The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (18 page)

Now I talked in §1 about Spinoza’s ‘communicating’ his general understanding of things to others. I had in mind something that was neutral on this question of how his readers may be intended, or may in fact proceed, to assimilate what is communicated. I was referring simply to his putting his understanding into words. Whether his readers bow to his authority and thereby acquire knowledge of the first kind or whether they work through his proofs, come to share his general understanding of things, and thereby acquire knowledge of the second kind – these are questions about the
effects
that his work has.

Here is another effect that his work may have, this time involving knowledge of the third kind. His readers may share his general understanding of things, see the importance of knowledge of the third kind, recognize some of the ways in which knowledge of that kind can be attained, be moved to pursue them, set themselves to do so, and succeed. This, I believe, would be an intended effect. So there is a sense in which Spinoza tries to impart knowledge of the third kind too. But this is not to say that he tries to
communicate
knowledge of the third kind.
Knowledge of the third kind cannot be communicated
. It is, in part, practical knowledge. And the part that is practical cannot be put into words. Or at any rate, it cannot be put into finitely many words, which is as much as I mean when I contend that it cannot be communicated. (I choose the word ‘contend’ advisedly. I do not claim to be rehearsing anything that Spinoza explicitly says at this point. But I see no other way
of making sense of his insistence that knowledge of the third kind is both adequate and yet incapable of issuing from knowledge of the second kind.
⁶⁶
Note, however, that even if I am wrong about this, the sheer particularity of knowledge of the third kind means that, if ever someone communicated knowledge of the third kind which he or she had, the result would be liable to be of little more than autobiographical interest. It would be some sort of coincidence if the same thing served to communicate knowledge of the third kind which someone else had, or might come to have.)
It may yet be possible to communicate a good deal of knowledge
about
knowledge of the third kind. That is certainly something that Spinoza tries to do in the
Ethics
. And his trying to do that is certainly an integral part of his trying to impart knowledge of the third kind (cf.
Treatise
, ¶37) – as of course is his trying to convey the adequate idea of substance on which knowledge of the third kind rests. But these are importantly different from his trying to say what it is that, in having knowledge of the third kind, he or anyone else knows.
⁶⁷

What it all comes to, then, is this. Knowledge of the third kind is the supreme aim of ethics. But it cannot be acquired except via knowledge of the second kind. More specifically, it cannot be acquired except via metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysics is therefore in the service of ethics. It helps us to realize the supreme aim of ethics. It also helps us to understand the supreme aim of ethics, to make sense of what it is to make ethical sense. Its own aim is not the same as the supreme aim of ethics. Its own aim is a general understanding of things. Even so, for the reasons given, metaphysics is an integral part of the good life. Such is Spinoza’s resplendent vision.

1
Throughout this chapter I use the following abbreviations for Spinoza’s works:
Ethics
for Spinoza (
2002c
);
Letter
1,
Letter
2, etc., for individual letters in Spinoza (
2002e
);
Political Treatise
for Spinoza (
2002d
);
Short Treatise
for Spinoza (
2002b
); and
Treatise
for Spinoza (
2002a
). All unaccompanied references are to the
Ethics
, for which I adopt the following conventions: ‘IIp40s2’ names Pt II, Prop. 40, Schol. II, and so forth; ‘IVdd1,2’ names Pt IV, Definitions 1 and 2, and so forth; ‘IVp23+pf’ stands for Pt IV, Prop. 23 together with its proof; and ‘acc’, as in ‘IIp29+acc’, abbreviates ‘all accompanying material’.

2
For an excellent overview of why the
Ethics
is a work in ethics, see Lloyd (
1996
),
Ch. 5
.

3
For a helpful discussion of these matters, see Cottingham (
1986
), pp. 152–156. For a discussion pertaining to the seventeenth century more broadly, highlighting its debts to antiquity, see James (
1998
). In the last paragraph of Descartes (
1984a
),
Third Meditation
, he tells us that our ‘greatest joy’ derives from ‘the contemplation of the divine majesty’. This is a related idea which has echoes in what is to come (see §5).

4
See esp. VPref where, with somewhat uncharacteristic derision, Spinoza makes a series of telling points against Descartes’ dualism. See also §2.

5
One interesting consequence of the differences between them is that, whereas Descartes’ dualism, together with his emphasis on ‘mastering’ our passions, makes his vision something of an anathema to mainstream feminism, Spinoza’s vision has attracted significant interest and support among contemporary feminists: see e.g. Lloyd (
1994
), Gatens (
1999
), and James (
2012
). I hope, in the course of this chapter, to cast light on the reasons why.

6
For discussion of how these remarks consist with Spinoza’s distinction between ‘
Natura naturans
’ and ‘
Natura naturata
’ (Ip29s), see Deleuze (
1990a
), pp. 99–104. See further
Ch. 21
, §2(a).

7
In
Ch. 1
, §6, I suggested that Descartes also took a cue from the fact that, when he first registered the indubitability of his own existence, he held the existence of any extended being to be in doubt. For discussion of the relation between that consideration and the argument presented here in the main text, see Williams (
1978
),
Ch. 4
, esp. pp. 102–108.

8
We shall return to this example in
Ch. 8
, §4. As we shall see, Frege himself would put the point somewhat differently.

9
For an interesting note of dissent, see Nietzsche (
1967c
), §523. (We shall return to Nietzsche’s view of Spinoza in
Ch. 15
, §7(a).)

10
Cf. Bennett (
2003
), pp. 115–116.

Might it not also be heard distributively, as specifying a quality of each attribute, rather than as applying to the whole group? Certainly the language itself allows for that interpretation (the original Latin is ‘
infinitis attributis
’). And the proof of Ip21, which adverts to Ip11, may even seem to demand it. But the explanation of Id6 and the proof of Ip14 are then problematical.

11
This is a dominant theme of Yovel (
1989
). See further nn. 22, 51, and 53. Note: my reference to ‘the least demanding conception of what it would be for something to be transcendent’ reminds us that there are indeed different conceptions of this (see Introduction, §6). On some conceptions, attributes other than thought and extension would
not
be transcendent. Still, let us not forget that Spinoza is conceding the existence of what is not merely unknown, but unknowable (by us).

12
Lloyd (
1996
), pp. 38–41, is very helpful on this point.

13
This is another reason why it cannot strictly be said to be identical to the world of snow and pain.

14
Cf. Quine (
1981e
), p. 98; and cf. further
Ch. 12
, §7. In Donald Davidson (
2005e
), Davidson illuminatingly likens Spinoza’s view to his own ‘anomalous monism’, whereby any event that can be characterized in psychological terms can also be characterized in irreducibly different physical terms.

15
Cf. Deleuze (
1990a
), p. 175.

16
See further Deleuze (
1980
).

17
But see above for why Nature must not then be construed simply as the world with which we are familiar. Henceforth I shall use ‘nature’ with a lowercase ‘n’ to refer to the latter.

18
For the importance of the qualification ‘strictly speaking’, see Vp36c: God’s ‘love’ is not ‘accompanied by the idea of an external cause’ (IIIDefEms6). For further opposition to the traditional conception, see Ip15s. Note: some of the features that prevent Spinoza’s God from being personal likewise prevent Him from satisfying various other conditions that God is often thought to satisfy, such as susceptibility to petitionary prayer.

19
Cf. Bennett (
1984
), p. 34.

20
Novalis (
1892
), Vol. 3, p. 318. But note that in the context Novalis appears to be accrediting Spinoza with a kind of atheism.

21
I have been helped in these deliberations by Bennett (
1984
), §9, even though he comes down on the opposite side and concludes that ‘Spinoza’s position is a kind of theism rather than of atheism’ (p. 35).

22
In §5 we shall see an even more basic reason why Spinoza denies that we can make sense of transcendent things, at least insofar as making sense of things involves having knowledge of them.

23
Cf. IVApp¶¶1–4.

24
See n. 17.

25
Cf.
Treatise
, ¶76, n. 2.

26
It is worth recalling here that ‘virtue’ can mean the same as ‘power’. Spinoza himself uses these words synonymously (IVd8).

27
See Deleuze (
1990a
),
Ch. 14
, to which he gives that question as a title.

28
I have taken the liberty of dropping Samuel Shirley’s capitalization of ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’ in his translation, to conform with my own usage in the rest of this chapter. (There is no capitalization in Spinoza’s original Latin.)

29
I referred in n. 14 to Davidson’s likening of Spinoza’s view to his own anomalous monism. In this passage, taken together with its context (IIIp2+acc), we also see a striking similarity in the routes they take to arrive there. Cf. Davidson (
1980
).

30
Genevieve Lloyd draws some interesting conclusions from this with regard to sexual difference: see Lloyd (
1994
), pp. 160–168. (Cf. n. 5.)

31
Given that these untold capacities are at the same time untold capacities of our minds, it also has significance for whether there can be radical conceptual innovation in metaphysics: see Introduction, §6, the discussion of the Novelty Question. We shall return to this issue in
Ch. 21
, §6. (See in particular n. 85 of that chapter.)

32
See further
Letter
32.

33
See IVp39s for just one of the complications.

34
For a very interesting discussion, see Barbone (
2002
). Also helpful is Brandom (
2002b
), pp. 124–126.

35
I have taken the liberty of correcting Shirley’s translation here. Despite his general reliability he fudges Spinoza’s important distinctions in this area. The word that I have rendered as ‘individuals’ is ‘
Individua
’, and the phrase that I have rendered as ‘one single thing’ is ‘
unam rem singularem
’.

36
Cf. Spinoza’s claim in IVp18s that ‘nothing is more advantageous to man than men.’ For discussion of the political consequences of his views, see
Political Treatise
and IVApp passim.

37
See e.g. Deleuze (
1988a
),
Ch. 2
; Deleuze (
1990a
),
Ch. 16
; and Williams (
2006o
), pp. 6–7 and
Ch. 10
. An earlier version of the distinction can be found in Hegel (
1942
), Pts Two and Three: see further
Ch. 7
, §6. The distinction is also of prime importance to Nietzsche: see esp. Nietzsche (
1967a
), First Essay, and Nietzsche (
1973
); and see further
Ch. 15
, §7.

38
For a helpful account see Brandom (
2002b
), pp. 126–129.