The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (115 page)

That view about Newton’s laws is in any case problematical. One does not have to be all that Fregean to balk at the idea that Newton’s laws ‘became true’ only when Newton discovered them. If they did, what previously kept the planets in orbit round the sun?
⁹¹
To be sure, there are various more or less dextrous ways of replying to this question, for instance in terms of a presently available explicans for a formerly instantiated explicandum. The question is, what could drive us to such dexterity? What could drive Heidegger to it?

Heidegger’s main concern is to safeguard the connection between Being and
Dasein
’s understanding of Being. But why should that connection be forged at the level of individual human beings such as Newton? Why, for that matter, should it require the existence of human beings at all? Why should it require the existence of
any
actual ‘whos’ – as opposed to possible ‘whos’? When Heidegger says that Being depends on
Dasein
, this is surely one point at which we do well to remind ourselves that ‘
Dasein
’ is not the name of a particular being, but of a sort of being. Heidegger’s claims about Newton’s laws – claims, it should be noted, that are in tension with our natural, pre-phenomenological sense-making – suggest that he may himself need reminding of this.
⁹²

But now, this progression from the kinds of claims that Heidegger does occasionally make concerning individual human beings to the kinds of claims that he should surely confine himself to making concerning
Dasein
calls to mind the expansion of who ‘we’ are, from a particular group of human beings to a kind of infinite locus of sense-making, which we witnessed in connection with the later Wittgenstein in
Chapter 10
, §4. And here, much as there, the claims at the end of the progression can have the kind of bite that they are intended to have only if their subject (
Dasein
in Heidegger’s case, ‘we’ in Wittgenstein’s) is being said to determine the limits of that of which a certain kind of sense can be made, and only if such limits are understood as limitations. Otherwise the subject is redundant and the claims either lack any substance at all or have to be heard as claims about a subject-independent domain of sense such as would be an anathema to both Heidegger and Wittgenstein. We thus arrive at idealism of precisely the problematical kind which I argued Wittgenstein was only just able to avoid – and which Heidegger’s mentor Husserl did not ultimately avoid.

Heidegger himself defines ‘idealism’ as the thesis that ‘Being can never be explained by beings but is already that which is “transcendental” for every being’ (p. 251/p. 208). He both endorses this thesis and concedes that it is ‘empty’ without an account of how Being is internally related to
Dasein
’s understanding of Being (p. 251/p. 207). Heidegger’s definition is not the same as mine. But the two are related. If we reserve the word ‘ontic’ for the kind of sense that can be made of beings, then idealism, on his definition, amounts to the thesis that susceptibility
to ontic sense-making is a limit to that of which ontic sense can be made. This is indeed empty without an account of how
Dasein
relates to such sense-making. But given such an account, or more specifically, given the account that Heidegger gives, it amounts to idealism by my definition too: idealism of the problematical sort just identified.

There are several symptoms of this idealism in Heidegger. One of these involves Heidegger’s conception of independence. As we have seen, he holds that the things of which we can make ontic sense (beings) are independent of such sense-making. But he also holds, as indeed he must – somewhat like Husserl – that such independence is a feature of the ontic sense of things we make. Thus he writes:

When
Dasein
does not exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even beings within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden.
In such a case
it cannot be said that beings are, nor can it be said that they are not. But
now
, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that
in this case
beings will still continue to be. (p. 255/p. 212, emphasis in original)

There we have it: ‘
in this case
’. The independence of beings with respect to us and our ontic sense-making is one of their essential features,
determined by
Dasein
. And it is an independence that they enjoy
to the exclusion of
(not their failing to enjoy it, but) their not even admitting of it – nor for that matter failing to admit of it.

This is of a piece with other symptoms of Heidegger’s idealism. Among these is his talk of the ‘nothing’ beyond beings which we considered in the previous section, his talk, as he also puts it at one point, of ‘the complete negation of the totality of beings’ (‘What Is Metaphysics?’, p. 98). How are these of a piece? In two ways. First, by casting that of which we can make ontic sense, which is to say the domain of beings, as a limited whole, beyond which there is that with respect to which ontic sense gives out. Second, and concomitantly, by falling prey to a version of the Limit Argument (
Ch. 5
, §8); that is, by themselves straining beyond the limit of ontic sense-making.

Heidegger says, ‘As surely as we can never comprehend absolutely the whole of beings in themselves we certainly do find ourselves stationed
in the midst of beings that are revealed somehow as a whole’ (‘What Is Metaphysics?’, p. 99). We are reminded of what Wittgenstein says in the
Tractatus
:

Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical. (6.45)

There are … things that cannot be put into words. They
make themselves manifest
. They are what is mystical. (6.522, emphasis in original)

And this at last brings us back to the material at the end of the previous section that heralded this discussion of idealism. I have been urging that Heidegger is involved in a problematical idealism which does not make ontic sense. This means that neither does it make propositional sense. That is precisely why I call it problematical. But of course, ‘problematical’
here really only serves as a term of condemnation to the extent that it (the idealism) is
supposed
to make propositional sense. It is open to Heidegger to take a leaf out of the early Wittgenstein’s book and to say that all these symptoms of his idealism, and indeed the idealism itself, are deliberate manglings of propositional sense-making designed to convey non-propositional insights; to instil a non-propositional understanding of Being. It seems to me that this is an exegetical possibility that we have to take very seriously.

By this I do not mean that Heidegger would elect to take this leaf out of Wittgenstein’s book. I am not at all confident that he would. I mean that he would do well to take this leaf out of Wittgenstein’s book, given what else he is committed to. I think this would be his only fully integrated way of justifying the inclusion in his texts of propositions, or rather apparent propositions, which, by his own lights, resist being interpreted as such. Shall we conclude, then, on Heidegger’s behalf if not in direct exposition of anything he says, that these ideas of his that we have been considering in this section are the stuff of poetry? That the passages in which he relativizes truth to the Being of
Dasein
, and suchlike, do not consist in assertions about how things are, but are moments of artistry?
⁹³

1
This is a convenient excuse, at an early stage in this chapter, for me to say something about Heidegger’s notorious writing style. Anyone previously unacquainted with his philosophy and opening
Being and Time
at random would be liable to have a harsh sense of linguistic butchery. (See e.g. the italicized paragraph at p. 437/p. 385 (referencing system explained below).) There are many points to be made in this connection. First,
Being and Time
is actually not all that typical, a fact that is somewhat obscured by one of the great curiosities of Heideggerian scholarship: the disproportionate amount of attention that is paid to this early, unfinished work. (I mean this less censoriously than it may sound.
Being and Time
is undoubtedly a central text.) Contrast, say,
History of the Concept of Time
, the supplemented text of a lecture course that Heidegger gave at the University of Marburg in 1925. The first two chapters of that book, i.e. §§4–9, provide an account of phenomenology whose language is, by philosophical standards, almost a model of unadulterated plain speech – and which is incidentally far clearer than anything of comparable length and scope in Husserl. Second, Heidegger is very self-conscious both about his neologizing and about its aesthetic defects: see e.g.
Being and Time
, §7, final paragraph. Third, and related, early passages in
Being and Time
are much less likely to offend against anyone’s linguistic sensibilities than later passages. Unorthodox language is used only once it has been defined. (The book is no different in this respect from an introductory logic text.) Finally, it is important to appreciate that Heidegger is often trying to make capital precisely out of his own wrenching of the language: see further §§6 and 7 below. Having said all of that in mitigation, I see no justification for Heidegger’s belief, itself I suspect a contributory factor to his way of writing, that the Greek language is unique in being able to put us ‘directly in the presence of the thing itself, not first in the presence of a mere word sign’ (
What Is Philosophy?
, p. 45).

Note: throughout this chapter I use the following abbreviations for Heidegger’s works: ‘Anaximander’ for Heidegger (
1984b
);
Basic Concepts
for Heidegger (
1993f
);
Basic Problems
for Heidegger (
1982b
);
Basic Questions
for Heidegger (
1994
);
Being and Time
for Heidegger (
1962a
);
Contributions
for Heidegger (
1999
); ‘Conversation’ for Heidegger (
1966
); ‘History of Being’ for Heidegger (
2003a
);
History of the Concept of Time
for Heidegger (
1985
); ‘Humanism’ for Heidegger (
1993c
); ‘Identity’ for Heidegger (
1969a
);
Introduction
for Heidegger (
1959
);
Kant
for Heidegger (1962b); ‘Logos’ for Heidegger (
1984c
);
Metaphysical Foundations
for Heidegger (
1992
);
Nietzsche 1
for Heidegger (
1979
);
Nietzsche 2
for Heidegger (
1984a
);
Nietzsche 3
for Heidegger (
1987
);
Nietzsche 4
for Heidegger (
1982a
); ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’ for Heidegger (
2003b
); ‘Technology’ for Heidegger (
1993d
); ‘The Constitution of Metaphysics’ for Heidegger (
1969b
); ‘The End of Philosophy’ for Heidegger (
1993e
);
The Principle of Reason
for Heidegger (
1991
); ‘The Question of Being’ for Heidegger (
1998
);
Thinking
for Heidegger (
1968b
); ‘Time and Being’ for Heidegger (
1972
); ‘Truth’ for Heidegger (
1993b
); ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ for Heidegger (
1993a
); and
What Is Philosophy?
for Heidegger (
1968a
). Page references for
Being and Time
are in duplicate, first to the translation and then to the original German as indicated in the margins. All unaccompanied references are to
Being and Time
.

2
We could also say that it denotes that which appears. But, as Heidegger warns, we must then beware that ‘appearing’ is also what is said to be done by that which, precisely without showing itself, is indicated by something else, as a disease is indicated by, or ‘appears’ in, its symptoms. The word ‘appearance’ can even be used to denote that which does the indicating, as the symptoms are an indication of, or an ‘appearance’ of, the disease. The ultimate example of this usage is to be found in Kant, where the word denotes that which does the indicating in contrast to that which is indicated and which
cannot
show itself, at least not to us (Kant (
1998
), A490/B518ff.; see
Ch. 5
, §4). A further complication is that something can be said to ‘appear’ precisely because there is no such thing: ‘There is an appearance of bravado in his manner, but really he is extremely nervous.’

3
These correspond to the indirect ways indicated in the previous note in which a thing can appear.

4
Cf. Husserl’s ‘principle of all principles’, cited in parentheses at the end of §3 of the previous chapter.

5
See the previous note, and see also the opening paragraph of §6 of the previous chapter.