The Sword And The Olive (17 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Thus, even though the Arabs countries outnumbered the
Yishuv
by better than forty-to-one,
4
in terms of military manpower available for combat in Palestine the two sides were fairly evenly matched. As time went on and both sides sent in reinforcements the balance changed in the Jews’ favor; by October 1948 they had almost 90,000 men and women under arms, the Arabs only 68,000.
5
Not so, however, in terms of equipment. According to Ben Gurion’s strategic adviser, Yisrael Beer, the Egyptian army entered the conflict with 48 guns, 25-30 armored cars, 10-20 tanks, and 21-25 combat aircraft (another source puts the total number of Egyptian aircraft at 177, but many of them were not serviceable). The Iraqis had 48 guns, 25-30 armored cars, and 20 aircraft; Syria, 24 guns, 36 armored cars, 10-20 tanks, and 14 aircraft; Jordan, 24 guns and 45 armored cars; and Lebanon, 8 guns and 9 armored cars.
6
The somewhat schematic nature of these figures makes one suspect that they were calculated from tables of organization rather than counted in the field—the more so because the Arab forces, like their Jewish opponents, rarely operated in forces larger than a brigade. Accordingly it is hard to say whether they corresponded to reality, particularly when readiness is taken into account.
Yishuv
by better than forty-to-one,
4
in terms of military manpower available for combat in Palestine the two sides were fairly evenly matched. As time went on and both sides sent in reinforcements the balance changed in the Jews’ favor; by October 1948 they had almost 90,000 men and women under arms, the Arabs only 68,000.
5
Not so, however, in terms of equipment. According to Ben Gurion’s strategic adviser, Yisrael Beer, the Egyptian army entered the conflict with 48 guns, 25-30 armored cars, 10-20 tanks, and 21-25 combat aircraft (another source puts the total number of Egyptian aircraft at 177, but many of them were not serviceable). The Iraqis had 48 guns, 25-30 armored cars, and 20 aircraft; Syria, 24 guns, 36 armored cars, 10-20 tanks, and 14 aircraft; Jordan, 24 guns and 45 armored cars; and Lebanon, 8 guns and 9 armored cars.
6
The somewhat schematic nature of these figures makes one suspect that they were calculated from tables of organization rather than counted in the field—the more so because the Arab forces, like their Jewish opponents, rarely operated in forces larger than a brigade. Accordingly it is hard to say whether they corresponded to reality, particularly when readiness is taken into account.
Against these forces Hagana, thanks to the British blockade, initially possessed nothing heavier than home-built armored cars (in reality, trucks with two steel plates with a layer of concrete between), 2- and 3-inch mortars, and PIATs (light antitank weapons). Some progress, however, had been made during the last months of the mandate; retreating armies have a habit of leaving equipment behind. Some arms were diverted from bases as they were being evacuated; others were purchased from corrupt British personnel, enabling Hagana to acquire a few light aircraft as well as a couple of tanks. Additional arms had been ordered abroad, and their escorts, Hagana’s representatives abroad, were waiting for the opportunity to ship them to Haifa. The United States having placed the Middle East under an arms embargo that was efficiently enforced, the principal sources were Italy and Yugoslavia, both of which showed some sympathy for the
Yishuv
. Even more important was Czechoslovakia, which had just fallen into Stalin’s clutches. Soon it began selling comparatively large amounts of weapons and equipment; priced at $12 million (U.S.), this brought in one-quarter of Czechoslovakia’s entire foreign currency income for the year.
7
Yishuv
. Even more important was Czechoslovakia, which had just fallen into Stalin’s clutches. Soon it began selling comparatively large amounts of weapons and equipment; priced at $12 million (U.S.), this brought in one-quarter of Czechoslovakia’s entire foreign currency income for the year.
7
Arriving before May 15 or shortly thereafter, the Czech arms included 25 fighters (Messerschmidt ME-109s), 200 heavy machine guns, 5,021 light machine guns, 24,500 rifles, and no fewer than 52,540,000 rounds of ammunition
8
—with the result that by June there were enough small arms to equip all units. Heavy arms, however, were still desperately short. Military vehicles such as jeeps, command cars, and half-tracks arrived in dribs and drabs. The same applied to artillery, tanks, and aircraft—the latter including a handful of former American B-17 bombers as well as some Dakota transports. Much of the materiel that did arrive had been sold as scrap and was antiquated, such as pre-World War I 65mm French mountain guns, which were promptly nicknamed “Napoleonchiks.” Inexperienced Hagana personnel did not always know how to maintain and operate the many different types of new arms. By the time the war ended, the heavy-weapon gap between the two sides was decreasing, but it had not yet been closed.
9
8
—with the result that by June there were enough small arms to equip all units. Heavy arms, however, were still desperately short. Military vehicles such as jeeps, command cars, and half-tracks arrived in dribs and drabs. The same applied to artillery, tanks, and aircraft—the latter including a handful of former American B-17 bombers as well as some Dakota transports. Much of the materiel that did arrive had been sold as scrap and was antiquated, such as pre-World War I 65mm French mountain guns, which were promptly nicknamed “Napoleonchiks.” Inexperienced Hagana personnel did not always know how to maintain and operate the many different types of new arms. By the time the war ended, the heavy-weapon gap between the two sides was decreasing, but it had not yet been closed.
9
MAP 6.1 THE ARAB INVASIONS, 1948
The departure of the British also allowed for accelerated construction of a regular army. During the last years of the mandate Hagana had operated a few light aircraft under the guise of an aero-sports club.
10
Emerging from the underground, the Sherut Aviri (PALMACH’s underground air arm) had 37 pilots including, besides the self-trained PALMACHniks, a few former Royal Air Force personnel (the most prominent of whom was Ezer Weizman)
11
and a few Jewish and gentile volunteers from various countries. The main base was at Sdeh Dov, north of Tel Aviv. However, as hostilities expanded, several other bases were improvised around the country; these were the days when fighters, if not bombers, could still operate from dirt airstrips. During the first two weeks after the establishment of the Jewish state the Egyptian air force sent out its Dakota transports to bomb Sdeh Dov and Tel Aviv proper. The Israeli pilots for their part took to the air and flew reconnaissance, liaison, strafing, and bombing sorties countrywide, even though some “bombs” were no more than pieces of pipe filled with explosives and dropped by hand. On June 3 they scored their first kills on two Egyptian planes that attacked Tel Aviv, thereby bringing the enemy “strategic bombing” campaign to an end.
10
Emerging from the underground, the Sherut Aviri (PALMACH’s underground air arm) had 37 pilots including, besides the self-trained PALMACHniks, a few former Royal Air Force personnel (the most prominent of whom was Ezer Weizman)
11
and a few Jewish and gentile volunteers from various countries. The main base was at Sdeh Dov, north of Tel Aviv. However, as hostilities expanded, several other bases were improvised around the country; these were the days when fighters, if not bombers, could still operate from dirt airstrips. During the first two weeks after the establishment of the Jewish state the Egyptian air force sent out its Dakota transports to bomb Sdeh Dov and Tel Aviv proper. The Israeli pilots for their part took to the air and flew reconnaissance, liaison, strafing, and bombing sorties countrywide, even though some “bombs” were no more than pieces of pipe filled with explosives and dropped by hand. On June 3 they scored their first kills on two Egyptian planes that attacked Tel Aviv, thereby bringing the enemy “strategic bombing” campaign to an end.
What was true of the air force also applied to the navy, which comprised an incredible gathering of antiquated hulks. Most of them were former immigrant-carrying vessels that had been seized by the British, taken to the port of Haifa, and abandoned; one had started life as an icebreaker in the U.S. Coast Guard and was sold to Hagana for the princely price of $10. At first none were armed, though two were later provided with 65mm and 75mm field guns. Officers and men were inexperienced. The former were mostly PALYAM personnel who had previously been in charge of immigrant ships (although they did not themselves sail, a task left to hired crews); the latter were a miscellaneous lot of landlubbers who might have sailed a boat at some point in their lives.
12
In spite of its obvious shortcomings, this improvised force as early as June 4 fought a naval engagement off the coast of Tel Aviv. Supported by a few aircraft from Sdeh Dov, the two available Israeli ships—one of which was armed with wooden guns—took on an Egyptian force of one destroyer and three landing craft. The enemy was forced to turn tail and desist any offensive operations he may have been planning.
12
In spite of its obvious shortcomings, this improvised force as early as June 4 fought a naval engagement off the coast of Tel Aviv. Supported by a few aircraft from Sdeh Dov, the two available Israeli ships—one of which was armed with wooden guns—took on an Egyptian force of one destroyer and three landing craft. The enemy was forced to turn tail and desist any offensive operations he may have been planning.
Finally, the weeks immediately following independence were used to disband the various existing military and paramilitary organizations and place them under a single, unified command. TSAHAL (that is, the IDF) was officially brought into being on May 28 by means of a decree signed by the provisional government; from then on it was to be the sole regular force in charge of fighting Israel’s external enemies. For Hagana personnel, commanders, and staffs this involved a mere change in nomenclature. The situation was different in regard to ETSEL and LECHI, which had heretofore been beyond the pale but had to be brought under central government control. Although, as the future was to show, LECHI had one last spectacular terrorist act up its sleeve, the integration of its personnel proceeded smoothly. Not so ETSEL, which proved a much tougher nut to crack.
On June 2, five days after the IDF had been formally established, ETSEL concluded an agreement with the provisional government. Begin agreed to dissolve his organization, hand over its arms, and send its members to join the IDF.
13
What followed next is subject to an intense and politically heated dispute. ETSEL’s 5,000 men joined the IDF not as individuals but in seven battalions of troops who were concentrated in Jerusalem and who operated under their own command. Meanwhile an ETSEL ship carrying nine hundred volunteers and a relatively large quantity of arms was on its way from Port de Bouc near Marseilles.
14
Apparently Ben Gurion and Begin could not agree how to distribute the arms among their men. The former insisted that all be handed over to the IDF; the latter wanted to retain 20 percent for the ETSEL battalions, which was roughly their proportion in the army. Fearing, or pretending to fear, that ETSEL was engineering a coup, Ben Gurion ordered Hagana to shell the ship as it was anchored opposite Tel Aviv on Monday, June 21.
Altalena
caught fire and went to the bottom with the loss of sixteen lives as well as all the arms onboard. The intensity of the feelings raised by this episode may be gauged from the fact that, then and later, Ben Gurion used the epithet “sacred” when referring to the gun that had done the shooting.
13
What followed next is subject to an intense and politically heated dispute. ETSEL’s 5,000 men joined the IDF not as individuals but in seven battalions of troops who were concentrated in Jerusalem and who operated under their own command. Meanwhile an ETSEL ship carrying nine hundred volunteers and a relatively large quantity of arms was on its way from Port de Bouc near Marseilles.
14
Apparently Ben Gurion and Begin could not agree how to distribute the arms among their men. The former insisted that all be handed over to the IDF; the latter wanted to retain 20 percent for the ETSEL battalions, which was roughly their proportion in the army. Fearing, or pretending to fear, that ETSEL was engineering a coup, Ben Gurion ordered Hagana to shell the ship as it was anchored opposite Tel Aviv on Monday, June 21.
Altalena
caught fire and went to the bottom with the loss of sixteen lives as well as all the arms onboard. The intensity of the feelings raised by this episode may be gauged from the fact that, then and later, Ben Gurion used the epithet “sacred” when referring to the gun that had done the shooting.
While the provisional government was using these somewhat brutal methods to put its house in order, the war had been under way for more than a month. Although the various Arab invasions took place almost simultaneously, their coordination was more apparent than real. Probably the one thing on which the Arabs could agree was the need to aid the Palestinians. This in turn may have reflected their fear of the extremely dynamic Jewish community and Israel’s capacity for future expansion—a subject that had come up at the Cairo meeting of Arab prime ministers in December 1947.
15
That apart, the invaders were often at cross-purposes. Proceeding clockwise on the map, the Lebanese were simply aping the Syrians. The Syrians may have dreamed about reestablishing Greater Syria (i.e., the pre-1914 situation in which both Palestine and Transjordan were ruled from Damascus), yet if such was their goal the steps they took toward its realization were totally inadequate. The Iraqi motive in sending an expeditionary force to Palestine—a country with which they had no common border—was probably to frustrate the Syrians. The same was true of King Abdullah, who as we have seen had his own designs on at least part of Palestine and may even have dreamed of offering his “protection” to the Jews and annexing it in its entirety.
16
15
That apart, the invaders were often at cross-purposes. Proceeding clockwise on the map, the Lebanese were simply aping the Syrians. The Syrians may have dreamed about reestablishing Greater Syria (i.e., the pre-1914 situation in which both Palestine and Transjordan were ruled from Damascus), yet if such was their goal the steps they took toward its realization were totally inadequate. The Iraqi motive in sending an expeditionary force to Palestine—a country with which they had no common border—was probably to frustrate the Syrians. The same was true of King Abdullah, who as we have seen had his own designs on at least part of Palestine and may even have dreamed of offering his “protection” to the Jews and annexing it in its entirety.
16
Finally, the Egyptians probably wanted to prevent a situation whereby a stretch of Israeli-owned land, the Negev Desert, would cut them off from the rest of the Arab world. Nor could they afford to see parts of Palestine occupied by other Arab states without seeking compensation for themselves (and, of course, vice versa). Thus, reflecting these divergent objectives, there was no common military headquarters, no attempt at coordinating the offensives of the Arab armies, and, apart from embassies maintained in the others’ capitals, not even a regular liaison service for sharing enemy intelligence.
17
Accordingly, once the road network inside Palestine had been more or less secured and the Israeli command-and-control problems solved, the IDF was able to operate on internal lines and beat the Arabs in detail.
17
Accordingly, once the road network inside Palestine had been more or less secured and the Israeli command-and-control problems solved, the IDF was able to operate on internal lines and beat the Arabs in detail.
Preliminary skirmishes with the Syrians had taken place since the previous November; on May 18, 1948, after two days of shelling, a brigade-sized force came down the Golan Heights and occupied Tsemach on the southern shores of Lake Galilee. The Hagana commander in charge happened to be Moshe Dayan, then thirty-three years old and native to the area. The local
kibbutsim
, Degania A and Degania B, had been fortified for defense and reinforced by a PALMACH battalion. On May 19 Syrian forces crossed the Jordan and gingerly moved west. Supported by artillery and a few tanks, they tried to overrun the settlements, which fought back with PIATs and Molotov cocktails. The battle climaxed during the afternoon of May 20, when the Jews positioned four Napoleonchiks on the overlooking hills to the west and opened fire. As Dayan later wrote, no sooner did the Syrian troops hear the shells whistling overhead than they fled, leaving Tsemach strewn with bodies, weapons, and vehicles.
18
Only once more did the Syrian army try to invade Palestine proper, when in the first week of June a brigade-sized force struck north of Lake Chule and occupied Mishmar Ha-yarden—a purely local operation that led nowhere (see Map 6.1).
kibbutsim
, Degania A and Degania B, had been fortified for defense and reinforced by a PALMACH battalion. On May 19 Syrian forces crossed the Jordan and gingerly moved west. Supported by artillery and a few tanks, they tried to overrun the settlements, which fought back with PIATs and Molotov cocktails. The battle climaxed during the afternoon of May 20, when the Jews positioned four Napoleonchiks on the overlooking hills to the west and opened fire. As Dayan later wrote, no sooner did the Syrian troops hear the shells whistling overhead than they fled, leaving Tsemach strewn with bodies, weapons, and vehicles.
18
Only once more did the Syrian army try to invade Palestine proper, when in the first week of June a brigade-sized force struck north of Lake Chule and occupied Mishmar Ha-yarden—a purely local operation that led nowhere (see Map 6.1).
Farther south, the vanguard of the Iraqi expeditionary force had arrived in the Jordan Valley after marching almost a thousand miles from Baghdad. On May 14 it occupied the electricity works at Naharayim; what equipment could be moved was stolen, the rest was demolished, and it has remained in ruins. Finding the bridges across the river likewise demolished, they established a pontoon bridge and crossed toward
kibbuts
Gesher, the neighboring police fort, and the overlooking Crusader fortress of Belvoir blocking the road to the interior. If Ben Gurion’s diary can be believed, the defenders had, apart from rifles and Stens (British light submachine guns), only one PIAT and two mortars.
19
Nevertheless the Iraqis, repulsed in turn at each main point of attack, decided to withdraw after a week’s fighting.
kibbuts
Gesher, the neighboring police fort, and the overlooking Crusader fortress of Belvoir blocking the road to the interior. If Ben Gurion’s diary can be believed, the defenders had, apart from rifles and Stens (British light submachine guns), only one PIAT and two mortars.
19
Nevertheless the Iraqis, repulsed in turn at each main point of attack, decided to withdraw after a week’s fighting.
Meanwhile other Iraqi forces had entered Palestine farther south. Concentrating in the Nablus area, they collected any of Kauji’s warriors that were still around and attempted attacks to the west and south. During the end of May and beginning of June there was heavy fighting on both sides of the Iraqi enclave as IDF units, basing themselves at the local settlements, contained the breakout attempts and even mounted an offensive toward Jenin. Wadi Ara, the most important corridor connecting the Plain of Sharon to the Valley of Esdraelon, was captured by the Golani infantry brigade, and inhabitants abandoned most of the Arab villages on either side. However, the Iraqi forces in the area remained undefeated and were to make their presence felt during the summer months, when they succeeded in breaking the Israeli hold on the hills around Jenin.
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