The Law Under the Swastika (35 page)

Several political lines thus intersect here. Frey received the media attention long denied him precisely because the public as such—and not merely the “left,” as was foolishly claimed—was concerned about him and the general rise of right-wing extremism. This concern is reflected in all the public declarations, demonstrations, candlelight chains, and other symbolic acts of the last years concerning right-wing extremism and hatred of foreigners, as well as by the vast majority of statements about Maunz’s dubious entanglements.

At the same time, a few individual members of the Association of Constitutional Lawyers reacted with visible anger to my article,
²⁰
in one instance in a defamatory outburst beyond the bounds of civilized discourse.
²¹
There are probably two main reasons for this reaction: unlike earlier statements,
²²
my voice of criticism came from within the ranks of the profession and was published in a daily paper. Such broad exposure seemed more difficult to accept than statements in books and professional journals that were read only by specialists. For example, what Alexander Hollerbach had written about Maunz’s role in the National Socialist state had not drawn any comments:

From the very beginning, Maunz stood with the National Socialist revolution and turned his attention especially to administrative law . . . Maunz turned Freiburg into a center of German administrative jurisprudence with a National Socialist bent . . . For all that, Maunz was neither a fanatical ideologue nor an ideological warrior. Rather, he embodied the type of the versatile legal expert with practical experience and concern for practical issues, whose basic positivist-technical attitude
leads him to spell out the political and constitutional givens in conformity with the system, and who sees to it that they become “operational” in the administrative reality of a state that was becoming increasingly totalitarian.
²³

A few constitutional lawyers were particularly incensed that the controversy spread to the Association of Constitutional Lawyers. Certainly it would have been more agreeable if one could have isolated the Maunz affair and seen it as the regrettable lapse of a colleague whom one had to treat with leniency because of his age and his undeniable services in other ways. In that case the whole thing could have been taken care of with a minor correction to his lifelong accomplishments in the obituary. But why this indulgence from an association that otherwise kept a close watch to make sure no “radicals” were admitted into its ranks? And in light of the freedom of research, scholarship, and teaching guaranteed in Article 5, section 3 of the Basic Law, the question of whether a constitutional lawyer who teaches the liberal-democratic order in the classroom is permitted to spend his leisure hours drafting legal opinions for extremist parties on the left or right is at least worth discussing within the profession. That same passage of the Basic Law declares that “freedom of teaching shall not absolve from loyalty to the Constitution.” Can there be any possible interpretation of this clause that would allow a professor who appears loyal to the constitution in the classroom to devote his time outside the classroom to writing articles and offering advice to enemies of the Constitution? What is the association’s general view on advice and expert opinions requested by those at the fringes of democratic consensus?

My own position on these question is easily summed up: In this area it is not possible to find a truly convincing line of distinction between professional advice and substantive support. The interpretation of normative statements is not value-neutral or free of value judgments. Equally unconvincing is a fictitious separation of the roles of scholar, legal adviser, and professor. Expert opinions are usually not secret information but are intended for public presentation in legal disputes of every kind. They are often published, as they should be; their author stands by them. If it is therefore true to say that for reasons of professional ethics there needs to be an inner coherence to the roles of professor, scholar, and adviser when it comes to the expression of professional opinions, it is also legitimate to ask how far the core of this inner coherence may be allowed to drift from what is at the heart of the liberal and democratic order. Still worth pondering are the words Gerhard Anschütz wrote in his application for emeritus status: “The task of the professor of constitutional law is not merely to transmit to
students a knowledge of German constitutional law, but also to educate students in the meaning and spirit of the prevailing system of government. This requires that a professor possess a high degree of inner commitment to the system of government.”
²⁴
To be sure, these words provide no protection if they are not linked to a system of political values. But if we embed them in the context clearly outlined by the Basic Law, it is clear that expert opinions or even anonymous writings in the world of extremist antidemocratic parties are reprehensible politically and from the standpoint of professional ethics.

For now we can merely say that this is a classic didactic drama about the professional and political condition of the Federal Republic: The revelations come through the way in which the public, the academic world, jurists, and civil servants reacted and
failed
to react to National Socialism. Maunz was a jurist of constitutional and administrative law, an expert witness and commentator, but most of all a teacher whose success was unparalleled. He was a minister whose skill in exercising this office was widely acknowledged. Erasing his name cannot change any of this. His abilities took him far—too far, in the view of a critical public. He held many offices, but he was also brought down by public pressure. He was successful, but he had to pay for the revelations after his death with a shadow that will forever hang over his name. Of course, how much of a shadow depends on the kind of consensus achieved in political and professional ethics that committed work for National Socialists and their modern-day intellectual successors cannot be silently accepted.
²⁵
This consensus has sustained the Federal Republic until now. Should it disappear, the basis on which the essays in this volume implicitly rest would also be destroyed.

NOTES

Cross-references in notes refer to notes within the same chapter
.

FOREWORD

1
. Cf. Ingo von Münch, ed.,
Gesetze des NS Staates
(Paderborn, 1994), 119–144; Joseph Walk, ed.,
Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS Staat
(Heidelberg, 1995).

2
. Martin Broszat, “A Plea for the Historization of National Socialism,” in Peter Baldwin, ed.,
Reworking the Past
(Boston, 1990), 77–87.

3
. Hans G. Hockerts, “Bürgerliche Sozialreform nach 1945,” in R. v. Bruch, ed.,
Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus
(Munich, 1985), 245–273.

4
. Rainer Zitelmann, “Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne,” in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann, eds.,
Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung
(Darmstadt, 1994), 1–20; Z. Baumann,
Dialektik der Ordnung. Die Moderne und der Holocaust
(Frankfurt, 1992).

5
. Ingo Müller,
Furchtbare Juristen
(Munich, 1987), 287.

6
. Cf. Clemens Vollnhals, ed.,
Entnazifizierung
(Munich, 1991).

7
. Jörg Friedrich,
Freispruch für die Nazi Justiz
(Reinbek, 1983); Müller,
Furchtbare Juristen
.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1
. Here “nonlaw” includes legal infractions as well as all norms that do not possess the quality of law—that is to say, customs and mores.

2
. This presupposes that the factual acceptance on the part of those subject to a norm is irrelevant to its validity, a point that is certainly open to debate.

3
. Here is Fraenkel’s definition of these two states: “By the Prerogative State we mean that governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees, and by the Normative State an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative agencies” (
The Dual State
, translated by E. A. Shils [New York, 1969], xiii).

4
. H. Schorn,
Der Richter im Dritten Reich
(1959); Schorn,
Die Gesetzgebung des Nationalsozialismus als Mittel der Machtpolitik
(1963).

5
. Revised version of my article “Nationalsozialistisches Recht,” in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann, eds.,
Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte
, part 20 (1981), cols. 873–892.

6
. M. Etzel,
Die Aufhebung von nationalsozialistischen Gesetzen durch den Alliierten Kontrollrat (1945–1948)
(1992), with additional references.

7
.
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
3:58, 4:115, 6:132, 23:98.

8
.
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
23:98, 106.

9
. The most important document of this kind is probably the book by E. Kogon,
Der SS-Staat. Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager
(1946); English translation by Heinz Norden,
The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System behind Them
(New York, 1953). This category also included A. Mitscherlich and F. Mielke,
Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung
(1947).

10
. E. Linsmayer, “Das Naturrecht in der deutschen Rechtsprechung der Nachkriegszeit,” diss., Munich, 1963; F. Wieacker,
Zum heutigen Stand der Naturrechtsdiskussion
(1965); H. D. Schelauske,
Naturrechtsdiskussion in Deutschland
(1968); W. Rosenbaum,
Naturrecht und positives Recht
(1972).

11
. F. v. Hippel,
Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaftsordnung als Warnung und Lehre
(1946); Hippel,
Die Perversion von Rechtsordnungen
(1955).

12
. See, for example, F. Kindler,
Der Rechtspositivismus. Der erste Kriegsverbrecher und seine Überwindung
(Linz: Katholische Schriftenmission, 1947). A representative
example from the opposing camp is H. Coing,
Die obersten Grundsätze des Rechts
(1947).

13
.
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
7:198.

14
. W. Wippermann,
Faschismustheorien
, 3d ed. (1976).

15
.
Braunbuch: Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik und in Westberlin
, 3d ed. (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1968);
Graubuch: Expansionspolitik und Neonazismus in Westdeutschland
, 2d ed. (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1967).

16
. Munich: “Die deutsche Universität im Dritten Reich” (1966); Tübingen: A. Flitner, ed.,
Deutsches Geistesleben und Nationalsozialismus
(1965); Berlin: “Nationalsozialismus und Deutsche Universität” (1966); Gießen: “Kritische Justiz” (1968–1969). A second series of courses began two decades later, for example, in Münster: P. Salje, ed.,
Recht und Unrecht im Nationalsozialismus
(1985); in Frankfurt: B. Diestelkamp and M. Stolleis, eds.,
Justizalltag im Dritten Reich
(1988); in Göttingen: R. Dreier and W. Sellert, eds.,
Recht und Justiz im “Dritten Reich”
(1989); in Kiel: F. J. Säcker, ed.,
Recht und Rechtslehre im Nationalsozialismus
(1992).

17
. Critique in W. F. Haug,
Der hilflose Antifaschismus
(1967).

18
. H. Mommsen,
Beamtentum im Dritten Reich
(1966); H. Jäger,
Verbrechen unter totalitärer Herrschaft
, 2d ed. (1982); P. Thoss,
Das subjektive Recht in der gliedschaftlichen Bindung
(1968); B. Rüthers,
Die unbegrenzte Auslegung
(1968); P. Diehl-Thiele,
Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich
(1969); M. Broszat,
Der Staat Hitlers
(1969; English translation by John W. Hiden,
The Hitler State
[London, 1981]); H. Matzerath,
Nationalsozialismus und kommunale Selbstverwaltung
(1970); U. Hientzsch,
Arbeitsrechtslehren im Dritten Reich und ihre historische Vorbereitung
(1970); F. Kaul,
Geschichte des Reichsgerichts 1933–1945
, vol. 4 (1971); D. Kirschenmann,
“Gesetz” im Staatsrecht und in der Staatsrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus
(1970); L. Gruchmann, “Euthanasie und Justiz im Dritten Reich,”
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte
20 (1972): 255 ff.; H. Kiesewetter,
Von Hegel zu Hitler
(1974). For the literature during the two decades from 1974 to 1994, which has long since become impossible to keep track of, the reader is referred to the ongoing reviews in the journal
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte
.

19
. An exemplary work is that of E. John et al., eds.,
Die Freiburger Universität in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus
(1991), with an essay by A. Hollerbach, 91–113.

20
. The contributions of legal history at the law faculties in Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Leipzig on this topic were extremely sparse. Scholars took no interest in a differentiated account of “Fascism” as defined by the party, and the similarities with their own system were obvious. To this we must add as exacerbating factors the general marginalization of legal history and scarcity of materials.

21
. D. Majer,
“Fremdvölkische” im Dritten Reich. Ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Rechtssetzung und Rechtspraxis in Verwaltung und Justiz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der eingegliederten Ostgebiete und des Generalgouvernements
(1981); and
Grundlagen des nationalsozialistischen Rechtssystems. Führerprinzip, Sonderrecht, Einheitspartei
(1987). On criminal law, see most recently G. Werle,
Justiz-Strafrecht und politische Verbrechensbekämpfung im Dritten Reich
(1989).

22
. J. v. Kruedener, “Zielkonflikt in der nationalsozialistischen Agrarpolitik,”
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
94 (1974): 335–361.