The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern (26 page)

The possession of nuclear weapons by the non-democracies—China, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and perhaps soon Iran–means that global flare-ups often will not necessarily be decided by the superiority of Western militaries per se. The stalemates, defeats, and hard going in Korea, Vietnam, and perhaps Afghanistan and Iraq prove that well enough. Soon war almost anywhere will invoke the specter of an aroused new nuclear power—one that claims it is more unpredictable, has less to lose, or harbors more grudges than a nuclear and democratic America, Britain, France, or Israel. The result is not just that Western war will therefore be limited, but rather it will more likely be fought in unconventional ways more favorable to non-Western societies.

The onset of the Internet and the instant dissemination of knowledge have also leveled the playing field. Again, who cares that Dr. Zawahiri’s suicide bombers draw on no innate tradition of either European physics or munitions? With money from a rogue Saudi prince, a terrorist soon may Google “dirty bomb” and download the necessary expertise to easily assemble a brew of Czech explosives and radioactive medical waste. If one such suicide bomber blew himself to smithereens inside the lobby of the U.S. Congress, he could do far more comparative damage to the confidence of the United States than a fleet of sophisticated B-2 bombers might do to the terrorists hiding among civilians in mud-brick villages in Pakistan.

Does all this depressing news mean the end to dominance of Western warfare, and with it the very security of the West?

Not quite. There always looms the next cycle, the classic response to the last round of such contemporary challenges. At this moment, missile defense is being deployed, with promises that such countermeasures will venture beyond the stratosphere and knock down missiles and planes in their initial takeoff.

Should a series of 9/11-type terrorist attacks hit the West, gone will be the present intramural bickering. Amid the civilian carnage few will warn that we cannot wage war as effective warriors because we are not proper moralists. Fewer will protest that we are too precious and prosperous to fight those who are not. The Somme, Dresden, and Tokyo remind us how quickly Western pieties about the moral limitations of Western arms dissipate when wars are no longer seen as optional, but are deemed existential.

At present—nearly a decade after the fall of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon—the United States may no longer wish to send affluent twentysomething college graduates into the Waziristan to fight the Taliban. In such climates, a suburbanite private at breakfast can text-message his girlfriend in Houston, and yet be blown up by noon by an illiterate Afghan with a Soviet-era rocket-propelled grenade. But should we lose a series of iconic buildings, see the government derailed by a dirty bomb in the capital, or experience serial explosions on our transatlantic fights, then hundreds of thousands not only will be willing to go after terrorists, but will also fight with a supportive public without much worry about constraining the frightening arsenal of sophisticated Western warfare.

Where does this all leave us as we begin the millennium? Not in as gloomy a state of mind as we might think—given that we can still relearn a once-common knowledge that has ameliorated danger over the centuries. The peril is not in accepting that the innate nature of war lies in the dark hearts of us all, but rather in denying it. History is our great ally. It offers as much hope as does high-tech shields, innovative new methods of diplomacy, or ecumenical world governance.

Some believe that an unchanging human nature is cause for depression, given history’s woes. I do not. Instead, I find solace in the fact that we remain the same as the Greeks, but have 2,500 years of experience, trial by error, and tragedy to draw on, and thus predict the general outlines of what men and women are likely to think and do in times of crisis.

Study of the past provides both instruction and comfort about preventing lethal wars. If we know the nature of our society and the fashion of our war making—its deadly advantages and the complex ways in which it has been sometimes checked—then we can always understand ourselves on familiar ground, no different from those who fought at Marathon or Iwo Jima.

Our great hope is not just that we will fight as well as did the Athenians who saved their civilization at Salamis, or the Marines who stormed Okinawa’s Shuri Line, but also that we will have learned what prevents such bloodletting in the first place. That knowledge, it is true, accepts the ubiquity of war. But our own past experience with war also reminds us that through preparedness, deterrence, and tough diplomacy, those who seek to profit by aggression can be restrained, but only while they are still relatively unsure of their power—before they gain greater strength, and thus prove both uninhibited and far more costly to subdue.

B Y   T H E   S A M E   A U T H O R

Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece

The Western Way of War

Hoplites
(editor)

The Other Greeks

Fields Without Dreams

Who Killed Homer?
(with John Heath)

The Wars of the Ancient Greeks

The Soul of Battle

The Land Was Everything

Bonfire of the Humanities
(with John Heath and Bruce Thornton)

An Autumn of War

Carnage and Culture

Between War and Peace

Mexifornia

Ripples of Battle

A War Like No Other

The Immigration Solution
(with Heather MacDonald and Steven Malanga)

Makers of Ancient Strategy
(editor)

INDEX

Abu Ghraib, 185, 214, 223, 232

Actium, battle at, 95, 96, 110

Aeschylus, 5, 34, 53

Afghanistan: and alternative to punitive war, 213; as asymmetrical war, 227, 228; and classical lessons about modern wars, 85, 93; and contradictions and paradoxes about war, 244; and decisive battles, 108, 109; and future of battles, 114, 115; and military errors, 167, 175, 178, 185; and military liberalism, 192, 193; and nation-building, 200, 201, 209; and neglect of military history, 9, 12; and paradoxes of the present, 237, 238; and present wars as reflective of origins of war, 240; and reasons for war, 19, 36, 42, 43; and redefinition of war, 235; and security versus freedom, 218; Soviets in, 108, 167, 224; and spread of democracy, 193, 197, 199, 210; and technology, 128
–
29, 133; and varieties of war, 25; and way of war in America, 149; and Western advantages, 234

“Age of Battles,” 110
–
11

Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 38, 200, 209, 222

air power, 16
–
17

aircraft carriers, 146
–
47

al-Qaeda, 15, 40, 47
–
48, 178, 180, 181, 208, 242, 244

Alcibiades, 28, 35, 86, 88, 89, 92

Alexander the Great:
Anabasis
as primer for, 65; brutality of, 70; at Chaironeia, 54; decisive battles of, 106; film about, 53; at Gaugamela, 67; in Mesopotamia, 34; Peloponnesian War compared with wars of, 90; and Persian Wars, 34; Plutarch’s description of, 28; and reasons for neglect of military history, 7; and technology, 133, 134; Ten Thousand as precursor to, 68; and utility of military history, 16; where to start studying about, 28, 29

Ambrose, Stephen, 11, 31

American exceptionalism, 78
–
79, 140

American Historical Association, 9

American Protective League, 217

American Revolution, 29, 167

Anabasis
(Xenophon), 27, 65
–
70

Andrewes, Tony, 68

Angell, Norman, 120

Annan, Kofi, 230
–
31

anti-Americanism, 209, 231

anti-Semitism, 231

Antietam, battle at, 166, 241

antiwar sentiment, 204, 231, 243

appeasement, 16, 209, 217

Ardennes, battle of, 113, 166, 167

Aristophanes, 34, 41, 55, 86, 231, 243

Aristotle, 45, 194, 216

Arnett, Peter, 176

Artaxerxes II, 64
–
65, 68, 69

Assad, Bashar al-, 17, 209, 222

Ataturk, Kemal, 195

Athenians: and anti-classical views of war, 45; as democratic, 46, 113, 193, 195
–
96, 206, 216, 217; lack of modern understanding about wars of, 6; and lessons learned from the past, 246; and military liberalism, 192; and roots of war, 35
–
36, 40
–
41; and security versus freedom, 216, 217; Sicily invasion by, 15, 45, 57
–
58, 84, 85, 86, 92, 196; and technology, 136; and utility of military history, 15, 16; and Western exceptionalism, 47.
See also
Peloponnesian War;
specific person

Atkinson, Rick, 11

atomic bombs, 77
–
78, 124, 144

Atta, Mohammed, 48

Atwood, Margaret, 10, 18, 19

Baker, James, 197
–
98

Baker, Nicholson, 219

Balkans: Alexander the Great in, 106; Baker’s comment about, 198; and decisive battles, 114
–
15; and democracy, 189, 198, 200, 205; and future of battles, 114
–
15; and military error, 164, 178, 185; and morality of military history, 25; and multilateralism, 205; and nation-building, 200; and paradoxes of the present, 238; Powell’s comment about, 189; and present wars as reflective of origins of war, 241; and redefinition of war, 185; and utility of military history, 15, 17

Barbarigo, Antonio, 98

Battle of the Bulge, 8, 12, 76, 108, 166

battles: end of decisive, 105
–
22; future of, 113
–
20; return of, 121
–
22; and technology, 115
–
20, 121; wars without, 108
–
11.
See also specific battle

Bazán, Don Alvaro de, 98

Beauchamp, Scott, 185

Bell, David, 111

Beloch, K. J., 91

Ben-Gurion, David, 28

Bendiner, Elmere, 26

bin Laden, Osama, 18
–
19, 40, 42, 67, 91, 95, 152, 180, 210, 232, 244

“Black Hawk Down,” 39

Blackwater, 68

blame, 23, 39, 54, 166, 184, 207, 214, 224, 228, 229, 238

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 6, 16, 43, 110, 111, 181, 191, 241

Boot, Max, 127, 129
–
32, 135

Bosnia, 112, 193, 198

Bowden, Mark, 28

Bradley, Omar, 12, 141, 166

Bragadin, Marcantonio, 95

Braun, Thomas, 67
–
68

Buckner, Simon Bolivar Jr., 77, 175

Burns, Ken, 11

Bush, George H.W., 148, 197, 209

Bush, George W.: and civilian-military relationship, 189; favorite reading of, 28; film/novel about assassination of, 218
–
19; foreign attitudes about the America of, 42; hatred of, 219; and Iraq War, 162, 198, 204; and military errors, 162; and nation-building, 208, 209; and security versus freedom, 218
–
19; and spread of democracy, 198, 204, 208, 209; and technology, 128;
300
as allegory for Iraq War and, 51; unpopularity of, 22; and war on terror, 17; and way of war in America, 149

Busolt, Georg, 91

Butler, Gerald, 51, 54

Caeser, Julius, 16, 28, 112, 191

California State University, Fresno, 11, 55, 56, 57
–
59

Cambodia, 37, 193, 238

Capponi, Niccolò, 96, 98
–
99, 100
–
101

Carter, Jimmy, 6, 57, 162, 168, 204, 209, 232

Casey, George, 174

casualties: and alternatives to punitive war, 215; and asymmetrical wars, 228, 230; and full force of military, 204; and future battles, 119; and nation-building, 210; natural disasters compared with war, 15
–
16, 224; and new-isms, 224; and paradoxes of the present, 238; and present wars as reflective of origins, 243; and spread of democracy, 204, 205; and war as “human thing,” 154, 157; and war in classical ages, 32; and way of war in America, 146, 147, 151
–
52, 157; West’s views about, 230.
See also specific war

Chaeronea (338 B.C.), 112

Chait, Jonathan, 219

Chávez, Hugo, 38, 200, 208

Chechnya, 108, 109, 238

China: and antithetical cultures, 192; and contradictions and paradoxes about war, 244; and decisive battles, 111; and future of battles, 113, 120; and Korean War, 13
–
14, 165, 170, 180; and military errors, 165, 170, 180; natural disasters in, 224; and return of battles, 121; and roots of war, 37; Sledge in, 73; and Taiwan, 37, 110, 120, 131; and technology, 131; and way of war in America, 147

Chomsky, Noam, 232

Christians, sixteenth-century, 94
–
101

Churchill, Winston, 16, 22, 23, 28, 29, 107, 187

Civil War, U.S.: casualties in, 23, 166; decisive battles in, 87, 107, 108, 111; and future of battles, 115; and military errors, 166, 171, 174
–
75, 178, 183; and neglect of study of military history, 9, 12; and popular culture, 11; and present wars as reflective of origins, 241; public sentiment about, 22
–
23; Sherman’s views about winning of, 21; and technology, 124; and way of war in America, 140
–
41, 142, 146; where to start studying about the, 27, 28, 29.
See also specific person or battle

civilian leadership.
See
leadership; presidents, U.S
specific person

Clark, Mark, 175

classical studies: and anti-classical view, 43
–
45; benefits of, 32; difficulty of understanding, 50
–
51; as foundation for studying past wars, 31
–
32; and popularity of Thucydides, 55
–
59; and war as tragedy, 32, 33, 43.
See also specific nation or war

Clausewitz, Carl von, 28, 30

Clearchus, 64, 67, 68

Cleon, 56, 88, 92, 93

Clinton, Bill, 15, 128, 189, 204, 205, 209, 213, 232

Codevilla, Angelo, 30

Coffman, Edward M., 8
–
9

Cohen, Eliot A., 28, 189

Cold War: and classical lessons about modern wars, 85; and decisive battles, 112; and democracy, 188
–
89, 196, 197
–
99; and distrust of military, 188
–
89; and military culture, 191; and military errors, 168; nuclear pessimism of, 6; and reasons for neglect of military history, 6, 7
–
8; and security versus freedom, 216; Soviet defeat in, 196; and technology, 128; and way of war in America, 140, 143

communications.
See
satellites; technology

Communism, 41, 111, 168, 192, 226.
See also
Cold War;
specific nation or war

Congo, 237, 238

consensual government, 45
–
46, 47

Constitution, U.S., 217, 218

convoy system, 169, 177, 180

cost-benefits of war: and alternatives to punitive war, 212, 213, 214; and American way of war, 152
–
53; and antiwar sentiment, 243; and decisive battles, 116
–
17, 121; explanations to public about, 186; and lessons learned from military history, 246; and Peloponnesian War, 91; and roots of war, 36, 39, 42; and spread of democracy, 192, 205, 210, 243; and study of military history, 15; and technology, 115, 116
–
17, 121, 126, 128

Council on Foreign Relations, 201

Crane, Stephen, 27

Crapsey, Edward, 176

Creasy, Edward S., 27

culture: antithetical, 190
–
92; confidence in one’s, 48; and democracy, 190
–
92; and interest in military history, 11
–
12; and military errors, 161; and moral equivalence, 223; and present as reflective of origins of war, 240; and spread of democracy, 207; tribal, 233; war as reflection of, 137
–
40, 141, 145, 147
–
48, 149, 150, 155; and Western advantages, 233

Cunaxa, battle of, 64, 65, 67, 105

Cyrus the Younger, 64
–
65, 67, 68, 69

Darfur, 33, 211, 238

Darius III, 34, 88

Das Boot
(film), 11

death: and reasons for neglect of military history, 7
–
8.
See also
casualties

Death of a President
(film), 218

Defoe, Daniel, 69

Delbrück; Hans, 27

democracy: and antithetical cultures, 190
–
92; and carnage of war, 202
–
3; challenges facing, 202
–
11; and civilian
–
military relationship, 188
–
90; and classical lessons about modern wars, 45
–
46, 85, 86, 93; and decisive battles, 113; definition of, 194; and democratic crusades, 193
–
95; and distrust of military, 188
–
90; and future of American warfare, 150, 151; and military coups, 191
–
92; and military liberalism, 192
–
93, 202; and military self-interest, 195
–
97; and nation-building, 199
–
202, 207
–
11; and new-isms, 224; Pericles’ funeral oration about, 215
–
16; in post-Cold War, 197
–
99; prerequisites for, 206; and present wars as reflective of origins of war, 243; spread of, 195
–
211, 224; Thucydides’ views about, 86; and way of war in America, 140, 145, 146; and West as immune from foreign attack, 226; and Western advantages, 233, 234; and Western exceptionalism, 45
–
46