The Everlasting Empire (41 page)

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pact, see Elman,
Cultural History
; see also Chafee,
The Thorny Gates
, for the Song dynasty.

23. See Chafee,
The Thorny Gates
; Bol,
“This Culture,”
48–58 and 148ff.

24. For ideological trends of the Song period, see Hymes and Schirokauer,
Ordering the World
.

25. Bol,
Neo- Confucianism
, 218–269.

26. My discussion of Wang Anshi is based on Bol, “Government, Society and State”; Smith, “State Power and Economic Activism”; idem, “Shen- Tsung’s Reign.”

27. Smith, “State Power and Economic Activism,” 85.

28. For the
baojia
system, see Smith, “Shen- Tsung’s Reign,” 407–414.

29. See Bol, “Government, Society and State.”

30. See ibid.

31. For political collisions around the New Policies, see Levine,
Divided by a Common Language
.

32. See James T. C. Liu,
China Turns Inward
, 63–67.

33. For various aspects of these processes, see Schirokauer and Hymes, “Introduction”; Hymes,
Statesmen and Gentlemen
; James T. C. Liu,
China Turns Inward
.

34. See the summary in Bol,
Neo- Confucianism
, 246–253.

35. For Buddhist antecedents of Zhu Xi’s activism, see, e.g., Glahn, “Community and Welfare”; for the lineage activities under the Song, see Ebrey, “The Early Stages.”

36. See Dardess, “Confucianism,” and Rowe,
Crimson Rain
, 85–90. It is worth noting that in both cases redistribution of the tax burden did not aim at increasing the state’s revenues but rather at avoiding a potentially explosive situation resulting from unequal distribution of the burden within the community.

37. See discussion in Esherick and Rankin, “Introduction,” 5–9; cf. Hejidra, “The Socio- economic Development,” 552–564.

38. See Chü,
Local Government
, 14–35ff.

39. See ibid., 36–55; Reed,
Talons and Teeth;
Rowe,
Saving the World
, 339–344.

40. See Rankin and Esherick, “Concluding Remarks,” 322–324.

41. For the complexity of these issues, see Rowe,
Saving the World
, 363–405. For the lineage organization in late imperial China, see Ebrey, “The Early Stages,” and studies in Ebrey and Watson,
Kinship Organization
.

42. The examples are scattered through Rowe,
Crimson Rain
, and idem,
Saving the World
; Hejidra, “The Socio- economic Development”; Perdue,
Exhausting the Earth
; Huang,
Civil Justice
. The tension between the “orthodox” status of the lineage organization and disruptive lineage practices is insightfully discussed in Lamley, “Lineage and Surname Feuds.”

43. For Hai Rui’s case, see Huang,
1587
, 130–155.

44. Cited from Crawford, “Eunuch Power,” 118.

45. For discussions of Zhu Yuanzhang’s personality and his policies, see, e.g., Mote,
Imperial China
, 517–582; Dardess,
Confucianism and Autocracy
, 183–

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254; Langlois, “The Hung- wu Reign”; Farmer,
Zhu Yuanzhang
; Jiang Yonglin, “In the Name of ‘Taizu.’ ”

46. For this comparison, see Andrew and Rapp,
Autocracy
; for the shifting perspectives on Zhu Yuanzhang, see Schneewind,
Long Live the Emperor
; cf. Jiang Yonglin, “In the Name of ‘Taizu.’ ”

47. Rowe notes that “much of the lineage elite that dominated the entire Middle and Lower Yangzi regions over the late- imperial and Republican eras was a systematic creation of the Hongwu [i.e., Zhu Yuanzhang’s] reign” (
Crimson Rain
, 66). Surely, many elite lineages perished during the prolonged uprisings that marred the last decades of Yuan rule; but it seems that Zhu Yuanzhang’s purges were an equally important factor behind the overhaul in the composition of the elite in the early Ming.

48. Bol,
Neo- Confucianism
, 256–261. My discussion of Zhu Yuanzhang’s policies is based on Schneewind, “Visions and Revisions.”

49. See Hejidra, “The Socio- economic Development,” 552–575.

50. See, e.g., Bol,
Neo- Confucianism
, 261–269; see also discussion in the next section below in the text.

51. For the tense relations between the Manchu conquerors and Chinese local elites, especially in the prosperous Lower Yangzi area, see Wakeman,
The Great Enterprise
; for the Yongzheng Emperor’s experiments, see Zelin, “The Yungcheng Reign,” and idem,
The Magistrate’s Tael
.

52. For an insightful, even if partly outdated, study of Chinese local society in the nineteenth century, see Hsiao,
Rural China
.

53. This issue is dealt extensively in Rowe,
Saving the World
, 326–405.

54. See Pines,
Foundations
, 187–199.

55. See
Lunyu
, “Xue er” 1.2: 2.

56. See
Han Feizi
, “Wu du” 49: 445.

57. See Liu Kwang- Ching, “Socioethics as Orthodoxy,” and other studies in idem, ed.,
Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China
.

58. See Liu Kwang- Ching, “Introduction” and “Socioethics as Orthodoxy.”

59. Keith Knapp identifies a correlation between the consolidation of elite lineages in the Later Han dynasty (25–220) and in its aftermath, and the parallel strengthening of family- oriented morality (
Selfess Offspring
, 13–26). A similar process recurred with the renewed proliferation of the lineage organization in the Song dynasty and thereafter (Ebrey, “The Early Stages”). In both cases, and particularly in the latter, the government was enthusiastic in promoting kinship values (see, e.g., Elvin, “Female Virtue”).

60. For the latter, see Rowe,
Saving the World
, 397.

61. See details in Ebrey, “The Early Stages,” 30, 42.

62. See Elvin, “Female Virtue.”

63. For problems connected with this policy and its modification under the Qing, see Kutcher,
Mourning in Late Imperial China
; see also Huang,
1587
, 21– 26, for the crisis around the mourning leave of the all- important imperial secretary, Zhang Juzheng.

64. Farmer,
Zhu Yuanzhang
, 202.

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65. For the Qing edict’s text and the history of its dissemination, see Mair, “Language and Ideology” (translation on pp. 325–326).

66. McDermott, “Emperor, Élites and Commoners.”

67. For an example of the elites’ mobilization for the dynasty’s cause, see Kuhn,
Rebellion and Its Enemies
.

68. Rankin and Esherick, “Concluding Remarks,” 338.

69. See, e.g., Perdue,
Exhausting the Earth
; Will and Bin Wong,
Nourish the People
; Will,
Bureaucracy and Famine
.

70. Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” 111.

71. See Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” for the latter point.

72. See Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” for the lasting impact of Zhu Yuanzhang’s model. For the Kangxi Emperor’s preference for fiscal “leniency” even at the expense of government revenues, see Zelin,
The Magistrate’s Tael
, 21–24.

CHAPTER 5
THE PEOPLE

1. See Meadows,
The Chinese and their Rebellions
, pp. 23, 24, 401–403; italics in original.

2. See Kuhn,
Rebellion and Its Enemies
; for the “orthodoxy- heterodoxy” juxtaposition, see the two volumes edited by Liu Kwang- Ching:
Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China
and (Liu and Shek)
Heterodoxy in Late Imperial China
; see, in particular, Liu’s and Shek’s “Introduction” to the latter volume.

3. The class character of popular rebellions (which are often dubbed in Marxist parlance “peasant wars,” echoing Friedrich Engels’s
The Peasant War in Germany
), was systematically studied by Soviet and Chinese scholars. For a summary of Chinese views, see Cen and Liu,
Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng
; for Soviet studies, see, e.g., Smolin, “Problemy.” For a recent inspiring discussion of the rebellions’ class nature, see Rowe,
Crimson Rain
, especially pp. 53–59.

4. The discussion in this section is largely based on Pines,
Envisioning Eternal Empire
, 187–218; see also Zhang Fentian,
Min ben sixiang
; Sanft, “Communication and Cooperation.”

5. Both citations are from the now lost “Tai shi” (Great Pledge) document, allegedly composed on the eve of the overthrow of the Shang (it should be distinguished from the eponymous forged chapter in the current collection of the
Book of Documents
). See
Mengzi
, “Wan Zhang A” 9.5: 219; and
Chunqiu Zuo zhuan
, Xiang 31: 1184.

6. See Pines,
Envisioning Eternal Empire
, 190–191.

7. See Lewis,
The Construction of Space
, 136–150; cf. Pines, “Bodies,” 174–181.

8. See details in Pines,
Envisioning Eternal Empire
, 198–203; for the impact of mass armies, see Lewis,
Sanctioned Violence
, 128–133; for the “iron revolution,” see Wagner,
Iron and Steel
.

9. Pines,
Envisioning Eternal Empire
, 201–210.

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10.
Lunyu
“Ji shi,” 16.2: 174;
Mengzi
, “Teng Wen Gong A,” 5.4: 124.

11. For the establishment of the office of song- collectors in the Han period, and its ritual background, see Kern, “The Poetry of Han Historiography,” 33–35. For the evolution of the complaint system, see Fang, “Hot Potatoes”; Fang fails to notice that the system he discusses invariably favored the educated segment of society. For the importance of “public opinion” for late imperial policy makers, see Rowe,
Saving the World
, 373–377; cf. Rowe’s discussion of the elite as natural leaders of the “stupid people,” on pp. 295–300.

12. Tu Wei- ming, “The Structure and Function of the Confucian Intellectual,” 20.

13. See detailed discussion in Pines, “To Rebel Is Justified?”

14.
Mengzi
, “Liang Hui Wang B” 2.8: 42.

15.
Han Feizi
, “Zhong xiao” XX.52: 465–466.

16. See
Xunzi
, “Zheng lun” XII.18: 322–325, and discussion in Pines, “To Rebel Is Justified?” 16–20.

17. I adopt “egalitarian” here from Chinese scholars who usually define rebel ideology in this way (
pingjunzhuyi
). See, e.g., Dong Chuping,
Nongmin zhanzheng yu pingjunzhuyi
.

18. The Chinese debates are neatly summarized in Cen and Liu,
Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng
, 221–239; for Soviet studies, see, e.g., Smolin, “Problemy.” To remind the readers, mainstream Marxist historiography in China and the Soviet Union defines imperial China as a “feudal” state.

19. See Liu Kwang- Ching and Shek, “Introduction.”

20. See Liu Kwang- Ching and Shek, “Early Daoism.” See, however, Donald Munro’s attempt to analyze concepts of equality in mainstream Confucian thought (
A Chinese Ethics
, 3–20).

21.
Xunzi
, “Xing’e” XVII.23: 443.

22.
Xunzi
, “Wang zhi” V.9: 148–49.

23.
Mozi
, “Shang xian shang” II.8: 67.

24.
Shiji
48: 1952.

25. For the Taiping examinations, see, e.g., Zhou Lasheng, “Da Xi, Taiping tianguo keju.”

26. This said, it should be mentioned that among certain rebel leaders the brigands’ brotherhood was valued more than strict social distinctions; hence they disliked attempts to institutionalize the rebels’ camp. See details in Dong Chuping,
Nongmin zhanzheng yu pingjunzhuyi
, 39.

27. See
Lunyu
, “Ji shi” 16.1: 172;
Mengzi
, “Teng Wen Gong A” 5.3: 118.

28.
Mozi
, “Shang tong shang” III.11:109.

29.
Liji
, “Li yun” XXI.9: 582.

30. See articles in Deliusin and Borokh,
Kitajskie Sotsial’nye Utopii
.

31. My discussion of banditry draws primarily on such studies as Perry, “Social Banditry”; Antony, “Peasants, Heroes, and Brigands”; and Robinson, “Banditry.”

32. The literature on Chinese sects is plentiful and fast growing. See the very important study by Ter- Haar,
White Lotus
, for a challenge to established views

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of sectarian movements; cf. articles in Liu and Shek,
Heterodoxy
. For the sects’ ideology, see Overmyer, “Attitudes toward the Ruler and State.” For an in- depth study of sectarian rebellions, see, especially, Naquin,
Millenarian Rebellion
, and idem,
Shantung Rebellion
.

33. For an excellent introduction to millenarian beliefs in China, see Zürcher, “Prince Moonlight”; see also Naquin,
Millenarian Rebellion
.

34. See Naquin,
Millenarian Rebellion
and
Shantung Rebellion
; Liu KwangChing, “Religion and Politics”; Shek and Noguchi, “Eternal Mother Religion.”

35. See Perry, “Heterodox Rebellion?”

36. See, e.g., Liu Kwang- Ching, “Religion and Politics,” 307. Even the Muslim rebels in Xinjiang employed this slogan in 1864, probably anticipating that they would thereby add legitimacy to their rebellion. See Kim,
Holy War
, 53.

37.
Shiji
48: 1950, cited with slight modifications from Watson,
Records
[Qin], 218.

38. See details in Xiong,
Emperor Yang
.

39. For a statistical analysis of the correlation between economic hardships and social unrest, see Tong,
Disorder under Heaven
, 76–95.