The Lemon Tree: An Arab, A Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East (52 page)

Whether or not Nasser wanted war in 1967 remains a contentious dispute among historians. Nasser's public statements sent a bellicose message to Israel and the world, much like his decision to close the Straits of Tiran (Mutawi, p. 95), but as Shlaim writes in
The Iron Wall, p.
237, "There is general agreement among commentators that Nasser neither wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel. What he did was to embark on an exercise in brinkmanship that was to carry him over the brink." Yost, in his 1968
Foreign Affairs
article, wrote that "there is no evidence—quite the contrary—that either Nasser or the Israeli Government . . . wanted and sought a war at this juncture." In a May 12, 1967 background briefing, according to Hirst (p. 343), Aharon Yariv, director of Israeli military intelligence, told reporters, "I would say that as long as there is not an Israeli invasion into Syria extended in area and time, I think the Egyptians will not come in seriously . . . they will do so only if there is no other alternative. And to my eyes no alternative means that we are creating such a situation that it is impossible for the Egyptians not to act because the strain on their prestige will be unbearable."

The specific numbers of troops massing near the common border at the edge of the Sinai Peninsula is also contentious. Herzog
(TheArab-Israeli Wars, p.
149 and p. 154) and Oren (p. 63, citing IDF intelligence) suggest close to one hundred thousand Egyptian troops were in Sinai. Israeli general Matitiahu Peled later indicated that the troop concentrations were lower than the figures Herzog and Oren used (Hirst, p. 337).

U.S. officials were also highly skeptical of the one hundred thousand figure. Perhaps most compelling on this point, and generally regarding U.S. diplomatic activity in May and June 1967, and military capabilities of Middle Eastern nations, are the exchange found in documents in the LBJ Library, many of which are housed in FRUS Vol. XIX (available online at
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/vol_xviii/index.html). The May 26 CIA memo is in that collection, document 79. Battle's "slightly insane quote" comes from a summary of a May 24 National Security Council meeting, FRUS Vol. XIX, document 54. The U.S. estimates of fifty thousand Egyptian troops, repeated in at least two separate CIA memoranda: May 25, FRUS Vol. XIX, document 61; and May 26, "Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States," from "National Security File-Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda," Folder 3, from which the analysis of Israel's "political gambit" also comes. Rostow's characterization of Israel's estimates of one hundred thousand Egyptian troops as "highly disturbing" come from his May 25 "memorandum for the President," from "National Security File, Mideast Crisis NSC History," Vol. 1, Tab 42, document 32. The CIA assessment of Israel's abilities to fight and/or defend various fronts comes from a May 23 memorandum (FRUS Vol. XIX, document 44). Yet another CIA memorandum, on May 26, assessed the "lack of cohesiveness on the Arab side" and the depletion of Nasser's forces by thirty-five thousand troops ("Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States," "National Security File-Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda," Folder 3). The conversation between Abba Eban, McNamara, and LBJ, including McNamara's telling Eban of the conclusions of "three separate intelligence groups" that the Egyptian Sinai deployments were defensive, and LBJ's "whip the hell out of them" quote, is summarized in the May 26 "Memorandum of Conversation" (FRUS Vol. XIX, document
77).
The Katzenbach "mop up the Arabs" quote comes from his oral history interview for the LBJ Library (interview number 3, December 11, 1968). For additional background on Eban's trip to Washington, see Heikal (p. 127), Green (pp. 198-204), and Shlaim (pp. 239240).

King Hussein's concerns about "USG" favoring Israel were delivered as an "oral message" to the U.S. ambassador in Amman and cabled to the "highest USG authorities" in Washington ("National Security File, Mideast Crisis, NSC History," Vol. 1, Tab 36). The same file, Tab 38, contains Secretary of State Dean Rusk's May 26 "Memorandum for the President," which notes Israel's conclusion that Egyptian and Syrian attacks were imminent, and Rusk's observation that "our intelligence does not confirm this Israeli estimate." LBJ's urgent May 27 telegram to Eshkol is in FRUS Vol. XIX, document 86.

Nasser's "we are ready!" remark is quoted in Mutawi, p. 94. These statements had special meaning for the Israeli public, for whom "the memory of the Holocaust was a powerful psychological force that deepened the feeling of isolation and accentuated the perception of threat" (Shlaim, p. 238).

Michail Fanous, an Arab of Ramla, confirmed Dalia's recollection of preparations. Additional detail, including the ten thousand graves, comes from Oren, pp. 135-36. The "push the Jews into the sea" remark is recalled by Dalia and cited to me in many interviews by both Arabs and Israelis. For perceptions of the strength of the Israeli army, see Shlaim, pp. 239-40. Numerous Arab sources express skepticism that the "push them into the sea" comments were ever uttered. Heikel (p. 141) suggests this was "a remarkably successful piece of disinformation." He recalls that following Indian president Nehru's concerns about the quoted threat, "a committee consisting of senior officials from Yugoslavia, India and Egypt was set up to sift through all public remarks by Nasser and Egyptian ministers," and that they found "no trace of the alleged comment." Hirst (p. 417) cites British parliamentarian Christopher Mayhew's offer of five thousand British pounds for anyone who could "produce any statement by an Arab leader which could be described as 'genocidal' in intent," and that "no statement was produced." Still, as mentioned above, the "push into the sea" remarks are specifically recalled by Arabs and Jews I interviewed, and even if the statement was never uttered in those precise words, the threats of Nasser and other Arab leaders toward Israel, and their effects on the Israeli public, are clear enough.

Heikal, p. 128, cites the visit to Nasser by the Soviet ambassador. Mutawi discusses King Hussein's position on pp. 85-121.

The rupture in Eshkol's cabinet is described by Shlaim, pp. 238-41, where he recounts Rabin's twenty-four-hour attack of "acute anxiety" and his dressing-down by Ben-Gurion, who told Rabin: "I very much doubt whether Nasser wanted to go to war, and now we are in serious trouble."

McNamara's conversation with Meir Amit is summarized in the June "Memorandum for the Record" (FRUS Vol. XIX, document 124). The "I, Meir Amit" and "seven days" quotes appear as a footnote in the memorandum, quoting Amit's recollection of the meeting with McNamara at a 1992 conference on the Six Day War. These and other details are also contained in Richard B. Parker's
The Six-Day War: A Retrospective,
(Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1996, p. 139). Nasser's remark to Mayhew is cited in Mutawi on p. 94. His conversation with Robert Anderson, and the upcoming visit of Mohieddin is summarized in two telegrams to LBJ and Rusk that Anderson sent on June 1 and 2 from the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal (FRUS Vol. XIX, documents 123 and 129). Walt Rostow, in a note to LBJ four hours after Anderson's June 2 cable arrived, wrote, "In the light of this picture of Nasser's mind, we must work out most carefully the scenario for talks with Mohieddin. . . . It is urgent that we decide whether we should inform the Israelis of this visit. My guess is their intelligence will pick it up. We would be wise to have Sec. Rusk tell [Israeli Ambassador Avraham] Harman," (FRUS Vol. XIX, document 129, footnote 1).

Nasser's June 2 telegram to President Johnson is in the LBJ Library, "National Security File, NSC History, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967," Tab 101. The June 3 CIA memorandum, "The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis," is located in "National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence memoranda," Folder 3).

The Israeli intelligence analysis is quoted by Schleifer in
The Fall of Jerusalem,
pp. 102 and 113.

See Mutawi, pp. 94-96, for more on Nasser's motivation and intentions. He quotes King Hussein and other prominent Jordanians as saying they did not believe Nasser wanted war. Rabin's "I do not believe Nasser wanted war" quote comes from Hirst,
The Gun and the Olive Branch, p.
337, and was published in a
Le Monde
article of February 29, 1968. Rabin added: "The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it." Matitiahu Peled, an Israeli general at the time, and later a prominent member of the Israeli peace movement, told
Ma ariv in
1972, "It is notorious that our General Staff never told the government that the Egyptian military threat represented any danger to Israel or that we were unable to crush Nasser's army, which, with unheard-of foolishness, had exposed itself to the devastating might of our army." Oren (pp. 92-97, 119-121), unlike most writers on the 1967 war, makes much of "Operation Dawn," an alleged plan by Egyptian war minister Amer to strike first against Israel, though he acknowledges that Nasser may not have even known about "Dawn" until days before it was to be implemented, raising questions as to whether this was a genuine plan. In any case, Oren writes, Nasser scuttled the alleged plan in late May, and it was never implemented.

The "strong warning" quote comes from Heikal, at the time a Nasser aide, on p. 126.

The start of the war is described by Herzog on pp. 151-53. Herzog mentions 1:45 as the moment the war began; Oren (p. 170) mentions 7:10. Eshkol's message to King Hussein is quoted by Shlaim on p. 244. The scene on the streets of Ramallah was described in various interviews, including with Nicola Akkel, and is corroborated in descriptions in
Homeland,
a collection of Palestinian oral history interviews, p. 62.

The Voice of the Arabs broadcasts emanating from Cairo are described by Mutawi on p. 133 and Oren on p. 178. Bashir recalls hearing such broadcasts on June 5 and his elation that the Arabs were winning. His cousin Ghiath told me the Umm Kolthum story in an interview.

The destruction of the Egyptian air force and the timing of the Israeli attack are described by Herzog on pp. 151-52. The coded message sent from Egypt to Jordan, containing "completely false information," is quoted by Mutawi on p. 123.

King Hussein's mistrust of Eshkol and the Israeli promises not to attack are outlined by Mutawi on p. 130. The "Brother Arabs" quote comes from archival tape provided me by radio archivist Andy Lanset of WNYC in New York. I used this tape in a December 2001 broadcast on the Arab view of the West for the public radio documentary program
American Radio Works.
Ahmad Said's "Zionist barracks" declaration is quoted in Morris
(Righteous Victims, p.
310). The attacks and the destruction of Arab air forces are described in multiple sources, including Herzog (p. 171), Oren (pp. 186-95), and Mutawi (p. 129). The explosions in Ramallah on June 5 and 6 are described by numerous sources, including Bashir; Husam Rafeedie in the oral history
Homeland, p.
63; and Raja Shehadeh's memoir,
Strangers in the House,
pp. 37
47.
Herzog (p. 175) mentions the radio transmitter in Ramallah being "put out of action" and on p. 176 describes the obliteration of the Jordanian infantry troops coming from Jericho. The reports of the Old City being surrounded is in Herzog, p. 176, and Mutawi, p. 134.

The "rapidly deteriorating" quote from Riad, the Arabs' choices, and the cables and telegrams between Amman and Cairo are described by Mutawi, pp. 138-39, quoting directly from original documents in Arabic.

The fall of Ramallah is described by Bashir and Akkel and in
Strangers in the House
by Shehadeh, who recalls his father's words, whispered as he was "totally enveloped in a troubled silence":

It's a repeat of 1948. . . . Just like 1948, so much talk and no action, just bravado: We will show the enemy, the Arabs declare, but when the fighting starts they disappear.

The near defenselessness of the Jordanian army and its retreat late on June 6 are depicted by Mutawi on pp. 138-40; however, he also cites an interview with Habes Majali, commander in chief of the Jordanian armed forces, as saying that the reports of Jordanian losses in the West Bank were exaggerated by field commanders. Clearly, though, without air cover the Jordanian army had become essentially unable to defend itself or the residents of the West Bank against the power of the Israel Defense Forces.

The image of white flags in the form of T-shirts and handkerchiefs comes from an interview with Nicola Akkel in Ramallah.

The destruction of Imwas, Beit Nuba, and Yalo is described by numerous historians, including Oren on p. 307. Today there is almost no trace of the villages; in their place is "Canada Park." A plaque reads:

The Valley of Springs in Canada Park has been developed through the generosity of Joseph & Feye Tanenbaum, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Jewish National Fund.

The flight of at least 200,000 Palestinian refugees during and after the 1967 war is one of the lesser-known effects of those six days. Oren makes no mention of it in
Six Days of War.
He writes that the "Palestinian community" was "for the most part retained in [its] prewar positions. . . ."

Segev, author of a recent book in Hebrew on the 1967 war, wrote me that the figure of displaced Arabs in 1967 was about 250,000, which included Syrian civilians who fled the Golan Fleights. Andrew I. Kilgore, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar and publisher of the
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
used a figure in March 1990 (
www.washington-
report.org/backissues/0390/9003017.htm) of 200,000 Palestinians displaced. The report.org/backissues/0390/9003017.htm) of 200,000 Palestinians displaced. The Israeli government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/
Israeli government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/
Israeli government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/
2000_2009/2000/2/Displaced+Persons+-+1967.htm) acknowledges "displaced per­sons" from the 1967 war but does not use a number.