The Major Works (English Library) (20 page)

The first is a mistake, or a conception of things, either in their first apprehensions, or secondary relations. So Eve mistook the Commandient, either from the immediate injunction of God, or from the secondary narration of her husband. So might the Disciples mistake our Saviour, in his answer unto Peter, concerning the death of John, as is delivered, John 21. Peter seeing John, saith unto Jesus, Lord, and what shall this man doe? Jesus saith, If I will, that he tarry till I come, what is that unto thee? Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, that that Disciple should not die.
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Thus began the conceit and opinion of the Centaures, that is, in the mistake of the first beholders, as is declared by Servius; when some young Thessalians on horseback were beheld afarre off, while their horses watered, that is, while their heads were depressed, they were conceived by the first spectators, to be but one animall; and answerable hereunto have their pictures been drawn ever since.

And as simple mistakes commonly beget fallacies, so men rest not in false apprehensions, without absurd and inconsequent diductions; from fallacious foundations, and misapprehended mediums, erecting conclusions no way inferrible from their premises. Now the fallacies whereby men deceive others, and are deceived themselves, the Ancients, have divided into
Verball and Reall. Of the Verball, and such as conclude from mistakes of the word, although there be no lesse then six, yet are there but two thereof worthy our notation; and unto which the rest may be referred: that is the fallacies of Æquivocation and Amphibologie; which conclude from the ambiguity of some one word, or the ambiguous syntaxis of many put together. From this fallacy arose that calamitous error of the Jews, misapprehending the Prophesies of their Messias, and expounding them alwaies unto literall and temporall expectations. By this way many errors crept in and perverted the doctrine of Pythagoras, whilest men received his precepts in a different sense from his intention; converting Metaphors into proprieties, and receiving as literrall expressions, obscure and involved truths.…

The circle of this fallacy is very large, and herein may be comprised all Ironicall mistakes; for intended expressions receiving inverted significations; all deductions from metaphors, parables, allegories, unto reall and rigid interpretations. Whereby have risen not only popular errors in Philosophy, but vulgar and senselesse heresies in Divinity; as will be evident unto any that shall examine their foundations, as they stand related by Epiphanius, Austin, or Prateolus.…

A third cause of common Errors is the Credulity of men, that is, an easie assent, to what is obtruded, or a beleeving at first ear what is delivered by others. This is a weaknesse in the understanding, without examination assenting unto things, which from their natures and causes doe carry no perswasion; whereby men often swallow falsities for truths, dubiosities for certainties, fesibilities for possibilities, and things impossible as possibilities themselves. Which, though a weaknesse of the Intellect, and most discoverable in vulgar heads, yet hath it sometime fallen upon wiser brains, and great advancers of truth. Thus many wise Athenians so far forgot their Philosophy, and the nature of humane production, that they
descended unto beliefs, the originall of their Nation was from the Earth, and had no other beginning then from the seminality and womb of their great Mother. Thus is it not without wonder, how those learned Arabicks so tamely delivered up their belief unto the absurdities of the Alcoran. How the noble Geber, Avicenna and Almanzor, should rest satisfied in the nature and causes of earthquakes, delivered from the doctrine of their Prophet; that is, from the motion of a great Bull, upon whose hornes all the earth is poised. How their faiths could decline so low, as to concede their generations in heaven, to be made by the smell of a citron, or that the felicity of their Paradise should consist in a Jubile of copulation, that is a coition of one act prolonged unto fifty years.
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Thus is it almost beyond wonder, how the belief of reasonable creatures, should ever submit unto Idolatry: and the credulity of those men scarce credible (without presumption of a second fall) who could beleeve a Deity in the work of their own hands. For although in that ancient and diffused adoration of Idols, unto the Priests and subtiler heads, the worship perhaps might be symbolicall, and as those Images some way related unto their deities; yet was the Idolatry direct and down-right in the people; whose credulity is illimitable; who may be made beleeve that any thing is God; and may be made beleeve there is no God at all.

And as Credulity is the cause of Error, so incredulity oftentimes of not enjoying truth; and that not only an obstinate incredulity, whereby we will not acknowledge assent unto what is reasonably inferred, but any Academicall reservation in matters of easie truth, or rather scepticall infidelity against the evidence of reason and sense. For these are conceptions befalling wise men, as absurd as the apprehensions of fools, and the credulity of the people which promiscuously swallow any thing. For this is not only derogatory unto the wisdom of God, who hath proposed the world unto our knowledge, and thereby the notion of himself, but also detractory unto the intellect, and
sense of man expressedly disposed for that inquisition. And therefore
hoc tantum scio quod nihil scio
,
⁴⁶
is not to be received in an absolute sense, but is comparatively expressed unto the number of things whereof our knowledge is ignorant; nor will it acquit the insatisfaction of those which quarrell with all things, or dispute of matters concerning whose verities we have conviction from reason, or decision from the inerrable and requisite conditions of sense. And therefore if any affirm the earth doth move, and will not beleeve with us, it standeth still; because he hath probable reasons for it, and I no infallible sense nor reason against it, I will not quarrell with his assertion.
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But if like Zeno he shall walk about, and yet deny there is any motion in nature, surely that man was constituted for Anticera,
⁴⁸
and were a fit companion for those, who having a conceit they are dead, cannot be convicted into the society of the living.

The fourth is a supinity or neglect of enquiry, even in matters whereof we doubt; rather beleeving, then going to see,. or doubting with ease and gratis, then beleeving with difficulty or purchase; whereby, either from a temperamentall inactivity we are unready to put in execution the suggestions or dictates of reason; or by a content and acquiescence in every species of truth, we embrace the shadow thereof, or so much as may palliate its just and substantiall acquirements. Had our fore-fathers sat down in these resolutions, or had their curiosities been sedentary, who pursued the knowledge of things through all the corners of nature, the face of truth had been obscure unto us, whose lustre in some part their industries have revealed.

Certainly the sweat of their labours was not salt unto them, and they took delight in the dust of their endeavours. For questionlesse in knowledge there is no slender difficulty, and truth which wise men say doth lye in a well, is not recoverable but by exantlation.
⁴⁹
It were some extenuation of the curse, if
in
sudore vultus tui
,
⁵⁰
were confinable unto corporall exercitations, and there still remained a Paradise or unthorny place of knowledge. But now our understandings being eclipsed, as well as our tempers infirmed, we must betake our selves to waies of reparation, and depend upon the illumination of our endeavours. For thus we may in some measure repair our primary ruines,
⁵¹
and build our selves men again. And though the attempts of some have been precipitous, and their enquiries so audacious as to come within command of the flaming swords, and lost themselves in attempts above humanity; yet have the enquiries of most defected by the way, and tyred within the sober circumference of knowledge.

And this is the reason why some have transcribed any thing; and although they cannot but doubt thereof, yet neither make experiment by sense or enquiry by reason, but live in doubts of things whose satisfaction is in their own power; which is indeed the inexcusable part of our ignorance, and may perhaps fill up the charge of the last day. For not obeying the dictates of reason, and neglecting the cries of truth, we fail not only in the trust of our undertakings, but in the intention of man it self. Which although more veniall unto ordinary constitutions, and such as are not framed beyond the capacity of beaten notions, yet will it inexcusably condemn some men, who having received excellent endowments, have yet sat down by the way, and frustrated the intention of their habilities. For certainly as some men have sinned, in the principles of humanity, and must answer, for not being men, so others offend if they be not more;
Magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus
,
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would commend those, These are not excusable without an Excellency. For great constitutions, and such as are constellated unto knowledge, do nothing till they outdoe all; they come short of themselves if they go not beyond others, and must not sit down under the degree of worthies. God expects no lustre from the minor stars,
but if the Sun should not illuminate all, it were a sin in Nature.
Ultimus bonorum
,
⁵³
will not excuse every man, nor is it sufficient for all to hold the common levell; Mens names should not only distinguish them: A man should be something that men are not, and individuall in somewhat beside his proper nature. Thus while it exceeds not the bounds of reason and modesty, we cannot condemn singularity.
Nos numerus sumus
,
⁵⁴
is the motto of the multitude, and for that reason are they fools. For things as they recede from unity, the more they approach to imperfection, and deformity; for they hold their perfection in their simplicities, and as they nearest approach unto God.

Now as there are many great wits to be condemned, who have neglected the increment of Arts, and the sedulous pursuit of knowledge; so are there not a few very much to be pittied, whose industry being not attended with naturall parts, they have sweat to little purpose, and rolled the stone in vain. Which chiefly proceedeth from naturall incapacity, and geniall indisposition, at least to those particulars whereunto they apply their endeavours. And this is one reason why though Universities be full of men, they are oftentimes empty of learning. Why as there are some which do much without learning, so others but little with it, and few that attain to any measure of it. For many heads that undertake it, were never squared nor timbred for it. There are not only particular men, but whole nations indisposed for learning; whereunto is required not only education, but a pregnant Minerva and teeming constitution. For the wisdome of God hath divided the Genius of men according to the different affairs of the world, and varied their inclinations according to the variety of Actions to be performed therein. Which they who consider not, rudely rushing upon professions and waies of life unequall to their natures; dishonour not only themselves and their functions, but pervert the harmony of the whole world. For if the world went on as God hath ordained it, and were every one implied in points concordant to their Natures; Professions, Arts and Common-wealths
would rise up of themselves; nor needed we a Lanthorn to finde a man in Athens.
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But the mortallest enemy unto knowledge, and that which hath done the greatest execution upon truth, hath been a peremptory adhesion unto Authority, and more especially the establishing of our belief upon the dictates of Antiquity. For (as every capacity may observe) most men of Ages present, so superstitiously do look on Ages past, that the authorities of the one, exceed the reasons of the other. Whose persons indeed being farre removed from our times, their works, which seldome with us passe uncontrouled, either by contemporaries or immediate successors, are now become out of the distance of envies: And the farther removed from present times, are conceived to approach the nearer unto truth it self. Now hereby methinks we manifestly delude our selves, and widely walk out of the track of truth.

For first, men hereby impose a thraldome on their times, which the ingenuity of no age should endure, or indeed the presumption of any did ever yet enjoin. Thus Hippocrates about 2000. year agoe, conceived it no injustice, either to examine or refute the doctrines of his predecessors: Galen the like, and Aristotle most of any. Yet did not any of these conceive themselves infallible, or set down their dictates as verities irrefragable;
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but when they either deliver their own inventions, or reject other mens opinions, they proceed with Judgement and Ingenuity, establishing their assertion, not only with great solidity, but submitting them also unto the correction of future discovery.

Secondly, Men that adore times past, consider not that those times were once present, that is, as our own are at this instant, and we our selves unto those to come, as they unto us at present; as we relye on them, even so will those on us, and magnifie us
hereafter, who at present condemn our selves. Which very absurdity is daily committed amongst us even in the esteem and censure of our own times. And to speak impartially, old men from whom we should expect the greatest example of wisdome, do most exceed in this point of folly; commending the daies of their youth, they scarce remember, at least well understood not; extolling those times their younger years have heard their fathers condemn, and condemning those times the gray heads of their posterity shall commend. And thus is it the humour of many heads to extoll the daies of their fore-fathers, and declaim against the wickednesse of times present. Which notwithstanding they cannot handsomely doe, without the borrowed help and satyres of times past; condemning the vices of their times, by the expressions of vices in times which they commend, which cannot but argue the community of vice in both. Horace therefore, Juvenall and Perseus were no prophets, although their lines did seem to indigitate and point at our times. There is a certain list of vices committed in all ages, and declaimed against by all Authors, which will last as long as humane nature; or digested into common places may serve for any theme, and never be out of date untill Dooms day.

Thirdly, The testimonies of Antiquity and such as passe oraculously amongst us, were not if we consider them alwaies so exact, as to examine the doctrine they delivered. For some, and those the acutest of them, have left unto us many things of falsity, controulable, not only by criticall and collective reason, but common and countrey observation… Other Authors write often dubiously, even in matters wherein is expected a strict and definitive truth; extenuating their affirmations, with
aiunt, ferunt, fortasse
,
⁵⁷
As Dioscorides, Galen, Aristotle, and many more. Others by hear say; taking upon trust most they have delivered; whose volumes are meer collections, drawn from the mouthes or leaves of other Authors; as may be observed in Plinie, Ælian, Athenæus, and many more. Not a few transcriptively; subscribing their names unto other mens endeavours, and meerly transcribing almost all they have
written. The Latines transcribing the Greeks, the Greeks and Latines each other….

Fourthly. While we so eagerly adhear unto Antiquity, and the accounts of elder times, we are to consider the fabulous condition thereof; and that we shall not deny if we call to minde the mendacity of Greece, from whom we have received most relations, and that a considerable part of Ancient times, was by the Greeks themselves termed
μυθικóν
, that is, made up or stuffed out with fables. And surely the fabulous inclination of those daies, was greater then any since; which swarmed so with fables, and from such slender grounds, took hintes for fictions, poysoning the world ever after; wherein, how far they exceeded, may be exemplified from Palæphatus, in his book of fabulous narrations. That fable of Orpheus, who by the melody of his musick, made woods and trees to follow him, was raised upon a slender foundation; for there were a crew of mad women, retired unto a mountain, from whence being pacified by his Musick, they descended with boughs in their hands, which unto the fabulosity of those times, proved a sufficient ground to celebrate unto all posterity the Magick of Orpheus harp, and its power to attract the senselesse trees about it….

Fiftly, We applaud many things delivered by the Ancients, which are in themselves but ordinary, and come short of our own conceptions. Thus we usually extoll, and our Orations cannot escape the sayings of the wise men of Greece.
Nosce teipsum
of Thales:
Nosce tempus
of Pittacus:
Nihil nimis
of Cleobulus;
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which notwithstanding to speak indifferently, are but vulgar precepts in Morality, carrying with them nothing above the line, or beyond the extemporary sententiosity of common conceits with us. Thus we magnifie the Apothegmes, or reputed replies of wisdom, whereof many are to be seen in Laertius, more in Lycosthenes, not a few in the second book of Macrobius, in the salts of Cicero, Augustus, and the Comicall wits of those times: in most whereof there is not much to admire and are me thinks exceeded, not only in the replies of wise men, but the passages of society and urbanities of our times. And
thus we extoll their adages or proverbs; and Erasmus hath taken great pains to make collections of them; whereof notwithstanding the greater part will, I beleeve, unto indifferent judges be esteemed no extraordinaries; and may be paralleled, if not exceeded, by those of more unlearned nations, and many of our own.

Sixtly, We urge authorities, in points that need not, and introduce the testimony of ancient writers, to confirm things evidently beleeved, and whereto no reasonable hearer but would assent without them; such as are;
Nemo mortalium omnibus horis sapit. Virtute nil præstantius, nil pulchrius. Omnia vincit amor. Præclarum quiddam veritas
.
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All which, although things known and vulgar, are frequently urged by many men, and though triviall verities in our mouthes, yet noted from Plato, Ovid, or Cicero, they become reputed elegancies….

Lastly, While we so devoutly adhere unto Antiquity in some things, we doe not consider we have deserted them in severall others. For they indeed have not only been imperfect, in the conceit of some things, but either ignorant or erroneous in many more. They understood not the motion of the eight sphear from West to East, and so conceived the longitude of the starres invariable. They conceived the torrid Zone unhabitable, and so made frustrate the goodliest part of the earth. But we now know ’tis very well empeopled, and the habitation thereof esteemed so happy, that some have made it the proper seat of Paradise; and been so farre from judging it unhabitable, that they have made it the first habitation of all. Many of the Ancients denied the Antipodes, and some unto the penality of contrary affirmations; but the experience of our enlarged navigations, can now assert them beyond all dubitation. Having thus totally relinquisht them in some things, it may not be presumptuous, to examine them in others; but surely most unreasonable to adhere to them in all, as though they were infallible or could not erre in any.