Read The Coming Plague Online

Authors: Laurie Garrett

The Coming Plague (81 page)

BOOK: The Coming Plague
7.64Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads
Political will was in short supply. And biology was working against public health.
Ten percent of Southeast Asia was rain forest, involving sixteen ecologically distinct types of forests. Malaria in the region was
forest
malaria, which meant that standard mosquito control measures were ineffective. How could one spray DDT in a wet, humid, dense tropical jungle?
At least thirty major species of mosquitoes carried malaria in Asia, many of which fed on a range of other animals as well as humans. Among them, these mosquitoes had adapted to breed and feed in every possible Asian forest context: a bamboo stump filled with rainwater, an irrigation canal, jungle pools, puddles of muddy water left by the feet of marching soldiers, elephant footprints, wheel ruts, rice paddies, lagoons.
These sturdy insects spanned most elevations of southern Asia. And they fed on people at all sorts of times of day and night. Many were resistant to the key pesticides, and most were “wild mosquitoes,” meaning that they stayed away from open spaces and human habitations, preferring the safety of dense tropical foliage.
People who lived or worked in the forested areas were constantly bitten by mosquitoes. For centuries an ecological balance existed between the humans and the parasites, via the mosquitoes. A large percentage of the humans would die of the disease during infancy, but survivors, who were
“vaccinated” every day by mosquitoes that injected parasites into their blood, were immune, or, as Kent Campbell would put it, tolerant.
Efforts to eradicate malaria severely disrupted that balance. Temporarily successful mosquito control programs eliminated the daily “vaccinations,” and immunity immediately disappeared. Prophylactic use of antimalarials fended off disease, but also lowered immunity. In periodic times of drug scarcity, surges of malaria cases could be seen.
The female mosquitoes, which fed voraciously on a range of creatures (from reptiles to humans), absorbed all kinds of microbes from animal blood. Different strains of malarial parasites co-inhabited the insect's gut, and there was evidence of genetic exchange and shuffling occurring between the various microbes inside the mosquitoes.
Entomologists felt certain that the roughly thirty identified species of malaria-carrying mosquitoes represented only a small percentage of all the Asian forest insects that were capable of serving as vectors for the parasites. It was, however, extremely difficult to study and taxonomically identify insects in such densely forested ecologies.
“Malaria is an ecological disease,” wrote Indian scientist V. P. Sharma.
193
Human beings in these regions were highly mobile in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Warfare and civil strife, religious persecution, economic necessity, and natural disasters prompted tens of millions of families and individual laborers to migrate within countries and between nations. More than half a million Cambodians alone were refugees during the 1980s. The Indonesian government transplanted nearly seven million people in 1990 to colonize forested outer islands.
With this mass movement came great risk for malaria. Most of the migrating humans either came from nonmalarious regions and had no immunity or were moving between areas inhabited by distinctly different strains or species of parasites. When a concentration of such immune-naïve
Homo sapiens
settled alongside a forest area, the mosquito population swelled and malaria was soon rampant.
Warfare and civil strife, such as the Vietnam War or the long Khmer Rouge insurgency in Cambodia, not only produced mass human migrations but directly disrupted the ecology in ways that were advantageous to the mosquitoes. Rain-filled bomb craters, abandoned water-soaked military vehicles, and such leavings of war created ideal breeding sites for insects. As Asia's human population exploded in the 1980s, desperate people pushed into forest lands, chopped and burned their way to the creation of farmlands. Public health and medical systems were nonexistent in much of Asia's forested area because the human inhabitants were usually poor, often migratory, and increasingly resided in areas not previously inhabited by people.
In many regions flagrant overuse of antimalarial drugs resulted, as adults and children alike swallowed whatever they could afford in an attempt to
protect or cure themselves. Poorly trained paramedics widely dispersed drugs to anyone who was suspected of having malaria.
“I have never seen such a low level of health infrastructure, even in Africa,” Ethiopian malariologist Awash Teklehaimont, a scientific consultant to Indochina for WHO, said. “Chloroquine injections are done openly, in the marketplaces, by quacks, under full view of the police,” he added, referring to Cambodia in 1992. With local physicians paid only five dollars a month, it was perhaps unremarkable that the shelves of government clinics seemed always to be empty, while the black market had no shortage of supplies.
If there was a single Asian focus of all this social/ecological/medical interaction, a place where resistant strains most often appeared, it was the gem-mining area straddling the Thai-Cambodian border. On the Thai side were squadrons of underpaid police and soldiers, anxious to look the other way when fortune seekers illegally entered the area, and equally eager to grab them as they exited, taking a percentage of the ruby and emerald harvest. On the Cambodian side was the Khmer Rouge army of Pol Pot, which exacted their percentage from the gem miners to support continued insurgency.
As word of the lawless access to fortunes spread during the 1980s, men poured into the area from all over Asia: Indians, Burmese, Thais, Cambodians, Lao, Vietnamese, Chinese. They moved surreptitiously, avoiding border patrols, police, soldiers, and, of course, health authorities. The area they moved into was one of dense rain forest inhabited by more than a dozen different species of wild,
falciparum
-carrying mosquitoes.
“It's a remarkable situation,” Uwe Brinkmann said, having spent time observing the gem miners. “All day long they sit or squat in the streams and rivers zigzagging through the rain forest. It's steaming hot and humid—you can't imagine the heat. They wear no protective clothing, and they stand in mosquito breeding areas all day long sifting the water and mud for gems. At night they sleep in open sheds.”
It was these fortune seekers who proved to be the best customers for the antimalarial black market. They purchased anything, and used anything, to keep the disease at bay. Most of the time they used drugs improperly, encouraging development of resistant strains.
194
Not surprisingly, it was there that multidrug resistance emerged. In 1983 the combined use of mefloquine and Fansidar cured 96.7 percent of all malaria in the gem-mining area. By 1990 the same drug combination cured less than 21 percent of all cases. In practical terms, malaria acquired in the region was incurable.
Men who contracted malaria in the area but weren't too sick to travel did their best to sneak past layers of police, armies, and border guards to get home, clutching whatever riches they had sifted from the Khmer streams. But it was tragedy that they carried with them, for in their bloodstreams lurked resistant parasites that were soon sucked up into the probosci
of feeding mosquitoes from Bangladesh to Nepal. And so the epidemic spread.
Despite expenditures of billions of dollars by governments,
195
the UN, and numerous Western agencies, malaria was completely out of control in Asia in 1994.
In 1977, WHO finally abandoned all hopes of eradicating malaria. In 1978 it outlined a global strategy that linked malaria
control
to primary health care. But in the absence of adequate primary health systems in most of the affected area, that policy, too, failed.
By 1992, WHO was forced, reluctantly, to admit that there was no
global
strategy for malaria control. Rather, every individual ecology in each endemic nation needed to develop its own environmentally and socially tailored plan of action. What might work in an African savanna certainly would not be effective in a swampland or an Asian mahogany forest.
WHO had discovered ecology.
Weary of failure and angry about corruption in malaria vaccine development efforts,
196
the U.S. government moved in 1993 to slash its financial commitment to malaria control efforts. Federal expenditures declined steadily between 1987 and 1990, and in the winter of 1993 two agencies of the government were at loggerheads over whether or not to completely cease funding overseas malaria programs.
197
When Teklehaimont viewed the crisis in southern Asia he couldn't help but worry about his home, Ethiopia. In 1992 Ethiopia experienced its worst malaria epidemic in
Homo sapiens
history, with more than 20,000 people killed by the parasites in less than six months. At least 10 percent of the cases were chloroquine-resistant, and the victims were of all ages. When Teklehaimont personally surveyed households in an area of 13,000 people, he found 759 dead.
And that terrible epidemic was in the face of
only
chloroquine resistance.
What will happen if the Cambodian multiresistant parasite gets to Africa? Teklehaimont wondered.
Thirdworldization
THE INTERACTIONS OF POVERTY,
POOR HOUSING, AND SOCIAL DESPAIR
WITH DISEASE
The States Parties to this Constitution declare, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations, that the following principles are basic to the happiness, harmonious relations and security of all peoples:
—Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity … . —Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease, especially communicable disease, is a common danger.
—Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946
 
 
Heavy, purple-tinged clouds filled the equatorial sky, blotting out the harsh noon sun. It was stifling hot, and the air was so moist that beads of condensation mixed with sweat on the skin. Three men struggled to push a bicycle uphill along a road made of thick clay mud, rutted deeply from the two or three vehicles that had passed from Bukoba, bound for Uganda, since yesterday.
Wrapped in white cloth and elephant grass, a five-foot bundle lay stretched across the handlebars. The somber trio maneuvered their way past a steady stream of pedestrians, most of whom bore enormous bundles upon their heads or carried a huge Nile perch dangling from their shoulders, the fish so massive that its mud-covered tail trailed along the road.
Each time the men hit a large rut, one of them carefully steadied the bundle, while the other two gave the bicycle a strong shove. Passersby, recognizing the nature of the bundle, carefully avoided staring and ceased their laughter or chatter. Even the wild young boys who dodged school and helped smugglers get their goods across the Ugandan border grew silent when they spotted the bicycle's burden.
The journey eased when the men reached a plateau and turned off the road onto a well-beaten footpath. Winding their way through dense, verdant banana groves, they occasionally passed a mud-and-thatch home. Residents
greeted them with nods or a quiet
“Jambo,”
children scurried to their mothers' sides, staring wide-eyed at the bicycle and its load. As the trio moved on, clusters of people gathered up specially wrapped bundles, called children to their sides, and fell in line. Soon a procession of a few dozen residents of Kanyigo had formed.
In the distance could be heard the high-pitched ululating of female voices. The procession drew near to the mournful sound and a child stationed along the path spotted the bicycle and ran ahead to alert others of its approach. The keening suddenly stopped, and for a moment the only sounds were those of squawking Lake Victoria birds and human feet tromping over mud.
The villagers of Kanyigo reached a small clearing, surrounded by banana trees. To one side was a round thatched-roof house. On the opposite end of the clearing a group of men took turns shoveling out a large hole in the clay soil. In the center of the clearing stood a thirty-five-year-old man wearing a button-down shirt, dark cotton pants, and a brightly colored print sash. As the bicycle trio approached, the man drew close to him five small children, aged two to seven years, each of whom wore sashes identical to his.
Without exchanging words, the trio greeted the man and his children, silently untied their elephant grass-wrapped bundle, and carried it into the hut. As they entered the home, the women's wailing resumed inside. Its volume and pitch were at first painful to hear, and some of the gathered children, unfamiliar with social propriety, cupped their hands over their ears. Mothers quietly clucked disapproval; the children obediently dropped their hands and stared with apparent fear at their sash-adorned counterparts.
The families took turns approaching the father and children. Whispered greetings, bowed heads, proffered gifts, some tears, an occasional hug.
Some of the adults stepped into the hut, stopping for a moment until their eyes adjusted to the darkness, and then groped their way through the crowded one-room home to a seat upon the clean floor of packed dirt. They sat in concentric circles surrounding the five-foot bundle that had quietly been set in place by the bicycle trio. An older woman occasionally lost control, wailing loudly and flailing about so wildly that her friends were forced to restrain her.
AIDS had claimed another life in Kanyigo. The thirty-two-year-old woman, who now lay upon her floor, swaddled in cloth and elephant grass, left behind a husband and five children.
“She was suddenly attacked by stomach pain four months ago,” the widower said. “So she went to her birth village, the next village over, to stay with her family. She had no appetite. She wasn't eating anything. We tried to force her to drink tea, eat bread. We really tried to force it on her. But it was no use. At eleven o'clock yesterday morning she collapsed and died.”
The man spoke in a monotone, too overwhelmed to express emotion. He looked down at his children, who stoically stood by his side, stifling their tears. His eyes swept over them and then settled on the visiting
Mzungu.
He studied the American for an instant before speaking.
“It is a great deal of work for me to feed them, care for them, and do my work. Why don't you take the children? I give them to you.”
Jonathan Mann was tremendously excited. True, there were any number of things that could still go awry; diplomatic noses might start bleeding, political shenanigans could well break out. But he and his highly energetic—and sly—staff of the World Health Organization's Global Programme on AIDS had for months carefully and strategically planned for this day.
“We are entering a new era,” Mann had assured an international press corps. “We will make 1988 the year we turn the tide against the AIDS virus.”
And here he sat, his bow tie straight, hair brushed, as usual, straight back off his forehead, wearing a natty tailored European suit, giving him the air not of a CDC epidemiologist but of a French diplomat. He looked out over the largest gathering of Ministers of Health ever assembled. Of the representatives of 148 nations who now sat before him in the vast Queen Elizabeth II Conference Center in London, 117 were Ministers of Health or their country's equivalent. Every key nation, save one, was represented by the most politically powerful health official in their land: Mann was ashamed to say that the exception was his own country. Still not wishing to give AIDS a priority status, the Reagan administration sent Dr. Robert Windom, who ranked two notches down the power ladder from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Otis Bowen.
Never in history had the majority of the world's top health officials gathered to discuss an epidemic. No scourge—not malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, or the plague—had ever commanded such diplomatic attention. Some 700 delegates and 400 journalists were also present in the London hall on this ice-cold January morning in 1988 to witness the World Summit of Ministers of Health on Programmes for AIDS Prevention. Mann felt that it was a coup for his program, for WHO, and for millions of powerless people with AIDS.
Mann urgently hoped to drive home a message to the world's health leadership: AIDS is spreading; if it hasn't yet emerged in your country, it will, unless you plan now, follow our recommendations, educate your populations, and embrace condom-based programs as a prevention strategy.
As of January 26, 1988, some 75,392 cases of AIDS had officially been reported to the World Health Organization. But that figure was a gross
understatement of the true dimensions of the pandemic: most nations lacked genuine systems for amassing and recording such health statistics. Mann tactfully didn't mention from the podium what everyone in the audience knew to be true; namely, that many nations were deliberately covering up their epidemics for political and economic reasons. Such delicate issues would be dealt with later, in private arm-twistings and minister-to-minister preplanned strategic confrontations.
Mann differentiated the ways in which the AIDS virus was spreading from person to person. In what he called Pattern I countries, such as those of North America and Western Europe, AIDS was spreading primarily via the sharing of needles between intravenous drug users and sexually among gay men. In Pattern II countries, such as those of Africa, AIDS was a heterosexual disease.
Though he was cautious in his public choice of words, it was Pattern III nations that most concerned Mann as he spoke in London. Asia, the communist bloc, the largely Muslim Middle East, and much of the Pacific region had only very tiny outbreaks of AIDS. Some of these countries were truthfully reporting no cases of the disease, and several more were accurately stating that the handful of cases in their countries all involved foreigners or citizens who had acquired HIV while living overseas. In those Pattern III countries, the relative handfuls of cases were equally likely to have resulted from heterosexual, homosexual, needle, or blood exposure.
Pattern III, in other words, represented the potential future of the worldwide AIDS epidemic. There was still a window of opportunity for public health action that might successfully prevent HIV from emerging in the majority of the world's populations.
Many of the Pattern III political leaders had already recognized the threat of HIV importation, of course, and taken their own steps to curb such events. However, Mann and his staff, which included smallpox hero Daniel Tarantola, were appalled by many of the anti-emergence measures some countries had taken. Privately, Tarantola had already spent months flying all over the world in attempts to convince many of the same ministers who now sat in the London conference hall that AIDS wasn't anything like smallpox. There was no vaccine that one could require that immigrants and visitors receive. The virus didn't manifest itself symptomatically for years—perhaps over a decade—in ways that indicated its presence even to the infected individual. And the AIDS blood test wasn't foolproof.
“What are you going to do, test every immigrant five or six times a year, every visiting student once a week? If you think you can keep the virus out of your country with legislation and testing, you are wrong,” Tarantola told public health officials.
Mann was worried that the world would become a patchwork of repressive public health regimes with laws aimed at keeping a virus, as well as its potential carriers—gays, Africans, prostitutes, drug users, poor immigrants—out.
He feared that it would push populations that already existed at the margins of global society further away from the mainstream, medicine, and all hopes of disease control. Indeed, restrictions intended to control populations at greatest danger for HIV infection might actually have the reverse effect, exacerbating the social and economic conditions in their lives that drove them to adopt risky behaviors. Simply put, he felt certain that this moment in London was pivotal to deciding whether HIV's emergence in most countries would be prevented through education of local populaces or temporarily stalled by repressive laws.
“Our opportunity—brought so clearly into focus by this Summit—is truly historic,” Mann told his distinguished audience. “We live in a world threatened by unlimited destructive force, yet we share a vision of creative potential—personal, national, and international. The dream is not new—but the circumstances and the opportunity are of our time alone. The global AIDS problem speaks eloquently of the need for communication, for sharing of information and experience, and for mutual support; AIDS shows us once again that silence, exclusion, and isolation—of individuals, groups, or nations—creates a danger for us all.”
Though his words were received with thunderous applause and a standing ovation, Mann knew that many of those before him who were loudly slapping their hands together and politely nodding approval were, back home, promoting policies of mandatory quarantine of HIV-positive individuals, escalated repression against homosexuals, even public execution of AIDS sufferers.
As a scientist, Mann knew that the men and women now looking up at him on the dais, studying his smile and careful public modesty, were People of Politics. They might wear the titles of health officials, but their modi operandi were less those of the laboratory or hospital than those of the maneuvering, backstabbing, and power plays seen in parliaments and presidential inner circles. What the ministers said publicly here in London would be at least as much for domestic consumption as for the sake of any global effort to stop the pandemic.
Anticipating such limitations, Mann and his Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) staff had toiled for months in preparation for this moment. Lifelong WHO veterans, and occasional renegades, Tarantola and Manuel Carballo showed Mann how to maneuver around the labyrinthine and often byzantine United Nations bureaucracy. Swiss-American Tom Netter, having spent years covering the rise of Solidarity and the fall of communism in Poland for the Associated Press, plotted every step of the GPA's interactions with the international media. Spanish-born Carballo, who knew every nook and cranny of the World Health Organization even better than WHO Director-General Halfdan Mahler, helped spot the few potentially influential individuals within the bureaucracy who understood the urgency of the AIDS epidemic.
“This is a place where people put URGENT! on requests for pencil supplies,” Mann said in wonder. “The concept of genuinely dire emergency has almost no meaning here.”
Carballo couldn't have agreed more. One of the happiest days of his life was when he joined the GPA staff. He felt charged up, at the top of his performance and truly impassioned about his work, possibly for the first time in his life.
They all did: American epidemiologists Jim Chin and David Heymann, Venezuelan biologist José Esparza, British public health expert Roy Widdus, Tarantola, Mann, and the dozens of scientists and public education experts who came to Geneva under special contracts to advise the GPA. They shared a mission: stopping the further spread of AIDS. And as Heymann and Tarantola had done before in their efforts to stop smallpox, these men were willing to bend every UN and WHO rule as far as possible to stop the pandemic. They were believers. Between them they shared the ability to write and converse in at least fifteen languages. And they had a camaraderie that was quite uncharacteristic of the usually opportunistic careerist atmosphere pervading most United Nations programs.
When Mann had originally left Kinshasa to take the reins of power in Geneva in November 1986, he had a total working budget of $5 million, a part-time secretary, and three epidemiologists who were borrowed from other programs. Mann's own salary was still paid by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control.
By the time he reached London for the January 1988 Summit, less than two years later, forty-year-old Mann commanded a far-flung AIDS program, a considerable staff, and a budget of over $50 million, with $92 million promised for 1989. It was, by WHO bureaucratic standards, a meteoric rise.
And none of it went unremarked by Mann's WHO peers, who headed other disease programs. With the envy of Cinderella's stepsisters, they watched as the cinder maid grabbed all the attention and the Prince's love at the ball.
That Mann had unique access to Director-General Mahler and could enter the chief's office without first passing through the usual rungs of intermediary power was noticed. That Mahler increasingly mentioned AIDS in his speeches, placing it with each oration higher on the WHO totem pole of priorities, was noticed. That U.S., Canadian, and Western European currency poured into Geneva specifically earmarked for the GPA was noticed. That Dr. Jonathan Mann, this Johnny-come-lately international bureaucrat, was almost daily gracing the front pages of leading newspapers and magazines from Tokyo to Casablanca was inescapable.
While Mann, Tarantola, Heymann, Carballo, and the rest of the AIDS staff did their best to create a highly publicized sense of worldwide emergency and mobilization, jealousy simmered in the hallways of the vast Geneva complex. In the enormous vaulted lobby of WHO headquarters,
experts on cholera, malaria, diarrheal diseases, schistosomiasis, health economics, polio, and vaccine development gathered in discreet clusters by the three-story-high glass wall that afforded a view of Lake Geneva and Mont Blanc. And they whispered. They cited the Programme's own statistics on AIDS—those modest numbers of underreported cases—and asked why the new disease should command such resources and attention when other microbes were killing tens of millions of people. They noted that Mann and some other Programme staffers were Americans, and assured one another that all the concern was
only
in place because AIDS was killing homosexuals in New York and San Francisco.
And even that increased their envy: they admired the skills and energy of the American and European gay activists who relentlessly lobbied WHO, knowing that cholera victims in Bangladesh or Cambodian malaria patients would never be able to mount similar campaigns on their behalf.
Mann and his team either were oblivious to the talk behind their backs or chose to ignore it. In either case, when questioned directly about comparisons between WHO commitments to, for example, malaria versus AIDS, the Programme group would say that all global health programs were underfunded and not one dollar or yen of AIDS monies should be gathered at the expense of other health efforts.
And they would politely remind critics that AIDS was a newly emerging epidemic which, by definition, would swell to claim tens of millions of lives if not stopped immediately. On that point Mann enjoyed the full support of the director-general.
1
The staff of the Global Programme on AIDS discussed quite consciously among themselves the inherent contradictions in the need for a state of emergency to halt a newly emerging disease versus the essential nature of WHO and the United Nations system. Though Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, and other emergencies had received the quick attention of WHO, they couldn't serve as models for action against AIDS. First of all, each had surfaced as seemingly confined local emergencies. Second, they, at least in part, burned out on their own. Third, the microbes caused almost immediate disease in those who were infected, with an alarming level of mortality; there could be no doubt to the populaces or their governments that a state of emergency was warranted. Fourth, fairly simple measures, such as provision of sterile syringes, could stop the primary spread of the diseases.
In contrast, HIV surfaced almost simultaneously on three continents and was quickly a feature on the health horizons of at least twenty different nations. Not only was there no sign that AIDS might burn out on its own; scientists could see no evidence of the famous bell-shaped curve of infection and disease.
2
Far from causing immediate disease and death, HIV was a slow burner that hid deep inside people's lymph nodes, often for over a decade, before producing detectable infections. As a result, a society could already have thousands of infected citizens before any sound of alarm was rung, and even when the first AIDS cases appeared, their numbers were
small enough to allow governments to feel comfortable about ignoring the seemingly trifling problem. Denial was all too easy a response to AIDS.
BOOK: The Coming Plague
7.64Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads

Other books

One of the Guys by Dawn Doyle
Captivated by Deb Apodaca
Rogue Alliance by Michelle Bellon
Waypoint: Cache Quest Oregon by Shauna Rice-Schober[thriller]
Baller Bitches by Deja King