The Historians of Late Antiquity (46 page)

Persian invasion and death

Julian planned an invasion of Persia from early in his reign (Blockley 1992: 24–30; Matthews 1989: 130–83; Marcone 1979; Bowersock 1978: 106–19; Ridley 1973). His military successes in Gaul and his victory over Constantius left him and his contemporaries with a high estimation of his skill and good fortune. The ultimate goals of an invasion of Persia have been debated (Seager 1997; Blockley 1992; Lane Fox 1997). At the very least, Julian hoped to demonstrate his superiority to Constantius, strengthen his position at home, and retaliate against the Persians for their recent successes. Julian may have had more expansive goals, including the overthrow of the Persian emperor Shapur or even the annexation of the entire Persian empire.

Historians report opposition, both human and divine, to the expedition. In March 363 Julian crossed the Euphrates with his army and then marched south, sending a portion of the army east as a diversion. In early April the army moved through Persian territory, receiving the surrender of several fortified towns. Julian and his army then approached Ctesiphon and halted on the west bank of the Tigris. Because the reinforcements had not yet arrived and the army of Shapur was near, Julian abandoned the idea of besieging Ctesiphon. As his army began to retreat, he ordered the entire fleet
of ships to be destroyed by fire. Ancient historians as well as modern scholars have provided various explanations for this action.

The Roman army retreated by land, pursued by Shapur, pressed by guerrilla warfare, and threatened by hunger due to the scorched-earth tactics of the Persians. On 26 June in a minor skirmish Julian was fatally struck by a spear. Some attributed the blow to a Persian, but others blamed a disgruntled Roman or Christians in the Roman ranks. Julian is said to have ended his life in emulation of Socrates, calmly discussing philosophy with friends as he died. The army quickly named as emperor Jovian, who salvaged the situation as best he could by suing for peace on difficult terms with Shapur to ensure the safety of the Roman army (Lenski 2000; Heather 1999a; Matthews 1989: 183–8; Scheda 1966; Conduché 1965).

Ammianus is surprisingly vague about the purpose of Julian’s invasion. He attributes to Julian love of war, a desire for revenge, and hope of receiving the title “Parthicus” (22.12.1–2). The broader strategic goals, like Ammianus’ narration of the campaign itself, remain hazy and filtered through a mythical lens. Ammianus was an eyewitness to the expedition, and his historical, tactical, and geographical details have been generally judged favorably by modern historians. Nevertheless, Ammianus created a narrative which impresses the reader more for its emotional power than for its detailed accuracy.

The importance of Julian’s Persian war to Ammianus, and the strangeness and difficulty of Ammianus’ narrative of the events, are the subject of a powerful article by Rowland Smith (1999; cf. also Matthews 1989: 130–79; Meulder 1991; Austin 1979: 92–101). Ammianus had warned the reader that his account of Julian will approach panegyric, and the emperor’s heroic longing for war against Persia moved the narrative into epic territory. Along the way, Ammianus underlines the magnitude of the task ahead and the audacity of Julian by reference to great heroes of the Roman past. The emperor died like a Homeric hero, and passed his last evening conversing as if in a Platonic dialogue. The epic nature of the story is magnified by the heavy foreshadowing of failure. Even while Julian was still in Antioch, numerous portents and omens made it clear that the expedition should not be undertaken. As the army moved south, further unfavorable signs occurred, and Ammianus tells us that the philosophers advising Julian were misunderstanding and misinterpreting these negative omens. Julian is absolved of blame for ordinary mistakes in strategy or tactics, and instead Ammianus portrays him as a
doomed but glorious leader, whose faults are the heroic ones of aiming “beyond mortal aspirations” (22.9.1).

At Antioch, Ammianus claims, Julian first became excessive in his ambitions (22.9.1). It was a bad omen that the emperor entered the city during the celebration of the Adoneia, when the population was sunk in ritual wailing and mourning (22.9.15).The failure of the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem also boded poorly for the future of the expedition (23.1.3). The twenty-third book is littered with evil signs: the death of fifty men in a hay accident (23.2.6), the death of a lion, the royal animal (23.5.8), the death of a soldier named Jovian by a lightning strike (23.5.12–14). While traditional interpreters of signs told Julian that this lightning strike portended evil for the campaign, the philosophers who advised Julian claimed that lightning was nothing but an atmospheric phenomenon, and that the death was therefore without significance.

As the army neared Ctesiphon, Ammianus downplayed the ill omens, and praised the heroic exploits of emperor and his men as they besieged and sacked several cities. But before the walls of Ctesiphon, a sacrifice of bulls to Mars was unsuccessful, and Julian’s angry promise that he would never sacrifice to Mars again proved prophetic (24.6.17). The army could not successfully lay siege to Ctesiphon, but the discussion which followed this decision is missing from our manuscripts. When the narrative picks up, Julian has given the order to march toward the interior and to burn the ships (24.7). Ammianus says that the ships were burned to deny their use to the enemy and to free up the men who were responsible for transporting the ships for combat. In retrospect, however, he says that it was as if the goddess of battle frenzy herself had lit the deadly fire (24.7.4).

The army was forced to retreat, pursued by Persian troops, and the omens became hopelessly bad (24.8.4). At night, Ammianus tells us, Julian watched his guardian spirit depart sadly from his tent (25.2.4). The next day, hastening without a breastplate to support the rear of the army against a Persian attack, Julian was pierced in the liver by a spear. Dying in his tent, Julian reassured his companions that he believed that the soul outlives the body, and that he found death in battle to be the most honorable way to die. After further philosophical talk, Julian died (25.3). Ammianus follows this affecting scene immediately with an obituary of the emperor. The historian is unstinting in his praise of Julian’s virtues, but does not refrain from criticism. Ammianus remarks that some critics would claim that Julian had provoked war with Persia to the
detriment of the Roman state, but that, in fact, it was not Julian but Constantine who was to blame for hostilities between the two parties (25.4.23; Warmington 1981). After Jovian was chosen to succeed Julian, Ammianus unfairly blames him for the mess which Julian left behind (25.5–7; Heather 1999a).

We know Eunapius’ version of the war largely through the outline of Zosimus. Eunapius tells us that he had at his disposal the memoirs of Oribasius, the doctor who had been a close advisor to Julian during the campaign (
fr
. 15). For these events, then, we would expect Eunapius to have been more accurate than usual, and in general Zosimus’ account is quite similar to that of Ammianus (3.12–30). Zosimus’ account of the fighting before Ctesiphon is, however, hopelessly confused (3.26), and it is impossible to tell how Eunapius had explained Julian’s burning of the ships and withdrawal. It seems clear that Eunapius did not cast blame on the emperor, since in one fragment the historian criticizes the carping soldiers who did not recognize the brilliance of Julian’s plan to march back to Roman territory (
fr
. 27.6). In another fragment he expresses concern that the soldiers might be corrupted by the great abundance of booty around Ctesiphon, so perhaps Eunapius portrayed Julian’s decisions as necessary because of the greed of the soldiers (
fr
. 27.5).

Zosimus says that Julian was wounded by a sword and remained alive until midnight, which suggests that Eunapius preserved the deathbed philosophizing found in Ammianus (3.29.4). Most likely Eunapius did not offer any conclusions as to the identity of Julian’s killer (
fr
. 28.1). It is likely that Eunapius portrayed the Persian invasion as a success, since Zosimus claims that at the time of his death, Julian had almost completely destroyed the Persian empire (3.29.4). The harsh treatment of Jovian by Zosimus and by the author of a
Suda
entry perhaps drawn from Eunapius suggests that he, like Ammianus, blamed Jovian for squandering the “victory” which Julian had won.

Eutropius, like Ammianus, was present on the expedition, and he, too, favors Julian and condemns Jovian (10.16–17). He writes that Julian captured several towns and forts, “laid waste to Assyria, and for a while set up camp before Ctesiphon. Returning home as victor … he was killed by an enemy’s hand” (10.16.1). Eutropius thus asserts as strongly as Eunapius that Julian had actually won the war against the Persians. Perhaps his statement that Julian was killed by an enemy is meant to rebut those who believed that the emperor was a victim of one of his own men.

Festus provides a taste of the sense of doom familiar from Ammianus’ account, saying that Julian led “cursed standards” against the Persians (28.1). He describes the movement of the army to the gates of Ctesiphon and then a daring movement by sea. This attack, Festus claims in an echo of Eunapius, would have resulted in the taking of Ctesiphon if only the soldiers had not been distracted by booty (28.2). Festus, therefore, unlike Eutropius, does not claim that Julian had been victorious, although he absolves the emperor of complete blame. Festus’ comment on the burning of the ships is of interest: “Despite his companions warning him to return, he had more faith in his own plan, and after he burned the ships, he was led by a deserter who had come for deception” (28.2). Although the connection is not clearly made, Festus seems to suggest that the burning was inspired by the deserter. In any case, he highlights Julian’s error.

Festus’ account of the death of Julian contains a few more details than might have been expected in his abbreviated history (28.3). The fatal wound, he says, penetrated Julian’s hip to the groin, and he pins the blame on an enemy horseman. Festus also alludes to the philosophical end of the emperor, who “emits his delaying soul” after speaking of many things to his companions. Festus, like Eutropius, criticizes Jovian for failing despite his possession of an army “superior in battle” (29.1). This positive portrayal of Julian is surprising coming from a Christian like Festus who was so hated by Eunapius and Ammianus. Since Festus writes to support the coming Persian invasion by Valens, it is important for propaganda purposes to portray Julian’s expedition as wise and successful, and to emphasize the ignominy of Jovian’s surrender and cession of territory.

Rufinus gives few details about Julian’s Persian invasion. The emperor “set out indeed, but never returned,” killed by either his own men or by the enemy (10.37). The accession of Jovian to power marks the return of “legitimate government,” and as soon as he becomes emperor, God’s providence is manifest (11.1). Persians provide food and supplies to the hungry army, and Jovian triumphantly restores peace to the eastern frontier and to the empire as a whole. Orosius, too, is sparing in his discussion of the invasion. He claims that the failure of the expedition occurred when Julian was misled by a traitor to move from Ctesiphon to the desert (7.30.6). Wandering carelessly through the wasteland, the emperor found death at the hands of an enemy. Jovian’s ensuing peace treaty was “not very worthy, but necessary enough” (7.31.1).

Socrates’ version is more complete. He claims that Julian had invaded Persia in early spring because he had heard that Persians are naturally sluggish and indolent during the winter (3.21). He describes the invasion as initially so successful that the Romans succeeded in besieging Ctesiphon and causing the Persian king to sue for peace. At this point, however, Julian refused to negotiate, Socrates claims, because he had become convinced that he was the reincarnation of Alexander the Great and could be satisfied with nothing less than complete victory. In full battle the Romans again defeated the Persians, but Julian was killed. In the version presented by Socrates, Julian is even more successful in war than the most partisan pagan historians had claimed. The result is to pin the final blame for the failure not on the army or on his successor but on Julian’s own megalomania.

After Julian’s death, Socrates says, the army blamed the emperor’s intemperance for their defeat, and in particular they blamed his foolishness in listening to a Persian deserter, who convinced him to burn the ships (3.22.9). Julian’s delusion and hubris cause him, in Socrates’ account, to continue to fight despite the Persian willingness to submit, and similar conceit leads to his death (3.21.11). In Ammianus’ account, Julian entered his final battle with a shield but no breastplate owing to the suddenness of the attack, but Socrates’ Julian wears no armor simply because of his delusional self-confidence. The historian gives various possible accounts of Julian’s slayer. He is inclined to agree with those who say that he was killed by his own men, although some say that a Persian was to blame. As an alternative theory, he adds that an epic poem by a certain Callistus on the war attributes the killing to a demon (3.21.14–15). While Socrates thinks that this is possible, he recognizes that Callistus may be simply writing poetically.

Sozomen continues to focus on religious aspects of Julian’s reign which Socrates had overlooked or downplayed (6.1). To prepare for the invasion of Persia, he reports that Julian wrote an arrogant letter to Arsaces, the Christian king of Armenia, in which he abused Constantius, blasphemed Christ, and demanded that he support the invasion. Sozomen also accuses Julian of planning his route east to avoid cities which are overtly Christian, and notes that the emperor stopped at Carrhae to sacrifice at the temple of Zeus. Recognizing that the failure of the expedition resulted from the threat of starvation which the army faced under Jovian, Sozomen builds his critical account of Julian’s leadership around
his failure to properly supply his army. As the Romans marched south through Assyria and took many cities, Sozomen maintains that Julian foolishly destroyed storehouses and granaries without considering that he would have to retrace his steps to return to Rome (6.1.4). This mistake becomes clear when the emperor, camped with the army at Ctesiphon, recognized that he was in danger of being trapped between the Tigris and the Euphrates, yet was unable to return by his original path which he had destroyed. Julian again showed his lack of foresight when he ordered all the provisions to be thrown off the ship, thinking that the soldiers would fight more boldly from necessity. A Persian who had resolved to die for his country struck the final blow against the army when he led them for three days through a wasteland. In Sozomen’s account, this deserter was not responsible for the burning of the ships, which was carried out to free up the men guarding them for combat (6.1.9). Nevertheless, the repeated lack of foresight by Julian left the army worn out from the journey and weakened by the lack of supplies.