration for the economy of each country.”

“The trouble with that,” I replied, “is that I do not believe the United States Senate would ever ratify a treaty so vaguely worded. The senators would ask: ‘What does gradually mean—five years or ten years or a hundred years?’ I just don’t believe they would accept it.”

But if the economic problems of underdeveloped countries provided one stumbling block, the political systems of other countries, particularly the United States, provided another. Our delegation had to insist on including a states’ rights clause because we could act only in regard to matters that were under jurisdiction of the federal government. We had to explain that in other matters, which were under the control of the states, we had power only to “recommend” that the states take appropriate action. Australia and Canada were the only other countries in a similar position.

Many of the other countries resented the fact that they were being asked to commit all their people to the instruments we were drafting, whereas on certain matters the United States delegation could commit only a limited number of the people and hope that the various state governments would accept our recommendations. I could understand their resentment and their opposition to our “states’ rights” system, but we always fought to get our amendment in. So far, however, the draft Covenants still lack a federal states’ rights clause. We made slow progress in drafting the legally binding Covenants and even slower progress in framing measures of implementation that would provide means to enforce the Covenants.

Late in 1947 it was decided that the next meeting of the Human Rights Commission would be in Geneva, so we left for that city early in December with the idea of completing our work in time to be home for Christmas. As chairman, I knew that it would require much hard work and long hours to be able to adjourn before Christmas but I was in a determined mood and I warned all the delegations of my plans.

I immediately laid out a schedule of work that, with night sessions, I believed would enable us to adjourn by eleven o’clock on the evening of December 17.

Nobody objected to my plans, at least not until later, and I must say that everybody worked hard. My own day started at eight o’clock, when I met with my advisers at breakfast and went over the work schedule and any difficult problems. Then I would go to the Palais des Nations Unies, where the sessions were held and get through my correspondence in time for the morning session of the commission. At luncheon we usually got several delegates together to continue our discussions informally and then returned to the afternoon meeting. At night we had an after-dinner session or a meeting of our delegation. Later Mr. Hendrick and I would talk for perhaps an hour about the next day’s plans, and after he had gone to bed Mrs. Hendrick would come in with a pile of personal letters on which we worked until after midnight. By the time I had dictated my daily newspaper column I was ready for bed.

This was a grueling schedule for everybody and within a few days I was being denounced—mostly in fun, I hope—as a merciless slave driver. But I must say we got through a great deal of work and kept to our schedule, for which I was very grateful to all the delegations.

We did end our work at eleven o’clock on the evening I had originally designated.

Our efforts to write a Charter or International Bill of Human Rights reached a kind of climax at the Paris sessions of the General Assembly in 1948. After our Geneva meeting we made steady progress on the Declaration, despite many controversies with the delegates from Communist countries.

Dr. Pavlov was a member of the commission and delivered many long propaganda harangues that appeared to be more for the purpose of publicizing the Communist point of view than in the hope of making changes in the Declaration. He was an orator of great power; his words rolled out of his black beard like a river, and stopping him was difficult. Usually, we had to sit and listen, but on one occasion it seemed to me that the rash accusations he brought against the United States and Great Britain were proving a real detriment to our work. Dr. Pavlov knew that most of us were getting tired of listening, but toward the end of one week when we were preparing to recess he began speaking again. He seemed likely to go on forever, but I watched him closely until he had to pause for breath. Then I banged the gavel so hard that the other delegates jumped in surprise and, before he could continue, I got in a few words of my own.

“We are here,” I said, “to devise ways of safeguarding human rights. We are not here to attack each other’s governments, and I hope when we return on Monday the delegate of the Soviet Union will remember that!” I banged the gavel again. “Meeting adjourned!”

Eventually we completed a draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that we foolishly felt would be quickly accepted by the General Assembly, which was meeting in Paris in the autumn of 1948.

“I believe,” General Marshall, who had become secretary of state, said before we left for Paris, “that this session of the General Assembly will be remembered as the human rights session.”

As the session opened I was full of confidence that we could quickly get the Declaration through the formal hearings before Committee Three and have it approved by the Assembly. My confidence was soon gone. We worked for two months, often until late at night, debating every single word of that draft Declaration over and over again before Committee Three would approve its transmission to the General Assembly.

During this time I made a trip to Germany, at the request of General Lucius Clay, who asked me to address a group of German women doctors at Stuttgart. This was not an easy assignment. There had been, during the conflict with Hitler, a considerable campaign of hatred in Germany directed against me personally because I had spoken out as strongly as I could against most of the things represented by nazism, including the persecution of Jewish people. Furthermore, any occupation force, whether good or bad, just or unjust, is detested by the people it rules, and I have never had reason to believe that an exception is made of American troops. General Clay, however, was trying with considerable success to carry out a difficult assignment in Germany and he told me he believed it might be helpful if I spoke to the women in Stuttgart. So, of course, I agreed to do so.

There was a large crowd at the Stuttgart meeting, and, as I had feared, the women were cool and reserved if not bitter toward me when I arrived at the dinner. I had no intention of letting their coldness prevent me from saying certain things I had in my mind, so I began with a denunciation of the Nazi philosophy and actions. I made it as strong as I could and I expressed the opinion that the German people must bear their share of the blame. I had not expected my audience to be pleased by such remarks and they were not. The atmosphere became cooler.

Then I talked to them more approvingly. At that time the Russians were blockading Berlin, cutting off all coal and other supplies that moved over the normal land routes and forcing the United States to organize a gigantic airlift to supply West Berlin. The purpose of the Soviets was to force the Western powers to move out of Berlin. In this crisis the German people had acted magnificently and I praised them for supporting the democracies and defying the Communist power. I talked about the future, the recovery of Germany under a democratic form of government, and the hope that the United Nations would mean the end of international wars. Slowly the audience warmed up and I could feel a change of attitude as I concluded: “And now I extend to you the hand of friendship and cooperation.”

On this trip I lunched with the women doctors and they told me about their problems with their own German refugees, who had to live on the German economy because they were German citizens but could not at that time of hardship find work. They were existing under miserable and dangerous conditions. I was also told of the difficulties of tracing children taken by Hitler from conquered Poland and other lands, under his plan of destroying their nationality. As the records were found, an effort was being made to restore the children to their families. Many of them did not even know they were not of German birth.

I stayed only a little more than a day in Stuttgart but the visit taught me much and I returned with zest to the work of the Third Committee of the General Assembly.

In the final vote in Committee Three, on presenting the Declaration to the Assembly, the delegates from four Moslem countries abstained, explaining that they believed the article on religious freedom was contrary to the Koran. We consulted Sir Zafrulla Khan, the foreign minister of Pakistan, the largest Moslem nation.

“It is my opinion,” he declared, “that our Pakistan delegate has misinterpreted the Koran. I understand the Koran to say: ‘He who can believe shall believe; he who cannot believe shall disbelieve; the only unforgiveable sin is to be a hypocrite.’ I shall vote for acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

In the end there was no vote cast against the Declaration in the General Assembly, but there were some disappointing abstentions. The Soviet Union and its satellite countries abstained, since the Russian delegate contended that the Declaration put emphasis mainly on “eighteenth-century rights” and not enough on economic, social and cultural rights. The delegate from Saudi Arabia abstained, saying he was quite sure King Ibn Saud would not agree to the interpretation of the Koran. South Africa also abstained, I was sad to note; its delegate said that they hoped to give their people basic human rights, but that the Declaration went too far. Two small countries were absent. The Declaration was finally accepted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948.

After the Declaration was accepted, it seemed to me that the United States had held the chairmanship of the Commission on Human Rights long enough. So at the 1951 meeting of the commission in Geneva, I nominated Charles Malik of Lebanon, with the consent of my government. He was elected and from then on I was just a member but a most interested member, for I believed the Human Rights Commission was one of the important parts of the foundation on which the United Nations might build a peaceful world.

The commission continued to work on drafting the Covenants, but this was so difficult that the United States group finally decided that it would be possible to progress only if we moved forward a step at a time. We proposed that there be two Covenants, one covering legally binding agreements on social and economic rights and another covering political and civil rights. This plan was vigorously opposed by some delegations, including the Soviets, on the ground that the economic and social rights were the most important and that they probably would not be accepted for years if they were in a separate covenant. But it seemed to our delegation that it was better to try to get what we could at that time. The civil and political rights already were a part of the law in many countries and were not so difficult to phrase in legal language that would be generally acceptable, although we knew that even this first step would be exceedingly difficult.