The Great War for Civilisation (33 page)

His press conference went on long into the night and into the early hours of the next morning. He spoke without notes and, although he would not regard the comparison as flattering, he often improvised his speech as he went along in much the same way that President Sadat of Egypt used to do. I noted in my report to
The
Times
next day that “when the president smiled—which he did only rarely—he was greeted by bursts of applause from fellow ministers and Baath party officials.” When several of us were close to Saddam after his speech, he offered his hand to us. In my notes, I recorded that it was “soft and damp.”

Two years later, Richard Pim, who had been head of Winston Churchill's prime ministerial Map Room at Downing Street during the Second World War, used exactly the same words—“soft and damp”—when he described to me his experience of shaking hands in Moscow with Josef Stalin, upon whom Saddam consciously modelled himself. It was one of Stalin's biographers who noted in 2004 that in the 1970s Saddam had dutifully visited all of Stalin's fifteen scenic seaside villas on the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia, some of them Tsarist palaces; these were presumably the inspiration for the vast imperial—and largely useless— palaces which Saddam built for himself all over Iraq.
⁴²

For the West, however, Saddam was a new Shah in the making. That, I suspected, was what his press conference was all about. He would be a Shah for us and a Nasser for the Arabs. His personality cult was already being constructed. He was a new version of the Caliph Haroun al-Rashid, it was said in Baghdad—he would soon become a far more disturbing version of an ancient Arab warrior—and his face now appeared across the country, in Kurdish dress, in Arab kuffiah, in business suit, digging trenches in guerrilla uniform, revolver tucked Arafat-style into his trouser belt, on dinar banknotes. He was, a local poet grovellingly wrote, “the perfume of Iraq, its dates, its estuary of the two rivers, its coast and waters, its sword, its shield, the eagle whose grandeur dazzles the heavens. Since there was an Iraq, you were its awaited and promised one.”

Saddam had already developed the habit of casually calling on Iraqis in their homes to ask if they were happy—they always were, of course—and my colleague Tony Clifton of
Newsweek
was himself a witness to this kind of Saddamite aberration. During an interview with the president, Clifton rashly asked if Saddam was never worried about being assassinated. “The interpreter went ashen-grey with fear and there was a long silence,” Clifton was to recall. “I think Saddam knew some English and understood the question. Then the interpreter said something to him and Saddam roared with laughter and clapped me on the shoulder. He didn't stop laughing, but he said to me: ‘Leave this room now! Go out onto the street! Go and ask anyone in Iraq: Do you love Saddam?' And he went on laughing. And all the people in the room burst out laughing. Of course, you couldn't really do that, could you? You couldn't go up to Iraqis and ask them that. They were going to tell you that they loved him.”
⁴³

Saddam had inherited the same tribal and religious matrix as the British when they occupied Iraq in 1917. The largest community, the Shia, were largely excluded from power but constituted a permanent threat to the Sunni-dominated Baath party. Not only were their magnificent golden shrines at Najaf and Kerbala potent symbols of the great division in Islamic society, but they represented a far larger majority in Iran. Just so long as the Shah ruled Iraq's eastern neighbour, its religious power could be checked. But if the Shah was deposed, then the Baathists would be the first to understand the threat which the Shia of both countries represented.

Shiites have disputed the leadership of Islam since the sixth-century murder of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohamed, at Najaf and believe that Ali's descendants, the imams, are the lawful successors of Mohamed. Their fascination with martyrdom and death would, if made manifest in modern war, create a threat for any enemy. The Sunnis, adherents of the
sunnah
(practice) of Mohamed, became commercially powerful from their close association with the Mamelukes and the Ottoman Turks. In many ways, Sunni power came to be founded on Shia poverty; in Iraq, Saddam was going to make sure that this remained the case. This disparity, however, would always be exacerbated—as it was in the largely Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia—by an extraordinary geographic coincidence: almost all the oil of the Middle East lies beneath lands where Shia Muslims live. In southern Iraq, in the north-east of Saudi Arabia and, of course, in Iran, Shiites predominate among the population.

Saddam tolerated the Shah once he withdrew his support for the Kurdish insurgency in the north—the Kurds, like the Shia, were regularly betrayed by both the West and Iraq's neighbours—and agreed that the Iraqi–Iranian frontier should run down the centre of the Shatt al-Arab River. He had been prepared to allow Ayatollah Khomeini to remain in residence in Najaf where he had moved after his expulsion from Iran. The prelate was forbidden from undertaking any political activity, a prohibition that Khomeini predictably ignored. He gave his followers cassettes on which he expressed his revulsion for the Shah, his determination to lead an Islamic revolution and his support for the Palestinian cause. One of his closest supporters in Najaf was Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi—later to be the Iranian ambassador to Syria who sent Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon in 1982—who was imprisoned three times by the Iraqi authorities.
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Khomeini's theological ambassador was Ayatollah Sayed Mohamed Bakr Sadr, one of the most influential and intellectual of the Shia clergy in Najaf, who had written a number of highly respected works on Islamic economy and education.

But Bakr Sadr also advocated an Islamic revolution in Iraq, relying—like Hussain Shahristani—on his own political importance to protect him from destruction. Once Khomeini was expelled by Saddam—to Turkey and ultimately to Paris— Bakr Sadr was in mortal danger. With an Islamic revolution under way in Iran, Saddam would have no qualms about silencing Khomeini's right-hand man in Najaf, let alone his followers. They were to suffer first. Bakr Sadr, sick at his home, was arrested and imprisoned in Baghdad—only to be released after widespread demonstrations against the regime in Najaf. The Baath then announced the existence of the armed opposition Dawa party and pounced on Bakr Sadr's supporters. The Iranians were later to list the first martyrs of “the Islamic Revolution of Iraq” as Hojatolislam Sheikh Aref Basari, Hojatolislam Sayed Azizeddin Ghapanchi, Hojatolislam Sayed Emaddedin Tabatabai Tabrizi, Professor Hussain Jaloukhan and Professor Nouri Towmeh. The Baath decided to crush the influence of the Shia theological schools in Najaf by introducing new laws forcing all teachers to join the party. Bakr Sadr then announced that the mere joining of the Baath was “prohibited by Islamic laws.” This determined his fate—although it was a fate that Saddam was at first unwilling to reveal.

For months, reports of Bakr Sadr's execution circulated abroad—Amnesty International recorded them—but there was no confirmation from the regime. Only when I asked to visit Najaf in 1980 did a Baath party official tell the truth, albeit in the usual ruthless Baathist manner. It was a blindingly hot day—23 July—when I arrived at the office of the portly Baathist governor of Najaf, Misban Khadi, a senior party member and personal confidant of Saddam. Just before lunchtime on this lunchless Ramadan day, as the thermometer touched 130 degrees, the admission came. Had Ayatollah Bakr Sadr been executed? I asked.

“I do not know an Ayatollah Bakr Sadr,” Khadi said. “But I do know a Mohamed Bakr Sadr. He was executed because he was a traitor and plotted against Iraq and maintained relations with Khomeini. He was a member of the Dawa party. He was a criminal and a spy and had a relationship with not just Khomeini but with the CIA as well. The authorities gave his body back to his relatives—for burial in Wadi Salam. The family have not been harmed. They are still in Najaf.”

I remember how, as Khadi spoke, the air conditioner hissed on one side of the room. He spoke softly and I leaned towards him to hear his words. This was enough to send a tingle down the spine of any listener. Khomeini's lack of respect for his former protectors now smouldered at the heart of the Baathist regime that once did so much to help him. “Khomeini speaks about crowds of people flocking to see Bakr-Sadr in his absence,” Khadi said softly. “But in court that man admitted that he spied. He was hanged just over five months ago. But these are small things to ask me about. We execute anybody who is a traitor in Iraq. Why do reporters ask unimportant questions like this? Why don't you ask me about the development projects in Najaf?”

This was a bleak, dismissive epitaph for the man who accompanied Khomeini into fourteen years of exile. Wadi Salam—the Valley of Peace—is the cemetery where so many millions of Shiites wish to be buried, within a few hundred metres of the golden shrine of the Imam Ali. The family were permitted to give him a traditional Muslim funeral and he now lay in a narrow tomb amid the hundreds of thousands of tightly packed, hump-shaped graves whose swaddled occupants believe that their proximity to Ali's last resting place will secure the personal intercession of the long-dead holy warrior on the day of resurrection. But there was another grave beside that of Bakr Sadr, and it was a more junior Baath party official who took some delight in expanding the governor's brutal story.

“We hanged his sister, too,” he said. “They were both dressed in white shrouds for their hanging. Bint Huda was hanged around the same time. I didn't see the actual hanging but I saw Bakr Sadr hanging outside the Abu Ghraib prison afterwards. They hanged him in public. He was in religious robes but with a white cloth over him and he was not wearing his turban. Later they took him down and put him in a wooden box and tied it to the roof of a car. Then he was taken back to Najaf. Why do you ask about him? He was a bad man.”

The history of the Baath party in Iraq might be written in the blood of ulemas and their families and the demise of the Shia clergy was to become a fearful theme over the coming years. Already, Imam Moussa Sadr, the leader of the Shia community in Lebanon and a relative of Bakr Sadr, had disappeared while on a visit to Libya in August of 1978. A tall, bearded man who was born in Qom and who looked younger than his fifty years, Moussa Sadr had been invited to Libya to observe the ninth anniversary celebrations of Colonel Ghadafi's revolution. All he would talk of in the Libyan capital of Tripoli, one Lebanese newspaper reported, was the situation in Iran. Had the Shah's Savak secret police seized Moussa Sadr? Had Ghadafi “disappeared” him for Saddam? He was supposed to have boarded Alitalia Flight 881 to Rome on 31 August, on his way back to Beirut. His baggage turned up on the carousel at Fiumicino Airport—but neither Moussa Sadr nor the Lebanese journalist travelling with him were on the plane. Many Shiites in Lebanon still believe that their imam will return. Others are today trying to bring criminal charges against Ghadafi. Moussa Sadr, who founded the Amal—Hope— movement in Lebanon, was never seen again.

In Najaf, the Shiites were cowed. No one openly mentioned Bakr Sadr's name in the ancient dusty city with its glorious mosque, built around the solid silver casket of the Prophet's son-in-law. One stall-holder shrugged his shoulders at me with exaggerated ignorance when I mentioned Bakr Sadr. The banners in the streets of Najaf that boiling July all praised Saddam's generosity—each slogan had been personally devised by local shopkeepers, an Information Ministry functionary insisted—and in one road there hung a small red flag bearing the words: “May the regime of Khomeini, the liar and traitor, fall to pieces.”

The elderly Grand Ayatollah Abulqassem al-Khoi, the rightful heir to the Shiite leadership in Najaf but a man who believed that the people should render unto God the things that are God's and unto Saddam the things that are recognisably Baathist, had lacked the necessary influence to smother the unrest—just as he would fail to control the mobs during the southern Iraqi uprising in 1991. There were to be no interviews with the old man. But the governor was quite prepared to take me to the house in which Khomeini had once lived. A single-storey terraced building with walls of flaking blue paint, it stood in a laneway suitably named Sharia al-Rasoul—the Street of the Prophet—in the southern suburbs of Najaf.

They tell you that the house has a varnished wooden front door and this is true; but the midday heat was so harsh that it sucked all colour from the landscape. The heat smothered us in the shade and ambushed us in fiery gusts from unsuspecting alleyways until all I could see was a monochrome of streets and shuttered houses, the fragile negative of a city dedicated to the linked identities of worship and death. Ayatollah Khomeini must have loved it here.

But the city was changing. The roads had been resurfaced, a construction project had erased one of Khomeini's old “safe” houses from the face of the earth, and Iraq's government was doing its best to ensure that the Shia now lacked nothing in this most holy of cities; new factories were being built to the north, more than a hundred new schools—complete with Baath party teachers—had been completed, together with a network of health centres, hotels and apartment blocks. The city's beaming governor drove me through the drained and sweltering streets in his white Mercedes, pointing his pudgy finger towards the bazaar.

“I know everyone here,” Misban Khadi said. “I love these people and they always express their true feelings to me.” Behind us, a trail of police escort cars purred through the heat. Khadi, though a Shiite, did not come from Najaf but from the eastern province of Diyala. He came to the Imam Ali mosque every day, he claimed, and gestured towards a banner erected over the mosaics of the shrine. It was from a recent speech by Saddam. “We are doubly happy at the presence here of our great father Ali,” it said. “Because he is one of the Muslim leaders, because he is the son-in-law of the Prophet—and because he is an Arab.”