MARCUS:
Quite right; that’s how things are. But in the procedure of philosophers (I don’t mean the older lot,
*
but those who have set up what might be called philosophical factories
*
) things that were once expressed in large general terms are now presented separately, point by point. They think that the subject which we now have in hand cannot be adequately dealt with unless this particular proposition (i.e. that justice is derived from nature) is examined on its own.
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ATTICUS:
I suppose you have lost your freedom of expression; or perhaps you are one of those people who, in arguing a case, defer to the authority of others instead of following their own judgement!
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MARCUS:
Not invariably, Titus. But you see the direction which this discussion is taking. My whole thesis aims to bring stability to states, steadiness to cities, and well-being to communities. So I am anxious not to make a mistake by laying down first principles which have not been well considered and carefully examined. Mind you, I do not mean that they should be proved to everyone’s satisfaction (that can’t be done), but to the satisfaction of those who believe that everything right and honourable should be desired for its own sake,
*
and that things which are not praiseworthy in their own right should not be counted among good things at all, or at least that nothing should be regarded as a great good if it cannot truly be praised for its own sake. To all these thinkers—whether they have remained in the Old Academy
*
like Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo, or whether they have followed Aristotle
*
and Theophrastus (who agree with the former group in fact though differing slightly in their style of presentation), or whether, as Zeno used to do, they have changed their terms without changing the substance of their beliefs, or whether they have even followed the austere and difficult school of Aristo, now refuted and discredited, in considering all else as wholly indifferent except for virtues and vices—to all these thinkers what
I
have said should be acceptable.
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As for those who go in for self-indulgence and are slaves of their own bodies—people who measure everything that they should seek and avoid in life by the yardstick of pleasure and pain—even if they are right (and there is no need to take issue with them here) let us tell them to preach in their own little gardens,
*
and let us ask them to keep away for a little while from any participation in public life, an area of which they know nothing and have never wished to know anything. Then there is the Academy, which has spread confusion in all these issues (
I
mean the recent Academy dating from Arcesilaus and Carneades). Let us ask it to keep quiet;
*
for if it intervenes in these questions, which seem to us to have been quite neatly presented and settled, it will cause too much destruction. At the same time
I
would like to pacify that school, and
I
wouldn’t dare to push it away . . .
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[There is a gap here in the manuscript—a gap in which Cicero seems to have spoken of venial sins. They can be expiated.]
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...But when it comes to acts of wickedness against men, and sacrilege against the gods, no expiation is possible. So the offenders pay the penalty, not necessarily imposed by the courts (which once did not exist anywhere, still do not exist in many places, and where they do exist are often unsound), but they are chased and hounded by the Furies, not with burning firebrands as in the plays,
*
but with the torment of their conscience and the agony of their guilt. If on the other hand men ought to be kept from wrongdoing by punishment rather than by nature, why on earth should the wicked have anything to worry about if the danger of punishment were removed? Yet no villain has ever been so brazen as not to deny that he has perpetrated a crime, or else fabricate a reason to justify his anger, or seek a defence for his crime in some provision of natural justice. If the wicked dare to invoke such principles, just think how resolutely they will be observed by the good! If, however, it is punishment or the fear of retribution, and not wickedness itself, that deters people from a life of crime and villainy, then no one is unjust; instead, the worthless should be called careless. By the same token, those of us who are persuaded to be 41 good not by probity itself but by some advantage or benefit,
*
are not good but crafty. How will a man behave in the dark if his only fear is a witness and a judge? What if he comes across someone in a deserted place—someone alone and helpless who can be robbed of a lot of money? Our naturally good and just man will talk to him, help him, and put him on the right road. But the fellow who does nothing for anyone else, and measures everything by his own advantage—you see, I fancy, what
he
will do! Even if he denies that he will murder the man and abscond with his money, he will not deny it because he regards the act as intrinsically evil but because he is afraid it may leak out, that is, that he may suffer as a result. What an attitude! It’s enough to make not just a philosopher but even a peasant blush.
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Most foolish of all is the belief that everything decreed by the institutions or laws of a particular country is just. What if the laws are the laws of tyrants? If the notorious Thirty
*
had wished to impose their laws on Athens, even if the entire population of Athens welcomed the tyrants’ laws, should those laws on that account be considered just? No more, in my opinion, should that law be considered just which our interrex
*
passed, allowing the Dictator to execute with impunity any citizen he wished, even without trial. There is one, single, justice. It binds together human society and has been established by one, single, law. That law is right reason in commanding and forbidding. A man who does not acknowledge this law is unjust, whether it has been written down anywhere or not. If justice is a matter of obeying the written laws and customs of particular communities, and if, as our opponents
*
allege, everything is to be measured by self-interest, then a person will ignore and break the laws when he can, if he thinks it will be to his own advantage. That is why justice is completely nonexistent if it is not derived from nature, and if that kind of justice which is established to serve self-interest is wrecked by that same self-interest. And that is why every virtue is abolished if nature is not going to support justice.
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What room will there be for liberality, patriotism, and devotion; or for the wish to serve others or to show gratitude? These virtues are rooted in the fact that we are inclined by nature to have a regard for others; and that is the basis of justice. Moreover, not just our services to other men, but also ceremonies and rituals in honour of the gods will be abolished—practices which, in my view, should be retained, not out of fear, but in consequence of the association between man and God. If on the other hand laws were validated by the orders of peoples, the enactments of politicians, and the verdicts of judges, then it would be just to rob, just to commit adultery, just to introduce forged wills, provided those things were approved by the votes or decrees of the populace.
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If there is such power in the decisions and decrees of foolish people that they can overturn the nature of things by their votes, why do they not enact that things wicked and destructive should be deemed good and wholesome? And why is it that, if a law can make what is unjust just, it cannot turn evil into good? But in fact we can distinguish a good law from a bad one solely by the criterion of nature. And not only justice and injustice are differentiated by nature,
*
but all things without exception that are honourable and dishonourable. For nature has created perceptions which we have in common, and has sketched them in our minds in such a way that we classify honourable things as virtues and dishonourable things as vices.
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It is insane to suppose that these things are matters of opinion and not grounded in nature. The so-called ‘virtue’
*
of a tree or a horse
*
(which is actually a misuse of the word) does not depend on opinion but on nature. If that is so, then honourable and dishonourable things too must be distinguished by nature. If moral excellence as a whole were certified by opinion, the same would apply to its parts. In that case who would judge a wise and, shall we say, shrewd man, not on the basis of his natural character but of some external factor? No, moral excellence is reason fully developed, and that is certainly grounded in nature; the same goes for everything that is honourable. Just as true and false, logical and illogical, are judged in their own terms and not by some external criterion, so a consistent mode of life (which is right) and likewise inconsistency (which is wrong) will be tested by their own nature. Or shall we judge the quality of a tree or a horse by nature and not likewise the qualities of young men?
*
Or should character be judged by nature, and yet the virtues and vices which come from character be judged in some other way? If they are judged in the
same
way, will it not be necessary to judge what is honourable
*
and what is dishonourable by nature too? Every praiseworthy good must have within itself something to be praised. Goodness itself is good not because of people’s opinions but because of nature. If that were not the case, happy people would be happy too because of opinion; and what could be sillier than that? Since, then, good and bad are judged to be so on the basis of nature, and they are fundamental principles of nature, surely things which are honourable and dishonourable must also be judged by the same method and assessed by the standard of nature.
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Yet we are confused by the variety and incompatibility of men’s opinions;
*
and because the same disagreement does not occur in regard to the senses, we think the senses are reliable by nature whereas we brand as illusory those ideas that vary from one person to another and do not always remain consistent within the same person. This distinction is far from the truth. In the case of our senses no parent or nurse or teacher or poet or stage-show distorts them, nor does popular opinion lead them astray. For our minds, however, all kinds of traps are laid, either by the people just mentioned, who on receiving young untrained minds stain them and twist them as they please, or else by that power which lurks within, entwined with every one of our senses, namely pleasure, which masquerades as goodness but is in fact the mother of all ills. Seduced by her charms, our minds fail to see clearly enough the things that are naturally good, because those things lack the sweetness and the exciting itch of pleasure.
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To bring this whole discourse of mine to an end—the conclusion is obvious from what has been said, namely that one should strive after justice and every moral virtue for their own sake. All good men love what is fair in itself and what is right in itself. It is not in character for a good man to make the mistake of loving what is not intrinsically lovable; therefore what is right should be sought and cultivated for itself. If this applies to what is right, it also applies to justice; and if it applies to justice, then the other virtues, too, should be cultivated for themselves. What about generosity? Is it free or for profit? When a person is open-handed without reward, it’s free; when he’s looking for a profit, it’s an investment. There is no doubt that a person who is called generous and open-handed has duty
*
in mind, not gain. So likewise justice looks for no prize and no price; it is sought for itself, and is at once the cause and meaning of all the virtues.
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Furthermore, if goodness is sought for its advantages, not for itself,
*
then there will be one virtue only; and that will most properly be called selfishness. For where each person measures his actions totally by his own advantage, to that extent he totally falls short of being a good man. Hence to those who estimate goodness by its rewards selfishness is the only admirable quality. Where is a generous person to be found if no one acts kindly for the sake of another? What becomes of gratitude if people are not seen to be grateful
*
to the person to whom they owe thanks? Where is that holy thing, friendship,
*
if no one loves a friend wholeheartedly, as they say, for his own sake? Why, a friend must be cast off and abandoned if he offers no hope of profit and reward; and what can be more barbaric than that? If friendship is to be cherished for its own sake, then human fellowship and fairness and justice are also to be sought for their own sake. If that is not so, there is no such thing as justice at all. For the worst kind of injustice is to look for profit from justice.
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What are we to say of restraint, temperance, and self-control? What of modesty, decency, and chastity? Do people avoid vice for fear of disgrace or of laws and lawcourts? Are they innocent and decent in order to be well spoken of? Do they blush in order to win a good reputation? I am ashamed to talk about the sense of shame, ashamed to speak of those philosophers who think it is honourable
*
to aim at avoiding condemnation without avoiding the vice itself. Well then, can we call those people pure who are deterred from lechery by the fear of disgrace, when that very disgrace reflects the vileness of the thing itself? What can be properly praised or blamed if you ignore the essential nature of what you think should be praised or blamed? Are physical defects, if they are very noticeable, to cause some degree of aversion, while the deformities of the soul are not? A soul’s ugliness can easily be inferred from its vices. What can be called more revolting than greed, more bestial than lust, more despicable than cowardice, more abject than dullness and stupidity? What then? Take those people who are conspicuous for one (or more than one) vice. Do we call them wretched because of the losses or damages or pain they suffer, or because of the power and ugliness of their vices? Conversely, the same point can be made positively in the case of goodness.
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