The Great Train Robbery (30 page)

I should like, therefore, for the Working Party which considered these arrangements to meet again at West Hill, Winchester, at 3.00 pm on Wednesday 22 April, 1964, in order that we can make a single decision amongst ourselves as to how long this operation should continue, and, if it is discontinued, what other steps might be desirable. It will, of course, be borne in mind that, having made all these arrangements, it should not be difficult to remote the exercise at short notice if considered advisable.

I should be glad therefore if you would attend this meeting or send a representative who is competent to speak on your behalf, so that early decisions can be made.

Yours faithfully,

Chief Constable

Hampshire and the Isle of Wight
21

The other issue concerning the bottling up of such an explosive story was just how long could it be kept from the media with so many various officials involved in the taskforce. The answer was soon apparent, when ten days after the Scotland Yard conference the story was broken by the crime editor of the
Daily Express
:

By Percy Hoskins

Plans of another Great Train Robbery have fallen into the hands of Scotland Yard. The target this time: a West Country express carrying £5 million to £6 million in notes. Again, everything was planned with military precision – for somebody had once more given a gang accurate information about the cargo and the train movements. Now the big question disturbing the authorities is: Who is the tip-off man in the Post Office? The information shows he is not a low-ranking official.

The Yard learned of the new plot from underworld informants three weeks ago and elaborate precautions were taken by Commander George Hatherill. The Chief Constables of every county the train passes through were called to a secret conference at the Yard. A defence scheme involving road blocks and the abandonment of county ‘frontiers’ for pursuit purposes was drawn up. Ever since, on the nights the train has carried valuable loads there has been a general standby at selected ‘danger spots.’ Although no raid has been attempted, Commander Hatherill does not believe the scheme has been abandoned, but that the thieves noting the precautions have changed the target.
22

Hoskins put his finger right away on the issue of inside information. It seems clear, as he concludes, that whoever the mysterious inside man was at the Post Office, he had to be a particularly high-ranking official.

The day after the
Daily Express
broke the story, post office security officials got together to discuss strategy now that the story was public. From the official account of the ‘Primrose’ meeting they attended on 22 April, it seems clear that they and their colleagues were much more interested in trying to discover who leaked the ‘Primrose’ story to the press than who leaked the inside information about the South West TPO train to a criminal gang bent on robbing it:

1.  Messrs McMorran and Link (PSD/PMB/S), Osmond and Edwards (PD/IB) and Shires (LPR) met on the 21 April 1964 to discuss Post Office tactics at the meeting of 22 April in connection with ‘Primrose’.

2.  It was agreed that the question of whether the threat to SW TPO was still alive and the extent to which the special security arrangements would be relaxed were matters for the police to decide. Subject to the concurrence of the police we would be prepared to:-

(a)  withdraw the 2 IB men travelling on the train;

(b)  withdraw the TPO Inspector travelling on the nights when HVPs were heaviest;

(c)  agree to a reduction in the number of escorting BT police.

The other security arrangements which had been made by the Post Office would remain as permanent features.

3.  It was agreed that in discussing the extent to which the police could relax their efforts, we should express the hope that they would continue their supervision at TPO stopping points.

4.  During the scare the civil police forces had maintained close radio contact with the Up TPOs throughout their respective territories. They might want to curtail this procedure to checking in and out of each constabulary. We would prefer calls from the train to the police every 10 minutes (the time interval Chief Constables had been asked nationally to agree to) but it was agreed that the frequency of calls must ultimately be left to the Chief Constables.

5.  Mr Osmond explained that he was committed to attending the meeting and would take Mr Edwards with him. It was agreed that they should speak on behalf of all Post Office interests and Messrs. McMorran and Shires need not attend. Mr McMorran would advise the Chief Constable, Hampshire accordingly. Mr McMorran also agreed to let Mr Osmond have a list of the security arrangements on the SWTPO made by the PO and a list of TPO stopping points which had telecommunication with the Police.

6.  Mr McMorran mentioned DDG’s enquiry as to who gave the information about ‘Primrose’ to the press. Mr Osmond confirmed that so far as he was aware it was not given by a member of the Post Office staff. He did not know whether the press release had been inspired by the police but agreed to let PSD/PMB/S know if he got any information from the meeting at Winchester.

7.  Mr Osmond asked about progress with development of an odometer. Mr McMorran said ED/W had now reached the point where a practical test was imminent: there had been a lot of design snags to overcome.

Note: Mr Hyatt ED/W, has since stated that development work has been slow because the novelty of the device had thrown up serious design problems which had never before been tackled eg the need to take account of wheel wear, and wheel slip, to ensure accurate mileage recording. It would probably be a month or two yet before design could be finalised.

(G McMORRAN)

22 April 1964
23

By the end of April, Commander Hatherill had decided that the threat level had reduced sufficiently to stand-down many of the security measures on the SW TPO route. However, he and his Flying Squad subordinates seemed little interested in pursuing the question of who had sparked off the whole episode by furnishing the inside information necessary to rob the Weymouth-Waterloo express.

Notes

  
1
.  DPP 2/3717, Report 15 (originally closed until 2045; redacted version opened 25/5/10). Only the first paragraph of the report on the Great Dover Street incident, reproduced here, is publicly available. From the end of this paragraph onwards, the entire page that follows has been redacted and remains closed until 2045.

  
2
.  Frank Williams,
No Fixed Address
, p. 76 ff.

  
3
.  According to a former Flying Squad officer, who was a close colleague of Frank Williams and who accompanied him later that evening on the Roy James arrest, this was not in fact what happened, but what was retrospectively entered into the police report. According to the officer, who spoke privately to the author in July 2010, Williams himself made the ‘anonymous’ call to place it on record having already arranged the time and location of the drop with his contact. Frederick Foreman also alludes to this incident and his own involvement in his book
The Godfather of British Crime
(John Blake, 2008), p. 130
ff
.

  
4
.  MEMP*

  
5
.  Malcolm Fewtrell,
The Train Robbers
(Arthur Barker Ltd, 1964).

  
6
.  George Hatherill,
A Detective’s Story
.

  
7
.  According to Williams, it was not until 1970 that he discovered Butler had not, after all, kept Millen and Hatherill informed of his activities nor passed on his reports regarding those robbers still at liberty. See Williams,
No Fixed Address
, p. 74.

  
8
.  MEPO*; Foreman,
The Godfather of British Crime
, p. 131
ff
.

  
9
.  See Foreman,
The Godfather of British Crime
, p. 130
ff
; Williams,
No Fixed Address
, p. 78
ff
.

10
.  POST 122/15959 (opened 2011).

11
.  
Ibid
.

12
.  A possible Weybridge-Woking TPO robbery planned around February 1963 was eventually aborted (see Chapter 1; Chapter 1, notes 15 and 16).

13
.  
Ibid
.

14
.  POST 120/95 (originally closed until 2001; opened 2002); DPP 2/3718, 2 of 6 (originally closed until 2045; redacted version opened 25/6/10).

15
.  POST 122/15959 (opened 2011).

16
.  
Ibid.

17
.  
Ibid
.

18
.  The name chosen for the operation, ie ‘Primrose’, seems from police files to be derived from the activities of a group of suspects whose common denominator was 69 Belsize Park Gardens, London NW3, where the phone number was ‘Primrose 0218’ (see Chapter 7).

19
.  POST 122/15959 (opened 2011).

20
.  
Ibid
.

21
.  
Ibid
.

22
.  
Daily Express
(20 April 1964, p. 4). It seems likely that DCI Peter Vibart was Hoskins’s source for the story.

23
.  POST 122/15959 (opened 2011).

T
he English court system under which the train robbers were tried in 1964 had hardly changed since the Middle Ages. Until 1967, committal proceedings were heard in order to determine whether criminal offences should be dealt with by the Quarter Sessions or referred to the Court of Assize.

The Courts of Quarter Sessions were local courts that were held at four set times a year.
1
They did not have jurisdiction to hear the most serious crimes and were usually held in the seat of each county or county borough. They were named after the four meetings held at Epiphany, Easter, Midsummer and Michaelmas each year from 1388 onwards. The Courts of Assize heard the most serious criminal cases that were committed to it by the Quarter Sessions.
2
Both Quarter Sessions and Courts of Assize were abolished in England and Wales by the Courts Act of 1971, which replaced them with a single Crown Court.

At the committal proceedings it was generally only the prosecution that would give evidence, with the defence reserving its case. Until 1967 these proceedings were often reported in the press, so that it was virtually impossible to find an unbiased jury for the Assize trial. This indeed was one of the key reasons for the 1971 reforms.

Despite the 1,700 exhibits that were to be produced in court, along with 2,350 witness statements and 209 witnesses,
3
the Crown was unable to bring before the court one single witness or piece of forensic evidence to identify any of those in the dock as being present at the scene of the crime in the early hours of 8 August 1963.

Was the political establishment out to make examples of the robbers whose actions it perceived to be a direct attack on the very fabric of the state? Were the police encouraged to get convictions at any price, and did the judge allow flagrant abuses of the judicial process in order to facilitate this? Immediately after the trial, the Conservative Attorney-General Sir John Hobson MP,
4
wrote personally to Judge Edmund Davies:

You must be thankful that the trial is over as it must have been an appalling burden on you. Nobody can congratulate or thank a Judge for administering justice in the way it is expected to be administered, but I think it would not be improper for me to say that no single word of criticism from any quarter (whether connected with the law or not) has been heard over the conduct of this trial, and all those concerned with the administration of the law must indeed be grateful for that achievement.
5

However, it is clear from the correspondence that Edmund Davies received after the trial and sentencing that Hobson’s claim that ‘no single word of criticism from any quarter’ had been heard was untrue. In addition to the large volume of letters from members of the public agreeing or disagreeing with the sentences handed down, there are detailed memorandums from a number of noted legal authorities who expressed degrees of reservation concerning his conduct of the trial.
6

The committal proceedings against the train robbers so far charged commenced at Aylesbury on 26 September 1963. Between then and 2 December, the court sat for nineteen days. As a sign of things to come, the ten prisoners were taken to and from court by twenty constables. On 2 December, all those charged appeared before the Linslade Magistrates sitting at Aylesbury. It was at this point that Mr Sabin, a junior counsel for the prosecution, told the chairman of the bench that the prosecution had decided to withdraw the charge against Mary Manson for receiving, and would not in fact be proffering any other charge against her. He then outlined the case against her and spoke of her connection with Reynolds.

He told the bench that:

It would be quite unfair for the prosecution to ask the bench to regard Reynolds as any other than the person with whom she went to the Chequered Flag Car Showrooms. No evidence had been produced to connect Reynolds in any way with the crime.
7
Reynolds was simply a man with whom she went to the garage and no more, and the prosecution could not prove that any of the money that came from her bag came from the train robbery.
8

Mr Sabin concluded his address by asking for all the other accused to be committed for trial on the charges that had been placed before the court. Mary Manson was then dismissed and the chairman of the bench said that costs would be allowed from public funds.

Lewis Hawser QC then submitted that Brian Field had no case to answer on the charge of robbery, on the basis that the evidence to support the charge of conspiracy was extremely thin and that Field should only be tried for receiving.

The court adjourned and on its return the chairman of the bench announced that they rejected all the submissions. Submissions were then made by all the defence counsel for the case to be committed to the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey). The reason given by the defence was that such a relocation would be more convenient for all concerned: defendants, counsel, witnesses etc. The chairman rejected the submissions and committed the prisoners to stand trial at the Buckingham Winter Session of Assize at Aylesbury, which was scheduled to begin the following month.
9
Applications for bail were made on behalf of Brian Field by his counsel Ivor Richards and for Gordon Goody by Wilfred Fordham. The magistrates’ bench, however, refused both applications.