Read The Campaigns of Alexander (Classics) Online
Authors: Arrian
After Gaugamela the pattern of warfare changed. In Bactria and Sogdiana Alexander found himself faced with a national resistance which, under the leadership of Bessus and then of Spitamenes, wisely avoided major conflicts and concentrated on widespread guerrilla activity. It was probably to cope with this altered mode of fighting that in 329 Alexander made an important change in the organization of his Companion cavalry. We no longer hear of eight
squadrons
(
Ilai
), but of (at least) eight
regiments
(
Hipparchiai
), each consisting of two, or perhaps more, squadrons. Some of these squadrons, it seems likely, now included or consisted of the excellent Persian cavalry.
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Certainly Alexander made use of Persian cavalry outside the Companions. As early as 330 we hear of a unit of Persian mounted javelin-men (3.24), and at the battle of the River Hydaspes in 326 he had in his army a body of Daae, mounted archers, as well as horsemen from Bactria, Sogdiana, Scythia, Arachotia, and the Parapamisus, or Hindu Kush, region.
At Massaga in India Alexander is said to have attempted to enlist Indian mercenaries in his army, but when they attempted to desert to have massacred them. No further recruitment of Indian mercenaries is recorded, and the only Indian troops that we hear of in his army are those provided by the rajahs Taxiles and Porus and the city of Nysa, some 11,000 in all. However, if Nearchus is correct in saying (
Indica
19.5) that at the start of the voyage down the River Hydaspes Alexander had 120,000 fighting men
with him (a figure given by Curtius (8.5.4) for the army at the start of the Indian campaign and by Plutarch (Alexander 66.4) for the (Infantry) force with which Alexander left India), Alexander must have had a great many Indian troops in his army. But their presence was only temporary, since there is no indication that any Indians returned to the west with him.
Among the grievances of the Macedonians in 324 Arrian (7.6.4) mentions the (recent) creation of a fifth cavalry regiment consisting, if we accept Professor Badian’s emendation of Arrian’s text,
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almost entirely of Iranians. This means that the division of the Companion cavalry into eight regiments had been abandoned and that for a brief period after the return from India there were only four. It is sometimes said that the change reflects the losses sustained in the march through the Gedrosian desert. This need not be the case. Hephaestion’s command is described (7.14.10) as a ‘Chiliarchy’, a group of 1,000 men, and, although it is true that he was ‘Chiliarch’ or ‘Vizier’, it is not self-evident that the preservation of his
name
required that his unit be called ‘the chiliarchy of Hephaestion’ rather than ‘the regiment of Hephaestion’. It is probable, it seems to me, that the new regiments were (nominally) 1,000 strong. If this is so, the change will have been a change in organization, a consolidation of the cavalry into fewer and stronger units.
In 324 the 30,000 young Persians (the ‘Successors’), who had been undergoing training in Macedonian fashion for the last three years, joined Alexander at Susa. Later in the same year, after the mutiny at Opis, Alexander sent home those Macedonians who were unfit or past the age for service, about 10,000 infantry and perhaps 1,500 cavalry, probably the bulk of his Macedonian forces. In
323 strong reinforcements reached Babylon. Philoxenus brought an army from Caria and Menander one from Lycia, while Menidas came with the cavalry under his command. It is likely that, as Brunt suggests,
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these were fresh drafts from Macedon to replace the veterans now on their way home; Alexander had not drawn on the manpower of the homeland since 331 and it is not likely that he wished the Macedonian element in his army to be reduced to negligible proportions. In addition, Peucestas brought 20,000 Persian archers and slingers, as well as a considerable force of Cossaean and Tapurian troops, presumably infantry. Alexander now carried out his last reform. The Persians were integrated into Macedonian units in such a way that each platoon consisted of 4 Macedonian NCOs and 12 Persians, each armed in their national fashion.
For the future, then, or at least for the immediate future, the army in Asia was to consist predominantly of Iranian troops. The only indication of the size of the Macedonian component is given in a speech in Quintus Curtius purporting to have been delivered by Alexander but certainly the historian’s own composition. There (10.2.8) the king mentions an army of 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, surely all Macedonians, excluding the garrisons already in being.
W
HEREVER
Ptolemy and Aristobulus in their histories of Alexander, the son of Philip, have given the same account, I have followed it on the assumption of its accuracy; where their facts differ I have chosen what I feel to be the more probable and interesting.
1
There are other accounts of Alexander’s life – more of them, indeed, and more mutually conflicting than of any other historical character; it seems to me, however, that Ptolemy and Aristobulus are the most trustworthy writers on this subject, because the latter shared Alexander’s campaigns, and the former – Ptolemy – in addition to this advantage, was himself a King, and it is more disgraceful for a King to tell lies than for anyone else. Moreover, Alexander was dead when these men wrote; so there was no sort of pressure upon either of them, and they could not profit from falsification of the facts. Certain statements by other writers upon Alexander may be taken to represent popular tradition: some of these, which are interesting in themselves and may well be true, I have included in my work.
If anyone should wonder why I should have wished to write this history when so many other men have done the same, I would ask him to reserve judgement until he has first read my predecessors’ work and then become acquainted with my own.
Philip of Macedon died when Pythiodelus was archon at Athens.
2
He was succeeded by his son Alexander, then
about twenty years of age.
3
The story goes that Alexander, upon his succession to the throne, went into the Peloponnese, where he assembled all the Greeks in that part of the country and asked them for the command of the campaign against Persia, which they had previously granted to Philip. The only people to refuse his request were the Lacedaemonians, who declared that the tradition of their country forbade them to serve under a foreign commander; it was their prerogative to lead others. At Athens, too, there was a certain amount of trouble; but resistance collapsed the moment Alexander approached, and he was granted even greater honours than his father Philip before him.
4
This settled, he returned to Macedonia and prepared for his Asian campaign.
The following spring he marched towards Thrace, having learned that the Triballi and Illyrians were up to
mischief.
5
The territories of these two peoples bordered upon Macedonia, and since his expedition would take him so far from home he did not think it wise to leave them in his rear, unless they were first thoroughly crushed. Starting from Amphipolis he entered the territory of what are known as the free Thracians, leaving Philippi and Mount Orbelus on his left; then, crossing the Nestus, he reached Mount Haemus, according to all accounts in ten days. Here, where the lower slopes of the mountain rise through a narrow defile, he was met by a large force of natives
6
under arms and the free Thracians, who had occupied the high ground which he would have to pass, with every intention of stopping his advance. They had collected a number of carts, which they intended to use, if they were hard pressed, as a sort of defensive palisade, with the further idea of sending them crashing down upon the Macedonian phalanx as the men were climbing the steepest part of the slope; their hope was that the impact of the vehicles would cause damage to the enemy troops in proportion to the closeness of their order.
Alexander had now to consider how to cross the ridge with least loss, for cross it he must, as there was no way round. His orders were that those sections of the heavy infantry which had room enough were to break formation when the carts came tearing down the slope, and so let them through; any sections, on the other hand, which were caught in the narrow pass were to form in the closest possible order, such men as were able lying prone on the ground with shields locked together above their bodies, so as to give the heavy wagons, as they careered down the
hill, a chance to bounce over the top of them without doing any harm. Alexander accordingly gave his orders, and the result was what he expected: those who had room left a space between their ranks, and as for the rest, the carts passed harmlessly over their locked shields. There were no casualties. The wagons had been the most serious cause of apprehension; so, when they proved ineffectual, the Macedonian troops plucked up their courage, raised a cheer, and charged. Alexander brought his archers across from the right wing to a more convenient position in front of the main body of his troops, and instructed them to meet with a volley any attack the Thracians might make; he himself took charge of his personal Guard and the other Guards’ regiments together with the Agrianes, and moved across to the left. Then the archers checked the Thracian attacks, and the infantry battalions, moving up to close quarters, had no difficulty in dislodging the inadequately armed and equipped enemy. Indeed, even before the troops under Alexander on the left wing came into contact with them, they flung down their arms and fled in a
sauve-qui-peut
down the mountain side. Some 1,500 were killed, but only a few captured; for most of them were too quick, and knew the country too well, to fall into their enemies’ hands. The women, however, who had followed the fighting men were all taken, together with the children and all the gear and stores.
The booty was sent back to the coastal towns, with orders to Lysanias and Philotas
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to dispose of it, and Alexander crossed the ridge. He then proceeded across the Haemus range to the Triballians, and arrived at the river Lyginus, three days’ march, on this route, from the Danube. His movements had been known for some time
to Syrmus, the King of the Triballians, who had taken steps accordingly, sending the women and children on to the Danube with orders to cross over to an island in the river called the Pine Tree. The neighbouring Thracians had also taken refuge on this island upon Alexander’s approach, together with Syrmus himself and his personal entourage, though the majority of the Triballians hurriedly retreated to the river from which Alexander had started the previous day.
The moment the news of the Triballians’ move reached him, Alexander set off to engage them. He turned in his tracks, retraced his steps, and found them already occupied in pitching camp. The tribesmen, caught napping, prepared to fight in the shelter of the wood by the river, and Alexander, forming his infantry in column, advanced against them, with orders to the archers and slingers to proceed in front at the double and discharge their missiles, in the hope of drawing the enemy from the shelter of the wood into open ground. The tribesmen, once they felt the effect of the missiles, came surging forward to get to grips with the lightly armed Macedonian archers, whereupon Alexander, having succeeded in drawing them out of cover, ordered Philotas to attack their right wing, which was well ahead of the rest of them, with the cavalry from upper Macedonia. At the same time he instructed Heracleides and Sopolis to advance against the enemies’ left with the cavalry from Bottiaea and Amphipolis. The main body of infantry, preceded by the rest of his cavalry, he led against the enemy centre.
The Triballians held their own while the fighting was at long range; but once they had felt the weight and drive of the Macedonian infantry in close order, and the cavalry, instead of shooting at them, had begun actually to ride them down in a fierce assault all over the field, they broke
and ran, in an endeavour to make their escape through the wood to the river. Three thousand were killed. Only a few of these too were taken alive, because the wood along the river-bank was very thick, and there was not enough daylight left for the Macedonians to finish the job properly. According to Ptolemy, the Macedonian losses were eleven men from the cavalry and about forty from the infantry.
Three days after the battle Alexander reached the Danube. This river is the largest in Europe; it drains a greater tract of country than any other, and forms the frontier to the territories of some very warlike tribes. Most of them are of Celtic stock – indeed, the source of the river is in Celtic territory – the most remote being the Quadi and the Marcomanni; then, flowing east, it passes through the country of the Iazyges, a branch of the Sauromatae, of the Getae (‘the immortals’), of the Sauromatae themselves, and finally of the Scythians, where it reaches the end of its course and debouches through five mouths into the Black Sea.
8
On the river Alexander found warships awaiting him: they had come up across the Black Sea from Byzantium.
9
He manned them with heavy infantry and archers, and, sailing for the island to which the Triballians and Thracians had fled for refuge, attempted
to force a landing. Circumstances, however, were against him: the ships met with resistance at every point where they tried to run ashore; they were few in number and not strongly manned; in most places the island shore was too steep for a landing, and the current, sweeping past it through the narrows, was strong and very awkward to deal with. Alexander accordingly withdrew the ships, and determined instead to cross the river and attack the Getae who lived on the further side. A large force of them – some 4,000 cavalry and more than 10,000 on foot – was already assembled on the river-bank, evidently prepared to resist a crossing, and the sight of them was one reason for his change of plan. Another was the fact that the idea of landing on the further side of the Danube suddenly seemed attractive.
10
He joined the fleet in person, having left instructions for the tents under which the men bivouacked to be filled with hay, and for all available dug-outs to be collected. There were a great many of these boats in the neighbourhood, for they are used by the natives for fishing, and for visiting neighbouring tribes up the river, and – fairly generally – for plundering expeditions. As many as possible of them were collected, and the troops, or as large a part of them as was practicable with this sort of transport, were ferried across. Actually, the number which crossed with Alexander was about 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantrymen.
The crossing took place at night, and the landing on the river-bank was more or less concealed by a tract of land
in which the grain stood high. Just before dawn Alexander moved forward through the grain-field, having given orders that the infantrymen should lead the way to the open ground, clear of crops, beyond, carrying their spears parallel with the ground and obliquely to their line of march, to flatten the grain as they advanced. The mounted troops followed the infantry through the cornfield, but once they were out in clear ground Alexander took charge of them and led them over to the right wing, at the same time ordering Nicanor to proceed with the infantry in close formation on an extended front.
The very first cavalry charge was too much for the Getae; the crossing of the Danube, greatest of rivers, so easily accomplished by Alexander in a single night, without even a bridge, was an act of daring which had shaken them profoundly; and added to this there was the violence of the attack itself, and the fearful sight of the phalanx advancing upon them in a solid mass. They turned and fled to their town, which was about four miles from the river; but as soon as they saw that Alexander, with his mounted troops ahead, was pressing on along the river-bank to avoid ambush or encirclement, they abandoned the town, which had few defences, and, taking with them as many women and children as their horses could carry, continued their flight into uninhabited country, as far from the river as they could go. Alexander took the town, together with anything of value which the Getae had left behind. This material was removed to the base by Meleager and Philip, after which the town was razed to the ground, and Alexander offered sacrifice on the banks of the Danube to Zeus the Saviour and Heracles,
11
not omitting the River himself, for allowing the passage.
The same day he led his whole force back to camp, safe and sound.
At this point Alexander was visited by envoys from Syrmus, the King of the Triballians, and from the various other independent tribes along the Danube. The Celts from the Adriatic Sea also sent representatives – men of haughty demeanour and tall in proportion. Al professed a desire for Alexander’s friendship, and mutual pledges were given and received. Alexander asked the Celtic envoys what they were most afraid of in this world, hoping that the power of his own name had got as far as their country, or even further, and that they would answer, ‘You, my lord.’ However, he was disappointed; for the Celts, who lived a long way off in country not easy to penetrate, and could see that Alexander’s expedition was directed elsewhere, replied that their worst fear was that the sky might fall on their heads. None the less, he concluded an alliance of friendship with them and sent them home, merely remarking under his breath that the Celts thought too much of themselves.
12
He then made for the territory of the Agrianes and Paeones, where a message reached him that Cleitus, the son of Bardylis, was in revolt, and had been joined by Glaucias, the prince of the Taulantians, and further, that the Autariates intended to attack him on the march.
13
For these reasons Alexander thought fit to get on the move without delay.
Langaros, King of the Agrianes, who had made no
secret of his respect for Alexander even in Philip’s lifetime, had already been on an embassy to him in person, and on the present occasion attended him with his bodyguard, the finest and best-equipped troops he possessed. Hearing that Alexander wanted to know who the Autariates were and what their strength was, he advised him to think no more about them, as they were the least warlike tribe in that part of the country. He offered to keep them occupied by invading their territory himself, and, with Alexander’s consent, actually did so, causing severe losses. For these services Langaros received from Alexander every mark of honour, including such presents as are considered in the Macedonian court to be of the highest value. Alexander also promised that if Langaros visited him at Pella, he would give him his sister Cyna in marriage.
14
Langaros, however, after his return home, fell ill and died.
Alexander now proceeded along the river Erigon on his way to Pelium, a town which had been occupied by Cleitus as the most defensible in the district.
15
Arriving there, he halted by the river Eordaicus with the intention of making his assault the following day. The town was ringed with commanding heights, thickly wooded, which were held by Cleitus’ troops, who were thus enabled, in the event of an assault, to attack the Macedonian forces from every side. Glaucias, the King of the Taulantians, had not yet come upon the scene. Alexander, however, lost no time, and the enemy, on his approach to the town,
having sacrificed three boys, three girls, and three black rams, made a movement as if with the intention of engaging the Macedonians at close quarters; but no sooner had the latter come within striking distance than they abandoned their defensive positions, strong though they were. The bodies of the victims they had sacrificed were found still lying where they fell.