The Israel-Arab Reader (51 page)

The PNC confirms its rejection of the Camp David accords and the autonomy and civil administrations plans linked to them. The council calls on the Executive Committee to develop PLO relations with Egyptian nationalist, democratic, and popular forces struggling against moves to normalize relations with the Zionist enemy in all their forms.

Reagan's plan, in style and content, does not respect the established national rights of the Palestinian people since it denies the right of return and self-determination and the setting up of the independent Palestinian state and also the PLO—the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people—and since it contradicts international legality. Therefore, the PNC rejects the considering of this plan as a sound basis for the just and lasting solution of the cause of the Palestine and the Arab-Zionist conflict.

Can the Palestine Liberation Organization develop a pragmatic diplomatic policy following its crushing military defeat in Lebanon? The sixteenth Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers last month disappointed those who had hoped so. Although the PLO may be adapting to the new situation, its pace is so slow and hesitant as to throw into doubt its ability or desire to negotiate before it is too late. With Israel daily tightening its hold on the West Bank, and Jordan considering initiatives in its own right, the Palestinian leadership seems again to have thrown away opportunities, and to be further than ever from its goals.

In recent years the PLO has gradually shifted away from its old, unattainable objective of destroying Israel and replacing it with an Arab state. The PLO now proposes a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, though it persists in refusing to recognize Israel. Last September President Reagan suggested a plan for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation with a large measure of Palestinian self-rule. Since then the Administration has hoped—and a large segment of the media has grasped at straws to imply— that the PLO might accept this proposal. The current government of Israel opposes all these ideas, but President Reagan hopes to induce Prime Minister Begin to change his policy.

The result of the convention of the PNC, the PLO's parliamentary body, was both a clear-cut political victory for Yasir Arafat and a reminder of just how narrow is his room for maneuvering. The Reagan plan was rejected, and resolutions discouraged a proposed negotiating tactic to circumvent PLO-Israel mutual nonrecognition—the creation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in which West Bank independents would represent the Palestinians, but take orders from PLO headquarters.

Observers have often overestimated Arafat's courage or ability to change PLO policy, given the caution bred by his constant struggle to mollify PLO factions and Arab regimes that use money, competing militancy, and even assassination in attempts to control the organization. Arafat's own weapons include cagey ambiguity in political positions and consensus above all. These tools have served him well, but also block any moving away of the PLO from a maximalist and rejectionist stance.

There are thus two ironies in the PLO's politics. First, the very policies that preserve the organization also freeze it into self-defeating negativism. Second, Arafat's strong position as leader is best protected by minimum use of his potential leverage. With time no longer on its side and deprived of its base in Lebanon, the PLO may well find such flaws fatal.

PNC Chairman Khalid Fahum and Arafat themselves sketched out, in milder but equally determined language, the reasons why the Reagan plan was unacceptable to the PLO. They scorned it for disregarding refugees' “right to return” to what is now Israel, self-determination, establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and recognition of the PLO as its sole legitimate representative. These four points all concern major issues; the Reagan plan cannot be adjusted to meet them.

Thus the PNC political resolution rejected the U.S. proposal in fairly clear language: “Reagan's plan, in style and content, does not respect the established national rights of the Palestinian people. . . . Therefore, the PNC rejects the considering of this plan as a sound basis for the just and lasting solution of the cause of the Palestine and the Arab-Zionist conflict.” Fatah leader Salah Khalif said in his speech—not quoted in the U.S. press—“I have not heard a single Palestinian say that he accepted Reagan's plan.”

The PNC took a more favorable position on a confederation with Jordan, which Arafat even defended as an expression of Arab unity. But there was no question of accepting domination from Amman. The resolution called for “a confederation between two independent states.” Our people shall live in their homeland, free and as masters,” said Arafat. The PNC was suspicious about allowing the Jordanians or West Bank mayors to negotiate with the Americans or Israelis. The PNC final resolution called for: “Rejection of all schemes aimed at harming the right of the PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people through any formula such as assigning powers, acting on its behalf, or sharing its right of representation.”

If the PLO does change course, the Arab regimes will have a great deal to do with it. Despite Syria's negativism, the majority of involved Arab governments favor some accommodation with Israel for the first time in history. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq take this “moderate” position. The Saudis, however, have been quite timid, even by their standards, in trying to influence the PLO. Their Fez summit resolution, endorsed by the PNC meeting, called for an independent Palestinian state in all the occupied territories with only the vaguest offer of recognition for Israel. So far they have not offered much encouragement to Reagan's efforts.

The PLO's anti-Americanism remains particularly strident. As PLO spokesmen repeatedly stress, the United States is Israel's main supplier of arms and aid, while U.S. guarantees to protect Palestinians in West Beirut proved worthless in the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Arafat's closing oration portrayed Lebanon as a PLO victory, and blamed setbacks on United States involvement. Washington received no thanks for saving the PLO leadership and troops in West Beirut from complete destruction. In Arafat's words, Ambassador Philip Habib and President Reagan decided “to destroy the foundation of the PLO.” He even claimed, “The U.S. 6th fleet . . . was the one that carried out the Israeli military landings. . . . ” But things in Lebanon were not really so bad: “They speak of this invincible [Israeli] army. But, brothers, by God I have not found it invincible. . . . I wish all my nation was with me to see the feebleness of this army.”

Such rhetoric is aimed at building morale, but it also shapes thinking. PLO strategy is still tied to positions based on illusion or internal politics. Reporters and commentators like to suggest that the failure of the PLO or of Jordan to accept the Reagan plan results from a lack of U.S. credibility and an inability to bring rapid Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon or a settlement freeze on the West Bank. But aside from the misdeeds of the Begin government, the fact is that the PLO has principled differences with American objectives and the Jordanians are hard put to join in without an Arab mandate or PLO acquiescence. The PLO only offers Hussein the unattractive option of risking a great deal to establish a PLO-led state. Unless the Arab side can produce a better offer, Washington will have no incentive to put pressure on Israel, and the creeping annexation of the West Bank will continue. . . .

Since the Israeli aggression of June 1967, and through our awareness of the dangers and repercussions of the occupation, Jordan has accepted the political option as one of the basic options that may lead to the recovery of Arab territories occupied through military aggression. Consequently, Jordan accepted Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. When the October 1973 war happened, it underlined the importance of continuing work on the political option while in the same time building our intrinsic strength. This war brought about Security Council Resolution 338, which put a stop to military operations and implicitly reemphasized Security Council Resolution 242.

Based on Security Council Resolution 338, disengagement agreements were concluded between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. This process completed the Arab circle immediately concerned with the recovery of the occupied lands through political means.

On this basis, Jordan, in cooperation with the Arab states, developed and adopted the concept of forming a unified Arab delegation that would attend an international conference for the purpose of achieving a just and comprehensive peace settlement to the Middle East problem.

In 1974, the Rabat Arab summit conference designated the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan went along with the Arab consensus and has been committed to that decision ever since.

The ensuing period saw the disjointment of Arab unity as evidenced by the Camp David accords. Further disintegration in the overall Arab position followed even between those directly affected by the Israeli occupation. All the while, Jordan kept sounding the alarm on the one hand and persevering in its course of action on the other.

Jordan warned repeatedly of the dangers inherent in the continuation of the no-war, no-peace situation, and of the exploitation by Israel of this situation to perpetuate the status quo by creating new facts in the occupied Arab territories, to realize its declared ambitions, aided by Arab disunity and by its military superiority.

Jordan has also cautioned against letting time pass by without concluding a just and comprehensive peace settlement because time was, and still is, essential to Israel's aim of creating new facts and bringing about a fait accompli.

Sixteen years have passed since the occupation, during which Israel established 146 colonies in the West Bank alone and has illegally expropriated more than 50 percent of that land.

Even today, Israel forges ahead in defiance of all international conventions and of the United Nations resolutions with a systematic policy of evacuating the inhabitants of the West Bank to change the demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories, thus realizing its designs to establish the Zionist state on the whole of Palestine.

From the early days of the occupation, and through awareness of the Zionist aims, Jordan made all these warnings and undertook the task of implementing all policies that may support the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and help them stay in their national soil.

With this objective in mind, we worked incessantly on all levels. Domestically, Jordan provides markets for the industrial and agricultural products of the West Bank and Gaza, and continues to extend support to the existing institutions in the West Bank. Also, we continue to attach great importance to building our intrinsic defense capability in cooperation with other Arab states, through the conviction held by all our nation of the great danger posed by Zionist ambitions, which threaten the Arab world and its future generations.

Within this context Jordan paid particular attention to building its armed forces, looked for new sources of arms within the available financial means and enacted the military service law to mobilize all its national resources for self-defense and for the defense of the Arab world because Jordan remains, by virtue of its geographic location, a constant target for Israeli aggression and the first line of defense on the east flank of the Arab world.

On the Arab level, Jordan sought to provide financial support for the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and formed a joint Jordanian Palestinian committee, which continues to implement the policy of supporting our people in the occupied lands.

On the international level, Jordan worked to mobilize world opinion to bring pressure to bear on Israel, and in the United Nations, through cooperation with Arab and friendly countries, Jordan succeeded in passing resolutions condemning, isolating and putting pressure on Israel.

All the while, Israel continued with its expansionist colonization program, evicting the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and replacing them by Jewish immigrants. We strive to confront this program, which stands to affect Jordan more than any other country and which threatens Jordan's identity and national security.

In June 1982, Israel launched its aggression on Lebanon, which resulted in that country joining the list of occupied Arab territories. Lebanon was not excluded from the ambitions of Israel, which had already annexed Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and which works for the de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Last September, the United States President Ronald Reagan declared his peace initiative to solve the Middle East crisis, and shortly after, the Fez Arab summit conference resumed its proceedings where the Arab peace plan was formulated. It is evident that both peace proposals were inspired by the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 and by the United Nations resolutions that followed.

Jordan, as well as other Arab and friendly countries, found that the Reagan plan lacked some principles of the Fez peace plan, but in the same time it contained a number of positive elements. Given the realities of the international situation, on the other hand, the Arab peace plan lacked the mechanism that would enable it to make effective progress. The Reagan plan presented the vehicle that could propel the Fez peace plan forward, and Jordan proceeded to explore this possibility.

We believe, and continue to believe, that this aim can be achieved through an agreement between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the establishment of a confederal relationship that would govern and regulate the future of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. This relationship would express itself, from the moment of its inception, through joint Jordanian-Palestinian action based on the Fez peace plan, Security Council Resolution 242 and the principles of the Reagan initiative. In addition, such a confederal relationship would be sought if only through the faith Arabs have in their joint destiny and in recognition of the bonds that have linked the people of Jordan and Palestine throughout history.