The Chameleon Conspiracy (14 page)

“So you are getting de-emphasized,” I said succinctly.

“Probably,” said Benny with a sigh. “But I’m not the issue
here. It’s the importance of Tevel that’s being questioned.” By
Tevel
Benny was referring to the Mossad’s former name for the now-renamed foreign-relations wing, responsible for liaison with
foreign services among other clandestine activities.

“Is he breaking it up?” I found that hard to believe, given the wing’s tremendous achievements, even though most of them were
unknown to the public. Dagan was thought to scorn introspection, but encourage originality.

Benny shook his head. “No, but he made structural changes. The bud get’s been reduced and the resources for the research division
and Tevel have been limited. Now we’re divided into two ‘directorates,’ as he’s calling them. The ‘operational’ one is responsible
for all operational wings, divisions, departments, and units, such as Tsomet, Neviot, Tevel, Kesaria, Intelligence, and technological
units. The other one is the ‘general staff/headquarters,’ which runs everything else—strategic planning, human resources,
internal security, logistics, communications, computers, counterintelligence, and so forth.”

I remembered that Kesaria, after the old Roman city known in English as Caesarea, was in charge of operations and included
an assassinations unit.
Kidon
was Hebrew for bayonet. Kesaria handles the “combatants,” a euphemism for Israeli spies, Mossad employees who assume different
identities to penetrate hostile Arab countries. Tsomet, from the Hebrew word for
junction
, was the main intelligence-gathering division, engaging “case officers”—KATSA, in its Hebrew acronym. It also controlled
and handled non-Israeli agents on the Mossad payroll as “independent contractors.” Neviot’s agents infiltrated buildings and
communication centers to install video and other digital listening and monitoring devices.

“Neviot,” I said absentmindedly.

Benny brought me back from my silent reminiscing. “It needs a shake-up too, I suppose,” he said. “You remember what happened
in ninety-eight.”

“Remind me.”

“I can’t believe you don’t remember. On February 19, an agent from Neviot was caught in Switzerland trying to install
surveillance equipment in an apartment building. It was in Bern, a building that contained the home office of a Hezbollah
supporter. Anyway, the operation was botched when the neighbors got suspicious—strangers carrying suitcases into the building,
et cetera. Some of our men got away, but one was caught and tried. Israel had to apologize. It was a complete humiliation,
but if that wasn’t bad enough, nine months later there was another fiasco. Two agents were caught spying on a military base
in Cyprus where Russian-made S-300 missiles were to be deployed. The Cyprus government accused Israel of spying for the Turks,
their archenemies, since the missiles were deployed aiming at Turkey. The Cypriots accused the Turks of spying on their defense
plan. The Turks, according to the Cyprus government, wanted to know how Cyprus would defend itself in case the Turks decided
to resolve the Cyprus problems between the local Turks and Greeks by walking onto the scene with their tanks and artillery.”

“Yeah, I read about it in the paper. I was long out of the Mossad. But that’s ancient history. What does it have to do with
what you’re talking about now?”

“He wants to avoid debacles like that. That means changing things around—and that’s where it hurts.”

“Does anything personally impact you?”

“It affects everybody. But it’s all under the surface, because no one knows what’s going to happen. There’s an atmosphere
of suspicion—who’ll be promoted and who’ll be passed over, whose department will be downsized. That’s unhealthy in any organization,
and particularly for us. Complete confidence and trust among the employees are an absolute must, because human lives are at
stake. For us, internal rifts could be devastating.”

“What’s happened so far?”

“Several heads of divisions and units, and at least as many department heads resigned, and many line personnel.”

“And you oppose it?”

“I think it’s OK to make the changes and make Mossad more operational. But cutting our bud get or ignoring our activities
isn’t helping that goal.”

“I hope you’re not planning to resign as well,” I said. I knew Mossad was Benny’s heart and soul.

“I haven’t made any plans yet, but…I heard Dagan was saying that our unit doing political research is redundant. He
thinks through the narrow prism of operational needs, and concluded that our foreign-relations wing isn’t vital in supporting
operations, and the political-research unit’s role is secondary at best. He wants to downgrade us to a division and limit
our intelligence-gathering activities.”

“I’m sure he knows about your reputation and the benefits you bring from your close relationship with other intelligence organizations.
Anyway, he must have his reasons.”

“I hope so,” said Benny. “You have to hope reality and good sense will prevail.” A glimmer of his usual optimism was returning.
“All he has to do is to go to the next prime-ministerial meeting on Israel’s national security, and have to listen to Aman’s
military intelligence without having his own estimate, based on his own intelligence gathering. He’ll be tacitly yielding
to Aman seniority.” Benny smiled. “In these meetings, Mossad, Aman, and SHABACH, the internal security service, present their
opinions. Believe me, after the first session as a passive listener, he’ll change his mind. There are no shortcuts here.”

“To be the devil’s advocate,” I said, “even given the fact that your wing is the very best in what you’re doing, what’s wrong
with increasing operational capabilities?”

“Dan, the intelligence-gathering world from human sources isn’t limited to James Bond–like operations. You know that as well
as I do. There is all the tedious work of identifying sources and recruiting them, with or without their knowledge. True,
break-ins and eliminating rivals are vital elements of ‘operations,’ but only relatively small ones. We’re less interested
in Jordan and Egypt since the peace agreements. We’ve got enemies far from our borders, hosted by governments that ask no
questions. To confront all that, you really need carefully planned operations.”

“But Benny, don’t you think you’d be better off using local intelligence services? Let’s take for example friendly nations
like Thailand or India, which are engaged in a daily battle against terrorists surreptitiously using their territories. You
can send five case officers there, or even ten. They don’t speak the local languages and have no local authority. So not only
do they have to identify terrorists plotting against Israel, but at the same time they need to protect their backs from the
wrath of the local governments that don’t particularly like agents of foreign countries infringing on their sovereignty and
playing cops and robbers on their land. Wouldn’t it be simpler to cooperate with the domestic intelligence services and send
just one or two case officers for liaison, and to inspect and taste the fruit that they’re picking off their own trees and
offering us?”

“Dan, that’s my quibble with Dagan. The marketplace for terrorist-related intelligence is becoming crowded. Now we compete
for the same information with the big guys. Why do you think I looked to the U.S. to join forces in Giverny? In order to survive
in the newly created marketplace we need goods to trade with. Either we develop them independently or hook up with the bigger
folks to broaden our capabilities.”

Now the coin had dropped into the slot. I realized that there was another reason why Benny was seeking pointed cooperation
in combating terror financing between his wing at Mossad and the CIA. A successful cooperation could give Benny a winning
card in his efforts to keep his wing’s central role, not to mention his own job.

“Dan, we must continue to regard as important the gathering of intelligence from sources you can identify, verify, and communicate
with. That means operational capability. But maintaining our close contacts with foreign intelligence services is just as
important, because of the volume. No operation brings us as much as a good contact with a foreign intelligence service.

“But your foreign-liaison activities buy secondhand or recycled intelligence that’s always neutered to disguise its source.
Foreign services trade or sell you stuff without a ‘certificate of origin or authenticity.’ You don’t know the value
of it. Foreign intelligence services aren’t going to tell you how they obtained the information and from whom. It could be
sanitized to protect sources—or worse, it could be disinformation. Anyway, the traded information is not of operational nature,
but in the form of disseminated intelligence reports identified as such.

“That’s one of the reasons Dagan wants raw intelligence harvested by our agents, not purchased in the marketplace,” said Benny.
“Therefore, we treat the information we receive through barter accordingly. Most of the time we use it as a lead, and nothing
else. We never make a recommendation, or worse, plan an operation, based solely on that type of information. You know what
happens in the end. Such an operation will take twice the time, will cost twice than what your plan said it would and, in
the best-case scenario, will yield half of what we need. But,” he concluded with a sigh, “these are my troubles, not yours.
You said you wanted something?”

“Yes, your help with Iran. Can you run the name Bahman Hossein Rashtian and see what you can find in your database?”

“Is that all?” Benny knew me too well.

“Nope.”

“Is the next request off the record?”

“Off the record, for now.”

“Why?”

“I’m just checking things, and haven’t got clearance for the idea yet. I’m developing a conviction that to crack this case
we need to employ human intelligence, and I’ve got some ideas on that.”

“And you say that you haven’t asked the Agency about it yet?”

“Not yet, but I will very soon. They’ll never answer anything without a gazillion procedures. Anyway, you heard during our
conference a hint that they had lost their permanent station in Iran.”

“How will human intelligence in that particular case help?” asked Benny. “And where?”

“I had some talks with the NSA. Even with all their gadgets
and sophistication, their help is potentially limited. Remember what Alex, our Mossad Academy instructor, said about recruiting
human sources. ‘Basically there are three ways to recruit an “asset”—a human source. Do it when your source is outside your
target country, and you have a very limited selection to choose from, or you can travel to the lion’s den and pick your prey.
The third category are people who travel out for brief periods, to conferences, for example. They are often desirable targets.’
In our case, the people with access to the information we want don’t travel. We have to go to them. It’s the logical thing
to do. Computer surveillance and hacking are good, but nothing can substitute for personal presence.”

Benny didn’t answer at once. He just looked at me pensively, and said, “I think so too, hence my presentation at the conference.
I think you should be ready to answer questions regarding the intelligence rationale of doing it. Show a raw plan, the risks,
the probabilities, and the potential hunting field to recruit sources. Let’s say that we have our respective agencies’ consent
to go ahead. Then what? Even after careful planning and logistics, we must have a head start while we are still here.”

“Meaning?”

“Meaning that the first task will be to identify potential local sources before commencing with recruiting efforts. That takes
time. But sending an agent cold turkey to Iran without preparatory groundwork will not only take much more time, it’s significantly
riskier.”

“Granted,” I said. “So we’ve identified potential targets of recruitment. Now we need to move in. Debriefing exiled Iranians
in Europe is good, but your selection is limited, and you never know who you’re talking to and what the guy’s doing in Europe
to begin with. Could be dangerous. Maybe he’s after you to bilk you, or worse, to entrap you.”

“Dan, bear in mind that with the kind of Iranian police supervision on every citizen and certainly on visiting foreigners,
it’s going to be difficult to return in one piece, even if we succeed in the intelligence-gathering effort. Unless there’s
a
risk-free, maverick plan that will yield immediate results, I think we should concentrate on sources outside Iran.”

“I agree,” I said. “But doing nothing will get no results as well. I’m raising the issue so we can brainstorm the option and
start looking for potential direction and resources. That’s what I mean when I say penetration is unavoidable. Obviously,
we need to jump through many hoops to get initial approvals and then do substantial preparatory work.”

“Still, it’s a suicide mission,” said Benny. “If we’re pressed for time.”

I knew Benny wasn’t hyping things, but I thought of the half-full glass. “The fact that twenty years have passed could, in
an odd way, make it easier in some security aspects. The time passed makes it less risky.”

“Dan, these people suspect even their own shadows. I hear that the diet in the Iranian prisons isn’t something you would ask
for a second serving of, even if you’re very hungry. I don’t even mention the Iranian treatment of spies or the thickness
of the noose.”

“Benny, if you don’t want to go hunting, don’t complain if we eat the catch without even offering you a dry bone. It’s not
as if we’re gonna board a plane tomorrow or cross the border on a camel or a mule. If action is planned for next year, today
is the time to talk about it.”

“Dan, talk to me when you have something on your plate other than the urge to succeed.”

He had been tough, but not unreasonable, and he hadn’t dismissed my ideas out of hand.

I returned to the safe apartment. Nicole gave me that look reserved for a husband coming in late at night with a lipstick
stain on his collar. “Where have you been?”