The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (129 page)

29
Cf.
Ch. 14
, n. 37.

30
Cf.
Grammatology
, pp. 56–57. Cf. also ‘
Sec
’, p. 329.

31
‘Meaning’ here, like ‘
WRITING
’, is to be understood very broadly: cf. ‘Semiology’, p. 26.

32
For an extremely helpful discussion of Derrida on
WRITING
and iterability, see Glendinning (
2007
), pp. 197–202.

33
I have been highlighting similarities between Derrida’s views and those of the later Wittgenstein. Here we see similarities between his views and those of Quine, whose repudiation of Fregean senses we witnessed in
Ch. 12
, §§4 and 5. Cf. esp. Quine (
1969a
), pp. 48ff. And for discussion, see Putnam (
1985
).

34
For one thing it misses a pun in the original: ‘
hors-texte
’ is a technical term used by printers to denote plates. For discussion, see McDonald (
2006
), pp. 222ff.

35
See the next section for discussion of what Derrida means by ‘deconstruction’.

36
I have taken the liberty of altering Samuel Weber’s translation by leaving ‘
il n’y a pas de hors-texte
’ in the original French, and by capitalizing ‘Being’ as a reminder of the background Heideggerianism.

37
Again the comparison with Quine is irresistible: see
Ch. 12
, §4.

38
For helpful discussions, see Priest (
1995
), pp. 236ff, and Moran (
2000
), pp. 461–463.

39
See n. 35.

40
See further
Grammatology
, Pt I and Pt II,
Ch. 2
; ‘
Sec
’, passim; and ‘Positions’, p. 68. (On p. 49 of
Grammatology
he defines the metaphysics of presence as ‘the exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for [a transcendental signified].’) Cf. (as a further reminder of how Wittgensteinian much of this is) Wittgenstein (
1967a
), Pt I, §§380ff. Cf. also Putnam (
1981
), esp.
Ch. 2
. Finally, for helpful discussions of all of the material in this section, see Norris (
1987
), Chs 3–5, esp.
Ch. 4
, and Hobson (
1988
), pp. 9–41 (much of which is also relevant to the next section). See also Murdoch (
1993
),
Ch. 7
– altogether less sympathetic, frequently uncomprehending, annoyingly glib, yet somehow riveting.

41
Cf. ‘Implications’, p. 10.

42
It may appear irresistible at this point to invoke the Hegelian notion of
Aufhebung
. But we can and should resist. Derrida explicitly distances the processes involved from processes of
Aufhebung
: see e.g. ‘Positions’, pp. 38–41.

43
Both the name and to some extent the idea are appropriated from Heidegger, whose corresponding ‘
Destruktion
’ – sometimes translated simply as ‘destruction’ – we encountered in the lengthy passage from Heidegger (
1982b
) quoted in
Ch. 18
, §4. See also Heidegger (
1962a
), §6.

44
‘Roughly’, because shortly after the material just quoted Derrida also talks of the difficulty of defining deconstruction, a fact which itself, ironically, illustrates the power of deconstruction (ibid., p. 4).

45
See e.g. Scruton (
2004
), pp. 478–479. It is worth noting in this connection the following quotation: ‘Everything that I deconstruct – presence, living, voice and so on – is exactly what I’m after in life. I love the voice, I love presence’ (‘Following Theory’, p. 8).

46
See esp. the lengthy quotation from Heidegger (
1982b
) given in that section. Cf.
Grammatology
, p. 24.

47
Cf. Sheppard (
2001
).

48
Cf. my distinction earlier between the sense in which Derrida rejects the discredited notions of
SPEECH
and
WRITING
and the sense in which he does not.

49
There are many similar quotations throughout Derrida’s corpus. There are also many places where he illustrates his thesis by appeal to specific thinkers, both among his predecessors and among his contemporaries, who he thinks have been concerned to repudiate traditional metaphysics and who he also thinks have worked within the very structures that they set out to repudiate (whether intentionally or unintentionally). See e.g.
Grammatology
, pp. 19–20, on Nietzsche;
Speech and Phenomena
, p. 5, ‘Phenomenology’, p. 166, and ‘Form and Meaning’, pp. 157–158, on Husserl; ‘Implications’, p. 8, on Heidegger; and ‘Violence and Metaphysics, pp. 82–83 and 111–112, on Levinas.

It is interesting, particularly in the light of my remarks in §1 and in the light of some of what will follow in this chapter, to compare Wittgenstein’s project in the
Tractatus
, where he uses, or rather ‘uses’, some more or less mainstream analytic tools (such as the idea of logical form) to dispose of those very tools. More generally, it does not take much to see the
Tractatus
as an exercise in deconstruction, perhaps directed at the prioritization of propositional sense-making over non-propositional sense-making. (For another comparison with the
Tractatus
, see Norris (
1987
), p. 17.)

50
Cf.
Grammatology
, pp. 82–83.

51
Here we see another instance of what I have already signalled as one of the great recurring themes of Part Three of this book (cf.
Ch. 15
, §7(b);
Ch. 16
, §4; and
Ch. 18
, §4). It will find its most resounding expression in §§3 and 4 of the next chapter.

52
Interesting discussions of deconstruction are Rorty (
1992
) and Priest (
1995
),
Ch. 14
. But I take issue with both. Graham Priest seems to me to have an overly systematic conception of deconstruction. Richard Rorty seems to me to achieve the remarkable feat of erring in the other direction. Moreover, both (see pp. 240–241 of the Rorty and p. 238 of the Priest) infelicitously liken the processes involved to those of Hegelian
Aufhebung
(see n. 42 in this chapter).

A further discussion of deconstruction, with particular reference to traditional metaphysics, and ultimately critical of Derrida, is Frank (
1992
).

53
In what follows I shall simply appropriate Derrida’s word rather than devise an equivalent.

54
This essay is the
locus classicus
for Derrida’s views about
différance
. But the word occurs in earlier works: see e.g.
Speech and Phenomena
, pp. 82 and 88, and
Grammatology
, p. 84. The first occurrence is in ‘Phenomenology’, p. 161.

55
An incidental benefit of the coinage, given that ‘
différence
’ and ‘
différance
’ are spelt differently but pronounced the same way, is that it provides a nice reminder of the advantages that writing can have over speech, which is itself a reminder of what Derrida does with his own notion of
WRITING
(‘
Différance
’, pp. 3ff).

56
On the second of these cf. Bergson’s account of how objects of analysis are ultimately distinguished (
Ch. 16
, §3).

57
It is interesting to note that in Heidegger (
1993b
) Heidegger himself uses a special word in connection with this difference. In fact he invokes the old German word ‘
Seyn
’ which we encountered in
Ch. 18
, n. 71.

58
Cf. Wood (
2001
), pp. 261–264.

59
Equivalently, what the word means is not an ‘object’ in Frege’s and Husserl’s sense: see
Ch. 8
, §7(b), including n. 71. Cf. also Wittgenstein (
1967a
), Pt I, §304.

60
Cf. ‘Moore’, p. 85.

61
Earlier in the same essay he is more forthright. He writes, ‘
Différance …
is neither a word nor a concept’ (ibid., p. 7). Cf. Geoffrey Bennington (
1993
), pp. 73–74, where Bennington writes, ‘This “word” or “concept” can be neither a word nor a concept, naming the condition of the possibility … of
all
words and concepts’ (emphasis in original).

62
This is not to mention the many paradoxes with which Derrida deliberately saddles
différance
. For instance, having told us that it makes the opposition of presence and absence possible, he goes on to highlight its place in the deconstructive project by telling us that what it makes possible is ‘the very thing that it makes impossible’ (
Grammatology
, p. 143).

63
Cf. also ‘Cogito’, p. 37, where, in a different connection (that of writing about madness), Derrida talks of ‘[the] difficulty, or [the] impossibility, [that] must reverberate within the language used,’ and goes on to comment, ‘One could perhaps say that the resolution of this difficulty is
practised
rather than
formulated
’ (emphasis in original).

64
I have taken the liberty of replacing ‘existent’ in Alan Bass’ translation by ‘being’. The original French is ‘
étant
’. For justification for this departure from the original, see Bass (
1978
), pp. xvii–xviii.

65
Does this cast doubt on my earlier insistence that ‘
différance
’ does mean something? I think not. Derrida is not specifically talking about the word ‘
différance
’ here. But in any case, more importantly, as the rest of the quotation testifies and as I hope will become clearer in the next section, there is meaning and there is meaning.

66
I have taken some liberties with the material in square brackets, where Derrida’s original has ‘I risk meaning’, but I think the context justifies my making the link I have. The quotation continues, incidentally, in a way that exhibits Derrida’s fine sense of humour: ‘To be entangled in hundreds of pages of a
WRITING
simultaneously insistent and elliptical, imprinting … even its erasures, carrying off each concept into an interminable chain of differences, surrounding or confusing itself with so many precautions, references, notes, citations, collages, supplements – this ‘meaning-to-say-nothing’ is not, you will agree, the most assured of exercises’ (ibid.).

67
For very helpful discussions of
différance
, see Wood (
1988
) and Moran (
2000
), pp. 463ff., the former of which is more critical. A further fascinating read is ‘The Original Discussion’: this is a transcript of the discussion with Derrida that took place after he first delivered ‘
Différance
’.

68
Cf. ‘Positions’, pp. 37–38.

69
Much of what follows in this section derives from Moore (
2001b
). I am grateful to the editor and publisher of the volume in which that essay appears, and to the editor of the special issue of
Ratio
on which the volume is based, for permission to make use of this material.

70
See esp. Austin (
1975
), whose very title is
How to Do Things with Words
.

71
It is interesting to compare this with a passage from Quine, someone who might be expected to be utterly hostile to Derrida’s views on these matters: Quine (
1961c
), pp. 55–56.

– For an excellent discussion of the debate between Austin and Derrida, see Glendinning (
2001
). For a famously belligerent defence of Austin, see Searle (
1977
). For Derrida’s reply, see ‘Limited Inc’. For an excellent discussion of the exchange between Derrida and Searle, see Sarah Richmond (
1996
) (in §§IV–VI of which Richmond draws some interesting comparisons between Derrida’s ideas and those of Donald Davidson). Finally, for further discussion of the issues surrounding the quotation of words, see the Appendix.