The Sword And The Olive (29 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The defenders of Abu Ageila and Umm Katef fought well enough, repulsing one assault after another. Even after 37th Armored Brigade had been brought up and joined the attack on October 31, they continued to resist, causing Dayan, who was thoroughly dissatisfied with the performance of his forces, to replace the commander of 10th Brigade midbattle. However, the fall of Kusseima changed the situation. Though 4th Brigade rested on its laurels, 7th Armored did not. Having successfully made their way through some difficult defiles, its tanks soon began to outflank the Egyptians from the south and threaten them from the rear. By the evening of October 31 the situation of the defenders was becoming quite difficult, but they still held out.
That morning the Egyptian reserve brigade, stationed at Al Arish, made an attempt to come to their aid; however, its leading battalion was attacked by Israeli fighter-bombers and was halted before it could get within effective range. That very evening the Egyptian high command—engaged in hostilities with the Anglo-French forces and fearful that its forces in the Sinai would become “isolated”—decided to withdraw to the canal.
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As the last potential reinforcements disappeared the garrison at Abu Ageila too had no choice but to evacuate, which it did most successfully during the night of November 1-2. Not noticing, the Israelis renewed the attack the next day and found the position empty.
69
As the last potential reinforcements disappeared the garrison at Abu Ageila too had no choice but to evacuate, which it did most successfully during the night of November 1-2. Not noticing, the Israelis renewed the attack the next day and found the position empty.
The fall of Abu Ageila meant that the principal road leading west into the central Sinai was wide open to the Israelis. With 7th Armored and its energetic commander, Col. Uri Ben Ari, firmly in the lead the latter drove on to Bir Gafgafa. There, Ben Ari had been informed by the IAF to expect to meet 1st Egyptian Armored Brigade, which was coming up from Fayid; however, by the time the encounter took place on the afternoon of November 2 the Egyptians had followed their orders and were already falling back on the canal. Only two companies, one consisting of T-34 tanks and the other of Su-100 tank destroyers, were caught and destroyed by the Israeli Shermans in the largest single armored battle of the war. Their defeat opened the road farther west, and by evening Ben Ari had reached his intended objective ten miles east of the canal.
The Israeli offensive proceeded from south to north—first the paratroopers, then Abu Ageila, then finally Rafah, which Dayan considered the most difficult objective as well as the decisive one.
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Against the Egyptian brigade at Rafah he had concentrated the IDF’s 77th
Ugda
, consisting of 1st Infantry Brigade and 27th Armored Brigade (the latter deploying only about half its tanks). The offensive started on the night of October 31-November 1 and at first made little progress since the air force and navy (the latter reinforced by a French six-inch gun cruiser
71
) were unable to pinpoint their targets in the dark; instead of hitting the Egyptian positions, they almost killed the
ugda
commander.
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After this fiasco—“a giant sprat,” to quote Dayan (who had attached himself to 27th Brigade)—heavy ground fighting started at 0300 hours. It proceeded hour after hour as Egyptians, well protected by mines and barbed wire, clung to their positions. Nevertheless by 0900 the town of Rafah, including the vital crossroads at which the road coming from Nitsana branched out to the right and left toward the towns of Gaza and Al Arish respectively, had fallen.
70
Against the Egyptian brigade at Rafah he had concentrated the IDF’s 77th
Ugda
, consisting of 1st Infantry Brigade and 27th Armored Brigade (the latter deploying only about half its tanks). The offensive started on the night of October 31-November 1 and at first made little progress since the air force and navy (the latter reinforced by a French six-inch gun cruiser
71
) were unable to pinpoint their targets in the dark; instead of hitting the Egyptian positions, they almost killed the
ugda
commander.
72
After this fiasco—“a giant sprat,” to quote Dayan (who had attached himself to 27th Brigade)—heavy ground fighting started at 0300 hours. It proceeded hour after hour as Egyptians, well protected by mines and barbed wire, clung to their positions. Nevertheless by 0900 the town of Rafah, including the vital crossroads at which the road coming from Nitsana branched out to the right and left toward the towns of Gaza and Al Arish respectively, had fallen.
The Gaza Strip thus having been cut off from the Sinai, the Israeli forces split. With Dayan still following in its wake, 27th Brigade, having rested a few hours, turned southwest along the coastal road. Meeting no more than halfhearted opposition, they passed through the Jirardi Defile and reached Al Arish by evening; by the time they were ready to renew the assault next morning (November 2), however, the Egyptian brigade had obeyed its orders and evacuated the town. Meanwhile 1st Infantry Brigade had turned in the opposite direction, working northeast toward the town of Gaza. There they linked up with the 11th Infantry Brigade coming up from Israel proper, that is, from the west. Together the two brigades had little difficulty in overcoming the Egyptian (in fact, Palestinian) forces in the area—made up of units that, as Dayan noted, had not been issued with heavy weapons by their Egyptian masters and had never been intended for anything more than purely holding operations.
Having echeloned their offensive in three successive stages, by the end of the fourth day (counting from October 29) the Israelis had effectively broken the Egyptian army in the Sinai. What remained were three sideshows, two of which took place during the critical days (October 30-November 2) and one after everything else was over. On October 31 Sharon, claiming the need to improve his positions against the anticipated counterattack from the north
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but defying Dayan’s orders, sent his men into Mitla Pass. Three companies under Lt. Col. Mordechai Gur mounted their half-tracks and drove forward without attempting reconnaissance or securing the hills on both sides. Contrary to expectations they found the latter occupied by units belonging to Egyptian 2nd Brigade, which had not retreated the previous day. They came under heavy fire from invisible caves and had to be extricated, leading to a murderous battle in which the brigade’s remaining forces outflanked the Egyptians by climbing the hills and then, descending the slopes into the pass itself, flushed them out from their positions among the rocks. This action cost the Israelis thirty-eight dead, almost a quarter of the number killed in the entire campaign. Furthermore, no sooner had the paratroopers cleared the pass than Sharon ordered them to evacuate.
73
but defying Dayan’s orders, sent his men into Mitla Pass. Three companies under Lt. Col. Mordechai Gur mounted their half-tracks and drove forward without attempting reconnaissance or securing the hills on both sides. Contrary to expectations they found the latter occupied by units belonging to Egyptian 2nd Brigade, which had not retreated the previous day. They came under heavy fire from invisible caves and had to be extricated, leading to a murderous battle in which the brigade’s remaining forces outflanked the Egyptians by climbing the hills and then, descending the slopes into the pass itself, flushed them out from their positions among the rocks. This action cost the Israelis thirty-eight dead, almost a quarter of the number killed in the entire campaign. Furthermore, no sooner had the paratroopers cleared the pass than Sharon ordered them to evacuate.
The second sideshow also occurred on October 31 and took place at sea. At 0330 hours an Egyptian destroyer,
Ibrahim al Awwal
, appeared opposite the coast of Haifa and opened fire; though it fired 200 four-inch rounds, damage was slight. Initially the Egyptian vessel came under fire from a French ship, the destroyer
Kersaint
.
74
Then, retreating (as it was running out of ammunition and considered its mission accomplished), it was engaged by two Israeli destroyers, which positioned themselves between it and its base. Soon the Israeli vessels were joined by a couple of IAF Ouragans. Whether it was the destroyers that hit the Egyptian ship or rockets fired from the aircraft is immaterial. At any rate the steering gear was put out of action and
Ibrahim al Awwal
hoisted a white flag after its crew tried unsuccessfully to sink it by opening the valves. Strategically this action was entirely without significance. It did, however, serve to raise Israeli morale to new heights—after all it is not every day that an enemy warship surrenders, captain and all.
Ibrahim al Awwal
, appeared opposite the coast of Haifa and opened fire; though it fired 200 four-inch rounds, damage was slight. Initially the Egyptian vessel came under fire from a French ship, the destroyer
Kersaint
.
74
Then, retreating (as it was running out of ammunition and considered its mission accomplished), it was engaged by two Israeli destroyers, which positioned themselves between it and its base. Soon the Israeli vessels were joined by a couple of IAF Ouragans. Whether it was the destroyers that hit the Egyptian ship or rockets fired from the aircraft is immaterial. At any rate the steering gear was put out of action and
Ibrahim al Awwal
hoisted a white flag after its crew tried unsuccessfully to sink it by opening the valves. Strategically this action was entirely without significance. It did, however, serve to raise Israeli morale to new heights—after all it is not every day that an enemy warship surrenders, captain and all.
Finally, it remained to accomplish Israel’s one real strategic objective for the entire campaign, that is, to seize Sharm al-Sheikh so as to break the Egyptian blockade and open the straits to shipping and overflight. Citing a shortage of transport, the local Egyptian commander had persuaded his superiors that evacuation was not practicable; with his naval support also gone (one Egyptian frigate was sunk by the British and another took refuge in a Saudi Port)
75
he and his two battalions were left entirely to their own devices. On the Israeli side a motorized brigade, the 9th, had been earmarked for the task and was concentrated at Ras en Nakb just south of Elat. On the morning of November 2 it received orders to proceed down the coast. There was, however, no metalled road, and driving through the sands that covered part of the track proved to be grueling. Meanwhile two companies of paratroopers had been dropped at A-Tur on the southwestern coast of the Sinai. Having secured the airport, they were joined by an airborne infantry battalion and a battalion of comrades who made their way by land; commanded by Eytan, the combined force drove south.
75
he and his two battalions were left entirely to their own devices. On the Israeli side a motorized brigade, the 9th, had been earmarked for the task and was concentrated at Ras en Nakb just south of Elat. On the morning of November 2 it received orders to proceed down the coast. There was, however, no metalled road, and driving through the sands that covered part of the track proved to be grueling. Meanwhile two companies of paratroopers had been dropped at A-Tur on the southwestern coast of the Sinai. Having secured the airport, they were joined by an airborne infantry battalion and a battalion of comrades who made their way by land; commanded by Eytan, the combined force drove south.
Coming from two directions at once, the offensive against Sharm al-Sheikh now developed into a race between 9th Brigade and Eytan’s men. In the event 9th Brigade arrived first. Supported by the IAF’s fighter-bombers, which strafed and rocketed, it opened the attack during the night of November 4-5. As usual when fighting from prepared positions, the Egyptian troops put on a fierce resistance even when the situation was hopeless; the Israelis made slow progress. In the end it took almost twelve hours’ fighting to break the outnumbered, outgunned, and isolated Egyptian battalions, and then it was Eytan’s force, coming from the other side, that brought about the decision. Being told by Dayan that the campaign was over, Ben Gurion retorted: “And I suppose you can’t bear that, can you?”
76
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At the time the Israelis went to war, about half of the Egyptian garrison normally stationed in the Sinai had already been withdrawn, giving the IDF considerable superiority in numbers of men and, even more so, armor. It is true that, having issued their ultimatum, the French and the British delayed the beginning of “Operation Musketeer”; yet only for the first forty-eight hours—until 1900 hours on October 31, to be precise—was the IDF on its own. At that time, out of the three main Israeli attacks, only the southernmost was a complete success. And that one was little more than a feint, mounted against an undefended sector with the aid of a single brigade that could be withdrawn if necessary. By contrast, the central Israeli advance, though it had already captured Kusseima and was threatening to take the main Egyptian positions in the flank and rear, had as yet made no impression on those positions. At that time the “critical” offensive (Dayan’s term) against the Rafah junction had not even begun.
Even disregarding the difficulties experienced on the central axis, whether the IDF would have done as well had the British and the French not launched “Operation Musketeer” is open to some doubt. Much would have depended on the IAF’s ability to identify and forestall Egyptian counterattacks; to judge from the episodes that did take place, like the successful interdiction of the Egyptian 2nd Brigade on October 30 and of the 4th on the next day, it was equal to the task. They were assisted by the three squadrons of French fighters that were stationed in Israel, strafed, dropped supplies, and even reached out as far as Luxor to bomb the Egyptian airfield there.
77
Still, and in large part owing to the entire way in which the campaign had been planned, the Egyptian air force was never defeated. After a somewhat slow start it fought back bravely enough, engaging in dogfights and launching several painful strafing attacks on the Israeli columns. Ultimately more than half its aircraft were destroyed by the British and the French;
78
but for “Operation Musketeer,” a fight against the IAF alone might have been much more balanced.
77
Still, and in large part owing to the entire way in which the campaign had been planned, the Egyptian air force was never defeated. After a somewhat slow start it fought back bravely enough, engaging in dogfights and launching several painful strafing attacks on the Israeli columns. Ultimately more than half its aircraft were destroyed by the British and the French;
78
but for “Operation Musketeer,” a fight against the IAF alone might have been much more balanced.
However, the most remarkable aspect of the IDF’s conduct of the campaign was its system of command and control.
79
Highly intelligent, easily bored, and something of a lone wolf—he hated committee work—Dayan himself was anything but an administrator. Having given his final orders prior to the campaign he spent his time away from headquarters, overflying the desert in a light aircraft, driving across it in his command car, and occasionally taking time to dig up archaeological finds. Attaching himself here to one force, there to another, much of the time he was out of radio contact with the General Staff and unable to influence the shape of the campaign. None of this was a surprise; instead it had been
planned
that way. Besides two
Ugda
headquarters, as in 1947-1949 the largest organic unit remained the brigade. Each brigade operated almost independently, having been assigned its objective, provided with supplies sufficient for forty-eight hours, and told to advance and fight continuously without paying heed to whatever happened to its right, left, or rear.
80
As two military historians have written, the “system” might have been well adapted for seizing fleeting opportunities in armored operations conducted against a mobile opponent
81
—except that no such operations took place.
79
Highly intelligent, easily bored, and something of a lone wolf—he hated committee work—Dayan himself was anything but an administrator. Having given his final orders prior to the campaign he spent his time away from headquarters, overflying the desert in a light aircraft, driving across it in his command car, and occasionally taking time to dig up archaeological finds. Attaching himself here to one force, there to another, much of the time he was out of radio contact with the General Staff and unable to influence the shape of the campaign. None of this was a surprise; instead it had been
planned
that way. Besides two
Ugda
headquarters, as in 1947-1949 the largest organic unit remained the brigade. Each brigade operated almost independently, having been assigned its objective, provided with supplies sufficient for forty-eight hours, and told to advance and fight continuously without paying heed to whatever happened to its right, left, or rear.
80
As two military historians have written, the “system” might have been well adapted for seizing fleeting opportunities in armored operations conducted against a mobile opponent
81
—except that no such operations took place.
Substituting morale for proper organization, the system was responsible for any number of “misfortunes,” as Dayan euphemistically called them. The first took place even before the campaign started. Taking last-minute pictures of the designated landing zone of Eytan’s paratroopers, the IAF mistook an Egyptian road construction crew for troops; consequently, instead of being dropped west of Mitla Pass as originally planned, they were landed in a more difficult-to-defend plain to the east. Even so, the pilots missed their objective by several miles so that the paratroopers had to march for two hours in order to reach their intended positions. Next Israeli pilots, having been sent to disrupt Egyptian telephone lines, found the tailhooks on their modified Mustangs were not up to the job and were forced to use their propellers and wings instead. While there could be no doubt concerning their bravery, clearly preparations had not been thorough enough.
These were only the beginnings. Driving toward Mitla Pass, Sharon’s convoy lost numerous vehicles (as well as ten of thirteen tanks attached to it) and was almost brought to a halt because nobody thought to bring spanners that fit the nuts on the trucks’ wheels. Once he arrived he sent his men to enter the pass against orders and in the most incompetent way possible, thus bringing about a totally unnecessary battle that also proved to be the bloodiest of the entire war. Farther east the 38th
Ugda
, consisting partly of elderly reservists who had not been given sufficient time to prepare, attacked the Umm Katef-Abu Ageila area without displaying the proper offensive spirit to satisfy Dayan. Ultimately not one but two out of its four brigade commanders, plus the
ugda
commander himself, had to go (nine years later he reemerged, this time as a professor of military history at Tel Aviv University).
Ugda
, consisting partly of elderly reservists who had not been given sufficient time to prepare, attacked the Umm Katef-Abu Ageila area without displaying the proper offensive spirit to satisfy Dayan. Ultimately not one but two out of its four brigade commanders, plus the
ugda
commander himself, had to go (nine years later he reemerged, this time as a professor of military history at Tel Aviv University).
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