The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (68 page)

potential contributors that they should support ± or at least not repress ± their efforts. Such resource and institutional dependencies fundamentally shape movement developments, as do competitive pressures that determine processes of

organizational founding, survival, and change.

Early work on thè`radical flank effect'' of foundation funding was predicated

on this insight. As this argument goes, in order to offset civil rights protest, foundation patronage was successfully directed in support of more moderate

efforts, ultimately promoting the creation and maintenance of professional

movement organizations. Jenkins (1999) develops this channeling argument by

mapping trends in foundation funding for different movements and organiza-

tional forms, arguing that social movement philanthropy encourages profession-

alization by supporting groups with more formalized structures. Whereas some

critics might consider this a form of co-optation, Jenkins suggests that the result cuts both ways. On the one hand, foundation funding provides ``technical

resources for consolidating movement victories and ensuring that these gains

remain in place'' (Jenkins, 1999, p. 15). On the other hand, more democratic,

participatory organizations are underfunded and organizers may have more

incentive to professionalize than engage in grassroots mobilization, potentially blunting movement effectiveness. Again, the trade-off between spontaneity and

organization looms in the background.

McCarthy et al. (1991) extend the channeling metaphor to thèìnstitutional

channeling'' of social movements by the state, noting thè`strong tendency

toward structural uniformity. . . among social movement organizations in the

recent American context'' (p. 47). They build on neo-institutional theories of

organization, pointing to the sometimes subtle and indirect institutional pres-

sures that channel organizational action into a limited set of choices. In addition to statutes that circumscribe the legality of various modes of associational

activity, there are federal and state tax laws, postal regulations, and monitoring agencies that provide incentives to organize according to official standards and to limit innovation. Although compliance with such norms is voluntary, à`tangle of incentives'' provides advantages to certain organizational forms over others. These are the groups that get the funding and the credibility; they also have better chances for survival.

I have analyzed processes of institutionalization from an ecological perspect-

ive on organizational evolution. My work focuses attention on how competitive

and institutional pressures shape the contours and viability of organizational

populations by influencing patterns of organizational founding, failure, and

change. Environmental selection and changes in the political environment estab-

lish the legitimacy of organizational constituencies and forms, thus setting

parameters around how social movements develop. To the extent that new

constituencies or methods become legitimate, they establish an institutional

niche; that is, an arena of activity that provides them with necessary resources for mobilization and organizational maintenance and protects them from the

vagaries of political transitions or shifts in the public agenda.

288

Debra C. Minkoff

Applying this framework to the contemporary civil rights and feminist move-

ments in the USA, I demonstrate that social movement development is contin-

gent on levels of inter-organizational competition for resources and the way this competition shapes the legitimacy of different models of organization (Minkoff,

1994). I argue that organizational density-dependence is a key mechanism driv-

ing the development of these movements. My findings indicate that increases in

the number of both service and protest organizations promoted the founding and

survival rates of groups pursuing advocacy, an intermediate strategy that com-

bines conventional lobbying and educational efforts with more confrontational

activities. As this organizational form gained legitimacy, competitive pressures became dominant after 1970. One result was that the continued growth of

protest and service organizations diminished as advocacy organizations began

to dominate this sector of movement activity.

The key insight from these studies is that, without some baseline of legitimacy, the organizational models adopted by movement actors are not likely to be

viable for long. Organizational ecology models suggest that early investments

in organization-building pay off, not only because resource flows become rou-

tinized and available for use by other constituencies, but also because the

successful maintenance and growth of organizations increases their acceptance

by powerful third parties. Such legitimacy affects the willingness of funders to support new constituencies, of authorities to tolerate their dissent, and of the media to broadcast their claims in a favorable light. As critically, organizational models must also be accepted by the movement constituency. As we know from

the more visible and better documented contemporary social movements, there

is often conflict among activists and constituents about what are the most

appropriate methods and forms of activism (for example, see McAdam, 1982,

and Polletta, 1997, on the civil rights and black power movements).

Elisabeth Clemens (1997) is one of the few researchers who has given such

internal and external legitimation processes serious attention. Drawing on cul-

tural-institutional arguments, she looks at two sides of the problem: how social movement actors adopt and adapt organizational models in ways that gain them

political leverage and how this promotes innovation in the prevailing ``repertoire of organization'' and the political system more generally. One important insight of Clemens's work is that organizational forms can be thought of as social

movement frames that must resonate with movement participants and potential

activists in order to be accepted. This is likely to entail something of a cultural or cognitive stretch ± for both activists and authorities ± since not all organizational models are considered fitting for all social actors. As she notes, there arè logics of appropriateness that specify who should use what form for what purpose''

(Clemens, 1997, p. 49; emphasis in original). To the extent that unfamiliar

movement actors can deploy familiar organizational forms they increase not

only their chances of success but, also, ``through such oblique approaches, the

roster of recognized political claimants and claims expands, transforming the

relation of state and society'' (Clemens, 1997, p. 12).

Using late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century activism by women, farm-

ers, and workers as her cases, Clemens demonstrates that their ability to adapt

Social Movement Politics and Organization

289

existing non-political organizations ± clubs, unions, corporations ± for political purposes provided them with legitimacy and access to authorities. In the case of women, this was especially significant, since at the time they were not politically enfranchised. Clemens takes the argument one step further by demonstrating

that, as these social groups gained a credible voice in the political arena because of their successful organizational innovations, they fundamentally transformed

the institutional structure and promoted the rise of interest group politics in the USA ± a critical step toward the development of à`social movement society'' a

half century later.

Social Movement Organizations and Politics

If social movements are now as organized and institutionalized as these argu-

ments suggest, the obvious question is: what are the implications for ``conten-

tious politics'' (McAdam et al., 1996b)? This brings us back to the orienting

theme of this chapter: the juxtaposition between spontaneity and organization.

Piven and Cloward (1992) have been the most vocal opponents of resource

mobilization's emphasis on the organized dimensions of social movements,

arguing (on both normative and descriptive grounds) that it not only provides

a recipe for the cooptation of dissent since formal organizations are essentially conservative, but also marginalizes the efforts of those groups unable (or unwilling) to establish formal organizations to press their claims. Nonetheless, the fact remains that contemporary protest movements are, in a number of ways,

dependent on a formal and professionalized organizational infrastructure. In

this section I argue for a renewed emphasis on movement organization by high-

lighting some of the direct and indirect ways in which formal movement organ-

izations remain central to protest politics.

As a first point, social movement organizations are essential for the initiation and diffusion of protest. Tarrow (1994) has argued that competition among

social movement organizations accelerates the spread of protest cycles. In the

beginning of a protest cycle, successful collective action by `èarly risers''

broadcasts to other movement groups that certain forms of collective action

are viable and that the risks of repression are not prohibitive. At the peak of

the protest wave, competition for members and supporters leads social move-

ment organizations to escalate protest. New organizations emerge and con-

ventional interest groups become active. The creation of new SMOs increases

interorganizational competition as groups try to outdo each other by adopt-

ing radical forms of action to gain public support and attention. This ``compe-

titive spiral'' is the dynamic behind the protest wave, encouraging tactical

innovation.

Although Tarrow theorizes the importance of movement organizations as

vehicles for protest, his emphasis is on the information provided by successful

collective action and how this drives the development of protest cycles. In

analyzing the relationship between the civil rights movement and the feminist

movement, I show that increases in the number of civil rights organizations, not 290

Debra C. Minkoff

civil rights protest events, promote feminist collective action (Minkoff, 1997a).

In fact, it appears that protest by initiator movements is likely to increase

activism by other groups only when political allies are in positions of power.

These findings suggest that organizational expansion is critical in creating protest opportunities for other challengers. Organizational effects operate both

directly and indirectly: activists cross movement boundaries, taking organizing

templates with them; resource-sharing and information-sharing transmit advant-

ages to new movements and their organizations; and processes of legitimacy-

building by initiator movements establish a resource base that becomes available to a wider set of challenging groups.

European social movements researchers are also beginning to analyze the

relationship between protest and organization, although this research remains

fairly descriptive and is limited to detailing the kinds of organizations that

sponsor protest events and how this changes over time (Kriesi et al., 1995;

Rucht, 1998). Rucht (1998), for example, documents a notable shift in organ-

izational sponsorship of protest events in Germany since 1950 (including East

German protests since 1989): whereas most demonstrations were organized by

large formal pressure groups in the 1950s and 1960s, after 1970 informal groups

and networks, along with political parties, also became key sponsors. Formal

pressure groups are still the dominant sponsors (they organized 46 percent of

protests in 1990±2), but not exclusively so. Importantly, the volume of mass

protest also increased over this period, despite occasional declines. This is

particularly the case with ``demonstrative'' events (demonstrations, marches,

rallies, and strikes), but there is also some indication of a recent rise in violent protests (consisting of property damage, physical aggression, and personal injuries). One conclusion Rucht draws is that although many protest groups have

become more professionalized and institutionalized, the result has not been à`deradicalization of protest'' (Rucht, 1998, p. 52).

Organizations, particularly formal ones, also promote the stability and con-

tinuity of social movements. Staggenborg's (1988) analysis of the consequences

of professional leadership and formal structure in the pro-choice movement

demonstrates that formally structured and professional movement organizations

help to maintain the movement under restrictive political conditions when

mobilization is difficult. They are also more effective than informal groups at

organizational maintenance because they can rely on paid staff to manage

routine organizational activities and because the existence of a formal structure ensures continuity despite changes in leadership and external conditions. Staggenborg also makes the point that, although formalization is correlated with the institutionalization of movement tactics (lobbying over protest, for example),

there is no evidence that goals necessarily become less radical or that organizations necessarily become more conservative in their use of tactics. At the same

time, her comparative analysis suggests that ``nonprofessional leaders and informal SMOs remain important in initiating movements and tactics that are critical

to the growth of insurgency'' (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 603). A diversity of organ-