The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance (12 page)

At 6 pm, Wellington received a reply from Blücher to his request for help the following day that had been sent off a little before 10 am. Blücher replied that he would do his best to come with his entire army sometime the following afternoon, but again was not in a position to give a firm time for when he would arrive.

It was a near thing, but night fell just as Napoleon’s lead units caught up with the rearmost infantry regiment of Wellington’s army – a unit of Brunswickers. Napoleon had reached an inn called La Belle Alliance when he saw a ridge around 1.5 km or so ahead of him lined with Wellington’s infantry and cavalry. What he could see was only a portion of Wellington’s army. Napoleon was uncertain if this merely a stronger rearguard positioned for the night, or if Wellington was standing to fight and had, as usual, hidden most of his men out of sight.

Napoleon sent forward a brigade of cuirassiers, supported by 24 cannon, to find out. They had barely moved forward when a battery of 60 guns boomed out from Wellington’s army. Napoleon had his answer. There would be a battle the next day.

As the French army bedded down as well as it could on the damp ground, with thundery showers continuing to sweep overhead, Napoleon received a message from the scouts he had sent out to his right, eastern flank. They had seen in the distance a large body of Prussians marching north towards Wavre from Gembloux. The Prussians had appeared to be in good order, but the French scouts could not be certain due to the distance.

Grouchy’s pursuit of Blücher

Napoleon was not overly concerned. He had told Grouchy to hustle Blücher so that he could not regroup, and to stay in touch. To date he had received no message from Grouchy after one written about 3 pm when he said that he was following the Prussians to Gembloux. If anything had gone wrong, Napoleon thought Grouchy would have told him.

In fact, nothing had gone wrong – but nor had very much gone right. Grouchy had begun by marching toward Gembloux as he was certain that at least a large part of the Prussian army had gone there. The rains began as he marched and before long he found that his artillery and supply wagons were getting stuck in mud with annoying regularity. The road Grouchy was using was of a much poorer quality than the modern, recently paved main road along which Napoleon was following Wellington.

Arriving in Gembloux, Grouchy halted his main body to give the stuck vehicles time to catch up, and meanwhile sent his light cavalry to find out which way the Prussians had gone. It took a long time to establish that although scattered bands of fugitives and baggage had gone east towards Liège and Germany, most of the formed units of fighting men had gone north. The delay was partly caused by the fact that many Prussians were going north without having passed through Gembloux, but having used country roads to the west – which were not probed by Grouchy’s cavalry.

If Gneisenau had had his way, the French scouts would have found the Prussian army at Tilly. As it was, most of the Prussians had moved on north toward Wavre, often by roads that did not go through Tilly, and so Grouchy’s men missed them.

Taking into account the state of the roads, the fact that the Prussians did not appear to be in a hurry and the tiredness of his own men, Grouchy decided to stay the night at Gembloux. He reckoned that after a good meal and decent rest, his men would be able to catch up with the Prussians the next day.

Blithely unaware of Grouchy’s slow movements, Napoleon was moving among his troops to cheer them up. He was also taking the opportunity to study Wellington’s position – and he was puzzled. The ridge on which Wellington had positioned his army was not particularly steep, nor very high. A short distance behind it was the huge Forest of Soignes. Moving an army through a wood could be tricky, especially if the troops were being harried by an enemy. The ridge therefore appeared to be both difficult to hold and difficult to retreat from.

Twice that night Napoleon got out of bed to go and look at Wellington’s position for signs of a retreat. At 3.30 am some men he had sent forward disguised as local peasants returned to report that Wellington’s army was asleep. There would be no retreat.

Napoleon was relieved. He had 75,000 men to Wellington’s 67,000. His men were all experienced veterans, many of Wellington’s were raw recruits. Blücher was miles away and battered, while Grouchy was – Napoleon thought – blocking his path to Wellington. The next day would be bloody, no doubt, but also victorious.

Henry Paget, earl of Uxbridge, 1768 - 1854

Chapter 7
 
‘An opening in the line thus occurred’
 

Captain Duthilt of the French 45th Infantry, writing some years after the battle
 

The position taken up by Wellington just south of Waterloo appeared at first glance to be a simple ridge, but there were distinct features that would come to be crucial in the battle as it unfolded.

The Mont-Saint-Jean ridge ran at right angles to the main road heading north to Brussels, along which Wellington had retreated the previous day. That main road ran direct from La Belle Alliance, the inn where Napoleon had his battlefield base, to the top of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge, where Wellington had his. The two headquarters were separated by around 1,200 m. In that space the land fell gently down into a valley before climbing up again to Mont-Saint-Jean.

The land was open and unbroken by hedges, ditches or trees. Most of the ground was covered by standing crops of grain, which stood 1.5–2 m tall. In the earlier stages of the battle these would hinder the view of the men on the ground, but before long it would be trampled flat. The fields were generally flat, but in places there were small rises and dips. At the eastern end of the battlefield the small Smohain stream cut through a narrow valley that was deeper than the rest of the battlefield. The stream ran north-east to join the river Dyle near Wavre.

Along the top of Wellington’s ridge ran a poor-quality country road from Wavre to Hal. Where it crossed the main road to Brussels there stood a large elm tree – where Wellington took up his position. To the east of the crossroads this road was lined by hedges; to the west, it ran through a cutting. Both features offered some protection to infantry, so Wellington put his first line along this road.

Defensive positions

Three substantial farm complexes stood in the valley between the two ridges. These buildings were all of stone and could be made into impressive defensive positions. Men stationed in the farms would be able to pour flanking fire into any French columns seeking to bypass them to attack Wellington on his ridge. They were therefore crucial to Wellington’s defensive plans.

In the east, on Wellington’s left flank, was Papelotte. This stood at the head of the ravine carrying the Smohain stream. Wellington stationed men of Perponcher’s Dutch division in Papelotte to defend it. Further out to the left was the hamlet of Frischermont, but this played little role in the battle.

Standing immediately beside the main Brussels road was La Haye Sainte. This consisted of a substantial house together with stables and a barn all linked by a high stone wall that enclosed a courtyard with a pond. A gate gave access from the courtyard to the main road, but otherwise only a few windows looked out from the complex. Wellington put two battalions of the King’s German Legion into La Haye Sainte, supported by a Nassau regiment behind them.

On the opposite side of the main road, facing La Haye Sainte, was a hillock that had been largely excavated by locals carting off the fine sand of which it was composed. Into this sandpit were put the 95th Rifles. This regiment was equipped with the Baker rifle, which was far more accurate than the standard infantry musket, but which was slow to load and often suffered from jamming.

The most westerly of the farms was also the largest. Hougoumont is usually described as a ‘chateau’, meaning it was a country manor rather than a farmhouse. Like La Haye Sainte, it was built around a walled courtyard, but the buildings were bigger and more solid. In addition to the main house, there was a chapel, barn, stable, cottages and assorted outbuildings. A gate opened to the south and another to the north. To the east of the buildings was a walled, formal garden with an orchard, also walled, to the east of the garden. To the south of the complex was a wood surrounded by substantial hedges. To garrison this stronghold, Wellington put the light companies of the four regiments of British Guards who were present.

Rifles were not used much by the military due to the fact that the soot and other residues left by black powder caused them to jam after only a few shots. British regiments such as the 95
th
which did have rifles were more often used for skirmishing and scouting than in pitched battles.

Wellington remained concerned about his right wing, worrying that Napoleon might yet march west to cut him off from his supply lines and the Royal Navy. He put most of his army to the west of the main road, massing in the right half of his line. Even that was not enough. A detached force of around 15,000 men was put at Hal, several kilometres to the west, where it guarded the road back to the Scheldt. It was there to guard his route to safety should Blücher not come to Waterloo in time.

At 2 am Wellington received a letter from Blücher in which the Prussian stated that his men were so tired that they could not start to march until dawn. As the sun came up, however, Blücher would put Bülow’s IV Corps in motion, followed by the other corps as soon as they could be got formed up and moving. Looking at a map, Wellington judged that Bülow might arrive about 2 pm.

Morning plans – fraught exchanges

Both Wellington and Napoleon were up and on the field by dawn. Wellington moved a few units about until he was satisfied, then he took up position under the elm tree at the crossroads, from where he had an excellent view of the area, and waited.

There he was approached by a succession of senior commanders seeking advice or passing on news. One such conversation was with Uxbridge, the commander of the British cavalry and second most senior officer on the field. Uxbridge had a delicate question to ask. Wellington was notoriously secretive and had not discussed his plans for the coming battle. ‘Since I am second in command: should anything happen to you, what are your plans?’ Uxbridge asked.

Wellington indicated the gathering French army ahead of them. ‘Who will attack first,’ he asked, ‘Bonaparte or us?’

‘Bonaparte,’ replied Uxbridge.

‘Well,’ continued Wellington, ‘Bonaparte has not given me a copy of his plans and since my plans depend on what he does, how can you expect me to tell you what my plans are?’ Uxbridge withdrew, chastened.

Napoleon was keen to get the battle started. At 6 am he dictated to Soult general movement orders for his troops, stating that the regiments should move at 9 am. While his army moved into position, Napoleon had breakfast with his senior officers. Men came and went as their duties allowed, but in any case it turned out to be a fraught meal. Napoleon had been expounding on how the odds were in his favour when Ney entered and caught the end of his remarks. Ney said that when he had fought Wellington in Spain the British general had proved adept at slipping out of apparently secure traps. Soult, who had also faced Wellington before, chipped in to suggest that a message be sent to Grouchy asking him to detach Gérard’s corps to march across country to fall on Wellington’s left flank.