The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (22 page)

Boyce did a speech at RUSI [Royal United Services Institute] yesterday, which was going pretty big today, where he basically said that the US were in a different position, that we had to choose between being part of a stabilisation force, and taking part in the wider war on terrorism. I raised it with TB, who just shrugged his shoulders and rolled his eyes as if to say ‘not much we can do about it’. Later I raised it with CDS. I said it was good to see that we cleared the speech, an ironic reference to the fact the
Telegraph
reported that we had done so. ‘Did I?’ he asked. And I said ‘No, you didn’t.’ ‘Should I have done?’ ‘Well it is the normal practice that we see speeches likely to make news, which a speech by the Chief of the Defence Staff at a time like this might well do.’ I couldn’t tell whether he was
irritated, worried or indifferent. He wasn’t the easiest guy to work with, but he probably felt the same about us. TB raised the speech with GH who said he had tried to tone it down but the MoD was so leaky there was a limit to what he could do without it becoming an issue.

Then Colin Powell gave us a problem. In Paris, he did a doorstep saying he was pleased that the UK had volunteered to lead a security force. Given that Tom Kelly had been pushing the line that no decision had been taken and discussions were still going on, which all sent Adam Boulton [Sky political editor] into an absolute bilious frenzy in which he said it was extraordinary that the British public learnt of this kind of thing from a US politician and that Powell was coming for a ‘bizarre event’ to remember September 11. I sometimes wondered if Adam didn’t let a lot of his own anger about whatever come through on issues like this. I got him in after his report in the street, and said it was outrageous that he editorialised like that. He held his ground and after a pretty robust exchange, went off in a huff.

Powell arrived and as they came in [William] Farish asked Straw to tell me that Powell didn’t want press people in the meeting. We were called in at the end to make sure lines were in the same place before the press conference. TB was on pretty good form, bounced away the CDS stuff and put over a general message well. I felt that our event to commemorate September 11 struck the right note, dignified and respectful, not over the top. The US school band I thought was better than the New York trumpeter and I thought GWB’s people made a mistake in having him in front of an Israeli flag. Not many would notice that it was an alphabetic point, as the flag was between the Irish and the Italian, but I suspected it would give them problems. I did a local Labour Party meeting, and got a fair amount of grief, particularly on faith schools.

The Yanks were still dithering on the OBL tapes, saying they were worried about quality, about translations, worried about the impact on relatives of victims at seeing him gloat. We had already got third parties lined up on reaction, but I was beginning to wonder whether they would ever see the light of day. We were also still in the same position on troops and the security force. TB was going through the terrorism bill in detail and said there were some real holes in it and it needed a lot of work. I took him over to the CIC, which was a real boost for them all. There was still a real impact on people when he
walked into a room just to say hello, even if he did slightly give the impression of not having a clue what they did. We thought IDS would do war, sleaze and public services at PMQs. He did health and transport but the nervous cough was getting really bad, and he just lacked impact, even if he made a strong point. TB said afterwards he would be amazed if he survived the term. I ran into GB at Number 11 who was having one of his receptions. There were lots of other people around so he did one of his big, friendly ‘How you doing?’ greetings. I found it odd that he could paint it on like that, whereas if there had been nobody else there, it would have been the usual growl or heavy discussion, depending on mood.

[Bill] Clinton was over making a speech and was up in the flat with TB. He was losing his voice so we sent out for some medicine and I chatted to him and Chelsea Clinton in the kitchen while TB got changed. He was clearly a bit worried re Bush, not convinced he was doing the right things, but even with us, he was pretty discreet. He had time to kill and TB had work to do. I took him for a little wander round the building to see some of the people these big cheeses wouldn’t normally see, like the switchboard and the messengers, and of course he was brilliant with them. The War Cabinet was gathering outside the Cabinet Room and Dearlove and Scarlett were clearly pleased to see him. I took him round to see the press office and the Grid team and he made a total beeline for Harriet Quinlan [Strategic Communications Unit]. As I took him out, he said ‘Gee, you got some great women.’ Later Doug Band [Clinton aide] called in a bit of state because Bill had referred to ‘Prime Minister Brown’ in his speech on AIDS at the QE2 [Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre in Westminster]. I assured him TB wouldn’t mind.

I got back for the War Cabinet. There was discussion about whether OBL was now in Pakistan, but it was clear nobody on our side really knew. Our bottom lines were that any operation had to be under CENTCOM, the US had to provide lift and extraction if necessary, but it was already becoming clear that the French didn’t want to be formally under CENTCOM. The Germans didn’t want to be under CENTCOM for different reasons, namely it would suggest we were going to fight rather than keep peace. TB later met Jospin when we arrived in Laeken [European Council summit in Belgium], and he was very clear that the French couldn’t operate like this. TB was clear that if there were no French or German forces, that politically and presentationally it was difficult. He felt we might have to call their bluff, say we would go ahead without them.

Cabinet was pretty short, John Reid on Sinn Fein offices in the Commons, DB on the fallout from the Sarah Payne case,
³⁸
TB briefing them on the war situation, then a political Cabinet. TB did his usual script, at some length. Maintaining economic strength and stability, investment and reform, what type of society we want to live in, international strength, pro-European, strong on defence. In all of them, emphasising we had broken free from traditional positions, we can manage the economy but also attack poverty. We can invest in public services but also do difficult reform. Strong on people’s rights but demanding responsibility. Tough on defence but proud of helping others in the world. All this matters for giving the party a sense of what we believe in, confidence in what we are for. He felt the Tories were in real trouble, and that the Lib Dems were becoming ridiculous, saying to anyone what they wanted to hear.

JP was basically defending himself on delivery, speaking almost exclusively about transport. GB said we were doing some difficult things and we had to get the party behind us on them. The press and Opposition were trying to demoralise people, make them think what we call progress was all spin. Jack was worried about cynicism, declining faith in politics. DB made a similar point, said the Tories were deliberately trying to erode confidence in politics. He said the papers were constantly trying to set us at each other, but in fact this was the most unified Cabinet ever in political terms. Tessa talked about a generation becoming disengaged. Alan felt the right wing were still better in some ways at conducting ideological battle. He felt we had been overly cautious about the country’s desire for change and fairness. On public services, we have to be careful we don’t revert to old-style command and control, that we have confidence in our own programme for change. And he argued strongly for under-promising and over-delivering. Darling was worried about the Libs. He said we all know they are wankers but out there it is not considered a bad thing to vote for them. Estelle echoed something Alan said, said we still have a language of caution when people are desperate for us to be more radical. Clare said this was a good government. She thought the Labour bit was good but the New bit wasn’t. She felt the policies were good but the presentation was useless. She said everywhere she went she was getting this stuff
about Tony and Gordon, that it was stupid and dangerous and it had to stop, that we had to pull together politically. Charles spoke well, particularly on the need for more debate within the party, better relations with the media, and with academia. We need to get more out of the Civil Service.

TB said it was important to understand why the media was like it was. A lot of them believe we are omnipotent, that the Opposition is useless, that they have to do the job for them. They don’t conduct a policy debate, drowning out the policy debate through scandal and controversy. It makes it hard to get definition. They deliberately breed cynicism. But New Labour, a modernised centre-left party, is strong enough to defeat that. Centre-left parties lose when they move out of touch from where people are on the basic economic and social issues. If we remain rooted in the instincts of people, we can defeat cynicism. It is not the left that is in retreat. He said we could be confident that we were in the right position, that the Tories had not yet learnt how to adapt, and that the Lib Dems, driven by opportunism, were storing up real problems for themselves in the future. Sally had worked on people, even on Alan and Charles, to be nice about GB. But, as TB said, ‘Was he gracious? Was he hell.’ Eventually, by 4pm our time, the OBL video was being played out and we got a good hit on it and had the third parties really going for it. We were into ping pong on the counter-terrorism measures [Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, which would receive Royal Assent the next day], dropped the religious hatred bit but finally got it through.

On the plane [to Laeken], TB, Jack and I carried on the discussion about cynicism in the media. I felt that unless the press bought into the idea that they have at least some responsibility, it was not going to be easy. The conference call was largely how to take forward the material in the video. Tucker [Eskew] had the idea of making a direct appeal to al-Qaeda people to realise they were working for someone who mocked their suicides. I watched [Sir] Ronnie Flanagan [Northern Ireland chief constable] on
Newsnight
when he was given a really hard time [Flanagan had been accused of ‘flawed judgement’ over the Omagh bomb inquiry], a really unpleasant interview. I felt so strongly about it that I wrote to him, said I thought he had handled it incredibly well and that the public would have ended up respecting him far more than the interviewer.

The OBL video was a massive hit, though there were still doubts being spread in the Arab world about its veracity. We were now
co-ordinating third-party responses from around the world to show that opinion was changing. CDS was chairing a contribution conference in London but the problem was the French and the Germans not wanting to be under CENTCOM command, the French because they are French, the Germans because their parliament would only support peacekeeping forces. It was tricky, because our red line was CENTCOM in charge because it meant they would have to stay involved and make sure our troops were got out if things got really tricky. In fact it was clear from the overnight telegram from Washington that the Americans didn’t mind as much as we did. After TB spoke to Chirac, who was adamant that the French could not be under CENTCOM, David M and Co. negotiated with the French and then TB personally negotiated a text, which they felt was OK, namely saying the UK would be in charge but working with CENTCOM. DM then spent much of the afternoon speaking to people in the MoD, eventually including GH, to emphasise it was what the prime minister wanted. He was getting quite stressed up and angry about it. I was even beginning to wonder whether CDS was looking for a reason to quit. Even though TB was very careful with him, and always polite, he probably knew the relationship was not as strong as with Guthrie, and he probably didn’t much like us either.

TB and Chirac spoke again and TB said, to laughter at the other end, that he was having trouble with his military. Chirac was in good form, and was retelling the story about when a microphone picked him up saying he loved Scotland but the haggis looked like shit and tasted worse. There was a lot of talk about who we would get to chair the [Future of] Europe convention, Giscard [former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing] or [Wim] Kok. TB was planning not to waste too much capital on it. Kok would be an obvious choice for us, but TB wondered whether Giscard might not be better because he was from a big country, and though he liked Kok, he would be more minded to put the interests of the small countries first.

The discussion in the morning was Afghanistan, and at the lunch the ludicrous Louis Michel briefed the historic decision that there was to be an EU army of 3,000–4,000 people in fifteen different countries, massive development, blah blah blah, what a lot of nonsense. I was at lunch with Peter Hain [Europe minister] who was about to do
The World at One
so I briefed him to go very hard for it, as did Jack at the press conference. However, Jack had also had a private chat with Hugo Young and said we would go into the euro by 2003. They turned it into a splash, so we had GB on the rampage again. TB came out
for a chat at one point. He said he thought GB’s problems were deep and it was a shame because he was brilliant in many ways but in the end maybe he didn’t have the breadth. So perhaps he was a great Chancellor and that was that.

I left TB etc. to meet up with the family at Neil and Glenys’ [the Kinnocks] in Brussels. Neil had a real downer on most of the Cabinet, including GB. He also felt Charles was overdoing the ‘openness and honesty’ bit, because it was being done at the expense of others. They were both reasonably OK re TB, but very down on Hoon, Clare, Milburn. Neil was on his best form for ages though. But he felt GB was in danger of blowing it and that Balls was a bad influence on him. Ronnie Flanagan called me while we were having dinner and said that my letter to him ‘meant more to me than you’ll ever know. That someone like you could be bothered to say that with all the other things you have to deal with.’ He sounded very emotional, and was clearly feeling a lot of the pressure, but I thought he was basically a very decent bloke.